State and religion: the conflicts of ultra-orthodox jews in Israel. by Shapiro, Sidney
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STATE AND RELIGION: 
THE CONFLICTS OF ULTRA-ORTHODOX JEWS IN ISRAEL 
by 
Sidney Shapiro 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts (MA) in Sociology 
 
 
The School of Graduate Studies 
Laurentian University 
Sudbury, Ontario 
 
 
© SIDNEY SHAPIRO, 2013
ii 
THESIS DEFENCE COMMITTEE/COMITÉ DE SOUTENANCE DE THÈSE 
 
Laurentian Université/Université Laurentienne 
School of Graduate Studies/École des études supérieures 
 
Title of Thesis     
Titre de la thèse   STATE AND RELIGION: THE CONFLICTS OF ULTRA-ORTHODOX  
    JEWS IN ISRAEL 
 
Name of Candidate   
Nom du candidat    Shapiro, Sidney 
       
Degree                            
Diplôme                            Master of Arts 
 
Department/Program     Date of Defence 
Département/Programme  Sociology   Date de la soutenance     August 02, 2013 
 
                                                       
APPROVED/APPROUVÉ 
 
 
Thesis Examiners/Examinateurs de thèse: 
                                                      
Dr. Aurélie Lacassagne  
(Supervisor/Directrice de thèse) 
 
Dr. François Dépelteau    
(Committee member/Membre du comité)    
       Approved for the School of Graduate Studies 
Dr. Robert Segsworth     Approuvé pour l’École des études supérieures 
(Committee member/Membre du comité)   Dr. David Lesbarrères 
M. David Lesbarrères 
Dr. Stuart Cohen      Director, School of Graduate Studies 
(External Examiner/Examinateur externe)    Directeur, École des études supérieures 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
ACCESSIBILITY CLAUSE AND PERMISSION TO USE 
 
I, Sidney Shapiro, hereby grant to Laurentian University and/or its agents the non-exclusive license to archive and 
make accessible my thesis, dissertation, or project report in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or for the 
duration of my copyright ownership. I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis, dissertation or 
project report. I also reserve the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis, 
dissertation, or project report. I further agree that permission for copying of this thesis in any manner, in whole or in 
part, for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor or professors who supervised my thesis work or, in their 
absence, by the Head of the Department in which my thesis work was done. It is understood that any copying or 
publication or use of this thesis or parts thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written 
permission. It is also understood that this copy is being made available in this form by the authority of the copyright 
owner solely for the purpose of private study and research and may not be copied or reproduced except as permitted 
by the copyright laws without written authority from the copyright owner. 
iii 
Abstract 
 
  
 
The thesis examines issues of religion and politics in Israel. The thesis is constructed around a 
critical reading of the literature written on the subject and an indepth first-person interviews with 
expatriates living in Ultra-Orthodox communities in Israel. After a careful presentation and 
examination of the various religious groups in Israel and their relationships with the state, the 
thesis offers a discussion on some of the many difficult issues Israeli society faces over the place 
of religion. More specifically, it explores the dynamics and processes of inclusion/exclusion of 
ultra-orthodox communities within / from the Israeli society. It looks at various policy sectors 
such as military service, housing, education and civil matters to see how the state has tried to 
find accomodations for Haredi people and how these latter have influenced and informed the 
ways public policies have been elaborated. It concludes that the historical statu quo on this 
question is no longer possible as witnessed in the last decade with growing tensions between 
various segments of the Israeli society. Therefore, the thesis proposes different scenarios to 
bridge the societal gaps between Haredi communities and the Israeli society.  
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General Introduction 
 The topic of this thesis is the role of ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) individuals in Israel. 
This is of particular importance as it examines a subset of the population that faces special 
challenges towards social integration. According to Reich (2000), 
the term “Haredi” (“God fearing,” plural “Haredim”) is usually used to describe the ultra-
Orthodox Jewish religious community in Israel whose political interests are represented … 
While this community is generally non-Zionist in political orientation — believing that the 
full national renewal of the Jewish people must await the arrival of Messiah — most Haredim 
have come to terms with Zionism and have, to one degree or another, become integrated into 
modern Israeli society. (p. 159) 
 
 As in many other contexts where a group finds itself apart from society, both by 
choice and by historical changes, and lacks the power to make meaningful changes towards 
empowerment and stake a place in the larger society, the Haredi population has become 
marginalized over time. With recent changes in government policies and the social context, a 
new paradigm is emerging. 
 Examining the role of disenfranchised segments of society generally, and the Haredi 
situation in Israel in particular, is especially relevant since, as with many disenfranchised 
groups throughout the world, Haredim seek to gain or maintain a power base within the 
larger society while expecting respect for their unique character and beliefs. The manner in 
which Israel comes to address the unique situation of the Haredi community, not only in 
religious terms but globally, could have powerful repercussions for other disempowered 
groups seeking to gain parity. The gulf between religiously observant and secular people 
within the society has become ever more pronounced. In certain quarters, the statement by 
Durkheim that “the sacred and the profane have always and everywhere been conceived by 
the human mind as two distinct classes, as two worlds between which there is nothing in 
common” (1992, p. 120) now seems to describe the politics and social issues revolving 
around religion. As many of the changes discussed in this thesis are ongoing and continue to 
expand, looking at the various coping mechanisms and finding avenues to consolidate power 
for individuals as well as larger societal groups, are crucial for creating a blueprint for 
integration and, ultimately, the composition of a diverse, yet more egalitarian and equal 
society. 
Shapiro 2 
 
 This issue has taken on more importance now than at any other point in the history of 
the state of Israel. Various milestones and compromises were reached in the past, but 
numerous socioeconomic, educational, and demographic factors have culminated in a 
situation where change is inevitable. Slow steps towards integration, building a larger power 
base, and creating political representation have taken on new meaning as these and many 
other factors have snowballed into what all recognize as a changing reality. This perspective 
was crystallized by Ephraim Lerner, an ultra-Orthodox expatriate university professor: 
You know, in the United States you’re expected—you’re expected to, to make a living. Here 
[In Israel], it’s kind of looked down upon. Oh, you make a living, you’re one of these guys, 
you know. I met a guy in [the ultra-Orthodox town of] Bnei Brak who lives in Bar Ilan, and 
his kids were playing with the kids on the block, and they all called their father a profressor 
[sic]. He’s a fressor [a glutton in Yiddish]. They couldn’t say professor. Profressor, because 
he’s teaching at a secular university. They couldn’t even handle that. How do you—how do 
you be a Haredi—he had a long beard and a black hat and everything. It didn’t mean 
anything because he’s teaching at a secular school. (2011) 
 
 In the past decade (2000–2010), there have been many changes in the way in which 
social assistance is granted and how various exemptions are seen not only by the secular 
majority of the country but also by the ultra-Orthodox minority itself. For perhaps the first 
time in the history of this young state, both sides agree on the inevitability of some sort of 
permanent compromise and the importance of integration going forward. At this critical 
juncture, this issue represents one of the most divisive cultural problems facing Israel today 
(Wagner, 2012, pp. 33–36), and a potential compromise or solution that suits the majority of 
Israeli citizens can have long-lasting and potentially extremely beneficial effects to society as 
a whole. 
 Parallels to the social issues at play in this specific instance can be seen in other social 
contexts outside Israel. A good example is the case study by Dick (2003, p. 324) that 
examines the Mennonite community in Western Canada in the early 20th century. The issues 
he discusses bear remarkable similarities to the topic at hand, and observations about the 
insiders who wish to communicate have clear parallels to the interview subjects in this study, 
located in contemporary Israel. 
 A number of elements in the ultra-Orthodox community in Israel have been in flux in 
recent years. Social assistance has been drastically reduced, and access to the wider society 
through mandatory military service, for which many ultra-Orthodox men in the past had 
received automatic exemptions when they were learning in yeshiva, have somewhat abated in 
favour of ultra-Orthodox military units. Completion of military service allowed improved 
access to the job market in Israel and to secular higher education. There has been a newfound 
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recognition by the government that policies of de facto exclusion, for a large segment of 
society, are a factor in creating massive social problems. An attempt to negotiate a more 
sensible understanding between the ultra-Orthodox segment of Israeli society and the secular 
one is a first crucial step to creating a situation in which all segments of society are enabled 
to flourish. 
 
What Is This Thesis About? 
 This thesis touches on many interrelated issues, with the focus on the ultra-Orthodox 
segment of the population, known collectively in Hebrew as Haredim. Haredi society is 
examined from the perspective of social justice through research on the structure of ultra-
Orthodox society and the various factors that have led to the present situation and the balance 
of power in Israeli society. Due to unique circumstances in Israel, many complications arise 
in examining a segment of society in the context of the involvement of state in religion, and 
to this end, many key questions in the modern state of Israel are touched on, such as the 
fundamental question of Jewish identity—the “Who Is a Jew?” debate. 
 This thesis examines the quandary of forming a progressive society while dealing 
with issues of assimilation of the religious minority versus the values, culture, and 
secularized religion of the majority. In particular, this thesis will examine how political 
processes can be used as a framework for understanding and reaching a dynamic equilibrium 
that acknowledges the many issues to be addressed by the wider society. 
 A critical element in moving forward lies in applying the research done in this study 
in order to see new dimensions in the various social and political problems facing the ultra-
Orthodox minority and coming up with new ways of integration without assimilation. To that 
end, the research approach for this project looks at a minority within the minority group. This 
study terms “American-Haredi” or ultra-Orthodox expatriates—a group that has a liberal 
democratic perspective as a result of its exposure to the Western context in which state and 
religion coexist seemingly well. These expatriate insiders experience a more fundamentalist 
perspective of Judaism and at the same time have had experience with a more liberal political 
and social organization of religion. This is an important aspect, as the world of Orthodoxy in 
the relatively closed society in Israel has very different political and social pressures, 
demands, and requirements for its adherents than other Orthodox contexts in the Diaspora. 
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 This thesis starts from a general look at the concepts behind the balance that Israeli 
society strives for to a historical and contemporary view of contentious issues among various 
religious and secular subgroups that have led to this point. From there, issues integral to 
moving forward and reaching accommodation are examined as well as future potential 
research questions. 
 
Historical introduction and preliminary notes 
 In the early 19th century, the majority of Jews who lived in or came to Turkish 
(Ottoman Empire) Palestine were elderly, seeking to live their final years in a holy place 
(notably Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed), studying Torah. They were mainly poor, and many 
depended on charity; very few were secular. There were, of course, notable exceptions, 
including Sephardi families who engaged in trade and development (see Glass & Kark, 
2007). By mid-century, there were rapid changes taking place, including the influx of 
European settlers and the first Protestant missionaries, and the arrival of European Jews who 
were fleeing persecution or were part of the Jewish national renewal (see Gilbar, 1990), and 
by the 1880s, a small Yemenite group who anticipated the arrival of the messiah (see Meir-
Glitzenstein, 2011). By the end of the 19th century, the Jewish population of Palestine had 
come to include Jews who were Orthodox, ultra-Orthodox, and secular (see Ben-Arieh, 1989; 
Margalit, 1963). 
 The Turkish government in Palestine had to accommodate a number of religious 
bodies—mainly Muslims, but also a substantial and varied Christian population, Druze, and 
Jews. The Turks recognized religious communities (millet), which were given autonomy in 
personal status issues: marriage and divorce, burial, and in the case of Muslims, the specific 
Quranic rules about inheritance (Braude, 1982). These religious communities also had 
control of their community lands and buildings, charitable operations, and general finances. 
Millet comes from the Arabic millah, which means “nationality” (like the Russian 
natsionalnost; it implies membership in an ethnic-religious group (Persky & Berman, 2005)). 
Israeli ID applications included the category “nationality” up to 2005 (Carmi, 2007).  
Speaking of “status quo” in modern Israel often refers to ways of dealing with 
religious issues that were initially established in Turkish times and then continued under the 
British Mandate and at the beginning of the state of Israel. The British appointed the first 
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Chief Rabbi of British Mandate Palestine (Raz & Wengrov, 1976), an institution that would 
later become the dual role of Chief Rabbi (Strum, 1989). Although the term “status quo” 
implies a static situation, the reality is rather different, in that the various religious 
communities have had to deal with demographic and historical changes over time, and the 
status quo has, in fact, been modified. The status quo shifts as new lines are drawn but 
remains a reflection of a historical perception, even if it is not strictly based in reality due to 
changing circumstances.  
It is important to note the entry of the ultra-Orthodox community into the political 
sphere. Ultra-Orthodox Ashkenazi parties preceded the surprising organization and political 
victory from the Shas party, which lead to a renewal of Sephardi-Orthodox political influence 
and subsequent corruption (Kamil, 2001, p. 128-143; Lehmann & Siebzehner, 2007). This 
shift demonstrates a change in how social/political power is perceived, and the utilization of 
a particular population for political goals far differently. This is similar to the 1950s and 
1960s, when many thought that civil war would erupt between the European and Mizrachi 
Jews (see Smooha, 1978; Rosenstein, 1981), but what happened was the entry of those Jews 
into mainstream political life. The “normalizing” of political relations between these ethnic 
origin groups took many decades, but now they have mostly reached parity. All this has 
implications for how the ultra-Orthodox can integrate into Israeli society. 
The pressure the ultra-Orthodox community currently faces from secularizing forces 
stems from a number of sources. Not only is the population rapidly growing (far outpacing 
secular Israelis) (Landau, 2003; Manski & Mayshar, 2003), but a complex social system has 
been developed in the Israeli content to create a unique dependency never seen before in 
Jewish history. The results of these factors are a new complex reality, one with an intangible, 
yet spiritual, link to the historical past. With the rise of political engagement by the ultra-
Orthodox community using their relatively small numbers to achieve voting bloc power, 
many factors drive the clash between the various segments of Israel’s secular and religious 
groups. 
A final note on the issue of gender is needed. While many of the subjects under 
discussion in the thesis relate to the male-dominated world of the yeshiva, there are many 
interesting aspects to the role of women in the ultra-Orthodox community. Half the 
interviews were conducted with women, and their perspective provides an interesting view of 
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the sheltered world of the ultra-Orthodox community. While gender certainly plays an 
important role in the communal dynamics of the ultra-Orthodox community in Israel, it is 
unfortunately not examined as closely in this study as it relates to the political factors.  
 
 Research goal 
 The goal of the research is three-fold. First, it is to study the various ultra-Orthodox 
communities in Israel and identify some of the defining characteristics that make these 
groups unique. With a varied population and inexact statistics and other data such as the 
census, it is very difficult to know who exactly falls under the banner of the ultra-Orthodox 
community. In addition, different ultra-Orthodox subgroups may collaborate on certain 
religious or political issues and support certain community-wide standards, yet on other 
issues divisions and fractures exist. This is most obvious in the more extreme segments of the 
population. Within the various subgroups, one can find differing communal and social values 
and priorities, along with various trade-offs made within the ultra-Orthodox community in 
order to gain advantage or favour in specific areas. Finally, one must identify specific 
elements among the various ultra-Orthodox communities in order to understand the larger 
patterns at play within the wider ultra-Orthodox community in Israel. 
 The second research goal is to identify various ways in which the ultra-Orthodox 
community is both included within and excluded from the larger (and generally traditional-
secular) Israeli society. Since the founding of the state of Israel, movements within the ultra-
Orthodox have moved out of the public sphere, as well as having been excluded from both 
social and political spheres by the larger secular society. However, the modes of exclusion 
are not necessarily limited to a dual withdrawal from secular society. Many elements of 
Orthodoxy have become increasingly prevalent in the larger secular society. In the 
relationship between the public and private spheres, in effect, everyone in Israeli society is 
governed in his or her personal sphere by laws based in religion. This has become a topical 
and pressing issue. Elements of the ultra-Orthodox community withdraw from certain aspects 
of secular life while at the same time there is greater engagement with secular society in 
legally mandated personal sphere matters such as marriage, divorce, and burial. This process 
of withdrawn engagement has occurred with the ultra-Orthodox community in a number of 
ways from education to politics and national service to employment. How these elements 
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have shaped the ultra-Orthodox experience through various processes of inclusion and 
exclusion illustrates the present status of the community, with many complex interactions 
and influences.  
 The third research goal is to examine the political and social consequences of the 
current state of affairs, from the social structure of society and the wishes of the current 
secular majority, to elements enshrined in the basic laws such as religious freedom. This has 
become a critical issue and has taken on even greater dimensions as the outcome of these 
debates could lead to a fundamental change in the way in which certain contiguous issues are 
resolved. For example, reaching a decision on the fundamental nature of Judaism not 
necessarily based in the ultra-Orthodox rabbinical interpretation of the religion would have 
far-reaching consequences for Israel, which refers to itself as the Jewish state. What this 
might mean in terms of an individual or group’s civil and legal status could be quite different 
from what is currently dictated by the ultra-Orthodox community. The underlying element of 
the political and social consequences for these various processes of involvement of the ultra-
Orthodox community within society fundamentally relates to the relationship and 
entanglement of church or synagogue and state in the Israeli context. Thus an examination of 
the various aspects of political and social consequences that have developed through the 
present situation is critical to understanding how the ultra-Orthodox community can not only 
coexist but can also re-evaluate and adapt to a changing world, improving integration and 
communication for the future. 
 
 Research questions 
The thesis has three primary research questions:  
 First, just who are the ultra-Orthodox? How are the ultra-Orthodox communities in 
Israel constituted? What are the various segments and issues that compose and divide the 
ultra-Orthodox community as well as determine their place in the overall social landscape of 
Israeli society? 
 Second, how are the ultra-Orthodox excluded from and included in Israeli society? 
There is a double process of exclusion and inclusion, with the ultra-Orthodox community at 
times choosing to participate and at other times excluding their members from participation 
in various aspects of Israeli society. At other times, this process is reversed, with the larger 
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Israeli society excluding or purposefully including members of the ultra-Orthodox 
community. 
 Third, what are the social, religious, and political consequences of the various 
elements of inclusion and exclusion for the future of the state of Israel and Israeli society? 
The process of exclusion and inclusion has a double mirror in which the ultra-Orthodox 
community at times includes or excludes itself from Israeli society by means of self-
segregation. At other times, secular society chooses to exclude or variously include the ultra-
Orthodox community in issues of national importance. A striking example of this process 
concerns the many government-provided, low-cost housing communities built throughout the 
country, which serve to segregate the population and prevent assimilation and integration. 
This is extensively to the satisfaction and wishes of the ultra-Orthodox community. Yet at the 
same time, elements of religious policy stemming from the entanglement of the ultra-
Orthodox in state religious policy are part of the social contract by which each citizen of 
Israel must abide. 
 This is particularly prevalent in matters of the personal sphere, such as marriage, 
divorce, and burial, all of which are dictated by religious policy. Having influence not only at 
the bureaucratic level, but also, due to voting patterns and the fractured nature of Israeli 
politics, the ultra-Orthodox community at times has a great deal of power and 
disproportionate influence on many issues in relation to various social movements in Israeli 
society. 
 These elements all contribute to questioning the underlying process that currently 
mediates issues of contention along the fault lines of state and religion. The “status quo” 
agreements developed in the early days of the state in fact were designed to prevent 
conclusive solutions to various problems that would, by their very nature, favour one group 
above another, and put in place a system where forward progress seems unlikely to 
impossible. The mechanism, which is meant to balance the desires and needs of different 
groups, as well as the fundamental underpinnings and rationale for supporting various 
solutions to critical issues, has become increasingly important as demographic developments 
have consistently shifted towards an increased ultra-Orthodox population. 
 
The Problematic and Aim of the Thesis 
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 The status quo arrangement creates a political and social reality that is inherently 
unsustainable because it creates an environment of instability. By perpetuating in an unstable 
cycle, not only do issues not get addressed, but the entire system becomes unsustainable. 
With contentious issues being shifted from one level of government to another and with the 
courts for the most part unwilling to take a stance and alter the fundamental basis for 
coexistence among the disparate groups in Israeli society, profound changes and a new 
paradigm are needed to reconcile the various segments of Israeli society. 
 The aim of this thesis is to examine the underlying issues concerning the ultra-
Orthodox minority in Israel and discuss various ways in which future resolutions of the 
tensions between secular and ultra-Orthodox may be managed. A solution that serves the 
interests of either extreme, ultra-Orthodox or ultra-secular, would simply be rejected. Various 
solutions such as consociationalism (Lijphart, 1977; Bolte, 2007; Lijphart 2008), which are 
currently in place, suppress rather than address the contentious issues facing religious society 
in Israel. By peeling back the layers and examining possible alternatives through the unique 
research approach of this study, new ideas and potential solutions will be uncovered and 
present real possibilities in terms of social reform and greater social justice and equality in 
Israeli society. 
 
Thesis Statement 
 Broadly, the thesis will examine various aspects of state and religion in Israel and the 
intersection between secular and religious society. This takes on a number of forms, from the 
study of governmental authority and the courts in relation to the ultra-Orthodox segment of 
Israeli society to questions of social structure and organization. This boils down to an 
essential question of hegemony for the ultra-Orthodox community: Does the moral and literal 
authority in the state ultimately rest with rabbinic leadership, the state in the form of various 
government offices, the Supreme Court, or somewhere else? 
This is a topical and relevant issue with many recent examples of the ongoing conflict 
between religion and state in the often complex and nuanced Israeli political scene. The 
thesis will examine three broad areas of research with overlapping importance. The first 
examines several recent clashes between the ultra-Orthodox segment of society and the 
government. The second will look at an extensive review of secondary sources dealing with 
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this particular issue in the Israeli context as well as state authority theoretical frameworks. 
Third, the thesis will use in-depth interviews with ultra-Orthodox individuals. 
 Alterman makes the case that a new political and social transformation is occurring in 
Israel within the ultra-Orthodox community: 
Increasingly influential are the Haredi-Orthodox Jews who purposely restrict themselves to 
their own enclaves within society [yet] … owing to their savvy exploitation of Israel's 
proportional-representation voting system, however, they are able to ensure a generous flow 
of funds into their schools and social programs. (2008, p. 13) 
 
This creates a new social paradigm that is fundamentally unbalanced in favour of a new 
pattern of “traditional” Jewish life. The current status quo is a source of great social and 
political tension between the religious and secular communities in Israel. 
 Due to the requirement of military service in Israel, many ultra-Orthodox individuals 
who view service in the military as an affront to their way of life are essentially limited from 
participating in society. As discussed in previous work (Shapiro, 2010), many 
accommodations that attempted to mediate between the ultra-Orthodox segment of the 
population and the government, such as the Tal Law, proved to be essentially ineffective. 
The reality is that ultra-Orthodox men are faced with a difficult choice: to integrate into 
society, which in the ultra-Orthodox world is socially unacceptable, or to join the military 
and have access to higher education, a possible profession, and better options for 
employment. According to many in the ultra-Orthodox sphere, however, this simply removes 
one from participating in his community, a problem that extends beyond those of post-
secondary yeshiva age. It is now a topical issue in primary school as a wholly religious 
curriculum is being taught in many ultra-Orthodox schools, leading to an entirely religious 
curriculum for high school education. The lack of “secular” studies, which would include 
more math, science, and language skills, precludes many from integrating into society later 
on, even should they choose to do so. This leads too many ultra-Orthodox feeling 
disenfranchised, and from the perspective of the secular government, there are many ultra-
Orthodox individuals, perhaps a large percentage, who could easily integrate into society and 
work, if the requirement for military service were not a prerequisite to higher education and, 
in many instances, employment. 
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 The government has proposed several measures, such as lowering the age of draft 
deferment from the current 35 years old or five children, to something like 24 years of age, 
which would allow a large group of individuals who wish to work to do so. Other proposals 
have included a shortened term of military service more appropriate to ultra-Orthodox 
conditions. An experimental unit has trained thousands of ultra-Orthodox individuals in a 
religious setting, so this approach is tenable although it does not necessarily coincide with the 
original secular intent of the military service as a means of integration into Israeli society. 
However, the military leadership has found that accommodation is important; if these 
individuals do not participate in some form of national service, and as a result, suffer 
exclusion from the broader society, they will not be able to maintain employment and 
contribute to the tax base of the country. 
Following the Holocaust and the decimation of European Jewry, there was a large 
push to restore Torah learning and Judaism. In contrast to the European model in which the 
best and the brightest became rabbis, in post-Holocaust Haredi society in Israel, nearly 
everyone received the same education with the goal of making a generation of rabbis. Now, 
more than six decades later, the great problem is what to do with the large percentage of 
people unsuited for rabbinic training but with few other options for economic integration. 
Contributing to the situation are social pressures within the ultra-Orthodox community, the 
limited access to secular education, and other aspects to be addressed in this study. Thus, we 
find the central disagreement between the ultra-Orthodox population and the government: 
The ultra-Orthodox, as a percentage of the population excluded from the main elements of 
Israeli life, are nevertheless able to maintain an element of power through a large voting bloc, 
yet as individuals are underrepresented in government leadership and within the bureaucracy. 
 This situation creates a great degree of pressure to continue the status quo, including 
ultra-Orthodox control of the Education Ministry and the Rabbinate, with the vast majority of 
ultra-Orthodox individuals unable to attend secular universities or receive a standard 
education while maintaining their religious principles. This has essentially moved beyond an 
issue of cultural identity and assimilation to one of wholesale exclusion. Subsidies have been 
given to ultra-Orthodox individuals for full-time yeshiva learning. However, it is estimated 
that 40% of all ultra-Orthodox men who learn full time in yeshiva are, in fact, working 
illegally as they are not lawfully allowed to maintain employment without an exemption 
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from the army. Considering this finding, the Supreme Court of Israel decided to withhold 
funding or severely cut funding for yeshiva students following a challenge by a number of 
secular Israeli university students. The students maintained that since they attend secular 
higher education full time, much as the ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students learn Torah full 
time, they should also be entitled to a stipend from the government (Kershner, 2010, p. 1; 
Koretz, 1999, p. 30). Withholding such funding has created a great deal of tension between 
the ultra-Orthodox population and the civil government, and this represents only one of 
several serious issues. 
 Numerous studies have shown that the ultra-Orthodox population lacks leadership 
roles in society and generally does not participate in military or alternative national service. 
The long-term effect will be a demographic crisis in which it will be impossible to maintain 
increasingly large numbers of a population without access to higher education and a job 
market that demands proof of military or other national service (Kaufmann, 2011, p. xviii). 
Recent social experiments among the Haredi population, such as providing them with 
opportunities for social service, national service, and Nahal Haredi (the religious brigade in 
the army), have had some success, but because these programs have only attracted a small 
fraction of the overall ultra-Orthodox population, they have not completely accomplished the 
goal of full integration (Stadler et al., 2011, pp. 143–146). The government has announced 
that it plans to draft an additional 1,000 ultra-Orthodox individuals in successive years, 
although the overall number of yeshiva students receiving exemptions for full-time study is 
more than several hundred thousand. Nevertheless, it is crucial for the ultra-Orthodox, 
whether or not they choose to take advantage of the new opportunities, to maintain their 
identity and integrate only to an extent in order to maintain communal and cultural cohesion. 
More advanced job training at perhaps a younger age, combined with the societal expectation 
of marriage and the number of children the average ultra-Orthodox family has coupled with 
cuts in social assistance might well move the ultra-Orthodox segment of the population 
towards greater integration into Israeli society. 
This thesis presents new insights into this topical issue and demonstrates that once an 
individual is given access and the tools to be included in the wider mixed society while 
maintaining his religious and social identity, the entire society can benefit. 
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Scope 
 The scope of this project is limited to events such as large-scale protests, social 
issues, and other aspects of interaction between state and religion, specifically those that 
occurred in the period leading up to and including 2009/2010. The issues examined relate to 
and had an impact on the ultra-Orthodox community in some way. This window takes into 
account events up to the end of 2010, making the research possible with a finite number of 
sources and text to analyze general overarching issues. While there are always new events 
occurring and twists to this ongoing story, the specific examples in this study provide insight 
into the general trends. 
 The project examines a major fault line in Israeli society. Conflicts between the ultra-
Orthodox community and the very secular elements of Israeli society have been and continue 
to be issues of national concern. Occasional flare-ups in the ongoing debate between religion 
and state in the Israeli context will continue as long as the fundamental underlying issues are 
not addressed. In addition to recent newsworthy events, long-standing issues of importance 
are examined as well, such as the bureaucratization of religion, the combination of religion 
and state, and the religious control over personal sphere matters, among others. 
 During the course of work on this thesis through 2012, new loci of contention and 
strife erupted between the ultra-Orthodox minority or fringe elements of the ultra-Orthodox 
community and the larger Israeli society, both moderate Orthodox and secular. The latest 
series of social discontent concerning the ultra-Orthodox community in Israel from 2011 and 
2012 are not included in this thesis. However, many of the underlying issues have not only 
remained the same but are equally important to understanding the move towards growing 
Orthodoxy on one hand and increased dialogue about the place of religion within the context 
of Israeli society on the other. 
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Chapter 1 
Conceptual Framework and Methodology 
 
 In this context, we are examining the ultra-Orthodox community in Israel and the 
social element of this society. Durkheim pointed out that there is a collective social reality 
that transforms the individuals within and has a clear impact. In his examination of suicide, 
he concluded that a collective reality is at work to shape individuals’ everyday lives. He 
states, “[b]ut it hardly seems possible to us, on the contrary, that there will not emerge from 
every page of this book, evidence that the individual is dominated by a moral reality which 
transcends him – collective reality" (Durkheim, 1985, p. 92). This can be seen in the ultra-
Orthodox community, where social regulation and textual conformity form the backdrop of 
social life. From this point, layers of social norms and collective memory are added to create 
an all-encompassing way of life. This reality has a forward-looking outlook of continuity, a 
collective history, and an ever-reinforced and evolving social component, all the while 
insisting that it is simply unchanging. 
 When examining the ultra-Orthodox community, we can ask questions about basic 
demographics, makeup, political power, and so on, but an individual from the ultra-Orthodox 
community would surely point out that these are the wrong questions to ask. Depending on 
what your definition is, what measurements you are making, the possible permutations of 
who is included and excluded are endless. Perhaps one of the difficulties is where the data 
come from and who is asking the questions—spiritual dimension or otherwise. An interesting 
parallel is Durkheim’s study of suicide and the social bonds of community and society that 
form around the notion of groups, superseding the dynamics of religious groups and forming 
something of a higher level. This has an interesting analogy in studying religion and policy in 
the Israeli context. As Durkheim points out, who gathers the data and classifies it can often 
have a marked effect on how it is interpreted: 
But, as Wagner commented long ago, what are taken to be statistics about suicide motives are 
in reality statistics about the opinions concerning such motives as held by officials, often 
minor ones, responsible for providing such statistical information. Unfortunately, as we are 
aware, official statements are often very faulty even when they refer to obvious material facts 
that are comprehensible to any conscientious observer and require nothing in the way of 
evaluation. How much more suspect must they be considered to be when they attempt not 
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simply to record a completed act but to interpret and explain it! It is always a difficult 
problem to specify the cause of a phenomenon. The scholar requires all sorts of observations 
and experiments to resolve just one of these questions. Human volatility is the most complex 
of all phenomena. (Durkheim, 1992, p. 98) 
 
This is a complex and dynamic problem to study, and coming up with exact answers is 
probably impossible. Examining the broad strokes of the data regarding the ultra-Orthodox 
community, however, reveals a detailed, fractured, and complex social dynamic. The 
commonalities among the ultra-Orthodox community, despite the many differences, are a 
uniting factor. Increased orthodoxy is seen as a way to preserve the traditions, history, and 
culture of a religion (or a religious group) set apart. Durkheim noted that uniting similarities 
are overwhelmingly more important than differences:  
What constitutes a society is the existence of a certain number of beliefs and practices 
common to all the faithful which are traditional and therefore obligatory. The more numerous 
and strong these collective states are, the more strongly integrated is the religious community, 
and the greater is preservative value. The particular details of dogma and rights are 
secondary. (Durkheim, 1992, p.102)  
 
While this can be seen to a degree in Israeli society at large, there is no doubt that among the 
various ultra-Orthodox groups, there are many issues of collective agreement. This creates a 
common starting point when facing outwards towards secular society. There is a distinct 
difference in the way community and society is used in the thesis, reflecting the societal 
whole and an often fragmented perception by various groups. This distinction can be seen in 
Tonnies (2011) for example. 
 
 
Durkheim’s work on Jews 
 The situation with the ultra-Orthodox community in Israel today, and the responses to 
various external pressures on religious and social levels, has a very distinct parallel to 
Durkheim’s examination of Jews during the Enlightenment. Circling the wagons around 
greater orthodoxy is not a new phenomenon, as “this also explains the case of Judaism. In 
fact, the criticism to which Jews have long been subjected to by Christianity has given arise 
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to feelings of exceptional solidarity among them” (1992, p. 102). External forces have 
historically acted to consolidate positions of orthodoxy among many religious groups. The 
religious context of separating the mundane from the spiritually elevated is also described: 
All known religious beliefs, whether simple or complex, present one common characteristic: 
They presuppose a classification of all things, real and ideal, of which men think, in two 
classes or opposed groups, generally designed by two distinct terms which are translated well 
enough by the words profane and sacred (profane and sacre). This division of the world into 
two domains, the one containing all that is sacred, and the other all that is profane, is a 
distinctive trait of religious thought; the beliefs, myths, dogmas and legends are either 
representations or systems of representations which express the nature of sacred things, the 
virtues and powers which are attributed to them, or their relations with each other and with 
profane things. (Durkheim, 1992, p. 119) 
 
Many of the nuances of the social organization and practices prevalent in the ultra-Orthodox 
community stem from these pressures. The minutiae of ritual life have developed as a result 
of these forces. Increased orthodoxy results from external pressures, and results in a 
contraction of the engagement the community has with outside secularizing influences.  
The ostracism to which they [Jews] are subjected is only one of the causes leading to this 
result; the very character of Jewish beliefs must make a large contribution to it. Like all early 
religions, in reality Judaism fundamentally consists of a set of practices that minutely govern 
all details of life and leave little latitude to individual judgments. (Durkheim, 1992, p. 102) 
 
From both religious practice and a social reaction to preserving the image of a particular way 
of life, external forces, as in case of the subject discussed in the thesis, play a significant role 
in shaping social life and practice. Similar to the challenges of the Enlightenment, there is a 
wide world of secular influence which the ultra-Orthodox community feels pressured by in 
various measures. This can be seen in the social and performative aspects of religion 
(recalling (Goffman, 1959, p. 1-17)), as well as larger reaching social changes. 
 
  
Consociationalism 
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 Consociationalism is often associated with pioneers such as Arend Lijphart (1969, 
1984) and Ivo Daalder (1984). Lijphart talks about maintaining a balance among various 
contentious segments of the population. This model has been extrapolated to many other 
circumstances from India to South Africa and Fiji (see Dew, 1976; Miline, 1975; Stiener, 
1987; Talbot, 1996). Lijphart has written extensively about not necessarily trying to solve a 
particular issue but rather moving the issue through various levels of government or reaching 
accommodations. The accommodations ultimately do not solve the underlying conflict, yet 
they create a system in which society is able to move forward while not necessarily 
addressing fundamental issues through key elements of “accommodation, bargaining and 
reciprocity” (Caspersen, 2004, p. 570). This creates a framework of unaddressed issues and 
allows limited progress through a system of give and take. Even though a particular 
population may have certain rights and control taken away by dominant elements of society, 
it is still able to maintain, and possibly gain, elements that are important to it through a 
system of give and take. In the Israeli context, this is referred to as the status quo.  
 Consociationalism stands in stark contrast to the ideology of integration and 
assimilation. Rather, this allows each distinct group—in the Israeli context, each religious 
group—to maintain a strong identity while not necessarily having its identity overridden by a 
nationalist or larger-reaching identity. In this system, there are many inevitable trade-offs. 
However, real fundamental underlying change cannot be achieved as this would bring to the 
fore many contentious issues, which consociationalism aims to repress. Through the key 
contemporary contentious issues examined in this thesis, many examples are given of why 
consociationalism, though an ideal solution to perpetuating the status quo, is not necessarily 
conducive to having long-term stable progress and change. 
 
B. Conceptual Framework 
 Consociational arrangements 
 The work of Arend Lijphart, a Dutch political scientist, speaks to the underlying 
situation of consociationalism (1969, 1984, 2008). It examines consociationalism in many 
contexts, and it is particularly apt in the context of Israel. “In a series of wide-ranging 
studies, Lijphart explains how consociationalism is adopted and practiced in polities where 
deep social and political cleavages threaten the institutions of public life with destabilization 
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and de-legitimization” (Cohen & Susser, 2000, p. 7). In many contentious issues, whether 
religious or social or public policies by one group or another, accommodations are made in 
order to pacify a particular segment of society in order to reach a majority consensus. Cohen 
and Susser explain that 
when consociational patterns are prevalent, societies with severe ideological, religious, and 
ethnic divides can, nonetheless, conduct their business civilly and sensibly ... 
consociationalism explains how deeply divided societies—societies we might otherwise think 
were politically doomed—can function reasonably well over long periods of time. (2000, p. 
7) 
 
 Although Israel has many similarities in terms of multiple levels of government and 
political organization to other Western liberal democracies, the country is unique as it 
resembles more of a city-state since there are very little local politics. Rather, the majority of 
inhabitants live in large metropolitan areas and have primarily a national, rather than local or 
regional, affiliation. One of the key features of both pre-state Israel as well as contemporary 
Israel is that there is a great degree of consociational agreements among the various factions 
that compete for power. 
Consociational arrangements tend to thrive when the differences between a political system's 
constituent groups are so severe that allowing them to develop unchecked threatens to issue 
in unity-shattering crises, violent conflict, and even the disintegration of a political 
community. Consociationalism is, then, a method of organizing intercommunal relations so 
as to mitigate the effects of conflict. (Cohen & Susser, 2000, p. 7) 
 
Consociationalism can be used to interpret the way in which the political and social 
organization of society seeks to maintain a balance without favouring one side above another. 
This way of looking at the internal forces on the status quo fits well in the Israeli context. 
Consociationalism and the way in which it balances various factors to maintain a constant 
state of compromise is not limited to the Jewish population in Israel, similar arrangements 
exist within the Druze and Israeli Arab communities as well (Dowty, 1999, pp. 175–177). 
 Considering the overall balance of the conflict, there is no question that during the 
past 60-odd years, there has been an increased movement towards secularism. Since the 
majority of citizens are secular, and in addition, many areas, such as the periphery in the 
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North and South, do not have a high percentage of religious population, it is, therefore, easier 
to implement secular policies, such as those relating to the Sabbath, without major 
repercussions. In the large metropolitan cities of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, changes relating to 
Sabbath observance (such as operating bus services or opening places of entertainment) have 
been controversial. Jerusalem has a large religiously observant population, while in Tel Aviv, 
although the majority is secular, the Sabbath issue is still seen as a major symbol of religious 
rights in the public sphere. 
 It is important to note that many of these religious issues do not have a place in the 
public sphere and are only paid lip service in the context of laws seeking to preserve a Jewish 
national identity. They are observed not on the basis of Halacha (Jewish law) but rather on 
the basis of consociational principles balancing the need for a general sense of Jewish-ness. 
For example, in many areas, holidays are often celebrated in a secular civic fashion rather 
than with any particular religious significance, particularly as most laws based on religious 
principles are not held to religious stringencies in terms of enforcement. This will be 
discussed in several cases later. 
 Israel has never had a majority government and often has to deal with very large and 
inclusive coalitions in order to govern effectively. This creates a situation, particularly since 
the development of involved political representation by the religious segment of society, 
where the larger secular society has been forced to address issues that would normally be 
outside their purview as they are in many other Western states. The separate educational 
system for religiously observant Jews, military deferments for yeshiva study, various funding 
issues, and religious policy are a few of the many examples of consociational arrangements, 
in which the status quo and balance of power are sought to be preserved in order to further 
overall progress by the majority coalition. 
 Since there is a scorched-earth principle in effect in which a particular segment can 
threaten to leave the coalition and bring down the government if, for example, it does not 
receive funding for its projects, minority parties can carry disproportionate weight within the 
coalition. Thus, religious parties are often included in very broad coalitions even when 
numerically they are not necessarily required for their formation; this is done in order to 
engage the religious parties in a consociational effort where certain elements are negotiated 
in exchange for meeting a balance with secular priorities. This relates to such matters as the 
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availability of public transportation on the Sabbath in Haifa and Be'er Sheva, unlike 
Jerusalem or Tel Aviv, where public transportation is not available. These more permissive 
cities are used as a liberalizing concession by the religious parties to enable them to pursue 
goals of greater importance from their perspective, such as the continuation of separate 
educational systems and various kinds of funding specific to their communities. 
 One of the key elements of consociationalism is changing the context of where 
arguments and disputes about these various issues take place. Often issues start at a local 
level, get moved to a national forum, and are often moved around even more to dissipate the 
focus on the issue. There is a great deal of effort is put into moving these issues into a 
bureaucratic administrative process or passing the issue from various levels of government 
until either the issue tires itself out or ultimately reaches the Knesset or the Supreme Court. 
Often, even at the highest levels, parties do not want to deal with these fundamental issues, 
and so they are used as bargaining chips in order to maintain the status quo in the context of 
other agreements. In this way, a form of balance and stasis is achieved. 
 However, as we will discuss in the section detailing the status quo, the overarching 
progress of religious society has been receding as religious society generally becomes more 
insular and, therefore, seeks more special interests and less general public measures than it 
has in the past. One of the key problems with this approach, as seen in various examples, is 
that although each group in consociationalism is able to form its own institutions and 
maintain a level of social independence, there are issues. A group may have, for example, 
separate communities, separate schools, separate funding, etc., and this presents an issue 
when conflict from the greater social compact and the implicit responsibilities of the state 
come into conflict with local sensitivities.  
Transforming incendiary confrontations of principle into technical, functional, local, or 
administrative arrangements is, therefore, a primary strategy of consociationalism.... The 
consociational style encourages the bureaucratization and localization of issues [where] 
issues appear to be more tractable, compromises are easier to come by, and, generally, a more 
practical problem-solving (rather than a bombastic ideological) style prevails. (Cohen & 
Susser, 2000, p. 12) 
 
There is no more apparent example than the debate about military service, which is 
incumbent upon all Israeli citizens, yet through a system of deferrals, does not always 
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happen. In the case of certain religious sensibilities, such as the case involving school 
segregation, where one group's religious outlooks come into conflict with the larger society, 
the Supreme Court is required to intervene in order to maintain, if not return to, balance and 
then find an ideal solution that is acceptable to society as well as to the individual parties. 
 A consociational agreement removes a lot of the daily interaction among the various 
institutions, levels of government, and administrative bodies. Therefore, it allows these and 
other contentious issues to build to the point where once they come to the forefront and 
break, they become much larger, blown-out-of-proportion issues than they would be 
otherwise. The level of autonomy that exists among various institutions and the larger society 
is constantly susceptible to change, and the fundamental principle of finding an appropriate 
balance is often at odds with the stated goal of maintaining overall societal norms and at the 
same time respecting the principles and priorities of particular groups. “Separation promotes 
stability by allowing each community to lead its own life, develop its own institutions, and 
create its own leadership without the friction-generating intervention of contentious rivals” 
(Cohen & Susser, 2000, p. 15). This allows groups to operate independently without any one 
particular group seeking overall control. Rather, power is gained through strategic 
positioning in which the best stake can be claimed while giving up enough to avoid an all-out 
confrontation. 
 
C. Methodology 
 Interview process  
 Following Ethics Board approval, interviews were conducted that outline the 
questions, purpose, and procedures of the research project. A number of issues were raised as 
part of the Ethics Board process. These were addressed, and an amended version was 
submitted prior to receiving approval for the project, as noted in the appendix. The procedure 
for interviews included a detailed explanation of the project, the use of the project data, 
signing confidentiality forms, and an explanation of the questions that would be asked using 
the standardized question script. Participants were asked if they understood everything and 
had any questions. If they did have questions, all questions would be answered to their 
satisfaction before proceeding with the interview. During the interview, a number of follow-
up questions were asked in each section, and in all interviews, all questions were answered. 
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In the first phase, informed consent was explained to the research participants. The 
project was outlined, and it was explained that the data collection being undertaken was for 
use in the thesis and would only be used for this particular project. It was explained that all 
informed consent forms would be kept by the project's supervisor, and no identifying 
information would be used. The aspects of ethical implications, voluntary participation, risks 
and consequences, confidentiality, and an overview of the project were presented to each 
interview subject. This initial phase of each interview consisted of approximately 10 to 15 
minutes in order to ensure that all participants understood the purpose of the interview. 
 All participants were asked to sign a form indicating their agreement to participate in 
the study and were given an additional copy of the informed consent form for their records. 
A number of participants asked either to see the results prior to dissemination or indicated 
they would like a copy of the study or both. In this case, they were asked to provide an email 
address where they could be contacted when those documents became available. 
 In order to ensure anonymity, each participant was asked a series of questions that 
were recorded on the interview script paper used in the interview. By doing this, an 
anonymous profile could be built, roughly based on a sketch of the demographic and 
biographical information of the interview subject. As the identity of the interviewee is 
unimportant and this information must remain confidential, interview subjects were reminded 
that the interview was focusing on their thoughts and opinions and were asked to consider 
their responses in light of identifying information to which they might inadvertently allude. 
Profiles with pseudonyms were based on name, age, sex, self-identification of Ashkenazi or 
Sephardic, and immigration experience. Finally, interview subjects were asked where their 
hometown is in Israel and how they would describe the community where they are currently 
living. From this information, a composite that reflects the bare facts of the interview 
subjects was created, using randomized names as well as slightly masked data without 
revealing exact specifics. For example, if someone mentioned that he or she had moved to 
Israel from Atlanta, Georgia, this information would be changed to the United States. 
Similarly, if someone stated his or her age as 32, this would be changed to early 30s. This 
was done to ensure that the data, while still being relatively accurate, could not be used in 
order to identify the participant. If an interview subject alluded in great detail to personal 
anecdotes, stories, or references that could be used to identify him or her, these were marked 
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while the interview progressed to enable further masking of the data once fully transcribed. 
In this way, the focus of the study—to examine the thoughts and attitudes of American 
Haredim—could proceed without compromising the individual's anonymity. 
 As there is a focus on American Haredi participants, demographic background plays a 
strong role. Likewise, a religious individual living in a mixed or secular town, though this is 
not the case in Israel, could potentially lead to a particular insight in the interview. In 
addition, the questions asked pertaining to immigration to Israel or being born in Israel 
speaks to perhaps different cultural influences from other places. There is a theoretical 
potential for interview subjects to have particular opinions linked not only to their experience 
in Israel, but also to their previous countries. As immigration is such a huge factor in Israel, 
with citizens literally coming from every country in the world, this could potentially speak to 
that issue. 
 Following the signing of a consent form, participants were asked specific questions to 
determine whether the individual grew up in Israel or had immigrated later in life. Based on 
the response, a number of questions—such as those pertaining to Israeli education—were 
eliminated. Several other questions during the course of the study were eliminated, and these 
will be noted elsewhere, as they seem irrelevant. A final point regarding anonymity is the 
question about whether participants had served in the military or another social service 
framework. This was eliminated as being irrelevant to, and perhaps coloring, the underlying 
focus of the interview. 
 The questions asked were generally in the order outlined in the document. However, 
two questions were asked out of order in order to establish a rapport and build up to the 
interview. As each question was asked, it was marked off on the sheet to ensure that no 
questions were missed, and if necessary, follow-up questions pursued a particular line of 
thought or returned the interview to the topic being discussed. 
 
 Interview questions 
 There were a number of considerations taken into account when writing the interview 
questions. How various questions would play out in the semi-structured format of the 
interviews (leaning towards a more structured approach) meant trying to discuss both the 
broad strokes of policy and religion, and at the same time discuss some of the personal 
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minutiae that made the perspectives of the interview participants so interesting. The direction 
of the interviews in the thesis takes both of these considerations into account, and this comes 
across in the interview excerpts.  
 Demographic information 
 The detailed in-depth interview consists of six main sections. The first is 
demographic information, and although the information will be changed, the interview will 
still reflect a generalized picture of the interview subject, as we discussed earlier, though not 
with enough data to identify that individual. 
 
 Religious beliefs 
 The second section talks about religious beliefs, feelings, and impressions associated 
with events involving state and religion, as well as social-religious beliefs. The section asks 
the interview subjects to identify the stream of Judaism they associate with. This creates a 
baseline as we are looking to interview Haredi or, as we differentiate, American Haredi 
subjects; other responses will, of course, be considered but may not be indicative of the 
overall direction we are attempting to pursue. The second question—How would you define 
your religious beliefs?—gets a more generalized picture of how the individual defines his or 
her beliefs, and that could possibly be extrapolated to a larger context of the questions being 
asked. Finally, under the religious beliefs section is the question: Do you associate yourself 
with a particular sect of Judaism? This again speaks to a nuanced association in which 
someone could belong to a particular group within the designated stream of Judaism. This 
could perhaps help to explain various opinions. Although the sample is certainly not 
representative, the in-depth interview does allow the potential for drawing limited 
conclusions in terms of how subjects associate themselves with a particular sect and their 
ensuing religious opinions. 
 The third part of this section, entitled “Social-Religious Beliefs,” asks three questions. 
The first: What does being “American-Haredi (English-speaking ultra-Orthodox)” mean? 
Interview subjects are asked to identify if they believe there is a particular subset of ultra-
Orthodox Jews that identify as being American or English-speaking. This is crucial because 
perhaps there are, as discussed previously, nuanced differences between ultra-Orthodox 
individuals born in Israel and those who bring a particular mindset from other places. There 
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are also cultural integrative factors as well; those speaking English as their primary language 
will naturally gravitate towards one another among a group of Hebrew speakers.  
While the beliefs of such an individual would be the same as the larger group, 
perhaps other aspects can be gleaned from the interview, and perhaps an interpretation of 
those values could shed light on some of the more crucial problems facing ultra-Orthodox 
society. Possibly this added perspective can create a more dynamic and in-depth view of the 
target population. The second question is: Do “American-Haredi” individuals reflect the 
reality of the Haredi world? This question speaks to the interview subjects' opinions whether 
individuals can maintain this dual identity. On the one hand, they maintain connections to the 
English-speaking world and have, as a result, a unique cultural and religious perspective, 
while on the other, they integrate and become part of a larger ultra-Orthodox society. How 
both sides view each other could again speak to the potential benefit of the interviewees and 
how particular aspects can be translated from one subgroup to another. The third question in 
this section—Are there advantages or disadvantages associated with being able to speak 
languages in the Haredi world?—again speaks to the idea of the subtle differences between 
entirely Hebrew-speaking ultra-Orthodox individuals and those who speak another language 
as well. Multilingualism can lead to inclusion or, on the flipside, exclusion or self-
segregation. This can have an impact on the relevance of this particular subset of the 
population towards the larger Israeli ultra-Orthodox society but, as an internal sample, could 
be very indicative of issues and potential solutions proposed by this sub-segment of the ultra-
Orthodox population. 
 
 Education 
 The next part of this section contains several questions regarding education. The first 
asks what type of primary education the participant received. This is particularly relevant as 
education is one of the integrating factors in Israeli society and, military service or the lack 
thereof, creates a major barrier to attending higher secular education. Primary education as a 
building block towards higher education is crucial. Many ultra-Orthodox institutions have 
decided to limit the amount of secular material students are taught from a very young age. 
This has a snowball effect on later secular learning, even if the military aspect is not an issue. 
This can also be indicative of the different subgroups we are analyzing, since perhaps 
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someone who is multilingual has been able to receive a higher level of secular education due 
to the bilingualism. This will again be a crucial determining factor in the overall study of 
integration as, for a very large part, integration relies on an educational path that ultimately 
ends in acquiring marketable skills in larger society. 
 The second question in this part asks what subjects were the focus of the participant’s 
education, and this question speaks again to the particular aspects of one's education that are 
determinants in the successive levels of education, as an institutional policy as well as on an 
individual basis. 
 The third question is: Do you believe your education was sufficient? This asks 
interviewed subjects if they believe that their primary education, again, was sufficient for 
them to continue on their educational path, or if their education created a barrier towards 
integration in the future. This obviously balances cultural and religious subjects against 
secular subjects. Ultimately, finding a compromise between the ultra-Orthodox and secular 
segments of society relies on finding equilibrium between the use of these various subjects to 
create a well-rounded and in-depth education. 
 The next question continues in the progression of educational-based questions and 
asks: What type of post-primary education did you receive? This could be composed of 
various types of education, whether secular, religious, et cetera. The next question asks: Did 
you attend any other types of educational institutions such as higher-level religious 
institutions, university, college, vocational school, and so forth? This asks the respondents, 
all of whom are above the age of majority, to chart their educational progression and to recall 
any potential stumbling blocks such as military service or a lack of prerequisites to continue 
onto the next educational level. The question that follows asks: Do you feel you have 
additional educational opportunities available to you? This question speaks to the potential 
and ability of the interview subject to continue with his or her education, again keeping in 
mind the potential barriers through military service, social situation, cultural acceptance, et 
cetera, that could prevent or enable one to continue with education. 
 Finally, the last question in terms of education asks: How do you see yourself 
compared to the Haredi public? This asks for the interview subject’s state of mind to relate 
how that individual sees his or her education in contrast to the wider ultra-Orthodox 
population in Israel and what that means. For the particular subset of the population we are 
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examining, this could have interesting repercussions in which there perhaps could be a bias 
towards a particular aspect of educational integration while maintaining bilingualism. 
 
 Political and social terminology 
 The next main section asks definitions of political and social terminology and 
personal opinion. This asks interview subjects to define and express how they feel about six 
particular terms. These terms were chosen for various reasons, as will be explained. The first 
is Toratam Omanutam, which literally means “Torah is their vocation,” “Torah study is their 
vocation,” and speaks to the concept that for some, higher education in religious subjects is a 
full-time vocation. How far this has gone is an issue of much debate that focuses on whether 
the system is broken and in need of fixing or operates perfectly within the guidelines created 
by the state. The second term that is to be defined is self-governance, which speaks to the 
compromises able to be made in integration. Naturally, giving up certain aspects of self-
governance is a key component of integration in a larger context, and aspects of the 
sovereignty religious leaders have in, for example, Halacha, Jewish law, can come in conflict 
with civil law enacted by the government. Finding a compromise on such issues is a crucial 
component towards integration. The third term is religious society, how one sees religious 
society and how that individual defines it. The next term is rabbinic authority. Because of the 
combination of state and religion in Israel, rabbinic authority takes on both a legal and 
governmental role, in addition to individuals maintaining their own rabbinic guidance and 
counsel. How the interviewed subjects define and feel towards rabbinic authority is crucial to 
understanding how various aspects of cultural integration can be broached with the larger 
ultra-Orthodox society. The fifth term is Halacha, Jewish law. The last is social assistance. 
Social assistance is a cornerstone of many of the contentious decisions between the ultra-
Orthodox and secular societies, each maintaining that it provides more benefit for the other. 
Defining the interviewed subjects' feelings towards social assistance is crucial to 
understanding the frame of mind of the ultra-Orthodox population. 
 
 State and religion 
 The following section asks interview subjects their impressions of recent events 
involving state and religion. There are four primary questions dealing with recently charged 
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political topics. The first group of questions relates to a situation in Jerusalem in which the 
local city government decided to keep parking lots open on the Sabbath and how the ultra-
Orthodox responded. The second group of questions asks interviewed subjects their 
impressions of the state taking religious considerations into account when dealing with 
archaeology. Archaeology is a highly contentious issue in Israel as it often deals with human 
remains and how those remains are treated. The stringencies or leniencies that are followed 
by the government as determined in Halacha are often a major point of contention between 
the ultra-Orthodox population and the secular government. The third group of questions asks 
about a case of civil servants—social workers—getting involved in a suspected case of ultra-
Orthodox child abuse and the ensuing problems. The fourth group asks about a recent 
Supreme Court decision regarding the desegregation of a publicly funded religious school in 
the town of Immanuel. In this situation, various factions claim that their religious beliefs 
were being pitted against the supremacy of the Supreme Court, and the ensuing compromises 
lend an interesting perspective on the potential to reach compromise in the future and speak 
to the ultra-Orthodox perception of the ultimate civil and religious authority in the state of 
Israel. 
 
 Social, state, military, and employment issues 
 The final part asks questions regarding social, state, military, and employment issues 
in four groups. The first group asks questions regarding religious identity in Israeli society 
and defining some of the social structures such as the centrality of marriage in ultra-Orthodox 
society as well as leadership roles and general perspectives on the outlook for social relations 
in Israel. The next group of questions asks general impressions of the state of Israel, and 
interview participants were asked to discuss how the state and Judaism are linked. They were 
then asked, given the state of affairs, if they think the present situation is viable in the long 
term plus other questions regarding religious freedoms and the overall ongoing controversy 
regarding the Orthodox community in Israel. The third group of questions in this section asks 
about military service and the opinion of the interviewees regarding mandatory military 
service in Israel, the potential effects that this policy can have on the ultra-Orthodox, and the 
interview subjects’ opinions regarding programs specifically designed for the ultra-Orthodox 
community as an alternative to military service. Finally, the fourth grouping of questions 
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inquires about economic issues in Israel, such as the interview participants’ opinions on the 
job market in Israel, and if there is a bias towards the ultra-Orthodox community or other 
issues in terms of access to education and the job market. 
 
 American Haredim 
 Using American Haredim for this research project presents numerous benefits and a 
perspective to understanding some of the fundamental issues that face the ultra-Orthodox 
community. There is a significant difference between ultra-Orthodox Jews in the United 
States and ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel. Ultra-Orthodox Jews in the United States are well-
integrated, and many do not see a conflict between receiving an education and participating 
in society as a method of social advancement without impinging on the cohesion and 
character of their societies. As assimilation is an ever-growing threat, maintaining their 
cultural identity has taken on a role of prime importance. 
 Since interview participants have a detailed and nuanced perspective of the Haredi 
community in Israel, as well as the larger Haredi world view, the research data are able to 
shed light on many attitudes, beliefs, and values shared by the ultra-Orthodox community. 
The importance of using American Haredim is that for the most part, American Haredim, 
who are defined as being Israeli and Haredi, are expatriates of Western countries ranging 
from North America to Europe, Australia, and New Zealand. Dual perspectives not only 
allow issues affecting the Haredi community to be discussed, but also offer the point of view 
of those from liberal democracies. For example, the United States allows discussion of 
church and state issues in the context of Israel without reverting by default to religious-
themed dialogue. While throughout the interviews, this did occasionally happen because the 
interviewees all had experience with religious rights in other contexts—they understand the 
separation of civil and religious issues—the perspective that they brought forth was very 
different from that an Israeli Haredi would have presented. 
 The interview participants, therefore, act as key informants with unique information 
pertaining to their current transplanted culture in society, and, at the same time, they are to 
some extent outside the main discourse in the Haredi community in Israel. As in many other 
contexts, many American Haredim have formed subsets of their community: Being American 
Haredi for many forms an alternate element of their personalities and informs their 
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experience in the larger Haredi community. The interviews are able to be generalized and 
help identify sentiments and discontent within larger Haredi society insofar as, in terms of 
religious ideology, interview participants shared many of the same concerns. By using this 
data source, a unique and introspective perspective will be able to be heard through the 
voices of the interview participants, and this allows for dialogue and discussion normally 
outside the sphere of acceptable dialogue within the strictly Israeli Haredi community. 
For example, Eliezer Weiss discusses the perspective of an outside world of 
secularism in the Diaspora. This inside-outside view is quite different in the context of a 
small religious minority facing a far greater secular majority on the outside, as is the case in 
the Diaspora, from the situation in Israel where the outside is Jewish, yet markedly different 
in practice, belief, and observance. Thus, the permutations regarding religion are quite 
different. 
In America things are— an American Haredi is much more open, he knows that there is a 
world outside of Torah—-It doesn't have to be right or wrong, but there is a world outside of 
him, okay?  Where in Israel society is much more closed. ... If you know that there is a 
different world — that you're only part of the world, then you look at everything differently, 
even— so if you're in Israel and you're more open, then you know that there is such a thing as 
people who don't keep Torah and mitzvot. They're still Jewish, not everybody without a 
kippah is a goy. (Interview with Eliezer Weiss, 2011) 
 
D. Entering the Field 
 When I was preparing to start the research, I conducted a sample interview with a 
friend to work on the flow and rhythm of my interview technique. I found that some issues 
came up when discussing certain topics and felt that delving into sensitive topics regarding 
ultra-Orthodox life while wearing a knitted kippah was inappropriate. I normally wear a 
knitted kippah; in Israel, a particular kippah style has a nuanced meaning, and a knitted 
kippah is normally associated with Religious Zionism (for examples of this discussion 
relating to kippah and identity, see Cohen 2007; Grossman 2010; Steinhauer, 1990). Being 
perceived as a Religious Zionist was counter-productive to the initial test interview (even 
though I do not necessary share the fundamental ideology) and, therefore, I decided to “enter 
the field” wearing a baseball cap. I felt that this solution would shorten the time it took to 
explain myself to the interview participants and would not immediately cause them to “put 
up barriers” through a perception that I was doing this research to simply find flaws with 
their way of life. 
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 I believe that this was effective to create a more "neutral" persona to conduct the 
interviews. In fact, one of the research participants asked me in no uncertain terms: “Why 
would a gentile be interested in researching Haredim?” Had I been wearing a kippah, I think 
I would have encountered a greater degree of hostility. On the other hand, had I chosen to 
wear a black velvet kippah, normally worn in Haredi society, I think many of the finer points 
that the interviewees explained to me would not be as detailed, as they would assume I 
already knew the answers and cultural context surrounding the questions I was asking. I 
would also consider the ethical implications of “dressing up” to play a particular part. 
 I prepared various technical elements in order to conduct the interviews for the 
research, such as an adequate supply of batteries or a box of tissues if one of the participants 
became emotional, as well as various writing supplies and my laptop—all the equipment that 
I would need for a full day of interviews. Since the interviews were for the most part carried 
out in a quiet downtown café in Jerusalem, the interviews were generally very convenient, 
and it was easy and accessible to break the ice before each interview by offering the 
interview subjects hot or cold drinks. While explaining the parameters of the project and the 
ethical considerations and obtaining consent, I was able to gauge a baseline from the 
participants and tried to understand a little bit about them and where they were coming from, 
so questions could be excluded from the interview, such as those regarding childhood 
education in Israel, if those were not applicable. This not only made the interview more 
focused and shorter, but it also helped keep the conversation on topic. Since I share a 
common identity to some extent with the interview participants, it was easy for me to 
understand the vernacular used in the interviews and to pick up on certain clues when the 
interview participants wished to elaborate on particular points, and I did so with follow-up 
questions from their responses. Throughout the process, I attempted to maintain a degree of 
detachment (Elias, 1987; Kilminster, 2004, pp. 25–36) in the process, and while interested in 
the responses of the interview participants, I saw my role as researcher and interviewer to 
prompt them to discuss particular issues posed by the interview questions and not necessarily 
to try to influence the interview subjects with my perspectives. This involved active listening; 
while the original questions were posed, we did not engage in a great deal of discussion, 
debate, and contextualization, so the participants were able to come to their own conclusions. 
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 Often participants had no knowledge of a particular question or a particular aspect, 
and these were easily bypassed. Due to time constraints and the number of interviews 
conducted within the relatively short time of just more than a week, the interview time did 
not enable me to engage in extensive conversations regarding the background of particular 
issues and instances alluded to in the thesis. Through this process of trying to streamline 
interviews as well as maintaining active and interested listening within the process, a rhythm 
formed in the interviews that led to focus interviews with pointed follow-up questions as well 
when applicable. I believe that the overall tone and positive interaction through active 
listening and participation helped not only to focus the interviews but also to streamline and 
improve the process from my perspective as the researcher as well as from the interview 
participants’ perspective. They were able to discuss the relevant and topical issues and to stay 
on point to discuss these particular issues and not have the interview devolve into other 
unrelated aspects. 
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Chapter 2 
The Complexity of Jewish Groups in Israel 
 
 This chapter examines the various ultra-Orthodox communities in Israel and discusses 
some of the religious and cultural divides within the ultra-Orthodox community. 
Understanding what makes up the ultra-Orthodox community is paramount to this research 
project and is one of the three research questions. Due to the way the ultra-Orthodox 
community is organized, much is known about the presence of the ultra-Orthodox in Israeli 
society, comprising anywhere from 7% to 15% of the population according to various 
estimates. This is discussed in more detail in the section examining statistics and 
demographics, which includes some of the issues that make accurate measurement of the 
ultra-Orthodox community difficult to impossible. 
 Sociology offers the tools to study the closed world of the ultra-Orthodox community 
in Israel. Giddens states that “sociology is a social science having as its main focus the study 
of the social institutions brought into being by the industrial transformations of the past two 
or three centuries” (1982, p. 9). This can be seen in the dramatic changes that the 
Enlightenment brought, where new ways of countering secularism were sought (such as a 
strong return to Orthodoxy) (Alexander, 2011, p. 288), but these social changes were 
certainly influenced by the rapid transformation of society as a whole. The social impact of 
industrialization, and the changing social organization and patterns of life had a great impact 
on Ashkenazi Jews in Europe and ultimately led to many of the unique patterns of life in the 
ultra-Orthodox community in Israel. Sociology offers the tools to study the wide-sweeping 
social changes on the macro level, to the specific contexts for social transformation on the 
micro level. 
 Due to strict voting patterns within the ultra-Orthodox community, there is often a 
disproportionate ultra-Orthodox say on certain issues that impact the community. This 
process of voting power is examined in greater depth in Chapters 3 and 4. In this chapter, the 
various groups are examined as well as the commonalities they share. While there is often 
agreement on various issues that affect the ultra-Orthodox community as a whole, for 
example, education and national service, there is also much dissension within the ultra-
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Orthodox community on other issues. Examining who comprises the ultra-Orthodox 
communities plus some aspects of the social and political forces at play helps illustrate in 
broad strokes how the community is formed and what aspects it comprises. This chapter also 
focuses on divisions within the ultra-Orthodox community, ranging from disagreements on 
religious policy to the often uneasy relationship the ultra-Orthodox community has with the 
secular governments in terms of the religious bureaucracy. This examination looks at factors 
that bind and support the ultra-Orthodox communities as well as divisive elements in 
religious and public policy. This is applicable to the final section of Chapter 2 as well, which 
examines Zionism and the ultra-Orthodox community, which has both positive and negative 
elements reflective of the varied perspective the ultra-Orthodox community has towards 
Israel and involvement in the public sphere. 
 
Overview 
 Although “millions of words have been printed to define and describe 'Israel' and 
'Zionism,' but stripped to the very nakedness of meaning, Israel is simply the only 
independent state in the world where the adherents of the Jewish faith are in the numerical 
majority” (Glick, 1974, p. 108). While this generalization could be interpreted as the 
description for a relatively homogeneous society, nothing could be farther from the truth. 
Many cultural segments, religious factions, and a diverse social makeup comprise Israeli 
society. Encompassing several major religions, as well as being the spiritual home of 
Judaism, religion is a much-debated issue in society and a political focal point. The 
involvement of government in regulating religious affairs adds another complex dimension. 
The particular details of how the various religions are practiced, administered, and organized 
are issues of the utmost importance to citizens and coreligionists. 
 Religion is a pressing and ever-present issue on the Israeli social and political 
landscape. Reconciling differences among the various religions in Israel is a never-ending 
challenge. As there is no separation between church and state, politics and religion are often 
two sides of the same coin, which can pit religious sensibilities against political pragmatism 
or vice versa. The very basic element of religion, according to Durkheim, is 
a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set 
apart and forbidden — beliefs and practices which unite into a single moral community ... 
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The idea of religion is inseparable from that of the Church, it makes it clear that religion 
should be an eminently collective thing. (1992, p. 121) 
This is indeed the case in Israel, where the organization and administration of religion has a 
social character. 
The phenomenon of Kibbutz Galuyot or the “Ingathering of the Exiles” from the 
Jewish Diaspora also presents unique religious, political, and social challenges, as the pool of 
potential immigrants is immense. “Jews are known to reside in 121 countries, 82 of which 
have permanent organized communities” (Elazar, 1985, p. 276). In a country of ever-
changing political realities, the 
establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, the Jewish [polity] … began a constitutional 
change of revolutionary proportions, inaugurating a new epoch in Jewish constitutional 
history ... [as] the majority of the Jewish people were presented with the opportunity to attain 
citizenship in their own state. (Elazar, 1985, p. 259) 
 
This by no means meant that Judaism in its traditional form was mandated or practiced by the 
Jewish majority. Rather, with the creation of the modern state of Israel, “a new Jewish civil 
religion [took] ... hold in modern Israel ... [a religious] reaction that was not contemplated by 
the pioneers of Zionism; the 1948 declaration of statehood artfully omits any explicit 
reference to God” (Grose, 1985, p. 43). A form of “passive Zionism” is “simply the ideology 
that postulates the historical, political, and religious reasons why that sovereign Jewish 
majority must reside in the land of Israel and no place else on earth” (Glick, 1974, p. 108). In 
the post-establishment state, this has resulted in a form of civil religion. 
The religious practice involved became entrenched in society as “religious forms 
quickly found their way into public occasions.… [One example of this is] even the non-
observant reaching for skullcaps as the Knesset reading of a Psalms commences” (Grose, 
1985, p. 43). Perhaps this is an element of a unified “civil religion”—a unifying device used 
to connect and reconcile the differences among the varied Israeli populace. As Sharkansky 
points out, 
as the world's only Jewish country, Israel reflects the impact of its politics on Jewish beliefs 
and traditions developed over ... more than two millennia ... [including] the notion of the 
Chosen People and the belief that Israel is the land promised to the Jews by God. (1997, pp. 
45–46) 
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Unifying these disparate elements through a secular state ideology utilizes grounding in a 
common religion to promote a shared vision of society.  
Religion, as a function of government, garners extensive government supervision and 
support. The governmental supervision of religion extends to what can be termed the 
“personal sphere” of affairs. For example, the government of Israel funds both religious and 
secular educational institutions, with this funding extending to Jewish and non-Jewish 
schools. In addressing the divisions of religious practice, it is important to note that Orthodox 
Jewish law only applies to Jewish citizens of Israel through the administration of the 
Rabbinate, a government-appointed ministry. Other religions in Israel are managed through 
their various religious authorities, such as the Christian Church or the Muslim Waqf, who 
almost exclusively govern the practice and administration of their religions. While there are 
some exceptions, generally, religious authorities have a great deal of control and oversight 
when dealing with their coreligionists. The current system is a continuation of the millet 
system from the Ottoman Empire and gives a certain amount of autonomy to religious 
communities to govern their own affairs. This is the basis for the contemporary public/private 
divide of religious rights (see Englard, 1987; Bentwich, 1964; Goldstein, 1991). 
There are several other contentious issues related to religion and religious freedom, 
such as the controversy regarding the Law of Return. The Law of Return, originally 
conceived in the pre-state British mandate, is the process whereby the government grants 
citizenship and residence to Jewish immigrants (Grose, 1985, p. 43; Smooha, 2002) on the 
basis of their religious affiliation. Recent decisions have shown that residency rights will not 
be granted to converts except in the case of “children of female converts who are born after 
the mother's conversion was complete” (Lipton, 2002, p. 41). This more closely follows the 
definition of matrilineal Jewish status as defined by the Israeli Rabbinate. This narrow 
definition is normally outside the operating parameters of other government ministries that 
govern immigration, such as the Absorption Ministry. It is important to note that similar to 
religious policy and control in the personal sphere, the Law of Return, which normally has 
wider criteria for determining who is Jewish and who is able to return, is still decided by 
stringent ultra-Orthodox policy. 
Government policies on religion, as a result of ultra-Orthodox control of certain 
ministries as well as a strong political power base, lean towards policies mandated by 
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Orthodox Judaism, to the exclusion of other streams of Judaism. There are many such 
examples, indicative of a 
deep religious divide in [the] ... Jewish state where the secular and Orthodox have co-existed 
under a fragile “status quo” set of rules governing everyday life.... Under such guidelines, 
non-kosher restaurants flourish in Tel Aviv but there is no public bus service in the free-
wheeling city on Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath. (Heller, 1993) 
While there is religious freedom, certain aspects of religious policy are jealously controlled 
by a religious minority. 
 Generally self-segregated by choice in order to preserve their religious way of life, 
the ultra-Orthodox face numerous ongoing campaigns to integrate them into the larger 
society, often a slow, difficult process. The integration of ultra-religious citizens into the 
larger society “exposes them to the opportunities embodied in modernization and technology 
... nevertheless, these influences do not ... [affect] religious belief or ritual observance, which 
continue to be rigorously kept” (Rebhun and Levy, 2006, p. 394). While ultra-Orthodox 
members of society seek to remain sheltered and tend to be religiously uncompromising, 
there are trends in other directions towards integration. Examples include such recent 
phenomena as ultra-Orthodox individuals joining the military, with a resultant change in and 
a gradual shifting of perception towards national service. Military or national service is the 
required entrée needed to gain access to the wider Israeli society. It is the path to 
employment, social integration, and one of the key experiences shared by nearly all citizens. 
The key point to stress is an ongoing campaign of integration rather than assimilation of 
religious individuals. 
 Secular Israelis are going through a cultural shift as well, as there has been movement 
towards understanding and integrating a “deeper connection to Jewish sources” (Rebhun and 
Levy, 2006, p. 394). This can be done in a wholly secular fashion, incorporating Jewish 
history and culture, rather than strict religious observance. Secular Israelis have noted that as 
society becomes more exposed to outside influences, and as the country becomes more 
concerned with materialism, there is a movement to counter the “rapid penetration of 
materialistic culture, which ... [is seen as a threat] to the spirit of Zionism and its values” 
(Rebhun and Levy, 2006, p. 394). It is of paramount importance to note that there are many 
opposing views of Zionism, which do not particularly incorporate religion. 
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Traditional schools of Zionism asserted the Jewish identity in nationalism; the [Zionist] 
pioneers were typically social democratic, relegating religious observance to the realm of 
superstition.... They [found] the essence of Judaism not in Israeli nationalism alone, but in the 
religious expression of the Bible and the Talmud and the traditions that have developed over 
the centuries in the Jewish Diaspora. (Grose, 1985, p. 31) 
 
With the rapidly changing dynamic of Zionism, social and religious facets of society are 
constantly changing. The balance of these factors and the perception society has of this 
reality in all segments of the population are constantly portrayed as important factors in 
Israeli politics and social discourse. 
 The religious landscape in Israel comprises various groups that include numerous 
minority religions with protected status recognized by the state. Primary religious groups are 
those of the Jewish, Christian, Muslim, and Druze faiths, with a small percentage of citizens 
of Israel making up various religions such as Baha'i and others. The contributions of these 
various religions towards society as a whole take a pivotal role in both the ongoing 
discussion and debate within the democracy as to equal rights, funding, education, etc., and 
the general advancement of all citizens regardless of religion. 
The terms “religious” and “traditional” in the Israeli context encompass extreme 
confusion in theory and are difficult to apply in practice. For the majority of Israelis who 
label themselves traditional, the word “‘traditional’ describes a group in the middle ... who 
follow many time-honoured Jewish practices as a matter of custom but are not devout or 
strict in a religious sense” (Dowty, 2001, p. 173). Exact statistics are not available on the 
religious landscape because the definition of one’s level of religious observance depends on 
how individuals define themselves. Because of this lack, it is difficult to gauge complex 
religious data in a tangible format, such as the census. 
The primary step in analyzing the numbers of religious versus nonreligious people in 
Israel and the many shades of religious affiliation in-between requires detailed demographic 
data that are at best unreliable or simply unavailable. As observances are both a mixture of 
personal practice and bureaucracy, divisions are difficult to measure quantitatively. In fact, 
“a closer look at demographic data indicates that religious observance, by Orthodox 
definition, is at best holding the line. For this purpose the simple division into religious and 
non-religious ... does not adequately capture the range of practices” (Dowty, 2001, p. 173). 
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The situation is further complicated by the way in which religious observance is categorized 
by religious society, as well as by the larger secular population. “Most surveys for the Israeli 
religious observance use threefold self-categorization of ‘religious’ (dati), ‘traditional’ 
(masorti), or ‘secular’ (hiloni or lo dati) to describe the population” (Dowty, 2001, p. 173). 
These labels do not accurately describe the complex elements and nuanced particularities of 
religious observance and the corresponding social groups formed through mutual interest. 
 A unique facet of institutions in Israel is that there is a historical character to both the 
terminology and the references made in Israeli society regarding the various offices and 
ministries of the state. While there would normally be a close similarity across many nations 
that rely on a similar system, for example, parliamentary liberal democracies, in Israel these 
are given unique terms, which correspond to historical or biblically-linked institutions. This 
includes the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, and notably, the 
Rabbinate (Berman, 1999).  
The modern state of Israel encompasses both the ancient and the new and must deal 
with the distinctions between a modern secular state with institutions developed and 
patterned after a progressive European model while integrating traditional, historical, and 
religious elements. Thus, it is an all-encompassing democracy that accepts and supports both 
religious and secular viewpoints, although the religious underpinnings of these institutions 
are interpreted very differently in the ultra-Orthodox community. 
 
 The ultra-Orthodox population 
There are numerous descriptions of the religious demographic divisions within the 
Jewish population of Israel. While estimates do not deal with many smaller groups, they do 
provide a generalization of the various demographic factions. Some estimates approximate 
that 4.5% percent of the Jewish population is Haredi, one-third is traditional, and half are 
secular (Lipton, 2002, p. 38). According to Stadler et al., “the Haredi community now 
comprises between 6 and 10% of the Jewish population ... the two largest Haredi 
concentrations are in Mea Shearim (Jerusalem) and Bnei Brak” (2008, p. 219). Israel's 
Central Bureau of Statistics states that “the Haredim ... constitute 8% of Israel's population, 
or some 600,000–700,000 people. It is the fastest-growing segment in Israel” (Beck, 2010, p. 
22). Wagner maintains that “where once ultra-Orthodox Jewry was merely a splinter group within 
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the minority of Israelis who identified themselves as religious rather than members of a secular 
majority, the ‘black hat’ Haredim have grown in terms of both absolute numbers and political 
influence in recent decades” (2010, p. 49). This is further complicated when some studies show 
that “twelve percent of Israelis define themselves as religious, 13% identify as traditional-religious, 
25% as 'traditional-light,' and 42% as secular. Among religious Jews there can be found Zionists, non-
Zionists, and anti-Zionists. None of these groups can be described simply” (Beck, 2010, p. 22).  
According to Koretz, “the [ultra-Orthodox in Israel] ... population growth, which doubles its numbers 
every 17 years, may bankrupt Israel's welfare system in a generation. Meanwhile, opposition to its 
privileges rises” (1999, p. 30). Moreover, “with birthrates three times the Israeli average, haredi 
influence is growing — increasing tensions. Only five percent of Israel's population in 1990, 
Haredim are expected to account for one in three Jewish children under age 14 by 2028” 
(Mitnick, 2010, p.1). This leads secular Israelis to question and worry about the impending 
demographic shift (see Berman, 2000). It seems that with Haredim as a small minority, social 
and religious issues are contentious, yet they still allow for compromise with the secular 
majority. Once the balance of demographic and political power shifts, the future seems much 
less certain to many secular Israelis. 
 The labels of traditional and secular are unique in the Israeli context in that 
“traditional Jews practice many Jewish traditions, but do not consider themselves religious 
… [and] secular Jews observe some Jewish religious traditions” (Lipton, 2002, p. 39), but are 
not traditional. The majority of religious Jews follow some form of practice, which is divided 
among many streams of Judaism such as Conservative, Reform, Reconstructionist, 
Humanistic, feminist, and others. It is important to note that in Israel, the only officially 
recognized stream of Judaism is Orthodox, and government policy is set accordingly, 
although there are a number of exceptions. An additional 20% of the overall Israeli 
population is Arab. Of those, 80% percent is Muslim, 10% Christian, and 10% Druze 
(Lipton, 2002 pp. 39–40). As a society, “Israel is definitely not a melting pot society, but 
rather a mosaic made up of different population groups coexisting in the framework of a 
democratic state” (Fleischer & Gal, 2007, 62). This is indicative of the tensions among 
various religious authorities, as well as intra-group pressure to control the state-backed 
aspects of religious policy and legislation. 
A more recent demographic survey puts the numbers at a total population of “6.4 
million people in Israel, 77.8% are Jews, 17.3% are Arabs, and the remaining 4.9% are 
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Druze, Circassians, and others” (Fleischer & Gal, 2007, p. 61). Exact numbers on religious 
breakdown are often difficult to quantify as 
Israel has [a] high level of informal segregation patterns because of its current multiethnic, 
multicultural, multireligious, and multilingual populations ... [Although] there is no official 
policy separate sectors within the society are self segregating, maintaining their deep cultural, 
religious, ideological, and-or ethnic identities. (Fleischer & Gal, 2007, p. 61) 
 
In addition, there are small Evangelical Christian and Jehovah's Witnesses communities 
throughout the country. A number of Christian missionary groups operate in Israel; while it is 
technically illegal to proselytize, these groups are generally tolerated. 
 
 Religious divisions 
This thesis asks: Who are the ultra-Orthodox, and by extension, how is Israeli society 
composed? There are many implications to quantifying the subjects of this research: If there 
is, indeed, a pressing social or policy issue, how widespread is the problem, and how best to 
address it? Quantification of the population in Israel in terms of religious tendencies is 
difficult as “there is no simple way to determine how many Israeli Jews are secular or 
religious, or, among the religious, how many are Orthodox, ultra-Orthodox, or traditional” 
(Sharkansky, 1997, p. 155). The questions posed in the census are themselves inexact and 
subject to change, as religious observance can be nuanced and often does not fall neatly into 
the predefined categories above. 
There is a majority who consider themselves Jewish but secular. There are those who call 
themselves Modern Orthodox ... who feel their beliefs are not incompatible with modern life. 
Meanwhile, the ultra-Orthodox, known as Haredim in Hebrew, strictly follow Jewish laws 
and believe that much of modern life possesses a threat to their spirituality. (Devi, 2005, pp. 
15–16) 
 
Factoring in political and social issues not related to religion further obscures composition of 
religious leanings in Israeli society. 
 The research specifically looks at the Israeli context; however it is important to note 
that there are a significant number of Israelis, from across the religious spectrum, living 
outside of Israel (Ember & Ember et al., 2004, pp. 137–138). As statistics are generally 
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compiled only on residents of Israel when examining religious divisions within Israel, this 
issue of the Diaspora is not addressed here, but would be interesting to examine. The 
influences and interactions related to state and religion between the Diaspora and Israel are 
certainly present in various contexts; examining this relationship could reveal new directions 
for the study of religion in Israel. 
 
 Perceptions: the Haredi community 
 The ultra-Orthodox community at large portrays itself as the sole legitimate form of 
Judaism, with exclusive authority to adjudicate laws that, in its view, ought to be based on 
the ultra-Orthodox interpretation of Judaism. This perception is integral to the internal 
struggle within Israel over the sense of control and the ability of one particular group to 
influence government policy in terms of religion, as well as internal control over members of 
a particular religious community within the larger religious sphere. This also extends to the 
framing of the debate over the place, character, and nature of religion in Israeli society and 
control over the future of Judaism and the meaning of Judaism in the larger context as well. 
This movement towards control and the self-perception of ultimate legitimacy by the ultra-
Orthodox community leads inevitably to a clash between the diverse elements of the 
religious spectrum and the decidedly secular camp. Secular advocates attempt to wrest 
control from the ultra-Orthodox community in order to control the “middle” of society, 
which is the largely traditional centre. 
 This ongoing push and pull can be analyzed in terms of the many small battles waged 
among the various sides, but the war on the whole must take into account the sensibilities of 
the large complacent middle that spans the spectrum of religious observance in Israeli 
society. This ongoing societal debate over control has interesting and far-reaching 
consequences not only within the context of the ultra-Orthodox community, but also with a 
myriad of other minority issues within Israeli society at large. 
 The process through which a gradual societal shift is changing within the ultra-Orthodox 
community to strengthen their position and maintain longstanding traditionalism in a face of 
assimilation integration has two opposing processes taking place. The first is an ongoing 
withdrawal and constriction into the closed ultra-Orthodox community. This involves a 
retreat into a particular world view, re-entrenching the textual basis for communal life, 
strengthening values within members of the community, and gradually increasing the redirect 
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used in relation to external potentially secularizing forces. The second, a diametrically 
opposite process, takes place where there is greater engagement with secular society, and this 
is done through utilization of the tools provided by the larger Israeli society to accomplish the 
goals of the community. This involves public funding for religious personnel, increasing the 
number of government-appointed religious figures, raising funding for political purposes 
through lobbying political organizations, and generally using the tools provided by the state 
to fully utilize the significant minority numbers the ultra-Orthodox community represents 
voting in harmony on numerous issues. … There is also … growing involvement of the 
Haredim in Israeli politics and their territorial expansion into previously non-Haredi 
environments, [which] has resulted in confrontations over living space and allocations of 
resources in the local and national sphere (Don-Yehiya, 1999, p. 93). 
 
This leads to a disproportional influence on certain policies, particularly those concerned 
with public funding for ultra-Orthodox institutions and other factors. This process can be 
observed as inherently contradictory whereas the ultra-Orthodox community on one hand 
withdraws from the public in order to reinforce the moral and social dictates of the religion, 
yet on the other hand, seeks to entrench this position by using tools born in a secular 
ideology. 
The expanding influence and visibility of Haredism in such varied domains as education, 
philosophy, law, entertainment, and politics point to one of the most pervasive struggles for 
legitimacy and authority within contemporary Jewish public life, its source of knowledge and 
imagination, its bonds of affect, and its markets. (Stolow, 2010, p. 1) 
 
 This points to an interesting misconception regarding the ultra-Orthodox community 
in Israeli society as a whole in that for all parties, including the large disinterested centre, 
there is a symbiotic relationship between the ultra-Orthodox community and the various 
stakeholders in the state and religion debate. For the majority of Israelis, there is a certain 
degree of ambivalence and acquiescence that religion in some form is part of the Zionist state 
ethos though not necessarily something that is put into practice on a regular basis. Having 
someone in the country practicing what is perceived in the ultra-Orthodox community as the 
only legitimate version of Judaism, in fact, lends a degree of credibility to the secular state 
even if for the ultra-Orthodox their religious practices do not involve Zionist ideology. This 
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symbiotic relationship is perhaps a reflection of the uneasy balance of Zionism as a tool to 
support a secular state ideology that incorporates Judaism. Specifically, the day-to-day 
practice of Judaism is influenced to change the larger context of what it means to be Jewish 
and Israeli. 
 The ability of a secular majority, who could seek to free themselves of the ultra-
Orthodox community completely, exists. They could be able to dictate to minority group 
policies reflecting an all-encompassing secular ideology. This is not done, however, because 
there is a degree of interdependence between secular Israelis and the ultra-Orthodox 
community, perhaps even the religious community at large, and each can stake a part in the 
Jewish state and its role in governing state and religious issues. Relegating religion to the 
private sphere would preclude the Jewish religious commonality, upon which Zionism seeks 
to expand in order to unite citizens from various backgrounds in the Diaspora into a common 
reality (or identity). 
 The process of the ultra-Orthodox community managing perception and determining 
their place in society involves give and take and the utilization of resources and privileges. At 
the same time, there is a redefinition underlying the fundamental premise of national service 
(as a major example) and the place that national service takes within society. The ultra-
Orthodox community views its religious contributions of paramount importance and superior 
to the physical contributions of secular society in terms of national service. There is inherent 
conflict with secular Israelis that underlines the fundamental lack of understanding between 
the two camps. Understanding the centrality of religious versus secular aspects is a key 
aspect to understanding how differing opinions over the place of religion can be understood 
and interpreted. In many ways ultra-Orthodox thinking represents an ideal conception of 
Jewish society, perhaps not attainable even within that restricted community. 
 As noted, the ultra-Orthodox and secular segments engage in a struggle to control the 
placid and inactive middle in both corporal and spiritual matters, with important implications 
for the future of Israeli society. The basic identity of what it means to be Jewish and Israeli 
perhaps can be extrapolated to the fundamental meaning of contemporary Judaism in the 
Diaspora. 
Haredi and secular Israel are on a “collision course,” says Yossi Klein Halevi, a fellow at the 
non-partisan Shalom Hartman institute in Jerusalem, which focuses on Jewish affairs. “The 
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situation is untenable. The ultra-Orthodox separate themselves from the rest of the Jewish 
people. They refuse to participate in the burden of defending the country. They insist on 
being subsidized for their separation and lack of participation,” he says, adding that Israel is 
too preoccupied with the Arab conflict. “The ultra-Orthodox situation is a long-term 
existential crisis, but the Israeli attention span is dominated by short-term existential crises.” 
(Mitnick, 2010, p. 1). 
 
 Ultimately, the perceptions that the ultra-Orthodox community has towards secular 
society, and vice versa, relate to the fundamental meaning of integration. How will 
integration fare in the face of the constant threat of assimilation? Are there significant 
impacts on the population and societal order by compromising or altering certain premises, 
such as the integration of the ultra-Orthodox community into the workforce while at the same 
time retaining religious values? This can be observed having been successfully done in other 
societies, such as the United States, and represents the unification of disparate values relating 
to the administration of religion and the freedom to practice and live in harmony with the 
larger society. This issue is seen on many levels from the individual integrating into the 
workforce, to national service, to the expansion of separate communities moving farther apart 
from the mainstream to create enclaves of coreligionists. All of these aspects lead to 
fundamental disharmony on the fault line of state and religion, and while there has been no 
clear victor emerging over the course of this disagreement, there is no question that the war 
being raged over the spiritual future of the state of Israel has great stakes for the religious and 
secular camps alike. With each side carefully calculating strategies and plotting the 
weaknesses of the various elements, there is a great deal of concern to win the war over the 
future of religion in terms of political, social, and public opinion and to balance these factors 
in order to gain support by the predominantly secular majority. 
In addition to the undue influence that many Israelis feel the Haredim hold in government, 
they are also aggravated by the fact that Haredim are extended full voting rights and social 
services while at the same time are exempt from military service. This particular issue has 
become a sticking point because compulsory military service is central to the life and identity 
of all secular Israelis. Most Israelis resent that the Haredim garner the benefits of a 
burgeoning economy and a strong military while contributing little to either. Ultra-religious 
Jews, on the other hand, feel that the majority of Israelis are not truly “Jewish” because they 
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rejected traditional ways of life. As a result, relations between secular and ultra-religious 
Israelis have been characterized by hostility and mistrust. (Simon, 1998, p. 15) 
 
 Of the ultra-Orthodox community itself, however, there are numerous religious 
factions, groups, and sects, who vie for control on numerous fronts. Yet all maintain a 
commonality in their joint opposition to fundamentally altering their way of life and being 
swept up in the secular ethos of the state. They are, therefore, united on this particular front, 
and this could extend to other aspects of policy as well. 
 
A. Who Are the Jewish Religious Groups? 
 This chapter deals with a number of issues relating to Jewish identity in contemporary 
Israeli society. Among them, issues such as Jewish identity, religious affiliation, recognition 
of various religious groups, the politics of religion, and government policies and 
implementation relating to the administration and the bureaucracy of religion are explored. 
These are complex issues because, at the fundamental level, “queries as to 'who is a Jew?' are 
in Israel largely a matter of who is a rabbi, and in a country where rabbis are paid by the 
state, that is an inherently political question whose outcome is determined by the results of 
the ballot box” (Wagner, 2010, p. 49). Politics and religion make the allegiance of Jewish 
Israelis fractious and complex. Examining a number of Jewish religious groups leads to the 
emergence of a more detailed picture of the contemporary religious landscape in Israel.  
 This section examines the roles of various segments and streams of Judaism, all of 
which form elements in the discussion about what religion means in the Israeli context and, 
indeed, argue as fundamental tenets of Jewish identity in the state of Israel. The ongoing 
debate about the spirit and rules of Judaism are, therefore, crucial not only to the religious 
segment of the population, but also to the entire society as long as everyone is governed by 
the same religious dictates translated into government policy. 
Defining Jewish religious groups speaks to the fundamental underlying difficulty of 
reaching a definition (within the Israeli context) of who is a Jew. In Israel, this transcends the 
question of religious doctrine as it relates to the fundamental identity of an Israeli citizen. 
Indeed, citizenship, nationality, and religion speak to the very essence of identity. This 
concept will be explored in depth throughout the thesis. In short, a country that defines itself 
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as the Jewish state and delegates authority for religious matters as well as uses the 
government bureaucracy to police religious elements creates a system that is quite opposite 
from the American separation of church and state. Rather, in the Israeli context, this becomes 
not only an issue of conjoining synagogue and state but also a charged political issue. The 
definition and acceptance of various religious groups in Israel are differentiated to a greater 
degree than in the Diaspora because of the authoritative administrative powers religious 
groups receive in Israel through the administration of state religion. 
 
 1. Sects and segments 
 This section examines various sects and segments in religious Israeli society and 
provides details on various facets of each to provide a broad picture of the various factions 
involved in religious society and politics. 
 
 Haredim 
 There are many differences among the various groups of Haredim in Israel and 
various factions within those groups as well. This pertains both to differences within 
religious factions themselves as well as with ultra-Orthodox communities in the Diaspora. 
Although the ultra-Orthodox community may at times present itself as a homogeneous 
entity—this can be a factor with similar modes of dress and action—many divisive factions 
regularly differ on politics, religious doctrine, interpretation of religious texts, and many 
other issues. Ravitzky explains that 
Haredi Jewry is composed of many diverse factions each of which differ[s] significantly from 
the others: Hasidim as against Mitnaggedim; Lubavitcher Hasidim as against those of Belz; 
Agudat Israel as against the Jerusalem Edah Haredit—each loyal to its own path and each 
with its own rabbi (and one may include among these also the followers of the Shas—the 
Sephardic Torah Observant). (1996, p. 146) 
 
Nevertheless, many commonalities are shared among most groups, including a fundamental 
understanding of how religious texts are interpreted and a particular, organized pattern of 
social life. For example, 
a basic Jewish belief maintained by the haredi community is that the Torah (“Law”) given to 
Moses comprises the “Written Law” (the first five books of the Bible) and the “Oral Law,” or 
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the explanation of the Written Law as relayed over the years by Jewish scholars and compiled 
in the Talmud around the year 500. (OECD, 2010, p. 167) 
 
Generally, among many Haredi groups in Israel, the power structure is that of a top-
down institution: Religious leaders interpret texts to give meaning to decisions based on how 
to live in a contemporary setting as well as to answer problematic issues relating to religious 
observance on all levels, from the personal sphere to that of the larger society. “The Torah is 
considered authoritative and to provide a set of codes (‘Halacha’) on what to do in almost 
every imaginable circumstance” (OECD, 2010, p. 167). However, as the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) goes on to explain, “By its very nature, 
human interpretation of the Law differs, and within haredi groups, rabbis or rabbinical 
authorities have the final say on the practical interpretation of Halacha” (2010, p. 167). Many 
groups are led by their religious leaders on matters both religious and secular, often 
consulting on issues of religious policy with others in a chain-of-command-like structure, as 
well as consulting with the religious political leadership who seek guidance from leading 
rabbis from their organizations on what the correct and religiously prescribed direction is to 
follow. “For public policies to be effective, it is thus important to convince rabbinical 
authorities” (OECD, 2010, p. 167). Utilizing these avenues of control is the best strategy to 
connect with a population largely out of touch with traditional forms of media and 
advertising. 
 However, it is important to note that although at times Haredi society, particularly if 
looked at as a snapshot in the contemporary social experience, can be viewed as a stagnant 
environment, there is, nevertheless, a great deal of change and shifting priorities in order to 
adapt to meet new challenges from assimilation, secularism, and the outside world. This has 
become more pronounced in the Israeli context as the outsiders, those who present a very 
different reality from the ultra-Orthodox community, speak a common language, share many 
common values, and, indeed, a common religion. Bridging the gap between this type of 
secularization is, therefore, is perceived as an even greater challenge to the ultra-Orthodox 
hierarchy. 
 In order to meet changing social and political pressures, a great deal of change has 
occurred to incorporate religious dictates and policies into new social adaptations. Examples 
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of this phenomenon are varied and include many religious decisions to incorporate the 
unique aspects of Jewish observance in the land of Israel, such as controversies about the 
proper procedures for the sabbatical year among ultra-Orthodox Jews. The ultra-Orthodox 
community faces many challenges in terms of integration and modernization within the 
context of Israeli society, such as various aspects of the creation of the state, modern 
technology, etc. It is important to note that many decisions made by rabbinic leadership have 
incorporated technological or other advances within the framework of existing texts and 
reconciled new paradigms of social coexistence with these factors; yet, at the same time, they 
have rejected many perceived dangerous outside elements that would have great secularizing 
or assimilative components. 
 The fundamental patterns of life and organization have stayed the same for many 
ultra-Orthodox Jews and their communities in Israel. Various cities built as ultra-Orthodox 
housing projects maintain elements of this lifestyle. This is due to social and political 
developments in Israel and also to a familiar style of existence that recalls many facets of life 
in a previous era, such as living in an all ultra-Orthodox community with rabbinic leadership 
consulted on the most mundane of matters in order to create a religious society without 
external influences, at least on an interpersonal level. 
In Brooklyn, Paris or London's Stamford Hill, the Haredim are ... a harmless reminder of life 
in Europe's vanished shtetls. At Israel's founding, the State's political leaders looked upon 
them in much the same condescending way.... [Following] the Holocaust, the new State's 
founders were in no mood for a confrontation with them. Why should the energetic young 
Israel care if small group of Jews wanted to dress and behave as if they were still in their 
medieval ghettos? In time, it was assumed, the Haredim would surrender to modernity and 
blend in with everyone else. (A Nation of Tribes, 1998) 
 
In an interview, Yitzhak Cohen stated that he 
view[s] ultra-Orthodox … as a group of Orthodox religious Jews [who] about 250 years ago 
... began observing their Judaism [differently]. They had a leader who they followed to—
every single thing that they do. They took their Judaism to, I would say, a little bit beyond — 
a different level where they dress differently—they try to take certain aspects of Judaism a 
little bit more seriously. They follow their leaders to the utmost degree, a lot more than other 
observant Jews, where they will even dress the same way and follow the customs that might 
not even be as important—they'll follow everything to the nth degree. And they live much 
more secluded lives. They try to, as much as possible, to shield themselves and their family 
from the outside world. (Interview with Yitzhak Cohen, 2011) 
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When asked about the difference between Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox, Cohen went on to 
say: 
For the most part, [the difference between] Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox is a lot in terms of 
appearance. I think that when it comes down to it, most of the religious observant—and when 
I say most, I mean like, probably 80–90% of the activities that Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox 
are doing in their daily lives, are very similar. Perhaps the only difference that I would say, 
besides their appearance in terms of how they wear their hair, and how they dress, and 
certain activities ... that are only appearance-wise, like their wives shaving their head, and 
things like that, is perhaps, the ultra-Orthodox spend their days studying Torah, all day long, 
every day—or, almost all of them, especially in Israel.... They spend their entire days 
learning. I would say, probably 80–90% of the ultra-Orthodox are like that, whereas, just 
Orthodox, without the ultra ... most of them, probably, work, and that's how they support 
their family. (Ibid.) 
  
Through their rejection of elements of modernity and integration, many Haredim see 
Religious Zionism as a direct threat to their way of life. They see the combination of Zionism 
with religious belief as being fundamentally incompatible, and often the priorities of the 
ultra-Orthodox community are very different from those of Religious Zionists who partake in 
various state institutions and see progress through integration. “Haredim ... have an attitude 
towards Zionism that ranges from passive acquiescence to outright hostility. Such hostility 
extends to modern Orthodoxy, a branch of Judaism that has enthusiastically embraced 
Zionism” (Wagner, 2010, p. 49). 
 The interpretation of texts by rabbinic leaders is a practical approach that speaks to 
the social organization of everyday life and various questions that arise. From daily life to 
political and social organization to the very highest level of politics, rabbinic leaders are 
consulted to ensure proper following of religious tenets as interpreted from religious texts 
and provide a social template by which adherents live their lives with the hope of leading an 
ideal lifestyle based in the values of Jewish law. 
 While throughout this thesis, and indeed in common usage in Israel and the Diaspora, 
the term Haredi is used homogeneously, Haredi society is in fact composed of many 
segments, often on very different ends of the Haredi spectrum in terms of core beliefs, 
organizational structure, and priorities. For example, 
at first glance many people tend to group all Haredi Jews into one category, that of “black 
hats.” However, a closer look at the Haredi world shows it to be a multifaceted society, at 
times supra-geographical, at other times with marked differences between similar Haredi 
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communities in different countries, and even between different Haredi communities in the 
same country. (Baumel, 2003, p. 91) 
 
To generalize, Haredi society is organized as a top-down administration, in which leaders of 
society, who are the most renowned rabbis for an individual sect, act as leaders in spiritual 
and religious matters and often in secular political matters, as well. “Haredi movements are 
organized from a pinnacle downward, the pinnacle being the da'at Torah, the 
unchallengeable theoretical-theological religious wisdom regarding a specific wisdom as it is 
expounded by a given movement's undisputed religious (and often political too) leader” 
(Baumel, 2002, p. 161). While there are many differences among the various Haredi groups, 
including numerous localized traditions and unique aspects of individual Haredi segments, 
faith, culture, and society, there are many elements that transcend group differences and 
apply to larger groups and form an interconnected network throughout the Diaspora to other 
Haredi communities outside Israel. According to Gopin, 
ultra-Orthodox Jews, including Hasidim, today embrace as isolated a position from the non-
Orthodox world as possible; [for example, in issues such as] the use of secular education only 
for the purpose of making a living, if at all; a literal belief in revelation from Sinai, and a 
much greater dependency on halakhic or spiritual leaders to determine the contours of their 
lives and choices....The lines of who is and who is not Haredi [are] blurry at the edges, with 
people defining themselves in various ways at the border of all Jewish affiliations. (2002, p. 
231) 
  
Haredi society in Israel must often compromise on internal divisions on many issues 
in order to gain political strength through a unified stance in the Haredi world. Many of the 
examples discussed in this thesis, such as large-scale protests, are not necessarily the work of 
one particular Haredi sect or another. Rather, they are issues that have an across-the-board 
appeal, and, as will be discussed in terms of political power, many issues are discussed 
among Haredi leaders, and they present a unified front even though their individual sects 
within the Haredi movement may be at loggerheads due to internal strife or divisions. 
 The present incarnation of Haredi society generally reflects a degree of Orthodoxy 
mirroring that of Orthodoxy in Europe.  
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Haredi society as we know it today first emerged in the aftermath of a rapidly industrializing, 
urbanizing, and nationalizing European modernity, within its ensuing regimes of voluntary 
association and political fractionalization and its expanding realms of economic opportunity 
and cultural choice. (Stolow, 2010, p. 46) 
 
Furthermore, Stolow continues: 
Like any movement that defines itself as an orthodoxy, Haredi-ism was never a static 
expression of tradition. Rather, it was a product of [often cataclysmic] social change, 
precipitating the very need for efforts to systematize, ideologically sharpen, and 
institutionally reorganize the conditions under which one could claim to uphold Jewish 
thought, practice, and moral outlook. It is possible to identify historical precedence of 
religious stringency and asceticism and the Jewish tradition going back to antiquity. (2010, p. 
46) 
  
Though contemporary Haredim do not necessarily reflect Orthodoxy throughout 
Jewish history, there is an element of Orthodoxy that has played a dynamic role in countering 
perceived or real pressure and threats from external secularism, assimilation, or the 
weakening of religious and societal values. Haredi society is based to a great degree on 
textual knowledge as well as that of interpretation, ranging from rabbinic interpretation of the 
key elements in the scripture down to minute guides to the organization and accepted 
practices in everyday life. Contemporary rabbinic interpretation on many issues varies in 
particular sects, yet there is a great deal of agreement for reasons of religious or political 
expediency stemming from the perceived threat from the secular majority in Israel, which 
often seeks to enforce or determine religious policy through legislative values. 
An interesting facet of Haredi society is identity management, where a particular way 
of life has been developed in terms of social organization and living and is practiced by many 
in society. This development comes through a set of perceived goals for society, and these 
goals are sought through adherence to custom, practice, religious dictates, and many other 
extra-textual interpretations of religious dictates. While the underlying basis for many of 
these dictates comes from religious textual interpretations, numerous social and other 
elements have developed out of the various experiences of ultra-Orthodoxy through the 
generations. “Israel's Haredim ... created a religious culture more insular and controlled than 
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had ever existed in Jewish history. A single kind of personality — the preternaturally pious, 
diligent, and the ascetic Torah scholars — became the ideal that everyone was meant to 
emulate” (Odenheimer, 2007, pp. 86–87). The perceived goals of the ultra-Orthodox 
community are in many ways concerned with the various milestone life events that cement 
membership and belonging in the larger social group. Among the various facets of these 
milestones is an overarching goal of creating a society of Torah scholars and imbuing various 
personality traits in the population. These goals are obviously far-reaching and realistically 
unattainable for each and every individual, yet are commendable ideals for which to strive, 
creating a template for a singular personality type. According to Shaffir, 
the focus on identity management and social control are also captured through an 
examination of status passages including matchmaking, betrothal, wedding, and death. Such 
matters do not simply concern individuals undergoing the experience, and by observing how 
they handle such transitions in their lives, we observe how the community exercises power to 
define and ratify changes in the individual status. (1993, p. 460) 
 
Even though on the surface it would appear that there is not a great deal of 
engagement with secular society at large in the public sphere and that there is a relatively 
stable and unchanging identity, there are, in fact, many vectors for public discourse and 
information, and this is apparent in the world of public and private advertising in Haredi 
society. For example, in the ultra-Orthodox neighbourhood of Mea Shearim in Jerusalem, 
posters and other signs are affixed throughout the neighbourhood about events, notifications, 
ideological controversies, and so forth. “A public face of the Haredim ... is analyzed through 
... their posters' text and subtext. In addition to signaling rivalries and varying perspectives in 
the community, they also serve as markers identifying appropriate and unacceptable 
behavior” (Shaffir, 1993, p. 460). In a society in which some do not read newspapers and 
others read only newspapers presented by their particular faction or group, the publicizing of 
information in this manner in the public sphere makes the Haredi world very sensitive to 
political and social change happening around them. Even though Haredim are generally not 
perceived to be involved in the secular affairs of the state or society at large on a practical 
day-to-day basis, this can be interpreted both politically as well as an ongoing apparent 
sensitivity to many issues, such as “adapting to environmental, political, and social 
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circumstances, and acting on opportunities which their particular configuration offers” 
(Shaffir, 1993, p. 460). 
 Ultra-Orthodox life in Israel generally takes the form of a socially constructed 
template for Haredi life. There are various complex social codes in which conformity of 
dress, actions, behaviour, gender roles, and religious observance are of the utmost 
importance. These codes are organized into both the public and private facets of Haredi life 
in terms of observance as well as social performative norms. Adherence to these strict social 
codes creates additional pressure to self-segregate to be able to form a society where these 
precepts and codes can be observed without extraneous pressure from secular society. 
Haredi[m] may identify with various traditions related to geographic locations … or 
philosophical orientation such as Hassidism—–a more spiritual approach to Judaism.... 
[S]ome outward manifestations, however, are common to all Haredim, including modes of 
dress that are modest and tend to be uniform, particularly for males; relatively specific gender 
role expectations; central values of marriage and large families; strict prohibition of male-
female physical contact before marriage, and explicit rules governing contact after marriage; 
daily prayer and study, more communal for men than for women; living in Haredi 
neighbourhoods and, wherever possible, making use of exclusively Haredi communal 
institutions. (Ribner, 2003, p. 54) 
 
Through this process of self-segregation from secular society, the ultra-Orthodox community 
is faced with a dilemma in terms of public funding for institutions. It is not desirable or even 
practical to segregate completely from secular society as a whole. Rather, moving to 
distinctly ultra-Orthodox neighbourhoods and seeking to establish ultra-Orthodox 
institutions, such as schools and those involved in social welfare, are all methods of 
removing any elements that could have an unwanted influence on ultra-Orthodox life. Yet 
this process comes back to underlying issues related to funding, where the very act of self-
exclusion is required to be funded by secular society, which may not agree with the 
underlying moral and value judgments being made and the reasons for self-segregation. This 
dilemma speaks to the fundamental underlying conflict, where on religious, social, and 
political issues, the two sides—religious and secular society—are simultaneously moving 
apart and coming back together. This arrangement, as discussed later with regard to the status 
quo, is untenable and presents severe demographic and social problems for the future.  
Shapiro 55 
 
 Haredim and Zionists have long had a difficult history. Since the beginning of the 
state, there was and still is a great deal of uncertainty about how to include a social group that 
leads a lifestyle that hearkens back to the norms of the European shtetl. One of the issues 
involved in discussing Haredim is that “the lines of who and who is not Haredi is blurry at 
the edges, with people defining themselves in various ways at the border of all Jewish 
affiliations” (Gopin, 2002, p. 231). Indeed, there are many influences that Haredim 
experience in terms of the political/social reality in Israel. How Zionism fits into this can be 
examined from many different angles. 
 From one perspective, one of the fundamental differences between Zionist thinking 
and that of Haredim is in the paradigm of prayer versus action. Haredim believe that morals 
and purity are a more critical facet than delving into an issue and understanding, or at least 
attempting to understand, and therefore to do the right thing in God's overall plan. Taking 
overt action and trying to control destiny, as Haredim understand the Zionists are attempting, 
is the antithesis of the Haredi outlook. To the Haredim, Zionism denies the spiritual element 
of man’s character and relies solely on the physical plane in interpreting reality. 
 Haredi attitudes range from pro-Zionism to ambivalence to rigid anti-Zionism, though 
it is important to note that attitudes continue to change as many of the social and political 
issues discussed in this thesis are becoming less of a theological debate and more a matter of 
practical social expediency. 
 Within the Haredi community, there are various components to ultra-Orthodox belief 
of the Torah, or law, and how it fits together with the practical social application in day-to-
day life, starting with the written law and the oral law. The written law is the Five Books of 
Moses and other original texts (on which Judaism developed); and the oral law, comprising 
the discussions of early rabbinic authorities culminating in the Mishna and the Talmud. As a 
whole, these works are viewed collectively as the foundation of Halacha, or Jewish law, and 
prescribe both an extensive legal code as well as practical living and fundamentally represent 
one particular true path (see Weisbard, 1990; Cooper, 1987; Sagi, 2007 for various aspects of 
this). Through time, arguments and disagreements about the various methods of 
implementation and the interpretations that sages and scholars have given in previous works 
throughout the years, led to the system of Halacha, many facets of which are open to 
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interpretation, as arguments on various points may have continued over hundreds of years, 
and which has historically given a certain flexibility to Jewish practice. 
 According to the organization of Haredi society, questions of fundamental importance 
about practice or theoretical aspects of Halacha, and even those at a lower, mundane, 
everyday living level, are asked of various rabbis arranged on a religious basis unofficially in 
a hierarchy. In this hierarchy, each successive rabbi, from the community leader to the sage 
of the generation, will have someone to consult as the particular issue warrants. This system 
also has a parallel in the organization of the government-sponsored rabbinate, which is in 
charge of Jewish affairs insofar as state issues and religion intersect. In contemporary Haredi 
society, typically men will continue to study Halacha, including recent decisions and 
contemporary issues in Judaism as well as ancient texts, in a formula of studying, reviewing, 
and advancing religious information. “Their central social institution is the yeshiva, where 
male students study and interpret the Talmud (oral law), the only subject that males are 
allowed to study” (Drory, 2009, p. 163). At the same time, women in the society will 
generally tend to be the breadwinners and go outside the home, or even outside the 
community, to work (Benor, 2012, pp.10–11; United Nations, 2009, pp. 408–409; Stadler, 
2009, p.120). The gender division of labour has an interesting and significant impact on the 
roles of individuals in the ultra-Orthodox community.  
 Because of the top-down structure, social change comes through the structured 
hierarchy of rabbinic leadership and experience. This is apparent in all four cases discussed 
in this thesis where state and religion, or the power imbalance between religiosity and 
secularism, come into contact. Through a consultative process with religious leaders, many 
social problems can be avoided, and this could present one aspect of the way forward. 
 It is important to note that Haredim, when dealing with the secular majority, do not 
necessarily take a passive role in promoting and defending religious interests. In contrast, 
there is a generally apathetic attitude towards religion by society at large, which means that 
the ultra-Orthodox not only have a great deal of hegemony in religious matters, but this can 
also lead to “further radicalization of the fundamentalist-religious camp” (Sheffer, 1997, pp. 
122–123). As a result, trying to influence civic matters on a national scale, particularly as 
they relate to matters of religious importance to Haredi society, is often at loggerheads with 
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the particular focus on maintaining control, funding, and low interference from secular 
society. 
 Ultra-Orthodox society in the Israeli context has generally tended to separate itself 
from secular society in a form of self-exclusion. This happens for a number of reasons, such 
as avoiding assimilation and integration in what the ultra-Orthodox community views as a 
secular majority losing fundamental traditional religious values. At the same time, there are 
other processes at work, such as an institutionalized exclusion through various processes, as 
will be discussed in the context of academia and military service, in which two opposite 
forces contribute to the ultra-Orthodox community at large pulling back from secular society. 
“[Haredim] are considered anti-Zionist and irrelevant to Israel's development.... By choosing 
to live in 'ghettos' of coreligionists, Israel's Haredim have been marginalized in virtually all 
civic matters” (Drory, 2009, p. 163). Liebman explains further: 
These religious communities have become increasingly insular for a variety of reasons. They 
now possess the resources and the talent to satisfy the demands of their adherents in realms of 
culture where, only two or three decades ago, religious influences were not to be found. 
Secular Judaism, once a lively component of Israeli culture, is now moribund. To put it 
another way, if one is raised as a religious Jew and continues to harbor strong commitments 
to the Jewish past, one has nowhere to go outside of the religious community. (1998, p. 408) 
 
 Who are the Haredim? 
 It is important to note that the majority of the religious community, divided as it may 
be, works in concert with the government and secular society on the social and political front. 
The religious community as a whole seeks partnerships in order to, among other things, forge 
a greater degree of autonomy and allow for various social arrangements, as discussed in the 
section relating to the status quo. These arrangements provide for religious sensitivities 
extending beyond the personal sphere to become elements in considering new policy 
decisions. This extends to many areas discussed in this thesis, such as education, social work, 
integration, military service, etc. While there are clearly various forms of interpretation and 
engagement with the wider Israeli society, the underlying tensions are unique to this social 
context. 
Because some Haredim are considered anti-Zionist and, therefore, are excluded from 
the national process as Haredi society often focuses on special interests related more directly 
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to their society, these perceptions create a very difficult impasse to breach on both sides in 
terms of integration and accountability to larger social and political issues. The following 
sections detail some of these challenges with the larger secular society, as well as identify 
various divisions within the ultra-Orthodox community. Even though collectively there can 
be a great deal of social and political power wielded by the ultra-Orthodox community, when 
this willingness to address certain issues is divided on various points, it creates a difficult 
situation of diluted social and political power, as well as lack of a clear consensus towards 
the various issues. “[The ultra-Orthodox or Haredi sector] has launched a major offensive to 
promote its interests. Both leaders and rank-and-file ... regard this offensive as successful, and this 
perception has led to further radicalization of the fundamentalist-religious camp as a whole” (Sheffer, 
1997, pp. 122–123). The vying for power in both political and monetary aspects is critical to 
the ultra-Orthodox community in order to maintain its ideology and way of life. In other 
words, there is a great deal that must be done in order to preserve the status quo. 
 It is essential to clarify that the fundamental issues relating to Haredi society, culture, 
and organization are not characterized by an anti-Zionist approach, though this does feature 
in small minority factions among the ultra-Orthodox, such as the Neturei Karta. These groups 
do not participate in the political process, and their ability to influence public policy is, 
therefore, very limited. In this particular case, groups that are overtly anti-Zionist seek to 
maintain an even greater degree of autonomy than requested by the remainder of the ultra-
Orthodox community, such as a separate education system, but go even further not to accept 
funding from the state and privately fund all their communal institutions.  
 Haredi society presents itself with links to history in an unbroken chain. The 
current organization of society envisions itself to be a direct descendant of previous 
generations going back to biblical times (OECD, 2010, p.167). This perception is difficult to 
reconcile with contemporary orthodoxy found in Israel today, as many facets of the 
contemporary ultra-Orthodox community are historical and social responses to increased 
orthodoxy. Haredi society is based on organizing principles and religious practices that 
emerged in the Ashkenazi European Diaspora and various party politics or lack thereof 
preceding the formation of the state of Israel. “Within the ultra-Orthodox community there 
are…groups following different rabbis and traditions…according to their European 
Ashkenazi or Eastern Sephardi origins. There is also a gamut of different political views, 
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ranging from nationalistic to even anti-Zionist” (Devi, 2005, pp. 15–16). Nonetheless, the 
current organization, formation, and top-down approach of Haredi society on matters of 
religious doctrine as well as political and social issues have a great effect on members of the 
ultra-Orthodox community, and while organizationally, their society may not represent that 
of biblical times, spiritually, many believe that there is a clear connection to the underlying 
fundamental context of the ultra-Orthodox experience. Baumel describes the origin of the 
term Haredi:  
Although the term [Haredi] is biblical [from Isaiah 66:5], its contemporary use began only 
during the latter half of the 20th Century. Initially utilized by speakers of Hebrew to denote 
any Jew who is punctilious about his Jewish practice, the term gradually came to designate 
those Jews whose style in life, worldview, ethos and beliefs went beyond what many people 
seem to understand by “Orthodox.” (2003, p. 91) 
 
 The concept of Orthodoxy can be perceived as a response to various historical periods 
in which assimilation and a process of secularization provided constant pressure on 
maintaining a discrete Jewish and observant identity. As various movements arose and 
sought to change the primary experience, various modifications were made to counteract 
these forms of social mutation. This constant process of trying to reach homeostasis through 
observance of religious doctrine, cultural nuances, and the various factors in which society is 
internally governed has become increasingly complicated. With the involvement of an 
official state religion (in which religious practices, laws, and customs become translated into 
bureaucratic missives and governmental decisions) that often does not reflect the letter of 
Jewish law, but rather the spirit, the compromises made and the religious elements acceptable 
to society are increasingly complex. This fight for the very soul of the Jewish experience is 
fundamental to the Haredi way of life in Israel and is expressed through many avenues by 
maintaining a degree of religious control of the personal sphere through bureaucracy, voting 
power, and other means. Dowty explains further:  
Haredim are “fundamentalists” … [with] “a … a strategy, or a set of strategies, by which 
beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their distinct identity as a people or a group.” This 
involves the selected retrieval of “fundamentals” from a sacred past and their use as a 
bulwark against the dislocations of modernization. It is … an innovative re[-]creation of a 
political and social order characterized by authoritarian leadership, strong discipline, a 
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rigorous moral code, clear boundaries, and an identified enemy. All these elements appear in 
Haredi society, whose roots go back over two centuries to Jewish resistance in the 
Enlightenment and the prospect of integration into European culture. (2001, p. 164) 
 
According to de Lange, fundamentalism is a  
term of Christian origin but now extended to other religions, designating a disposition to 
interpret texts literally and treat them as infallible. Jewish fundamentalists maintain an 
unquestioning in the divine source and inerrancy not just of the Biblical teachings but of the 
oral law as well.... This belief is characteristic both of modern Orthodoxy and of 
traditionalism. Fundamentalists typically turn their backs on manifestations of modernism 
and secularism, and believe that the world can be saved from these dangers by the 
maintenance of an ancient faith of which they are the custodians. (2008, p. 111) 
 
This takes many different forms, but an ongoing retreat to what is perceived as traditional 
values and patterns of life has been taking place among ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel. 
 Haredi society is not necessarily a cohesive unified front in either politics or social 
terms. While outwardly there may be similar, though non-identical modes of dress or 
political leanings, there are many internal divisions and factions competing along the same 
lines. It is important to note, though, that many of these groups do share a great deal in 
common and often compromise on political and social matters for the greater good. 
Decisions by one group can reflect a negative pressure against the ultra-Orthodox community 
as a whole, and this is taken as an affront to many groups that generally would not 
necessarily be involved in these issues. This extends as well to internal divisions within 
various groups, which often for reasons of internal politics, practice, customs, etc., are at 
loggerheads with each other about the proper ways that one practices religion and the cultural 
elements that go along with this degree of religiosity. Nevertheless, “this movement 
promotes stringent interpretations of Jewish law, intensive study of Jewish texts, and 
submission to the authority of a narrowly defined rabbinic elite” (Stolow, 2010, p.1). Beck 
notes that “while the term Haredi ... appears in the Bible (... Isaiah 66:5 and Ezra 10:3), its 
modern political use can be traced to the 1920s, when the Agudat Yisrael was founded in 
Poland to counteract the secular-Zionist movement. Participants in this countermovement 
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were called the Haredim” (2010, p. 22). This new utilization of the word has connected the 
ancient contextual meaning with the new social-religious phenomenon.  
 Historically, particularly leading up to the creation of the state of Israel, and during 
the Holocaust period, for example, ultra-Orthodoxy was viewed as outmoded and failing, 
particularly in light of the great secularization forces at play in the prewar era. Upon the 
foundation of the state of Israel in 1948, many viewed ultra-Orthodoxy as merely a response 
to secularizing pressures and maintained that in the context of the new Israeli reality, they 
would no longer feel threatened and would soon integrate and assimilate into secular society. 
In fact,  
most secular Israelis assumed that the Haredi way of life was disappearing and looked on the 
Haredi neighborhoods of Jerusalem and B'nei Brak as living museums to be visited before 
they vanished entirely.... [T]he experience in Eastern Europe and Palestine before the 
Holocaust had been one of rampant assimilation. Few of [the] children, it was felt, would 
resist the pull of the modern world. [Thus], it was easy to be tolerant and even generous in 
granting Haredi demands [such as] military exemption for yeshiva students [and] funding for 
their separate educational networks. (Dowty, 2001, p. 179) 
 
However, the exact opposite has been true, and Haredi society has undergone revitalization 
and renewal in ultra-Orthodox social and cultural life in Israel. Though statistics are not 
exact, ultra-Orthodox Jews, as well as Israeli Arabs, are two of the fastest growing segments 
of the Israeli population. There are various factors attributed to this, but overall there is no 
question that ultra-Orthodox life continues to flourish in Israel. Many of the social issues 
surrounding this increase in demographics have either not been addressed or have been set 
aside in favour of status quo style arrangements, and this has led to increased pressures and 
various challenges in society. Through the thesis, these issues will be explored, and possible 
solutions discussed.  
 It is interesting to note the influence of Ashkenazi Haredim and many of their 
experiences in Europe that have translated into elements of cultural identity on the Sephardi 
Haredi population. Many religious Sephardim identify with the predominantly Ashkenazi 
Haredim, despite a degree of backlash to cultural and religious homogenization. This process 
can be distinguished through the advent and increased power of the Shas party, a Sephardic 
ultra-Orthodox political party with Haredi overtones. While this movement has sought to 
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establish a unique Sephardi religious identity, many ultra-Orthodox Sephardim maintain the 
trappings and outward appearance of Ashkenazi Haredi culture.  
 This is important as many Sephardim, who maintain a more easygoing and indeed a 
more congenial relationship with those outside their immediate sphere of influence and with 
secular society as a whole. These cultural vectors are very important in understanding the 
overall Haredi society and its disparate influences, particularly when it comes to inter-
factional politics within Haredi society. According to de Lange,  
the Haredi movement unites Chasidim and Mitnaggedim, despite their historic divisions. 
Haredim affect a distinct style of dress; the men wear beards and side locks and black coats 
and hats, while married women have shaven heads, covered by a wig or headscarf, wear 
modest clothing that hides most of their bodies. Haredim in Israel are increasingly violent in 
their hostility to modernizing trends, particularly to secular Zionism. (2008, p. 53) 
 
While this description is perhaps too specific and identifies merely a subset of the Haredi 
population, Caplan points out, that for some segments of Haredim, “‘Western culture’ is 
associated with a large number of historical events, personalities and processes that are 
perceived negatively ... the Jewish enlightenment movement (Haskalah), the rise of Reform 
Judaism, secularization, Zionism, and the more recent trends of assimilation and 
intermarriage” (2006, p. 272). Orthodoxy presents a pattern that casts a far wider net than 
mere external appearance. It is a response and a reaction to perceived threats and a 
contraction inward towards age-old and familiar values and culture, often taken to an 
extreme. 
The question when one studies religion in Israel, particularly religious groups or 
subgroups such as the Haredim, is to define who comprises the group and to look at 
particular statistics or data regarding population levels. This is particularly difficult in the 
context of Israel as the census does not necessarily pinpoint specific membership in religious 
subgroups; rather, the census merely asks if one identifies as being religious. In Israel, 
approximately 85% of the population identifies itself as being traditional, as observing some 
elements of Halacha, or Jewish law, and not others. Approximately 15% of the Israeli 
population represents itself as being religious, although it is difficult to quantify this, as it 
may be, depending on the religious criteria used, as high as 30% or as low as 10% to 15%. 
These numbers have recently ranged from 10% to 28% in one recent poll (Arian & Shamir, 
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2011, p. 284). In terms of numbers, “the Israeli ultra-Orthodox population in Israel did in fact 
double in size between 1979 and 1995, from about 140,000 to 290,000, and is on track to 
double again by 2011” (Berman, 2009, p. 89). How the varying degrees of religiosity across 
the spectrum of Israeli Orthodoxy relate to the study of Haredim, of a subsection of ultra-
Orthodox Jews, is difficult to determine. According to Ravitzky, 
as a generic term ... “Haredi Jewry” may be artificially and only valid from the perspective of 
the outside observer who sees surface manifestations, but not the underlying conflicts of 
philosophy and outlook. This problem certainly presents itself when we consider the variety 
of Haredi attitudes towards the existence, laws, mores, and activities of the sovereign Jewish 
state in the current (i.e., pre-messianic) era. That issue stands at the center of a sharp conflict 
within the Haredi community.... [Therefore,] we must begin with a question, what common 
characteristics do these groups in fact share? (1996, p. 146) 
 
Even more so, unlike many other demographic values of the overall population, religion 
cannot be divided on ethnic lines, such as Ashkenazim or Sephardim, or indeed on 
socioeconomic or other lines, as the Haredi subsection of the population has members in 
many of these different movements. There has been an ongoing trend towards greater 
religiosity in the European tradition by many Sephardim, such as members of Shas, and this 
skews the ability to pinpoint who are Haredim and to approximate their numbers.  
Generally, it is assumed that Haredim number approximately 10% of the overall 
Israeli population; they have a greatly expanding birthrate, leading to a future increase in 
relative population. Many of the laws and issues discussed in this thesis take into account the 
sensibilities of both ends of the population: the Haredim on one side looking for increased 
recognition by the state and hegemony over their internal affairs, and on the other, secular 
society, which as the majority, seeks to maintain a balance between religion and the state. 
The Haredim represent a visible minority, and, while they can be clearly identified, there are 
many subsections, streams, and sects within the overall general movement. Nevertheless, 
many members are interested in the same direction of religiosity; this is reflected in the major 
religious parties who, due to their large demographic numbers and by using strict party 
voting, are able to overcome largely apathetic secular voters divided by many factious 
parties. Caplan notes that  
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Haredim, like other fundamentalist groups, are influenced by their respective surroundings, 
such as dress, mannerisms, and social and cultural norms. Although this conclusion may 
sound trivial and commonplace, it is noteworthy because Haredi rhetoric tends to insist that 
“Haredi is Haredi is Haredi,” no matter where or when. Be that as it may, the significant 
differences between Haredim in various countries explain why both scholars and laymen 
naturally refer to American Haredim, Belgian Haredim, British Haredim, French Haredim, or 
Swiss Haredim, rather than to Haredim who live in America, Belgium, Britain, France or 
Switzerland. (2006, p. 270) 
 
The term used in this thesis, American Haredim, is indicative of a particular group of 
expatriates in Israel that still maintains social and cultural links with the larger ultra-
Orthodox world. For the purpose of this thesis, by looking at Orthodox expatriate 
communities as a subset of the larger ultra-Orthodox community in Israel, a generalized 
picture of ultra-Orthodoxy in the Diaspora and ultra-Orthodox Jews will be considered. As 
far as relative levels of observance are concerned, these communities—indeed many groups 
having both Diaspora as well as Israeli communities—share very similar observances and 
outward trappings. The fundamental lifestyles of ultra-Orthodox communities in the 
Diaspora have very similar social underpinnings, and the motivating factors for study, 
observance, and maintaining a particular way of life are nearly identical. 
 The obvious large disparity between ultra-Orthodox communities in Israel and the 
Diaspora is the effect on religion in the public sphere. While private-sphere affairs relating to 
the trappings, beliefs, and events of everyday life may be identical, as far as public policy is 
concerned, there are obviously great differences when it comes to the separation of church 
and state. Although the focus of life in, for example, political aspects, may be varied, there 
are elements that make the Diaspora ultra-Orthodox experience unique. The ultra-Orthodox 
in the Diaspora are living among a greater degree of cultural assimilation and are surrounded 
by cultural influences that may not be present in a more homogeneous setting in Israel. This 
leads to various social allowances among Diaspora communities, such as interest in sports 
and some cultural activities, which are not necessarily discouraged to the same degree that 
they would be in a comparable society in Israel.  
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Although some ultra-Orthodox adherents in the Diaspora partake in listening to and 
participating in a culture of secular music, this is not necessarily condoned by the society or 
its institutions. Caplan points out that  
it is quite common to find American haredi yeshiva students who listen to ... music ... 
associated in their world-view with the American popular culture ... and some will even 
attend live concerts ... notwithstanding the fact that it is forbidden in some yeshivas and 
regarded as inappropriate in others. (2006, p. 272) 
 
While these liberties are not condoned per se by the larger ultra-Orthodox religious 
community in the Diaspora, there is a level of acceptance and cultural and social integration.  
The trappings of secular life are inescapable when living in a greater secular society. 
To this end, while there are many similarities between ultra-Orthodox communities in the 
Diaspora and Israel, a fundamental difference remains at the level of relative segregation 
with the larger society. Due to the separation of church and state in many parts of the 
Diaspora, the ultra-Orthodox community in Israel has a very different outlook and different 
priorities towards religious rights influencing the public agenda and their impact on the 
private sphere.  
American Haredim or other ultra-Orthodox Jews living in the North American 
Diaspora or other locations of large ultra-Orthodox communities throughout the world have a 
very different way of integrating and reconciling the differences between their religious 
culture and that of the surrounding secular population. For example, a culture of sports and 
music, common elements that are found to be of great interest among the surrounding 
population, are followed with a level of interest in American Haredi society. “Many Haredi 
yeshiva students faithfully watch National Football League and National Basketball 
Association games.... Some of them know a great deal of sports information and statistics, 
such as the players on each team, their personal and team records” (Caplan, 2006, p. 272) 
Sports is perhaps a more acceptable form of engagement with secular society as it 
does not require questioning basic religious, moral, or social tenets of the society, though the 
private lives of professional sports players leave something to question. 
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Though this is not exclusive to the experience in the United States, the generic term 
American Haredi refers to the blending of external and internal societal priorities. This 
balance is exemplified in the following description:  
A large number of ... rabbis, teachers and spiritual leaders frown upon their students taking 
part in activities associated with “decadent” Western culture, especially when they become 
involved in activities that resemble religious worship, such as sports. However, some rabbis 
and teachers will occasionally mention a team or an outstanding player in their sermons or 
lessons, in order to show that they are up to date. (Caplan, 2006, p. 273) 
  
It is important to note that when it comes to elements of religious observance, dress, 
or lifestyle, American Haredim remain outwardly homogeneous and in many respects 
resemble their coreligionists in Israel. However, in the United States, there is an element of 
underlying Haredi values that are shared with the cultural or civic identity of the surrounding 
society, and to that extent, there is a great degree of involvement in the larger social and 
political spectrum. American Haredim engage within limits and seek to be a part of the larger 
social society in a relationship based on give and take rather than on domination through 
politics or religion in contrast to Israel where Haredi society is also generally, to a great 
degree, self-segregated. In Israel, through time, the Haredi experience has become more 
insular and does not concern itself as much with the external trappings of secular society.  
While there is still a great degree of interest among younger Israeli Haredim in certain 
sporting events, this is frowned on by a much larger segment of society than in the United 
States. However, “awareness of the average Israeli Haredi yeshiva student on...aspects of 
Israeli culture [such as sports] is far more limited....He knows very little about local 
basketball and soccer leagues…or...genres of popular music” (Caplan, 2006, p. 274). In fact, 
there are elements of secular society, such as sports figures, used as teaching examples or in 
sermons in the American context, that create a relatable and identifiable example for use in, 
for example, a religious analogy. This is one of the fundamental underlying elements of the 
duality that is explored between Haredim in Israel and Haredim not native to the Israeli 
context. For American Haredim, having an external identity, such as being able to identify 
with concepts of liberal democracy and a plurality of opinions, as well as the elements related 
to institutional rigidity, set them apart from their Israeli coreligionists. As the issues 
regarding state and religion are more flexible in the American context and the experience of 
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the Diaspora differs greatly from the Israeli context, such as the pressures that American 
Haredim feel towards assimilation, the unique insights American Haredim bring to the study 
of the ultra-Orthodox community in Israel are examined in depth in the thesis. According to 
Fader,  
Hayim Soleveitchik ... suggests [that in postwar North America], the “diminution of 
otherness” evoked a new vigilance among the second-generation Haredim. He notes that in 
voluntarily separate communities… there must be a continual reinforcement and heightening 
of difference. A central area where Haredim claim Jewish difference is increasingly stringent 
interpretations of sacred texts that they cast as the true essence of a shared Jewish past, 
although the texts actually reflect contemporary concerns with accuracy and 
authenticity....This invention of tradition was shaped not only by the experience of historical 
rupture but also [by] new opportunities for Jewish participation in North American life as 
citizens. (2009, p. 13) 
  
Moreover, the OECD points out that “in the United States, Haredi rabbinical 
authorities allow their men to strike a balance between study and employment to provide for 
their families....The suspicion towards employment participation is much more a feature of 
Haredi communities in Israel than elsewhere in the world” (2010, p. 167). This is because 
employment is a complex first step into a secular society which the Diaspora is constantly 
surrounded with; this is much less the case in Israel, where the ultra-Orthodox community is 
generally more insular. 
 Being American Haredi (or English speaking and at the same time ultra-Orthodox) is 
in itself an inherent conflict. When interview participants were asked what it means to be 
American Haredi compared to Israeli Haredi compared to simply American, interesting 
nuances appeared in how they define the intersection between these dual roles. These relate 
to cultural integration. They relate to the way in which individuals interact with the society 
around them, not only on the surface but also in terms of education, employment, and life in 
general. The attitudes towards the outside world also vary greatly, and this comes out in the 
various interviews. 
Well, I would say the difference between an American ultra-Orthodox and, let's say an Israeli 
ultra-Orthodox, I personally believe that the American ultra-Orthodox are a little more 
integrated into society. An American ultra-Orthodox Jew is more likely to be in the 
workforce. Especially if you're in New York, you'll land up working in the diamond district or 
many other similar type of activities. I believe that, in America, they are a little bit more 
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focused on just American cultural things. That's because it's a little bit harder to shield 
themselves and their children that may follow sports, and they—you know. I have a friend of 
mine that's an ultra-Orthodox American. He's a big football fan, a New York Giants fan. You 
could find that more here [in America], whereas in Israel, which I'm understanding from 
your question that you're contrasting, it may be to an Israeli, that in Israel, they don't—
they're really quite sheltered, and you know, you find that if any of the ultra-Orthodox starts 
wanting to become a little more involved in the—I guess you can call it secular culture—they 
completely shed any connection to their Judaism. They completely get rid of all their, you 
know, everything that they're doing. There's no real middle ground at all....So the American 
ultra-Orthodox still will look the same, I would say, as an Israeli ultra-Orthodox, but in terms 
of culture, I think they're a little more integrated; in terms of working, they're a little more 
integrated; and perhaps you could also say that, you know, an Israeli ultra-Orthodox will 
strictly speak in Yiddish to everybody in their family. And they probably do that as well in 
America, but I would say that they're more likely to speak English as well there. (Interview 
with Yitzhak Cohen, 2011)  
 
It is interesting that in the following interview, Yitzchak Cohen delineates the internal 
conflict between Torah observance and secular political ideology. Due to the political 
ideology, where there does not seem to be fundamental agreement in terms of how various 
individuals stress their commonalities such as in the Diaspora, in Israel, there exists a certain 
degree of tension in order to control the dialogue around religion and the power from the 
state that accompanies it. 
I think American-Haredi, as opposed to Israeli-Haredi, is a little bit more open-minded 
because of the type of society that Americans come from. In America, since it's not a Jewish 
state, there's no contradiction of being a good citizen and being a Torah Jew. In Israel that's 
a problem because being a good citizen and being a Torah Jew could be two opposite things. 
They don't fit together well, so it creates a lot of problems. An American-Haredi person has 
found a way to live in a secular society; in Israel it's not the case. In America, since Haredi 
Jews have no political power, their only option is to persuade, whereas in Israel, persuasion 
is not an issue because they have political power. And that creates — that rubs a lot of people 
the wrong way. In America, Torah Jews are not a threat to secular society, and because of 
that, there's less of a friction, there's less friction. Orthodox Jews can walk, work, talk, and 
speak with secular people without a problem at all; here it's a little bit different. (Interview 
with Yitzhak Cohen, 2011) 
  
In an interview with Menashe Blum, he seems to make a very clear distinction between being 
a member of a political party and being part of a more closely integrated political identity, 
which takes on many more aspects of connection and involvement with the core group than 
one would find in the Diaspora. This interview also speaks to the clear voting bloc patterns, 
which are seen as crucial in order to preserve a degree of hegemony over religious affairs and 
provide political leverage in order to preserve the ultra-Orthodox way of life. This interview 
also indicates that this must be done through the ultra-Orthodox party mechanisms. An 
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outside party with secular ideology would not be able to provide the same level of tolerance 
or understanding as a religious party would. It, therefore, becomes imperative to vote in 
accordance with the larger bloc. 
In Israel you have to belong to a political party, or not a political party as such — no, as a 
political — you have to be in a political party. Your yarmulke, your way you think, you have 
to belong to a group. You have to belong, you can't be on the outside all by yourself. That's 
why I have a trouble. Everybody in Israel belongs to a party, one party or another, secular or 
religious, they belong to a party. In America, you can be independent, it doesn't make any 
difference, nobody cares. And then for president, you can vote for who you want. But in 
Israel, you have to belong to a party, you have to vote for a party, it's different.  
Interviewer: But isn't it possible to be part of a party with special interests that doesn't have 
religious ideology? 
Respondent: Not if you're religious. If you're religious, whatever that party is, that party has 
a certain ideology which is a religious ideology, and either you're with that or you're not with 
it. If you're not with it, you can't identify with that party. 
Interviewer: So, you're saying that in order to identify culturally, it also leads into the 
political side of it? 
Respondent: Well, religiously, yeah. If you want to say culture and religion are the same 
thing, then yeah. The way you view Torah, the way you view Judaism will influence the type 
of party you belong to. And then you are influenced or you're basically told that you have to 
hold certain principles or certain ideas because you belong to a certain party. (Interview 
with Menashe Blum, 2011) 
  
The idea of insular community is present in ultra-Orthodox society, and Deena 
Friedberg speaks to this facet of societal organization. The close-knit community of Israeli 
ultra-Orthodox members can be at odds with the more outward looking and socially 
integrated worldview of American ultra-Orthodox individuals. The ability to cross this 
barrier and to integrate into the Israeli ultra-Orthodox community can be challenging, but 
ultimately such a transition is possible. There is a degree of validity to the perspective that 
ultra-Orthodox expatriates are able to bridge a cultural gap between the ultra-Orthodox 
community in Israel and the ultra-Orthodox community in the Diaspora. There is also 
discussion of changing shifts and cultural cues, which are necessarily different in Israel from 
what they are in North America. Perhaps one of these factors is the large number of secular 
Israelis who by virtue of speaking Hebrew as their primary language may indeed have more 
in common with the ultra-Orthodox in Israel than secular Jews do with the ultra-Orthodox 
community in the Diaspora. Factors such as language, culture, society, holidays, and outside 
dominant culture all play a role in creating a unique intersection in cultural and perhaps even 
religious organization. 
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Well, I think that's because Israeli Haredim, as well, kind of see the difference. Most of them 
are very cliquish. My husband says that they're not so friendly. I don't know from the men, I 
just hear what he's saying. He says the men all stick together, they all knew one another from 
kindergarten, and, you know, all the way from cheder all the way up, and they're not so 
friendly to outsiders who are, like, the English speakers—not like there's a huge number in 
our community, but there are some. And he feels that they just tend to keep to themselves, 
they're not so friendly and whatever. And they have a more rigid view of things than someone 
who lived in North America and then made aliyah. Like, you know, we have a different 
perspective of things, and like a lot of kids also, like, going through the Israeli school system, 
they also have a more narrow-minded view of the world. Like if they see a man walking in the 
street without a kippah, they'd say, “Oh, he's not Jewish.” My kids too. My kids came here 
when they were different ages. The youngest one was 3, the next one up was 6, 9, and 13. And 
the two younger ones—we put them into school right away, of course, and they started to pick 
up more Israeli values than the two older brothers who already had a North American 
education. And then one time I took them into town, and my little girl was like 3,4, and she 
saw a man without a kippah—“Oh, he's not Jewish.” I said,  
“Yes he is, but, you know, not everybody wears a kippah or he doesn't know he's supposed 
to.” So that's the kind of attitude I think that Israeli kids grow up with…they're more—you 
know, because they live in this very closed society, they have a different attitude than, say, 
kids from North America, where they are more used to the idea of—there are other people out 
there who are not exactly like themselves. (Interview with Deena Friedberg, 2011)  
 
 Policies and goals 
 The policies and goals of the ultra-Orthodox community are generally very diverse. 
Depending on the specific faction within the community, there may be different elements that 
can be negotiated in order to attain a greater degree of social cohesion on behalf of the ultra-
Orthodox community as a whole or around certain particular issues that are interpreted as 
impassable negotiating points for the community. The overall goal of the ultra-Orthodox 
community generally is to form an all-encompassing mode of life that is entrenched in 
textual interpretation. There is an ongoing process of trying to reconcile the textual with the 
practical aspects of people’s everyday lives. This can be perceived both at the higher political 
levels as well as with the dialog within the community itself among different community 
groups.  
Eventually, this cycle of textual interpretation and strictly controlled everyday 
behaviour lead to a point where societal norms become a type of performance steeped in 
textual interpretations and constantly re-enforced through communal involvement in all 
aspects of social life, from the mundane, such as the way in which men and women interact 
in the grocery store, to larger societal issues, such as education, national service, and so on. 
“Within a non-Zionist Orthodox and anti-Zionist ultra-Orthodox there has been an overall 
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trend towards the humra -- increasing stringency and strictness of interpretation and practice, 
over the years” (Avruch, 2001, pp. 154–155).  Even within the community, there are 
disagreements regarding the policies that should be in place regarding such contentious 
issues as the expansion of women’s education.  
Education for girls and women saw the rapid growth of institutions devoted to the rudiments 
of religious life and observance of Jewish law, on the argument that modern Haredi women 
could not be trusted to have received adequate instruction from parents or other informal 
sources. In both Israel and the Diaspora, this included institutions such as Bais Yaakov…a 
federation of primary and secondary schools for Haredi girls closely affiliated with Agudat 
Israel, as well as midrashot (seminaries for adult women's education in Torah), and women's 
study circles and other types of part-time instruction sponsored by local synagogues and 
community institutions. (Stolow, 2010, p. 55) 
  
As bread winners, it is important for women to have accessibility to the job market 
and be able to support their families through a variety of interaction, which interestingly 
often takes place in a secular environment. Yet women’s education is also determined by 
ultra-Orthodox cultural norms, which limit educational options to certain possibilities. While 
these vocations show signs of expanding in the future, there is often a difficult balance to 
maintain between having availability to the job market, having job skills that are in demand, 
allowing for the social characteristic of the ultra-Orthodox community (such as maternity 
leave), and still falling within the regulated norms of everyday ultra-Orthodox life.  
 Throughout this process, which can be understood through the spectrum from 
education to many other aspects of social life, the government has tried with varying degrees 
of involvement to increase the potential of members of the ultra-Orthodox community to 
integrate to a greater degree. This naturally leads to a push-pull situation between the 
autonomy of the ultra-Orthodox community and the potential integration into the workforce, 
considering the particular social difficulties faced by ultra-Orthodox individuals seeking to 
expand their potential economic opportunities outside their social network.  
Ultra-Orthodox schools funded by the State have demanded that they be exempt from 
teaching English and mathematics required in other schools, to concentrate on Jewish studies. 
Against the group demand for autonomy rises the question of individual rights (pupils 
deprived of studying curricula that will allow them later on to choose their way in life, inside 
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or outside the Orthodox community), but also a question of the common good: will these 
students be able later in life to integrate in the job market or will they remain poor and 
dependent on State allocations? (Ben-Porat, 2008, p. 174) 
 
These limited aspects, which show some of the fault lines between various groups within the 
ultra-Orthodox community and the compromises that they seek in order to maintain a 
homeostatic relationship or to maintain a relationship with the rest of Israeli society, 
underline a series of interdependent responsibilities. There are the responsibilities of the 
various schools and educational institutions at all levels, both religious and secular. There are 
the responsibilities of the society as a whole to the individual, both in terms of Israeli society 
to the ultra-Orthodox individual, as well as the ultra-Orthodox community to the individual. 
There is a further layer of responsibility of society to the protection of religion and minority 
rights, and these factors must be balanced in order to maintain equilibrium between religious 
society and the secular community. Even within the various communities themselves, there is 
a great degree of uncertainty, and, as a result, the policies and goals of the ultra-Orthodox 
community are often in flux seeking to find a stable middle ground without necessarily 
endangering their transpositions regarding such things as education and stipends for higher 
level yeshiva learning.  
Mr. Netanyahu…as Prime Minister, is fighting for Haredi schools and yeshivas to teach the 
basics (English, math, and science) to equip their graduates for the job market. It is still a 
fight, every politically sensitive step of the way. The Haredi rabbis and their political parties 
have waxed powerful as vital backers of ruling coalitions. They wrest cash from the state to 
fund the yeshivas. Mr. Netanyahu needs their votes. (The Economist, 2010, p. 50) 
 
This may appear to put the ultra-Orthodox community as a whole and the rest of society, or 
perhaps the government, at odds, yet there is certainly a way to achieve religious fulfillment 
while still engaging the larger society as a whole.  
[A] major element of accommodation is the autonomy of religious institutions and culture, 
which protects the religious subculture from threat of assimilation by a secular society. This 
is especially marked in education, but extends through a network of institutions designed to 
preserve the integrity and vitality of religious life within the national-religious community. 
There is even greater separation in the Haredi community, which has its own courts, welfare 
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institutions, religious authorities, and independent schools. The autonomy is not only an 
expression of Jewish traditions and customs, of course, but is also in some ways a 
continuation of the millet system of the Ottoman Empire. The existence of these networks 
gives the most parties an additional stake in the status quo, since most of these institutions are 
State-supported despite their autonomy (even the “independent” schools in the Haredi 
community receive [full or partial] government funding). (Dowty, 2001, p. 168) 
 
 Mitnagdim and Hasidim 
 Many groups make up the ultra-Orthodox community in Israel. It is important to note 
several specific examples to highlight various aspects of the ultra-Orthodox community. 
These divisions stem from the many different cleavages in Orthodox practice in Israel. These 
differences can include religious outlook and practice, social divisions, political perspective, 
origins, and so on. For example, two opposing groups, generally categorized as mitnagdim 
and hasidim, are often close in religious ideological position. Each group is representative of 
a slightly different religious philosophy and is composed, through various structures, with 
multiple leaders, social groupings, and movements. However, for all the differences between 
the mitnagdim (or opponents of Hasidism), and the ultra-Orthodox Hasidim, there are many 
similarities. These similarities include fundamental elements of religious observance, while 
differences occur in slightly different modes of dress, political attitudes, and social 
organization.  
 It is important to note that the rise of Hasidism and the backlash to it by the 
mitnagdim developed within the past few hundred years. While this movement fits into 
traditional patterns of Orthodoxy, there are many overlaid elements to the expansion of 
mysticism and spirituality in Judaism (Blumenthal, 1978). This led to the development in 
which the mitnagdim of the Lithuanian yeshiva world rejected the authority (and attitude) of 
the Hasidic movement in order to put the emphasis in Judaism back on textual learning and 
interpretation (Nadler, 1999). 
Differences of worship relate to the attitude towards mysticism and ritual and prayer 
as well as to the fundamental understanding and interpretation of the ultimate authority over 
religious matters. In the case of Hasidim, as will be discussed later in the thesis, the rebbe, or 
the leader, is the ultimate authority in the religious hierarchy. This structure imitates a form 
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of European feudalism, and so far as the well-being of the structure is concerned, the group is 
relatively isolated (Mintz, 1992, p. 3).  
For mitnagdim, or the movement that argues for more rational devotion, the result is 
increasingly rational, legalistic, and focused on textural understanding. There is also a shift in 
the perception of rabbinic authority, rather than on particular leaders of personality, followed 
by the community. In the same tight hierarchy, there is a great deal of scepticism regarding 
the inclusion of mysticism and other elements, which are an integral part of religious worship 
and way of life for the Hasidim. According to Eisenberg, Israel Baal Shem Tov, the founder 
of modern Hasidism, who was born in 1698 on the Russian-Polish border, “breathed life into 
a Judaism that had become ossified with the punctilious observance of ritual and devoid of 
any emotional content, and his influence spread to millions of Jews over the next two 
centuries” (1995, p. 2).  
The Hasidic movement offered a transformed and transformative Judaism. Sparked by the 
teachings of...the Baal-Shem-Tov “Master of the Good Name,” Hasidism spread quickly 
through much of Eastern and Central Europe where pogroms against Jews were common, 
and many, especially in Eastern Europe, lived in poverty. Hasidism is messianic. Hasidic 
Jews hope that by fulfilling their religious obligations they will bring the geulah “re-
demption,” which includes an end to Jewish exile and a rebuilding of the temple in 
Jerusalem by God. The Messiah has been delayed, many believe, because of the impieties 
in the Diaspora (Fader, 2009, p. 7). 
 
Many of the schisms between the Hasidim and the mitnagdim date back to an early period 
where a great deal of doubt and misconceptions were formed around the events relating to 
the Sabbatean movement led by Shabbtai Tzvi (Hazony, 2001, p. 288; Menken, 2005, p. 148; 
Wein, 1990, p. 21). In this particular incident, the fundamental element of spiritualism and 
mysticism were debated among the Jewish people, and the tragic ending of the events led to 
one of the criticisms of the Hasidic movement and its organization and thought. When 
Shabbtai Tzvi was ultimately found to be a false messiah, many were turned off by the 
contradiction in the religious belief in redemption, and the unfulfilled hope of a redeemer 
(Wein, 1990, pp. 21–29).  
 Nonetheless, both groups to some extent define themselves as maintaining a link to 
the traditions, teachings, and character of the European-Jewish experience. Its more modern 
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context, which has influenced a large number of Jews in the state of Israel, was one of the 
early facets of the Enlightenment. This form of social and religious upheaval was one of the 
factors that Orthodoxy formed in order to push back against the Enlightenment.  
Other traditionalist Jews based in Lithuania opposed Hasidic Judaism from its beginning, 
arguing that religious authority should come from scholars in yeshivas....These Jews were 
called misnagdim “opponents” (of Hasidism) or, alternatively, litvish “Lithuanians” referring 
to their place of origin or, later on, yeshivish. Litvish Jews followed the authority of the head 
of a yeshiva, rejecting the all-encompassing authority of Hasidic rebbes, the focus on 
mystical texts, and the ecstatic democratizing forms of worship (Fader, 2009, p. 8) 
 
Examining Hasidic groups as a component of the ultra-Orthodox community is important for 
a number of reasons. The emergence of anti-Zionist ultra-Orthodoxy primarily comes from 
the Hasidic sector of the ultra-Orthodox community, and a brief discussion of the foundation 
and various social changes that have happened within this group is warranted within the 
larger context of an analysis of the ultra-Orthodox community in Israel. There are numerous 
major Hasidic groups, comprised of both large and small Hasidic dynasties. They are 
distributed through major cities in Israel and, with a few exceptions, generally live side by 
side within the ultra-Orthodox community.  
Aside from the Bobovers, Belzers, Satmar, and Lubavitchers, the other major Hasidic 
groups are the Vishnitzers, Gerers, and Klausenbergers, Skverers, and Bratslavers, along 
with a smattering of smaller sects. Slightly more than half live in Israel, primarily in the 
cities of Benei Brak and Jerusalem. (Eisenberg, 1995, p. 4) 
 
There are many religious and social differences among Hasidim within the ultra-Orthodox 
community. One key difference is the hierarchy and organizational arrangement that Hasidic 
groups have that differ from other subgroups of the community and the prominence of certain 
beliefs such as the key Hasidic principle of Messianism. This belief in the redeeming 
Messiah returning Jews to the biblical land of Israel is a precursor to various Hasidic 
groups’—among others’—objections to modern day Zionism in the state of Israel. Since a 
key element is the belief in redemption, there is a natural opposition to formation of the state 
in a secular context.  
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 The Lubavitchers are among the most militant of all Jewish groups in their desire to retain the 
territories. The ultra-Orthodox response to this issue is confusing and contradictory. Where 
some Hasidic groups, Satmar in particular, would like to see the state of Israel dismantled and 
the Jews allowed to live peacefully under United Nations or even Palestinian governance, 
there are others, such as Lubavitchers, who while not willing to call themselves Zionists, 
behave like them in the extreme. While they take pains to reject Israel as the resurrection of 
the Davidic kingdom that existed before the destruction of the temple, they see the 
establishment of the State as a sign that the age of redemption is near. (Eisenberg, 1995, p. 
153) 
 
Historically for Hasidim, there have been major shifts from common practice in other ultra-
Orthodox contexts, such as the organizational hierarchy in Hasidic groups with the rebbe 
being the unquestioned spiritual leader directly involved with the lives of followers. This 
more limited top-down pyramid like structure, in which the leader has the ability to interpret 
and be more active in the lives of participants, challenges the rabbinic authority of other 
rabbis who generally are perceived as authorities on various aspects of Halacha in the ultra-
Orthodox community.  
However, as a successful Chasidic movement found itself in the... Jewish establishment all 
over Poland and even further afield, and its leaders themselves confronted the challenge of 
the Haskala, it became less radical in its stance. From ridiculing Talmudic casuistry it began 
to concern itself with punctilious observance of the halachah…and today Chasidim [consider] 
themselves and are considered by others to belong firmly to the traditionalist, Haredi camp, 
together with Mitnaggedim. (de Lange, 2008, p. 323) 
 
While the basic text and liturgy is the same among many of the ultra-Orthodox groupings 
within the community, Hasidism introduced a new dimension of spiritualism and 
reintroduced elements of Messianic redemption and other practices. This sets them apart 
from others in the ultra-Orthodox community through rituals and religious practice as well as 
differentiates the essential philosophy of Hasidic thought from a more staid and textual-based 
interpretation of Judaism as practiced by other elements of the ultra-Orthodox community in 
Israel. Eisenberg describes Hasidim in the following way:  
To most observers, they seem strikingly anachronistic and somewhat mysterious. Dressed in 
the garb of eighteenth-century Poles—fur hats and black overcoats for the men, wigs and 
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long skirts for the women—they seem almost otherworldly. The ultra-Orthodox of today, 
however, are not remnants of another time; they are the green shoots of a vibrant tradition 
that has its roots deep in the soil of Judaism. But it would be a mistake to think of them as 
monolithic. International Hasidism—there are about 650,000 worldwide—consists of a 
number of groups, each with its own unique perspective. (1995, p. 2) 
 
Menashe Blum makes the case that Halacha is all-encompassing, and one who lives 
within the system of Halacha often follows rigid and delineated patterns of life and behavior. 
When issues are not necessarily clearly defined or when there is disagreement among 
religious authorities concerning those issues, there are tensions and conflict within the ultra-
Orthodox community as to where and when an individual is able to be lenient or more 
stringent in his or her approach. This could then create a situation that would be in conflict 
with others in the ultra-Orthodox community, and one could therefore find oneself at odds 
with the consensus in the community. 
I guess Halacha, I would define as religious law as developed, I guess, through modern 
poskim, and that's it. I mean the problem I think would be—is when it's not clearly stated in 
Halacha. When something is clearly not stated in a source and it's just da'as Torah, that's 
where a problem comes in. Where, you know, we believe that somebody that's so steeped in 
Torah becomes like a living sefer Torah, but he integrates all of this Torah and then whatever 
would come out of his mouth would be Torah. But he's now dealing with things which he 
can't really point to and say, this is the Halacha in this se'if of the Shulchan Aruch; it's not 
there. So when you have a problem like that, then you have varying degrees of disagreement 
among rebbeim and then a person has to think on his own—although this is not a haredi 
point of view—has to think on his own and find that rav who speaks to him. And that's not 
always so simple. (Interview with Menashe Blum, 2011) 
 
 Haredi recognition of the state 
 A fundamental conflict exists about the religious nature of the state. The inherent 
religiosity of the state of Israel and the repercussions for what that means are key issues of 
contention the ultra-Orthodox community has with secular society. Overlapping issues of 
national formation, such as ideologies regarding Zionism, Judaism, the practice, and purpose, 
to the way in which Judaism fits into the state and its role in state policy and formation, all 
come together to form an amalgam of ideological and political elements. These elements do 
not necessarily represent the traditional pattern of Jewish life in the Diaspora, and with the 
state as a new political, social, religious, and ideological entity, the ultra-Orthodox have 
many fundamental disagreements with the place of religion in the state, the nature of state 
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and religious interplay, and the general position the state of Israel takes towards the ultra-
Orthodox community. “Some Haredim have…refused to accord any legitimacy to the state of 
Israel, insisting that the Jews remain a people living in divinely proscribed exile, even when 
living in the Holy Land” (Stolow, 2010, p. 45).  
[Nevertheless], Agudat Yisrael still recognized Israel only on a de facto basis, and other 
elements in the Haredi community did not even go this far. None of them accepted Israel as a 
legitimate state and government according to Jewish law; the difference lay in their willingness 
to make practical, temporary accommodations -- and thereby receive State funding -- while 
working to transform the secular order into a truly Jewish state based solely on the laws of the 
Torah as authoritatively interpreted by their own rabbinical establishment. While accepting the 
validity of Knesset legislation as “temporary” laws, therefore, Agudat Yisrael opposed the 
drafting of a mandate constitution for Israel (as did, for that matter, the religious-Zionists). 
Unlike the religious-Zionists, however, Haredi authorities also oppose the celebration of Israel 
Independence Day (including the recitation of Psalms -- Hallel -- on that occasion), use of the 
Israeli flag or other national symbols, or service (at least by their own youth) in the Israeli 
army. (Dowty, 2001, p. 167) 
 
To understand the complex dynamics of how the ultra-Orthodox community views the state, 
an examination of the redemption is a critical starting point. Ultimate redemption of Jewish 
people from the Diaspora into the God-given land of Israel is a very different reality from a 
secular state, which is geographically situated in the land of Israel (Rawidowicz, Ravid & 
Meyer, 1986, p.184). For the ultra-Orthodox, the critical question is: How does the state of 
Israel move the Jewish people closer to this ultimate spiritual goal? For the ultra-Orthodox 
community, the state of Israel is, therefore, a nonissue in terms of the redemption, and the 
scene is being firmly tied into the here and now rather than having an intensely spiritual 
dimension. It is interesting as for other Jewish groups, and groups of other religions, Israel 
has an important spiritual dynamic and is considered by many to be the “Holy Land.” Yet for 
the ultra-Orthodox community, the inherent holiness of the land of Israel is tempered by the 
secular state, which does not always operate with the guidance of the values of the ultra-
Orthodox community.  
The religious character of the state and what this character represents outline the 
fundamental division in the state/religion debate. For the ultra-Orthodox community, the 
Shapiro 79 
 
question is what is to be done with the institutions of state and the organization of society as 
a whole given the outlook that the state is a fundamentally secular rather than religious entity. 
For the ultra-Orthodox community, steps must be taken, primarily spiritual, to bring about 
the ultimate redemption. For many, this is not through processes afforded by a state with a 
secular agenda regardless of the shared religious commonalities that exist between Zionism 
and ultra-Orthodox Rabbinic Judaism.  
The conflict between secular Israelis and ultra-Orthodox Haredim is not new. Indeed, Haredi 
criticism of the state of Israel has been widespread since the nation's independence in 1948. 
The criticism is rooted in the belief that a Jewish state has no legitimacy until the arrival of 
the Messiah. Because the independence movement of 1948 was largely secular, some ultra-
religious consider the State fundamentally sacrilegious. (Simon, 1998, p. 14) 
 
This conflict begs the question of what is the ultimate goal for Israeli society. Is it to forge a 
commonality, seeking outright acquiescence, or the outright assimilation of all groups into a 
new entity? Does this form a new Israeli citizen, the product of a compromise, or would a 
multicultural solution work in which differences are overlooked and the country is united 
through a shared element? Consociationalism perhaps provides one answer to this dilemma, 
but ultimately any goal seems to be difficult to attain when factoring in the history of a 
people who have withstood the temptations of assimilation and integration through living 
apart in numerous societies in order to preserve their distinct religious identity. While there is 
no question that this has evolved over time and new social realities have emerged from this 
process, the underlying concept of engagement versus withdrawal, immediate power versus 
an indirect control over the affairs of the community are all indications of the longstanding 
elements of the communal psyche to preserve autonomy and assimilation.  
 Despite the rifts that exist between the ultra-Orthodox community and Israeli society, 
as well as the apparent separations, the ultra-Orthodox community is actually very much 
involved in the affairs of state and society. This seems to be an illogical statement. 
Considering that to preserve values and ideology, the ultra-Orthodox community socially 
contracts and withdraws into enclaves in order to maintain its identity and traditions, the 
exact opposite should be true. In fact, distinct societies do not exist within the greater Israeli 
context; rather, the ultra-Orthodox community makes up a part in the larger Israeli society 
and is integrated in numerous ways, although this is not always overt. For this reason, a clear 
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distinction is made throughout the thesis by using the term ultra-Orthodox community instead 
of ultra-Orthodox society. This division illustrates how there is mutual coexistence and a 
fundamental interdependence.  
 There is a fundamental symbiotic relationship between the ultra-Orthodox community 
and the rest of Israeli society even if at times these two sides seem extremely far apart. 
Through an examination of the commonalities that the ultra-Orthodox community and 
secular Israelis have, new forms of mutual codependence may be recognized leading to 
potential solutions. This thesis utilizes one such example of ultra-Orthodox expatriates living 
at the crossroads between the extremes of ultra-Orthodoxy and access to the outside world. 
These key informants and inside/outsiders (Bernard, 2012, p. 171) are able to lend a unique 
insight into the functioning and some mutually existing bonds that unite the ultra-Orthodox 
community with secular society even if they are minor in terms of the major, political, and 
social issues of the day.  
 Despite the often touted claim by some in the ultra-Orthodox community that the 
state is illegitimate and their refusal to work within it, this is not the case for all.  
 As a result of economic, social, psychological, and political conditions, however, this 
separation [between secular and Haredi society] is not hermetic. Members of the ultra-
Orthodox community are actively involved in the modern Israeli State, working alongside 
secular Israelis and playing an integral part in decision-making processes taking place in the 
central political and economic institutions.” (Livio & Weinblatt, 1999, p. 31; see also Ravitzky, 
1996, p. 156) 
 
For the majority in the ultra-Orthodox community there is a type of tacit acceptance of the 
realities in Israeli society and ways to work within the framework of the state while still 
maintaining an ideological opposition if only on a religious basis. This type of conflict may 
be an overt symbol of resistance to the very secular nature of the state. Perhaps maintaining 
that the state itself is illegitimate provides a way to preserve an intangible barrier to 
assimilation.  
The prevalent position currently dominant among most Haredi circles in the state of Israel (in a 
variety of versions) recognizes the secular state de facto, but has not granted it de jure 
recognition. Haredi representatives cooperate in a circumscribed and conditional manner with 
the institutions that are the outcome of the Zionist idea and the Zionist movement, but they 
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deny the validity of the Zionist doctrine per se; that is, they reject the founding ideology of the 
national enterprise. (Ravitzky, 1996, p. 151) 
 
Unlike other periods of assimilation the ultra-Orthodox community has faced in the past, 
such as during the Enlightenment, the current situation facing the ultra-Orthodox community 
in Israel is assimilation to a culture, a language, and values, which more closely mirror the 
ultra-Orthodox community than ever before. As a result, the tensions over issues of state and 
religion and the stakes in maintaining distance have never been greater. Though there are 
inevitable movements towards some form of acceptance and integration, even covertly, the 
issue of legitimacy is perhaps a clear way to distinguish between the secular state of Israel 
(and Zionist ideologies) and the promised land of Israel with its biblical significance. The 
land of Israel with its religious and mythic properties is still very much a part of the ultra-
Orthodox dream of redemption, and cooperation with the secular state may be a way to 
accord a firm grounding to the possibility of spiritual and physical redemption in the land.  
While the Haredim still live in tension with Israeli society...they have “tacitly accepted” the 
existence of the State. With Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu defining Israel as a Jewish 
state, Haredim believe that they have an important stake in determining the meaning of the 
State. After all, who can best define what a Jewish state is if not those who strive to maintain 
their tradition in its most pristine form? Zionism may have defined the outer form of the Jewish 
state, but only the religious can supply the content of “Jewish.” (Beck, 2010, p. 24) 
 
For the ultra-Orthodox during the course of recent history, defining and redefining 
borderlines in both the physical and spiritual realm have taken on a new significance. As the 
ultra-Orthodox community seeks to establish and push forward boundaries, there are many 
new significant developments, which see the ultra-Orthodox community staking out and 
consolidating new territory and power. This ongoing push happens in terms of the physical 
realm, as well as in the social and religious spheres. There are a number of reasons why the 
ultra-Orthodox community, though on one hand withdrawing into a state of religious 
contraction, on the other, seek to expand into secular society. This is done in order to validate 
legitimacy of the ultra-Orthodox community and preserve its hold as the guardians of 
spiritual leadership and the sole interpreters of Rabbinic Judaism. According to Stolow, “the 
Haredim have involved themselves in a moral mission to expand the frontiers of Haredi 
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authority and to draw the Jewish nation further along a path towards what they define as 
repentance and redemption” (2010, p. 45). This has a widespread effect on secular society 
and, indeed, relates to the fundamental elements of setting government policy.  
[Moreover], the value of the yishuv framework and its institutions is measured only by the 
degree to which they bring the people of the Lord closer to the Torah, the commandments and 
the faith.… Accordingly, the future of the Jewish state is not preordained or predetermined by 
God. The people [are] invited to choose [their] own path and, accordingly, [their] destiny. 
God's judgment remains suspended and conditional. (Ravitzky, 1996, p. 145) 
 
It is interesting to note that while the issues discussed could be simplified to the lowest 
common denominator, seemingly simple interactions between the state and the ultra-
Orthodox community have a complex dynamic. Vying for power and perception, these 
questions in fact examine how the state relates to the ultra-Orthodox community and vice 
versa, which can be theoretically understood in the model of actors and institutions 
(Considine, 2004, p. 2). The added dimension of what this perception brings along with it is 
fundamental to understanding the way in which each side forms a symbiosis requiring input, 
uptake, and recycling of issues in order to preserve the status quo.  
The significance of the Haredi resurgence was apparent in the May 1993 ceremony to install a 
new Sephardi Chief Rabbi elected with a strong Shas support. Since this was a State occasion, 
marking the filling of a State office by official electors, the President of Israel was present and 
the national anthem (Hatikva) was to be sung. A number of those present, however, tried to 
prevent the singing of the anthem. As a television camera recorded the turbulent scene, Rabbi 
Ovadiah Yosef -- spiritual and political leader of Shas and a former Sephardi Chief Rabbi 
himself -- ostentatiously hid his face behind a pamphlet…This refusal to acknowledge the state 
of Israel, even when one of their number was being inducted in a State office, fed the 
apprehensions many had about the increasing political leverage of Haredi leaders. In the words 
of one editorial, Shas “treats the State as if it were a foreign entity, and it participates in its 
government for strictly materialist reasons.” A Labor member of the Knesset put it less 
elegantly: “the more tightly they're connected to the teat the more they will kick the milk 
bucket.” (Dowty, 2001, p. 179) 
 
 This process points to a fundamental conflict over duel loyalties as defined by religious 
leadership. This conflict asks questions of the individual as well as the community and the 
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state, such as how does the state function versus religion. How do the courts fare versus 
rabbinic leadership? How do Torah values stack up against secular hedonism? These 
fundamental conflicts are the starting point to understanding the critical issues facing the 
disenfranchised ultra-Orthodox community. These issues potentially present elements to 
designing a solution towards forging forward with a new Israeli identity, but such a solution 
begs the question if a new paradigm is even required. 
The state of Israel as a political entity and act of political organization by Jews is deemed to be 
devoid of religious significance, whether positive or negative; it is in itself a neutral 
phenomenon, existing within the secular realm; it is neither within the sphere of transgression 
nor of obligation, but rather within the voluntary sphere ... Rabbi Avraham Yeshayahu Karelitz 
(known as the Hazon Ish), was recently and reliably summed up: “The Hazon Ish did not view 
the state as the height of darkness of exile, and certainly not as redemption, but rather as 
something merely technical and administrative; it therefore has no significance in principle, 
neither as a success nor as a disaster, and it has no connection with the redemption.” (Ravitzky, 
1996, pp. 151–152) 
 
The question is: Does a solution that tackles fundamental differences in these various 
structures hold more promise than a new ideal in which the immediate and the practical take 
precedence over the ongoing debate about religious theology and the place of Judaism in the 
state? The very question of the centrality of religion within the state structure is key to 
understanding the makeup of Israeli state and society, and the answers to this particular 
question vary widely depending on who is being asked.  
 
 The State as a religious manifestation 
 Religious Zionists consider the state to be a religious entity having inherent holiness, 
and, indeed, they regard the creation of the state as being a miracle. Religious Zionists see 
continuity between the biblical Land of Israel and the modern state of Israel and consider a 
direct correlation in the religious observances that they follow as a result. “A large contingent 
of politically active Jews regard their homeland as the expression of an incomplete form of 
religious nationalism....[I]t is essentially a secular state...and that leaves many Jewish 
religious nationalists deeply dissatisfied” (Juergensmeyer, 2008, p. 55). Miles explains 
further: 
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For the Jewish state, the origins of a religious political movement go back to the beginnings 
of modern Zionism [which]...crystallized under the spiritual guidance of Rabbi Isaac Jacob 
Reines to justify and ensure a religious dimension to the project of a Jewish homeland. 
Reines, while maintaining the traditionally messianic underpinnings of legitimate Zionism, 
provided a theological justification for settling the Land of Israel without compromising the 
belief in divine redemption” (2010, p. 182). 
 
Three examples of the religious observances of Religious Zionists include the feelings 
towards serving in the military as a mitzvah, as will be discussed in depth later; the recitation 
of “Hallel, Psalms of Praise,” with a blessing, on Israel’s Independence Day, cementing their 
relationship between ritual observance and the modern state, while other groups recite 
“Hallel” without a blessing or do not recite “Hallel” at all; and shmita, or the observance of 
the sabbatical year in agriculture (Berlin and Grossman, 2011, p.246; Telushkin, 2008, 
p.746). This, among other Jewish laws pertaining solely to the land of Israel, was not 
observed in the Diaspora, and new solutions and terms had to be reached in order to revive 
these centuries-old commandments, traditions, and prohibitions. Much of this was done in 
the early 20th century as the Zionist ideal of returning to the land of Israel started to take 
shape. Many Religious Zionists had to come to terms with the return to Israel and what that 
meant in a religious context in relation to the creation of a state within biblical Israel.  
While extreme Jewish activists view the state of Israel as a largely secular entity, for many 
(including its Arab opponents), Israel is an example of religious nationalism achieved. 
Muslim nationalism in the Middle East has been fueled in part by a kind of religious 
competition, since many Muslim political observers feel they deserve what the Jews have, 
their own state. Some Egyptian activists claim that the Jewish nation's religious zeal—in 
contrast to the secular indifference of their own country—contributed to Israel's victory in the 
1967 War. (Juergensmeyer, 2008, p. 55) 
 
Many Haredim do not view the state as a religious entity as they believe the time for 
redemption had not come. In this view, the state was created by mortal means, rather than the 
divine, and thus lacks the approbation of a higher power. In this view, for the ultra-Orthodox 
community, “Judaism represents a personal and national commitment to a relationship with 
God defined by Torah laws and values; and consequently a Jewish state must be a theocracy” 
Shapiro 85 
 
(Reghai, 2009, p. 66). The creation of the state and the lesson behind it are not equated to 
divine providence in the ultra-Orthodox view; rather, they are seen as a form of pre-empting 
destiny with a secular state. Furthermore,  
the State's conception and birth were neither holy nor profane...neither a messianic awakening 
nor an anti-messianic eruption. Rather, it should be judged like any other historical 
phenomenon: according to its concrete relationship to the Torah, and according to the attitude 
of its leaders and adherence of the precepts of Halachah. (Ravitzky, 1996, p. 145) 
 
  With this interpretation, the ultra-Orthodox community finds it easy to become unaligned 
with the state.  
Though many ultra-Orthodox Jews live in Israel, they do not view the entity of the 
state as inherently holy; rather, they view the land of Israel as viewed from the perspective of 
the Bible until the present as being inherently holy. However, this does not necessarily 
mandate a Jewish government running the state. This opinion has very diverse views. For 
example, on one extreme, the Neturei Karta, who do not believe in a Zionist state at all, 
would be happy with a gentile leadership such as the Palestinian Authority to control the 
state of Israel (Berger and Ahimeir, 2002. p. 253). On the other extreme, are ultra-Orthodox 
Israelis celebrating military victories through attributing their Torah study to secular military 
victory as a form of a contemporary religious miracle. Nevertheless,  
both major groups within the religious population refused in principle to recognize the 
supremacy of State law over religious commandments: religious-Zionists did so because their 
Zionism was linked to the State's religious mission, while non-Zionist Orthodoxy disputed the 
State's legitimacy from the outset (Dowty, 2001, p. 161).  
 
Moreover, according to Avruch, 
In perceptions of Redemption, Exile, and the Land, messianic nationalism and anti-Zionist 
Orthodox or Haredi Judaism differ fundamentally. Yet all these differences are condensed in 
the symbol of Israel as the Jewish state. Ultimately what distinguishes Israeli Judaism and 
sets it apart from the preceding millennia of Jewish history... is the linkage of Judaism, as 
cultural and social systems, both to the legal and institutional, as well as the coercive and 
destructive, capacities of a modern state. It is [in] their respective perceptions and 
valorizations of the Jewishness of the state of Israel, that the faces of ultra-Orthodox and 
Orthodox-nationalists and Israeli Judaism differ most profoundly and fatefully. (2001, p. 151) 
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Yitzchak Cohen points out the inherent conflict between Israel as a Jewish state and 
the religious nature of what that actually entails. Separating democracy without religion from 
democracy rooted in a religious tradition is essentially complex when the democracy forms 
itself in the mould of religious identity but at the same time is inherently secular in character. 
It is interesting that Cohen notes that the state considers religious dictates when planning 
public policy. In the Rabbinate, for example, government policy is informed by religious 
norms in the ultra-Orthodox community. This is most apparent when dealing with issues that 
involve the private sphere. In terms of policy affecting the public sphere, however, very little 
strictly religious observance is mandated to be publicly practiced; rather, the intention is 
symbolic in nature. This appears to align with the notion, pointed out in the interview, that 
the foundations of the state are inherently secular, and this, therefore, dictates the way in 
which policy, and perhaps even perception, is implemented. 
I believe that, as a homeland for the Jewish people—that's something that Israel has always 
stated as its number one goal from its founding—that Jews from all around the world can 
find Israel as their home. They'll be accepted and can become a citizen. However, I think the 
state is run in a secular sense, through a democracy with not—it's not run through religion. I 
do feel that because there is a large percentage of the population that is religious, they do 
take that into consideration when it comes to certain laws, just to accommodate the religious 
public. At the same time, I think that the country's laws are based on a general democracy, 
not necessarily anything based on religion. (Interview with Yitzhak Cohen, 2011) 
 
Menashe Blum notes that there is a distinct difference between a state that runs in 
accordance with religious principles and a pragmatic approach to incorporating and 
acknowledging religious dictates in trying to find solutions that are imitable across society. 
The link between the state and religion, Blum maintains, is often delicate and fragile and 
requires constant attention in order to meet the needs of all those involved. He notes a 
fundamental issue of willingness to accept religious dictates. This is more than simply a 
matter of accepting religion in the public sphere. It is rather a complex series of arrangements 
as part of the status quo and other societal conventions in which a push-pull relationship is 
accommodated in order to find mutual grounds. The compromises that have been made by 
both sides are integral elements of the compromises made in Israeli society and are, 
therefore, the important aspects in the balance of politics, society, and state. 
I don't think—I think the link is very fragile. I think Haredi Jews would like the connection to 
be very, very broad and very deep, but it can't be that way because the secular government, 
or the secular community, is not interested in having a halachic state. And those parts of the 
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state that do run by Halacha, or that are influenced by Halacha, is only because they have no 
choice. I don't think they do it out of— they want it, they want the army to be kosher, I don't 
think anybody in Israel's secular society wants it to be kosher; it was something that had to 
be done at the beginning that just kept on. Today there are many more religious Jews in the 
army, but I don't think it's something they wanted; it was just something that was necessary.  
(Interview with Menashe Blum, 2011) 
 
Eliezer Weiss makes a very interesting observation that religion in the context of 
Israel gives fundamental meaning and purpose to why society functions as it does. Now what 
is particularly fascinating about this interview is that Weiss blends the land of Israel and the 
state of Israel concept into an amalgam in which military service is acknowledged, while at 
the same time, it is done through a religious paradigm. This amalgam, while uncommon, 
shows how even in the most secular circumstances, there can be a religious interpretation and 
meaning, and, perhaps, this can be indicative of the attitude required to support a 
multicultural society. In such a society, each individual would interpret, for example, state 
institutions as he or she sees fit and assign meaning to those various elements, while at the 
same time, the state or the institution would maintain an internal self-awareness to guide its 
purpose. Moreover, Weiss notes the commonality rooted in religion. This is also interesting 
as it does not necessarily extend to a multicultural definition within the context of Israeli 
society or in the example used here, within the military. It does not take into account anyone 
other than Jews if, indeed, it is accepted that the motivation for service and various practices 
within the military are based in religious practice rather than in an effort to create a particular 
type of citizen through indoctrination in the military experience. This view has an interesting 
extension through a religious line of reasoning, in which everyone in the society does 
participate in a religious master plan whether or not he or she is cognizant of it. This, 
therefore, lends credence to religious thought such as the ultimate return of the Jews to the 
land of Israel or, in this case, the combination of the state of Israel and the land of Israel. 
Okay, I see that as positive because especially in the army— if you're in the army you can be 
in situations where you have to give up your life, so it would be real nice to know why you're 
doing that. And if you're not religious, I can't see how they justify themselves. If you're 
religious, I can see how. Okay, I'm helping defend Eretz Yisrael, I'm protecting other Jews, I 
see a reason. But if you don't have those, I don't quite see— even the littlest things; Kiddush, 
keeping kosher in the army— all this stuff is theory because, unfortunately, in practice it's not 
always put into effect. But at least according to the rules it's supposed to be. The army takes 
just about all the soldiers to all sorts of religious places to get a feel because even the secular 
Jews here realize that the basis of everything really is Torah. They might not want to accept it 
and they won't say so orally, but they know that that's the bottom line. I mean, that's why 
we're here. (Interview with Eliezer Weiss, 2011) 
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Deena Friedberg makes an interesting comment on the state as well as the secular 
professions and examines ideas such as cultural background versus religion. This 
fundamentally relates to the state and its definition as can be seen through the example of the 
Declaration of Independence, which does not explicitly mention religious precepts, such as 
the outright mention of God, and rather uses the term Rock of Israel. In essence, Friedberg 
shows the complexity surrounding the fundamental nature of a Jewish state and highlights 
the difficulties that arise out of creating a secular state based on what is in essence a religious 
definition. 
Okay, I mean it's a Jewish state simply because we are—happen to be in this land that 
happened to be given to Avraham Avinu. It could have gone to Uganda. I mean that's where 
Theodor Herzl— I don't want to get started on him, but—he didn't really like it. He came one 
year for a visit, he said it's dirty, it's disgusting, we might as well take Uganda. We just need 
a Jewish country so there won't be any anti-Semitism in the world. He was, like, totally off 
base, you know. But people here, they, you know, they turned him into a hero. If they knew 
what they—what he really thought of Israel, you know (inaudible). But when the founding 
fathers of Israel started— Ben Gurion, he did have somewhat more respect for religious 
leaders than nowadays. Now that's all gone. But also, like, in the Israeli Declaration of 
Independence, they—he wanted to—somebody wanted to put in a mention of Hashem. and 
other people said no, so they compromised on the word “Rock of Israel.” So that is sort of an 
allusion to Hashem, but except for that it's not, like, considered, like, a Jewish state, it was 
just that they wanted a country, they wanted a refuge after the Shoah to have our own 
country. But it isn't what it should be. It's far from it....Well, technically there are a few 
things, that they're not allowed—Israeli diplomats are not allowed to be seen eating in a treif 
restaurant, or I don't know if they are allowed to violate Shabbos openly—maybe not if they 
keep a low profile, or whatever. So they do have certain things, you know. Or when they 
bring world leaders to Israel they take them to the Kotel or they take them to Yad Vashem, 
but I don't know if it's, like out of religious reasons or it's just like, you know, like this is our 
cultural background. It's a cultural thing, not a religious thing. (Interview with Deena 
Friedberg, 2011) 
 
Yehuda Aronson examines the way in which, superficially, it may appear that the 
secular government is taking certain elements of Judaism into the context of state formation; 
however, this can be, as the interview notes, “widely open to interpretation.” This contextual 
understanding of societal aspects led to a particular vision of what Judaism, within the 
context of a secular state, should be and, therefore, is not necessarily reflective of traditional, 
long-held beliefs around Judaism. This speaks to the fundamental issue at hand, which 
American Haredim are able to see as the duality between secularism and a religious state. It 
is interesting that this is noted as the correct way to interpret things rather than the viewpoint 
of a secular Israeli who, as the interview notes, has already been exposed to the wrong 
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context, which, therefore, has a domino effect, further masking the potential for the 
organization of religion and the state. This interview nicely lines up the controversies of 
secular versus religious, interpretation versus practice of Judaism, modernity versus tradition, 
and, ultimately, the meaning of a secular religion. The religious context and significance, a 
way of looking at things from a uniquely religious perspective, need to be considered when 
looking at the holistic view of how state and religion merge in the modern construct of the 
state of Israel. 
So what they're doing—they're taking the trappings of Judaism—Saturday and, you know, 
day of rest, and you know, certain basic concepts, okay, and not religious, but they're using it 
as a background or format to be able to do your own thing. And it's—and that's open to your 
interpretation, whim, whatever. And the religious people will say, no it isn't. You're stealing 
the kedushah of it, and there's real core values there which you're doing the external without 
the core of it, and that's causing problems. So the secular guy who grew up with that—he—
even when he—if he becomes a baal teshuva, even, you know, he has to relearn all that 
stuff—he said, I knew that concept, but I always understood it in the wrong context. 
Everything now becomes the wrong context. I'll tell you a little story about that also. I was 
once—I was learning in yeshiva and I had a—this was back in America— I had a—we had a 
discussion at the Shabbos table once. We had some Israelis in American yeshiva, and like we 
said, oh wow, it's so easy, they can read the Hebrew. They could read the Hebrew text and 
it's so easy. They have a big advantage of their mastery over the Hebrew text. So—until 
somebody pointed out—they said, you don't realize that it could be a hindrance as well. 
Because they know Hebrew, and they knew it may be in a secular way—in this case I'm 
referring to modern Hebrew—the text of modern Hebrew, Ben-Yehuda modern, the 
dictionary of modern Hebrew—that also stole a few Torah words and changed it a little bit. 
So take an American who doesn't know Hebrew at all; I have to learn, I'll learn it right from 
scratch. Whereas the Israeli already knows it in the wrong context. It's harder for him to 
throw out the old associations when he's going to, you know, start learning the Hebrew text. 
So he's got—in that respect he has a disadvantage by knowing Hebrew. So—and the same 
thing over here. If you didn't know anything about Shabbos, the first—being exposed to the 
beauty—you'll see the kedushah of Shabbos, you could understand it in its proper context. If 
you know Shabbos because in a secular way, so you just don't get it. I'll tell you a story about 
that also. If—I don't know if this is a thesis (inaudible) [or ]stories. This is going back almost 
about 30, 40 years when they were throwing stones on Shabbos. You know, “Shabbos!” And 
hafganot. So, I remember seeing there was a rabbi was screaming when the cars were 
moving, “Shabbos! Shabbos!” So a secular lady came out and opened the door—“Everybody 
knows it’s Shabbos, what are you yelling for?!” Yeah, it's like saying, you know, “Tuesday, 
Tuesday!” Yeah, they just do. Like it just—the word “Shabbos” has no kedushah to it. 
(Laughs). So, that was pretty funny because she understood the word, but she didn't 
understand the significance of that word. Okay, that's the conflict. (Interview with Yehuda 
Aronson, 2011) 
 
Ephraim Lerner looks at issues of state and religion and examines the biblical land of 
Israel versus the modern state of Israel and what this means in the context of Judaism and 
day-to-day practice and philosophy. The debate over the place of religion in society is also 
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important, not only in this particular context but in general, as the wider society aims to take 
elements of religion and adapt them for cultural and societal reasons. 
When Napoleon conquered Europe, a delegation of Christians and, I think, Moslems, came to 
him and said,“take all the Jews and ship them to Israel.” And he said, “why?” And they said, 
“because they’re Jewish and that’s the Jewish homeland.” And he called all the Jewish 
leaders, and he asked, “well, you guys ready to go to Israel?” And they said, “no.” And he 
said, “well, you’re Jews. Israel is your homeland.” They said, “Judaism is a religion. It is 
not a state.” So it is a religion. Israel is the place where the religion says that is where the 
country should be. But it doesn’t mean that if you’re outside Israel, you don’t keep the 
religion. Religion is a person thing, and, of course, it’s easier to practice here, and thank G-
d, a lot of opportunities that you don't have there. So it’s kind of an assistance to our 
practicing the religion better and easier. (Interview with Ephraim Lerner, 2011) 
 
It is important to understand how religion fits with the nation’s psyche, and this can 
be seen particularly at times of crisis. Certainly, during times of crisis, there has been 
widespread national reform and a movement to turn towards tradition, albeit on a temporary 
basis. The reasons for this are many, and the effects were perhaps temporary due to the 
various hardships that were going on at the particular time. It did not have a long-lasting 
effect because of the difficulties associated with adopting religious dictates rather than 
maintaining a secular lifestyle, still within the milieu of being somewhat observant of some 
elements in Israel. 
In the final analysis—let's put it this way—I was here during the Six Day War. I was in a 
bomb shelter not a mile away from here, okay? And when all the nurses went away to the 
front, Sha'arei Tzedek was left without any nurses. So all of us at […identifying information 
removed…] went over to Sha'arei Tzedek, and we filled in—and we ran that hospital. And 
when the boys came back from the front, they came to that hospital and they told us their 
stories. Totally mind-boggling stories about whole platoons of Egyptian people surrendering, 
enormous shiryonim of tanks coming towards these small three tanks, Israeli tanks—and all 
of them stopping one at a time—do you know the story? Probably not, because it was told to 
me by a chayal personally, it's not a second-hand story. He was in a group of three tanks, and 
they were advancing against this enormous line of Egyptian tanks, and one by one the tanks 
started stopping. The first one stopped, the second one stopped—And there was—as I recall, I 
think it was 20. It might have been 10, but I think it was 20. And by the time the last one was 
about to stop—and they all had radio contact among each other—by the time the last one was 
rolling, he stopped, and he got out of the top of his tank, and he screamed, “please, please, I 
surrender.” It seems as though each one of these Egyptian tank platoons—each one of them 
in turn would radio the next one, or radio the rest of them; there's a man here, he's got a 
white a white beard. And then there was silence. They said, there's a man here, he's got a 
white beard. And there was silence. Until this one guy was left, and he said, you know—that's 
it. And this guy came back (laughs) with this story—and there were more stories like this. 
That one just sticks in my mind.  
People—in the streets, people were going up to Haredi people on Rechov Malchei 
Yisrael. That's where—you know where Machon Gold was? Haturim and Malchei Yisrael. 
And people—soldiers were coming out of Schneller and practically attacking Haredim with 
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their tefillin—“please, please, put the tefillin on me. Please, please, I want to lay tefillin. 
Please, please, doesn't anybody have a pair of tefillin?” In the hospital it was happening all 
of the time. People—it was—it was like nothing you've ever seen. People would, you know—it 
was like u'malah ha'aretz de'at Hashem k'mayim layam m'chasim—it was—the whole country 
was in this frenzy of I've got to be frum, I've got to be frum. And you know something? We all 
knew it couldn't last. We knew it couldn't last. ... Don't forget we were constantly 
outnumbered, and right now we are—and we were out-ammunitioned by the Lebanese—and 
let them PR themselves all over the place—well, we won that war.  
The chesed over there with the guy who made all those tents on the seashore for the 
people from—you know, from the cities around Haifa? And guess what? If they had what we 
think they had, they could have lobbed them and killed everybody on the seashore. They 
didn't, did they? Why do you think the paradigm didn't—it did, and it does all the time, but 
guess what? Torah's not convenient. People don't want to keep Torah. No fun. At least they 
think it's no fun. 
 (Interview with Yocheved Saks, 2011)  
 
  Haredi versus Religious Zionist perspective 
There are various differences between the ideologies of Haredi groups and Religious 
Zionists in Israel. Each has a particular take on the state and levels of religious observance as 
well as stringencies. However, one interesting point of contention is the involvement of each 
group with the state and, more so, its theological understanding of the state’s intrinsic 
holiness. Many Religious Zionists, if not all Religious Zionists, serve in the armed forces and 
in certain units are disproportionately represented since pre-military academies, as well as 
highly motivated soldiers, factor into impressive numbers of volunteers for elite units. Many 
Religious Zionists see an inherent holiness in the modern state of Israel, connecting biblical 
Israel to the modern state in a continual historical chain or connection. This connection not 
only creates a duty to serve in the armed forces, but serving in the armed forces also fulfills a 
religious obligation and creates a positive good deed, or mitzvah.  
For national-religious Jews, at least, there are cross-cutting affiliations, as they are integrated 
fairly well into the economy, governmental service, the army, and the media.... the 
politicization of religious issues is itself a moderating factor since it means that these issues 
are threshed out in bargaining between party leaders rather than being worked out directly on 
the popular level. (Dowty, 2001, p. 170) 
 
Haredim, for the most part, see the modern state of Israel as a pre-emptive entity that, in 
itself, has no inherent holiness. “Haredim view Zionism and the drive for land as a modern 
form of idolatry. As one Haredi rabbi put it, ‘For us, the Torah study and practice take 
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primacy over the land’” (Beck, 2010, p. 24). As the state was originally established as a 
wholly secular state, which includes accommodations towards religion on the basis of 
historical and cultural aspects, the modern state does not merit religious character. For 
Haredim, the concept of ancient biblical Israel and the modern state are very far removed, 
and many Haredim believe that only the coming of messiah will bring a time of redemption 
and, ultimately, the return to the land.  
Most Haredim see the state now as being inherently secular and, as a result, do not 
view it as positive to serve in the armed forces or participate on a state level. Moreover, 
“Haredim rejected the association of Hebrew with the nationalist aspirations of the Zionist 
movement and the perceived defiling of the holy language that every day use of Hebrew 
implied” (Bogoch, 1999, p. 124). 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note the changing perceptions during the past three 
decades. Haredi involvement in politics has skyrocketed and has completely changed the way 
in which the Haredi public is viewed, both in Israeli society and in the power that they hold 
in the fractured Knesset. Haredim often have the swing vote and are crucial to any coalition 
as they are a very stable block of voters who have very strict voting discipline for whichever 
party the rabbis endorse, nearly always an ultra-Orthodox one. The Haredi voting practices is 
explained:  
The relationship between Haredim and Zionism became more complex after the founding of 
the state in 1948. Some Haredi groups adopted a pragmatic position, and involved themselves 
in the political process of the state by voting in elections and accepting state funding. Others 
have maintained a more hard lined rejectionist position, refusing all funding from Israeli state 
and abstaining from taking part in the political process. (Books LLC, 2010, p. 20) 
 
Many ultra-Orthodox Jews see a symbiotic relationship between their idealized Torah study 
and the continuation of the state. They view themselves as the guardians of the religion and 
the biblical Land of Israel through their religious observances and do not necessarily feel that 
their involvement on a national level is necessary for the country's survival. Their separation 
can be viewed thus:  
A community’s separateness is reflected in the dress of its adherents. In modern Israel, it is 
likely that a man whose head is covered (unless he is in the sun) is religious and supports a 
religious party. But the differentiation is likely to be even finer: A knitted kipah (skullcap) 
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has become a symbol of the NRP [National Religious Party] and especially of its youth 
movement; a non-knitted kipah, by extension, often indicates support for the religious point 
of view, but probably not for the NRP. Black wide-brimmed fedoras and suits generally 
identify non-Zionist Orthodox supporters — popularly known as “black hats” in Israel — 
while the more traditional garb of long-flowing robes and fur hats identifies the dress of the 
Aguda and their supporters and separatists. Different subgroups also have different colored 
socks, gowns, and other identifiable garments. (Arian, 2009, p. 87) 
 
 Religious Zionists 
 Religious Zionists have a very different perspective on the place of religion in the 
state than the majority of the ultra-Orthodox community. Nevertheless, while some Religious 
Zionists wear a distinctive kippah, which symbolizes their particular beliefs, Religious 
Zionism spans the spectrum including the traditional majority to Orthodox or ultra-Orthodox 
community. 
Essential tenets of Religious Zionism are a belief in the inherent religiosity of the 
state, seeing a divine interpretation of history, and reimagining social priorities based on the 
de facto reality of the establishment of a Jewish state. Seeing contemporary Israel as a 
religious entity, which goes beyond the ultra-Orthodox belief of the biblical land of Israel 
versus the modern secular state of Israel, Religious Zionism attributes religious principles to 
the modern state as well. This perspective, therefore, interprets history, such as military 
victories, as being accomplished through divine intervention and indirectly assigns religious 
significance to the planning and various outcomes of the affairs of state.  
After the Six-Day War in 1967, religious Zionist groups saw the capture of the West Bank 
and Jerusalem as a confirmation of a divine plan. They began to spend all their energies and 
resources settling the new areas, leaving their traditional concerns for education and for 
preventing secularization in the hands of the Haredim. (Beck, 2010, pp. 23–24) 
 
Participating in the various functions of the state, ranging from serving in the military to 
paying taxes, can all be interpreted as fulfilling a religious obligation as Zionism as a 
political philosophy becomes a key tenet in religious belief, practice, and observance. 
Religious Zionism stems from the belief that the divine is involved with the modern state of 
Israel, and, for example, founding the state, though the leadership was secular, was part of a 
Shapiro 94 
 
divine plan. Thus, the object of the Mizrachi (Religious Zionist) “political party...with the 
slogan ‘the land of Israel for the people of Israel according to the Torah of Israel’...was to 
provide a voice for Religious Zionists and to unite with secular Zionists in achieving a 
Jewish national home as an antidote to assimilation and Anti-Semitism” (de Lange, 2008, pp. 
211–212). 
While Religious Zionists are concerned about religious identity and assimilation the 
same way that Haredim are, they endeavour to use state resources, such as publicly-funded 
religious schooling and integration, as a method of maintaining their religious cohesion. As a 
result, they are looked upon favourably by many groups across the spectrum that see them as 
contributing to secular society. One of the key elements of Religious Zionism and one of the 
fundamental changes it has had on the attributes of Orthodoxy in Judaism in the Israeli 
context is that there has been a great deal of religious discussion regarding the place of the 
state in religious dialogue.  
 Zionism changes the social priorities within the spectrum of Jewish social 
engagement. For example, integration is a hallmark of Religious Zionism, and this includes 
all aspects of participation in the state. This is not the case for many in the ultra-Orthodox 
community who see the state as both an external and foreign product created within the land 
of Israel outside divine intervention. The traditional resistance to integration that has been the 
hallmark of the Jewish experience throughout the Diaspora is pushed aside for Religious 
Zionists to engage with the state for religious reasons. The key motivator for avoiding 
contact with secularism and outside influences has been the fear of assimilation, which has 
been replaced with a religious purpose to integrate into society for the sake of the divine. 
This, therefore, takes many forms of engagement with the larger secular society and often 
puts the Religious Zionist movement in conflict with the ultra-Orthodox community. There is 
an underlying shared religious commonality, yet the ultra-Orthodox shy away from adapting 
or changing their modes of dress, views, and engagement with secular society in order to 
maintain a traditional Orthodoxy. At times even going so far as to increase the level of 
stringency observed in order to react to heightened threats of assimilation, Religious Zionists 
seek to create a new identity within the context of Zionism and religious Judaism.  
 This belief furthers the co-joining of state and religion in Israel and places increased 
importance on the involvement of the state in religious affairs and policies. It is interesting to 
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note that many aspects of the bureaucracy involved in the management and organization of 
religion in Israel are the domain of the ultra-Orthodox community. Some issues, or especially 
some religious disagreements, are particularly fierce when there is a significant difference of 
opinion between Religious Zionists and the ultra-Orthodox.  
 Religious Zionism shares many aspects of the various degrees of Orthodoxy in Israel 
on a religious basis, with a number of exceptions. Religious Zionists have many of the same 
stringencies as large segments of the ultra-Orthodox community. What distinguishes 
Religious Zionists from other groups among religiously affiliated communities in Israel is 
that Religious Zionists believe in the inherent religiosity of the state. This creates a clear 
distinction between the biblical land of Israel and the modern state of Israel. By interpreting 
the existence of the secular Jewish state as being a miraculous event showing a degree of 
divine inspiration, many elements of the secular state take on religious dimensions. These 
include serving in the military, paying taxes, being involved in society, and a host of biblical 
and rabbinic era precepts, which are only possible to observe in the land of Israel.  
 In contrast, the ultra-Orthodox, disparage any religious attribution to the modern state 
and see the creation of a Zionist state through secular nation-building as co-opting the divine 
plan for the Messiah and return of the biblical land of Israel. Religious Zionists are often 
involved to a great extent in the religious activities of the state and are very strongly 
represented in the military revenant as well as the state revenant, yet the overall numbers of 
Religious Zionists are much smaller than the ultra-Orthodox community as a whole. This, 
therefore, indicates that even though the ultra-Orthodox community may not in many 
respects be directly engaged in religion within the state, the overall influence and direction of 
the degree of Orthodoxy mandated in state religious policy follows that of the ultra-Orthodox 
community. This is a contentious area; in many cases, Religious Zionists seek to be 
increasingly lenient in their interpretations of religious dictates, particularly those that apply 
to the land of Israel such as observance of the sabbatical year and other controversial issues, 
yet due to the political power of the ultra-Orthodox through their superior numbers, progress 
in this area has been very difficult to achieve. 
 One key issue between Religious Zionists and the ultra-Orthodox involves the state as 
a religious entity. Many Religious Zionists, who themselves are a brand of ultra-Orthodox, 
although they are fully integrated into society, having attained secondary and post-secondary 
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education, view the state as an intrinsically religious entity. This is not the case with the 
Haredim, who view the state as wholly secular. Many view the state as a corruption of 
traditional Jewish values; although the state is run with several religious elements built in, it 
is not itself a religious state but rather a secular, liberal democratic one.  
If Haredi attitudes were changed to accept integration, they would be much more like 
Religious Zionists, maintaining a religious identity and achieving success in society. 
Ravitzky clarifies: 
 Opposing views... [attribute] a distinctive, inherent religious significance [to] the Zionist 
movement and the state of Israel – for good or for evil. Both views also profess to foresee – 
each from its own point of view – the destiny of Zionism and the future of Israeli society. 
However, the majority of ultra-Orthodox Jews utterly reject both of these ideological stances 
and dismiss their judgments regarding these questions. From the Haredi point of view, the 
state of Israel is a religious neutral entity, part of the secular realm still belonging to the age 
of exile. (1996, p. 145). 
  
Moreover, according to Cohen and Susser, 
between the traditionalists and the secular Zionists stood the Religious Zionists. Theirs was a 
complex and multifaceted stance. Being both Zionist and religious, they were simultaneously 
allies and enemies to both sides. They mediated between the poles and, like so many 
mediators, were often charged with treachery by both sides. The history of Religious Zionism 
chronicles the shifting and intricate relationships, the strains and pressures, that resulted from 
the confrontation with its two polar allegiances. (2000, p. 4). 
  
Defining the “pressure points” of disagreement over the implementation of religion, Zionism, 
and the state is therefore crucial to understanding how the pieces fit together. 
  
 2. Streams of Judaism in Israel 
 Within the larger context of defining who the ultra-Orthodox are, it is important to 
discuss the place of the ultra-Orthodox community within the larger spectrum of religious 
groups in Israel. This situates the ultra-Orthodox community as a whole within the Orthodox 
and as part of traditional groupings within Judaism in Israel. This section will include an 
examination of the ultra-Orthodox community and the various forms of Orthodoxy it follows, 
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as well as a brief study of traditional Judaism, where many in the centre label themselves 
indicating a degree of religiosity, as well as other religious groups such as the modern 
Orthodox, religious Zionism, and Conservative and Reform Jews in Israel.  
 
 Ultra-Orthodox 
 The ultra-Orthodox community in Israel consists of approximately 450,000 people, 
“all of whom adhere to a particularly strict interpretation of a guiding text of Judaism” (Livio 
& Weinblatt, 2007, p. 30). Ultra-Orthodoxy in the Israeli context is all-encompassing and 
governs the various aspects of private and public life in ultra-Orthodox society. This system 
relies on textual and rabbinical interpretation of societal norms and is gender segregated with 
accepted roles for men and women, which are atypical of Israeli society and also of ultra-
Orthodox communities in Diaspora.  
The ultra-Orthodox community is very tightly organized around the strict observance of the 
Halacha, that is, the Old Testament and the Talmud that are preserved as the supreme 
ultimate guiding texts that direct the life of the community. Community members differ from 
the secular westernized public and from the religious Zionist public in their dress and their 
daily practices that ... [isolate the] community from its “heretic” surroundings...only middle 
compromises with modernity are allowed, if at all, from general society. (Barzilai-Nahon & 
Barzilai, 2005, p. 31) 
 
For example, Livio and Weinblatt point out that 
ultra-Orthodox leaders have approved the use of unique “Kosher phones” marketed to the 
community by an Israeli service provider, and nicknamed thus because they do not allow 
users to engage in controversial activities such as Internet use, reception of messages from 
contact providers, and text-messaging. (1999, p. 31). 
  
Using this type of technology has implications for religious and social control mechanisms as 
they relate to technological innovations, potentially a weak spot in a cloistered community. 
 The typical role for men is to learn religious texts and for women to be both providers 
for the family and caregivers for their children. In other words, women are responsible for 
the household in every possible sense, doing both paid and unpaid labour, and the men are 
occupied with Judaic learning. The ultra-Orthodox community in Israel grapples with 
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internal and external pressures to integrate with Israeli society on a number of levels and 
constantly challenges the place of religion in society in order to create a homogenous 
community, which is free of external influence. One of many reasons for this withdrawal is a 
growing measure of control through self-segregation as many in the ultra-Orthodox 
community feel that growing consumerism and materialism, which are prevalent in secular 
society, have a threatening impact on the everyday lives of the ultra-Orthodox community.  
 In the utopian dream of the ultra-Orthodox community, the goal and drive of society 
are measured in spiritual gain rather than by material possessions. This perspective presents 
both a social and a religious attitude contributing to the withdrawal of the ultra-Orthodox 
community from the secular mainstream.  
Consumerism, the ultra-Orthodox say, is the fourth in a series of trials visited upon the Jewish 
people in recent history…. First was the Enlightenment…perceived as a spiritual disaster.... 
Then…the Holocaust, a physical trial, unveiling…the falsehood of the Enlightenment and 
brutally reducing the number of Jews.... Zionism is a national disaster that offers yet another 
false dream of rescue and revival. The current disaster, the trial of luxury/consumerism, is, 
according to a leader of the community, “no less of a threat. It looks innocent, and it is aimed 
towards a much weaker generation than the previous ones. (El-Or & Neria, 2004, p. 72) 
 
A widely accepted version of Jewish asceticism is unique to this context and has wide-
reaching impact on the ultra-Orthodox community in Israel, which has developed very 
differently and has taken on a different form from similar communities elsewhere, both 
spaciously and temporally.  
 
 Description of the ultra-Orthodox community and life  
The balance of life in the ultra-Orthodox community is determined by following 
biblical precepts or rabbinic interpretations, which ultimately come down to positive and 
negative choices through which all modes of social and religious interaction can be 
interpreted.  
Within ultra-Orthodox society, daily life is governed by a series of Jewish laws known as 
mitzvot. These laws cover everything from the segregation of the sexes, distinct clothing, 
living in a defined geographic community, sexual relations, and ritual purity. Men are 
encouraged to study the Bible, Jewish laws, and commentaries well into adulthood, while 
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women are often responsible for the family budget and for rearing children. Modern 
conveniences such as television, computers and even mobile phones are viewed with 
suspicion. (Devi, 2005, pp. 15–16) 
 
The goal is to have the positive commandments of the religion and aspects of codified Jewish 
law protect the core values and precepts of Judaism, thereby allowing individuals living the 
prescribed lifestyle to have an easier time fulfilling the various ritual aspects of observance.  
This concept becomes more pronounced as members of the ultra-Orthodox 
community seek to increase the “protective fence” surrounding key elements of religious 
observance by increased Orthodoxy in all aspects of daily life on both personal and 
communal levels. The increased Orthodoxy has the net effect of widening the gap between 
traditional Jewish observance and new stringencies and places a new barrier between the 
ultra-Orthodox community and the rest of society. This is done to pursue a balanced and 
perfect society in which biblical precepts are followed as the de rigueur law. In many cases, 
since this is not possible, as the ultra-Orthodox community represents a minority and the 
majority are either secular or traditional, ultra-Orthodoxy has sought to withdraw from the 
public sphere in order to create a society in which the ultra-Orthodox community can flourish 
without the threat of assimilation and integration into the larger, more secular Israeli society.  
These new values lead to a new form of Jewish Orthodoxy, which creates a new 
paradigm in Jewish observance. Imagining moving beyond this point is difficult.  
The real question is what it would take, emotionally, culturally, and politically, for Orthodox 
and Haredi leaders today to develop their own version of a normative Judaism that works for 
them and their people, but could also somehow embrace the universal values that are so 
critical to coexistence. (Gopin, 2002, p. 109) 
 
Due to the Orthodox influence in Israel determining such key areas as Jewish identity 
and the personal sphere, the ongoing shift towards more Orthodox interpretations of religious 
values has become increasingly contentious with other groups contesting the increasingly 
restrictive policies of the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox communities. Certain values that play 
a major role in the various aspects of the ultra-Orthodox community are very different in the 
Haredi ultra-Orthodox context in Israel than in ultra-Orthodox Jewish groups elsewhere. Key 
elements of the social makeup of the ultra-Orthodox community in Israel are the values 
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regarding social prestige, which generally relate to men studying full time and essentially 
living in poverty or great financial difficulty.  
In the ultra-Orthodox community, social prestige resides in religious studies, a domain 
inhabited exclusively by men. Mundane matters are ranked as secondary and entrusted to 
women, albeit under strict social control. As a result, many married [ultra-Orthodox] women 
are both homemaker and breadwinner. (Blumen, 2002, p. 133) 
 
Blumen goes on to note that “religious male unpaid work takes priority over the hegemonic 
capitalistic value of paid work. Hence, in accordance with women's subordination in the 
gender prestige system, paid work is assigned to women” (2002, p. 135). Since women are 
normally responsible for all forms of work, and as a result, they often leave the home or the 
community to engage in employment in secular society, developing a focal point of 
interaction with secularism that men may not at all be exposed to. Ultra-Orthodox women, 
therefore, often become the public face of Haredi society when they are out in the generally 
secular world of employment. “In out-of-community female workplaces, ultra-Orthodox 
women are exposed persistently to modern values of work and femininity that run counter to 
the values of their community, forcing them to negotiate their femininity and social 
belonging” (Blumen, 2002, p. 135) 
 Menashe Blum makes an interesting point identifying the debate over helping 
alleviate the symptoms of poverty versus directly changing the conditions to change poverty 
itself. Many aspects of ultra-Orthodox life inherently lead to poverty. As the interview 
participants stated, there is simply no other option for someone living in a society that does 
not have access to jobs for various reasons or does not have access to education for various 
reasons, where one is expected to follow a certain pattern of life, have many children, and so 
on. All these factors can combine to create a great deal of poverty, and, as a result, the 
community has to look inward to establish structures that support those in the greatest need. 
Unlike a similar structure in the Diaspora, which is integrated into the job economy to a 
greater degree, in the ultra-Orthodox community in Israel, new solutions have to be found to 
create economic opportunity within the confines of the ultra-Orthodox world. This does not 
necessarily mean that the ultra-Orthodox community has to turn outside; rather, new 
possibilities are able to be created within the community itself while still adhering to 
religious standards and preserving the ultra-Orthodox community’s way of life. 
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Well, I guess, I think you mean like welfare and things? I think a Jewish community has an 
obligation to help the weakest parts of their society. The question is, I think, the general 
society is asking, we're willing to help the lower stratas [sic] of the community, but is it 
because they want to be like that? Do they have no other option, no other choice? I think 
that's the issue. Should we be helping people to continue living below poverty, not to help 
them get out of poverty? That, I think, is the issue. And in a Haredi community, the two—it's 
not so simple, you have to live in poverty because of the way you want to live. A Torah life, 
being in kollel and having children, whatever, you have to live in poverty; there's no other 
option. So now the question is, do you starve or does the outside community help? And I don't 
think anybody in Israel is going to be willing to let people starve to death. I think it's a type of 
issue that the community itself, the Haredi community itself, has to come to grips with—that 
they are in poverty and their children are suffering. And they have to find a way out of that 
suffering. (Interview with Menashe Blum, 2011) 
 
 Originally, Blumen explains, “the yeshiva educated a small, intellectual, religious 
elite, exempting selected students from their worldly burden. Separation, it was hoped, would 
ward off modernization and protect the old lifestyle” (2002, p. 135). But, he continues,  
in the West, and later in Israel, most Jewish immigrants joined the modern middle class, 
signifying a new era of voluntary Jewish-ness…. These modern Jews, reluctant to see the old-
style community disappear and aided by the principles of the modern welfare state, willingly 
financed the ultra-Orthodox minority as a “society of scholars.” (2002, p. 136) 
 
Haredi society is organized in an attempt to maintain real or imagined communal and societal 
values, which are preserved as fundamental and integral components of the ultra-Orthodox 
community internal structure. In many cases, however, such as the overarching development 
of the Haredi community in Israel, there are products of various secular policies by the Israeli 
government that date back to the creation of the state and are unique to this context. This can 
be understood through the use of other developmental indicators, such as class divisions 
between the various religious groups in Israel. Normally in other capitalist democratic 
societies, such as the United States or Europe, the ultra-Orthodox community has integrated, 
though not assimilated, to a great extent and has become generally very successful utilizing 
various modes of success such as education, the development of a particular work ethic, etc. 
to succeed in their adopted societies.  
 Due to state support and the ethos placing priority on Jewish learning as the highest 
achievable goal in the ultra-Orthodox community, the Israeli context is very different, and 
religious men do not strive to attain the trappings of the middle class; rather they seek an 
aesthetic lifestyle of learning. Various symbolic steps towards becoming part of the franchise 
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in society, such as property ownership and material success, are of less importance in the 
Israeli context among ultra-Orthodox Jews as they seek to establish a de facto community 
and preserve its borders within the context of the larger Israeli social and political 
environment. According to Gopin, 
[The] great obsession [of Haredi Jewry in Israel], and the roots of its deep separatism, is a 
response that is similar to other fundamentalists, namely, the strong perception of fear of 
cultural annihilation. The contemporary materialist society continues its assault every day on 
their children and their ethics and pits itself squarely against the separatism that the ultra-
religious see as their only hope of maintaining their religious lives for as many millennia as 
their ancestors did….Their greatest fear is to fail their ancestors and their descendants, to be 
the ones who lost the continual line of devotion to the Torah. (2002, p. 110) 
 
It is important to note that the particular version of Judaism under discussion regarding the 
ultra-Orthodox community in Israel is Rabbinic Judaism. Loosely defined, Rabbinic Judaism 
emphasizes textual interpretation and presents a detailed daily plan of life creating standards 
and a code of behaviour that is reiterated throughout the society. This can be seen in 
numerous ways such as the emphasis on “the religious deed, Torah study, and large set of 
ethical and ritual acts, which comprise one’s spiritual relationship to God and the 
community” (Gopin, 2002, p.235). According to Rabbinic Judaism, the minutiae of everyday 
life build up to be incredibly important factors within communal norms. Gopin explains 
further:  
 [Rabbinic Judaism is] a transformation of Biblical Judaism that occurred over a period of 
many centuries before, during, and after the beginning of the Common Era; a hermeneutic 
rereading of Biblical religion that is so complete that it effectively becomes the standard 
Judaism until the modern day. It emphasizes the religious deed, Torah study, and a large set 
of ethical and ritual acts, which comprise one's spiritual relationship to God and the 
community. (2002, p. 235) 
 
Zionism poses an upset to the longstanding traditions of Judaism by combining 
secular political movement with a religious tradition that does not necessarily contain within 
it inherent political organization. As a result, the fundamental Jewish value of hope has 
become changed and in some ways co-opted to serve other purposes, and the belief in the 
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redemption and the Messiah has taken new forms in both spiritual and political terms. This is 
understood to be an inherent threat to the ultra-Orthodox community that views the 
redemption and the coming of the Messiah as key elements of its belief system, which cannot 
be exchanged for temporal rewards unless they are God-given.  
The emergence of Zionism as a secular political movement actively seeking to return the 
Holy Land to Jewish sovereignty constituted a formidable theological dilemma for Orthodox 
Jews, a dilemma which has been aggravated by the Holocaust and by every Zionist success. 
While the return to Zion had been at the core of Jewish hopes for redemption for two 
millennia, it was never expected to materialize through the this-worldly efforts of heretics 
who [have] strayed from the fold. (Shafir & Peled, 2002, p. 138) 
 
The combination of secularism overlaid on Judaism that emerges in Zionism is also 
worrisome to the ultra-Orthodox community as this combines deeply seated values and could 
potentially lead to greater assimilation.  
 Changing values about the interpretation of Rabbinic Judaism and how it has reacted 
to secular forces have led to, in recent history, a withdrawal from secular society and newly 
imposed barriers concerning what appears to be a corrosion of values. These values, traits, 
and communal norms and attempting to utilize textual sources and apply them to everyday 
life have long been of utmost importance in Rabbinic Judaism. When this is not possible for 
a variety of reasons or if the patterns of life are changed through new pressures from society, 
this becomes an even more difficult challenge and places the ultra-Orthodox community at 
odds with their secular contemporaries.  
 
 Modern Orthodox 
 Since the Enlightenment, a moderate stream of Judaism has developed called Modern 
Orthodox. Modern Orthodoxy, also called Centrist Orthodoxy, strives to maintain a balance 
between liberal, secular values and integrating aspects of these values into religious life. 
Modern Orthodoxy is, therefore, less formal in structure than ultra-Orthodoxy and seeks a 
moderate accommodation through less rigid religious structures that govern every aspect of 
life.  
Modern Orthodoxy is broadly defined as the effort to adapt Orthodox Judaism to modernity 
and to avoid the social and/or cultural isolation which living in strict accordance with halakah 
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would seem to impose....There are Orthodox Jews who... are able to do so by ignoring those 
aspects of halakah which they find most cumbersome or onerous and/or by a process of 
compartmentalization in which they apply Jewish law to some, but not to other, aspects of 
their lives. Some of this is accompanied by feelings of guilt, sometimes not. (Liebman, 1998, 
pp. 405–406) 
 
Cohen and Susser note that  
those described as modern Orthodox adopted a more positive, accommodationist attitude 
towards the contemporary world. Although they retained a resolute loyalty to Halacha (the 
body of Jewish scriptural law), isolation per se was not viewed as a virtue. Modernity, they 
would say, is not necessarily inimical to the religious life; properly pursued, it creates 
significant opportunities for religious self-realization. Whether through selective adjustments 
to Western culture, or by compartmentalizing life into religious and neutral zones, or, most 
ambitiously, through synthetic interpretations that compound modernity and tradition, the 
objective of modern Orthodoxy is to live authentically in both worlds simultaneously. (2000, 
p. 3) 
 
The modern Orthodox perspective seeks the guidance of rabbinic leadership to define and 
interpret the boundaries of Jewish law and custom as they apply to their community while 
seeking to accommodate the secular attributes of society, such as education, requirements of 
citizenship, and integrated communities within the majority. According to Stern, “modern 
Orthodoxy has argued that a Jew can simultaneously be a committed religious person and be 
engaged in...culture, politics, and academic life” (2002, p. 49). This is in contrast to the 
policy among Israeli Haredim of placing the primacy of religion above all else and 
withdrawing from mainstream society.  
Modern Orthodoxy presents a vision of political and social compromise that allows 
adherence to the strictest moral and religious standards of Rabbinic Judaism, yet at the same 
time, allows for accommodation and engagement with secular society.  
One of the effects of this outward movement has been in an increasingly emboldened 
challenge to the authority and legitimacy of modern-Orthodox Judaism, the basic outlook of 
which has been the object of relentless criticism among Haredim. Haredi teachers, rabbis, and 
other agents have also been at the forefront of pressures within Orthodox Jewry to devalue 
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the practice of socializing with cultural others and the pursuit of secular studies and 
professional careers. (Stolow, 2010, p. 45) 
 
While there are forms of engagement within the Diaspora Jewish communities, which term 
themselves Modern Orthodox, the disparity between the Haredim and Modern Orthodox 
groups in Israel cannot be directly compared to similar distinctions in the Diaspora. This is 
because Modern Orthodoxy in Israel can adhere to a far greater degree of religiosity than 
would be possible in other contexts.  
Setting up a secular Jewish society in Eretz Yisrael (or anywhere else for that matter), where 
Jews could be safe and prosperous, was a worthwhile undertaking, although it had no bearing 
on the hoped-for messianic redemption. Orthodox Jews, according to this view, should 
actively participate in this undertaking both because of its intrinsic value and because their 
participation could mitigate its secular character. This position has been associated with 
“modern orthodoxy,” a tendency that in general has sought limited accommodation to modern 
secular society. (Shafir & Peled, 2002, p. 138) 
 
Modern Orthodoxy is distinct from Religious Zionism, as discussed at length elsewhere, due 
to the fact that Modern Orthodoxy seeks to strike a balance with secular modernity not out of 
religious motivation but rather because of emphasis on very different values than are ascribed 
to the ultra-Orthodox community in Israel. Modern Orthodoxy does not maintain a core 
belief in the inherent religiosity of the state, and Modern Orthodoxy may, in fact, mirror 
many sentiments in agreement with the generally ultra-Orthodox position regarding Zionism 
in Israel. 
 
 Conservative/Reform movements in Israel 
 Other streams of Judaism, which are more prevalent in the Diaspora, are the Reform, 
Conservative, and Reconstructionist movements. Despite ongoing pressure of Israeli 
governments and the constant struggle to gain recognition, these groups do not have legal 
status in Israel. Their rabbinic leaders are not recognized and are not included in the 
consociational balancing that regulates the balance between secularism and religion. There 
are a number of reasons why groups such as the Conservative and Reform movements have 
not gained a foothold in the Israeli context, including the small numbers of Conservative and 
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Reform followers. This essentially creates a paradox in which these groups are unable to gain 
recognition for a lack of numbers, yet are not afforded the rights and privileges of other 
recognized religions in order to gain more followers.  
Religious pluralism was never a part of the complex system of compromises and 
arrangements that governed Orthodox-secular relations. Part of the reason relates, no doubt, 
to the very small number of Conservative and Reform Jews in Israel....Despite their vast 
power in the Diaspora, the liberal wings of Judaism are repudiated by Israel's Orthodox 
rabbinical establishment without qualification or hesitation. (Cohen & Susser, 2000, p. 121) 
 
This constantly shifting boundary, of the Diaspora dictating and often influencing policy, is 
not as clear on the issue of religious policy.  
 A key difference between Israel and the Diaspora is a degree of involvement in 
religious affairs by the Jewish population. The numbers of affiliated Jews who maintain 
membership in non-Orthodox communities is significantly higher in the Diaspora than it is in 
Israel as the traditional majority picks and chooses the various observances that it follows 
and for the most part is not involved in religious life. For many Israelis, government services 
provided through the personal sphere, such as for burial, marriage, conversion, divorce, etc. 
are sufficient if services are obtained through ultra-Orthodox rabbis. Therefore, non-
Orthodox groups challenge ultra-Orthodox stringencies and the status quo arrangements, 
which seek to form compromises, without either side actually compromising on its key 
positions.  
Government acceptance of non-Orthodox Jewish groups would be for the ultra-
Orthodox akin to a complete separation of the church and state as control over the private 
sphere would no longer be in Orthodox hands, and Judaism would become open to increased 
individualism and a new host of religious options. This creates an interesting paradox as 
Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox Jews are a minority (approximately less than 10%) in the 
Diaspora, and other religious groups or non-affiliated Jews make up a majority of the Jewish 
community outside of Israel (Stolow, 2010, p. 205). The quandary for Israel, then, is 
extending religious privilege and maintaining an equitable balance of religious freedom of 
society to Jews from outside Israel whose religious preferences are not acknowledged as 
viable options in the state of Israel. “Representatives of the Reform and Conservative 
movements...have been battling for years for more rights in Israel” (Brownfeld, 2010, p. 49). 
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The ongoing debates about religious policy in the private sphere, recognition, identity issues, 
and numerous other aspects of religious policy are key issues of contention with other 
streams of Judaism and could ultimately lead the charge against widespread reform in this 
area. 
 Where in the past minor inroads have been made in Israel in terms of recognition for 
non-Orthodox religious groups, these compromises are often extremely contentious and very 
rarely held in force in any significant way.  
Demands by non-Orthodox rabbis for recognition and funds for their congregations are 
viewed by the Orthodox as challenges to their religious establishment.…However, there has 
been an increase in the number of Reform and Conservative synagogues and schools which 
have received financial support from the government and quasi-government organizations. 
(Sharkansky, 1997, p. 160) 
 
Though there has been some movement in this area, the advances are generally insignificant 
when compared to the government funding the ultra-Orthodox community receives. 
According to Dowty,  
one threat perceived by Orthodox circles in Israel is a “softening” towards non-Orthodox 
(Reform, Reconstructionist, and Conservative) forms of Judaism. In the past the general 
public attitude toward these movements, even among secular Israelis, was fairly negative, and 
only a tiny percentage of the public joined non-Orthodox congregations. This has been 
changing...beginning in 1989 Reform and Conservative Jewish movements won a series of 
court cases regarding government funding, membership in religious councils, recognition of 
non-Orthodox conversions, and provision for non-Orthodox burial. (2001, p. 175) 
 
Recognition of alternative streams of Judaism would essentially redefine Israel as a Jewish 
state and would play a key role in transforming the various ongoing social debates regarding 
the place of Judaism in society, the egalitarian practice of Judaism, and a new epoch in 
Jewish development for the state of Israel. Major shifts in this area are unlikely in the short 
term as the ultra-Orthodox minority maintains great enough influence and voting power to 
keep a firm grasp on religious affairs in Israel. Should this demographic change, for example, 
with non-Orthodox religious groups making greater inroads in Israel or new waves of 
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immigration manifesting, the absolute power the ultra-Orthodox community has over 
religious values in Israel would drastically change, creating a new and more dynamic reality.  
 
 Traditional 
 Traditional Judaism strives to maintain a balance between religiosity and secularism. 
Unlike the extremes on either end of the religious spectrum, the very Orthodox, or the very 
secular, the majority of the population is made up of unaffiliated or somewhat affiliated 
individuals who heavily rely on Orthodoxy for their religious needs; yet they, themselves, are 
religious to varying degrees. Due to the fact that in some aspects people define themselves as 
traditional and in others as Orthodox, exact statistics regarding this segment—and indeed all 
segments of the religious population in Israel—are difficult to come by. Yet all indicators 
point towards this largest group, the centre of religiosity, to greatly outsize groups on either 
end of the spectrum.  
 This is important as “traditional” or more secular elements of society maintain an 
implicit acceptance of the ultra-Orthodox community's supremacy in religious matters. This 
is evident from government support and subsidies to the ultra-Orthodox community for the 
salary of the local ultra-Orthodox city rabbis in every city throughout the entire country. In 
most of these locations, ultra-Orthodox representatives of the Rabbinate minister, upon 
demand, to traditional Jews. For both reasons of tradition preserving an idealized version of 
Judaism through the ultra-Orthodox and the preserved continuity of a religious mode of life, 
traditional Jews affirm the ultra-Orthodox lifestyle even if they themselves are secular.  
The traditionals are as much as saying, “I may not be rigorously observant, but it is important 
that someone is. I can go my own way in the knowledge that others remain loyal to and 
perpetuate the faith”– or, as the political philosopher Shlomo Avineri famously cracked, “the 
synagogue I don't go to is an Orthodox one.” (Cohen & Susser, 2000, p. 132) 
 
Cohen and Susser go on to explain further:  
Traditionalists want Orthodoxy to be a significant presence in the Jewish state. As long as 
they can practice in their own way, they are comfortable, perhaps even content, to see 
Orthodoxy as the official and public representative of the Jewish faith. Ironically, the secular 
and religious protagonists carry out their vocal confrontation as if unaware of the existence of 
this large, traditional community [in Israel]. (2000, p. 132) 
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Social protest movements and other forms of social activism, even when focused on this 
particular issue, often find their focus divided by the multitude of other issues facing Israeli 
society and the deep-seated lack of personal involvement many feel towards religion. It is the 
apathetic majority which essentially supports the informal status quo. 
 It would normally be relatively simple to ascertain what the differences are between 
ultra-Orthodox and Orthodox and by extension, what the differences are between various 
forms of Orthodoxy and alternate streams of Judaism such as Conservative and Reform. 
Among interview participants of whom this was asked, the answers were interesting 
regarding the degree of social conformity or disunity with the established positions of the 
Israeli ultra-Orthodox community. Perhaps this is a function of participants’ dual perspective 
regarding state and religion, which comes from their exposure to a fundamentally different 
type of state and religion arrangement in the Diaspora. 
It is also interesting to note how politics and religion can overlay each other. As 
Dvorah Nudelman points out, distinction is made between authentic and unauthentic variants 
of Judaism and through this, everything else is determined. In many ways, this is the same 
superior view taken of the ultra-Orthodox interpretation of Judaism by the state Rabbinate. 
My specific [label] is Orthodox—authentic Orthodox Judaism.... [I]f you say National-
Religious, so it could be their emphasis is on living in Israel, but I live in Israel, so I don’t see 
that I’m necessarily less—I may not be nationalistic, you know, politically, but that’s my—I 
don’t think there’s a stream, there’s one type of Judaism; anything else is not exactly 
authentic. (Interview with Devorah Nudelman, 2011) 
 
A complex idea is whether culture is a function of religion or vice versa. How these 
ideas fit together makes up the differences that we see in ultra-Orthodox society or, for that 
matter, in religious society in Israel in varying degrees, such as cultural changes, actual 
religious practice, and so on. Perhaps it is a combination of both, as Moshe Auerbach 
discusses the context of modesty (tznius) and communal standards. This shows that society is 
continually forming norms for particular modes of life and is self-correcting to ensure that 
certain communal standards are met. It is interesting to note that this interview took place 
with Auerbach, a resident of Jerusalem who has lived in Israel for approximately 10 years. 
He shows familiarity with the codes and context for modesty within the community, and this 
shows the importance of the applicability of these codes in the community. 
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Interviewer: Are we talking about a function of religion, or are we talking about a function of 
culture or society? 
Moshe Auerbach: No, I think—culture definitely—there's definitely a culture that's, you 
know, Haredi or Mizrachi, but we're talking about—we're talking religion. And the religion 
helps to create their culture as well. So I don't know what they would mean when they would 
say it, even though I'm sure they mean it, but that's how I would say it. 
Interviewer: Can you give me an example of what a religious difference would be? 
Moshe Auerbach: Um, it gets complex. I could think, let's say, in certain areas of a—you 
know, it's the stereotypical example, maybe, let's say tznius. So, in some communities, you see 
people dressed one way. Let's say they're more covered, and some people dress less covered. 
Now the one who's less covered might sit here and say—you know, and really less covered. I 
mean, I see a skirt that barely went to the knee, if that, with the top over here. She's exposing 
way more than what is allowed, and they also might tell you, I try to keep Torah and mitzvot 
to the—but that's not the way their grandparents kept it; not in the Sephardic or in the 
Ashkenazic lands. So they might say the same thing as me, but, you know, this is how I mean 
it and—I'm not sure why they're saying that or what they mean by that, you know, but that's 
how I would say it.  
Interviewer: So what you're saying is that you have a more legitimate continuity of tradition? 
Moshe Auerbach: I think in the Haredi world, yeah, for sure. It's much more strict in terms 
of the Halacha, and it's much more true to what Torah values were supposed to be. It's much 
more reflecting of G-d's will. Not that there's not issues, but it's much more reflecting of that 
attempt. I mean, to walk around with, you know, within that example— and I don't want to get 
into so many examples right now, but walking around within that example of somebody who's 
not so tzanua (modest), it's just not close to what G-d's will is. So—(Interview with Moshe 
Auerbach, 2011) 
 
The nuanced view that Auerbach takes into the role of culture in ultra-Orthodox 
society is very different from the next interview with Sarah Falk. She notes that while certain 
cultural differences are acknowledged, behaviour in society generally is governed strictly by 
textual interpretation. Yet, Falk acknowledges that there is a great deal that is not written 
down that becomes part of an accepted societal norm, such as what color socks one wears. 
This is particularly apt in a society with a high degree of social conformity, where people are 
expected, as a matter of course, to dress in the same fashion, and this would naturally extend 
to things like socks more so than other outward displays of appearance.  
Like, cultural is, let's say Hasidish versus Ashkenazi versus—like that's a lot more where you 
come from and who your—but societal—and I don't really know how to define between the 
two. Cultural—like there's some who know that—there's some things that aren't within the 
Torah, like what color socks you wear. (Interview with Sarah Falk, 2011) 
 
Perhaps the mode of dress and the small differences among the various groups 
forming the ultra-Orthodox community have a function of distinct appearance as well as 
relaying a number of social political orientations. In this way, various stringencies can be tied 
to both religions precepts as well as social dictates. Ruchama Spiegel agrees that appearance 
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can indicate acceptance of various external influences, such as those of political issues and so 
on. The interesting thing to note is how a modernized version of ultra-Orthodox society, 
when asked directly about modern Orthodoxy, is simply unable to answer, showing how the 
cultural aspect of Orthodoxy can be complex and ingrained within the ultra-Orthodox 
community. 
Modern, well, modern Orthodox then would be a question—I don’t know. Some of it’s how 
they would relate to modesty issues with women and men and how they interact. And, let’s 
say, Mizrachi is political more, I think, just to how—where the state of Israel fits in their 
scheme of—their picture of ... Is that religious differences? I guess outlook, if you call that—
okay. But I mean the basic premise, I think, is the same. Maybe how they apply certain things, 
maybe you want to put it that way. (Interview with Ruchama Spiegel, 2011) 
 
The following interview with Deena Friedberg is interesting as it relates to how 
difficult it is to judge the religiosity of certain individuals by their outward appearance. 
Friedberg also touches on the fact that there is a difference between the ways in which 
religion is practiced in the Diaspora versus how it is practiced in Israel. Even though outward 
appearances may indicate that someone is secular, this is not necessarily the case as that 
individual does observe various rituals, which would normally only be associated with the 
Orthodox community. This adds a greater layer of confusion into the social implications of 
religion; no doubt they are there, but they just make it increasingly difficult to distinguish 
among individuals. 
Even here people who might say they're secular. There was this great story about a rabbi 
[identifying information removed] that we know who made aliyah, and then he came back to 
talk about what it was like. And he said one of his neighbors didn't seem to keep much of 
anything, but come Sukkot, he said he said, “when are we going to build a sukkah?” They 
were in an apartment complex, so they were going to do it together. He said, “You're going 
to build a sukkah?” And he goes, “of course,” you know. Some people won't do anything, but 
Yom Kippur, they all go to shul. So it's not so clear-cut. Like, in North America, people are 
either secular or religious, but here [in Israel] some people keep certain things. There are 
some people who don't really keep much of Shabbat or whatever, like they can go to the 
beach or watch TV, but their homes are strictly kosher, they would never dream of mixing 
meat and milk or anything like that. So, yeah, it's not so clear-cut. (Interview with Deena 
Friedberg, 2011) 
 
Despite differences in the ultra-Orthodox world, there are, as Friedberg says, “varying 
approaches,” yet at the same time, the fundamental values and textual references are the 
same. This attitude tends to show that within the narrowly defined world of ultra-Orthodox 
society, there can be room for religious pluralism while staying within the borders of 
religion.  
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Everybody is following Shulchan Aruch. We just have different, maybe approaches, different 
minhagim, different—we’re all trying to follow the Torah, you know, according to your 
stream or whatever it is. You know, you may have a different color hat. Or if one guy’s 
working, one guy’s learning, one guy’s in the army—but, you know, we’re all attempting to 
serve Hashem and—you know, using our capabilities. (Interview with Yehuda Aronson, 
2011) 
 
Yocheved Sakes makes an interesting case for the performative social norms within 
ultra-Orthodox society. Individuals are expected to dress and behave in a particular fashion 
and more so in the Diaspora. This rigidity is constantly reinforced and reinterpreted in order 
to maintain standards within the ultra-Orthodox community. It is important to note that these 
standards do not necessarily stem from religious observance or practice. They may have 
started as traditions linked to modesty or mode of dress from the Diaspora and morphed in 
time into a social phenomenon whereby to be accepted, all members of society need to 
conform to a rigid system of dress. 
Yesterday I went to an interview in a purely secular mercaz kehilati, and, you know, right 
away the director called in the person in charge of Haredim. Now I was wearing a pretty 
good sheitel and I was wearing what I'm wearing today, which in the winter is entirely 
appropriate. She knew right away who I was. Now I don't think I dressed—you know, and I 
was wearing, you know, not this on my head. But I don't think I dress particularly Haredi, 
and, you know, I'm an artist by profession, so I'm pretty—but you know, women especially; 
men are not as good as that. When my husband walked into his kollel with his captain's hat, 
which the Chofetz Chaim used to wear such a hat, somebody said, “ooh is that funny, can I 
wear it on Purim?” In America, they didn't say that. He was the rav, and he used to wear that 
hat every day; here, you just feel really strict dress guidelines. (Interview with Yocheved 
Saks, 2011) 
 
B. Zionism and the ultra-Orthodox Community 
The Orthodox community has varying perspectives on Zionism and the secular nature 
of the state. Within the larger Orthodox community, opinions range from outright acceptance 
for matters such as military service and involvement in the affairs of state to the other 
extreme of ultra-Orthodox groups such as Neturi Karta, which refuse to acknowledge the 
existence of the state and do not participate in state-funded programs or policy.  
This position is held by the extreme, mostly religious Orthodox fringes in the Haredi 
community, which view Zionism and the state of Israel as demonic enterprises and refuse to 
have anything to do with them. In recent times the two tendencies described here as 
“principled accommodationism” and “pragmatic rejectionism” have increasingly been 
showing signs of convergence, with Religious Zionists becoming more orthodox in their 
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religious behavior and Haredim (with the exception of the “principled rejectionists”) 
becoming more nationalists in their political outlook. (Shafir & Peled, 2002, p. 140) 
 
Opinions within the ultra-Orthodox community vary as well. This section examines Zionism 
and the state of Israel within Orthodoxy and within the ultra-Orthodox community. This is an 
important element in identifying the currents, positions, and motivations underlying the 
varied positions of the ultra-Orthodox. Rejection of Zionism varies from a complete and utter 
rejection to tacit acceptance of the state on a practical level. 
 This thesis focuses on the largest segment of the ultra-Orthodox community, which 
generally participates in the political process and various other elements of the state, such as 
new military programs targeted towards the ultra-Orthodox, job training, and other 
integration programs. However, despite these various attempts by the state to create a more 
inclusive and egalitarian framework for the ultra-Orthodox community, some elements of the 
ultra-Orthodox community reject the state’s position for various religious and ideological 
reasons; those arguments are examined in this section. This section broadly explores 
elements of the conflicts between the ultra-Orthodox and the state as well as the ultra-
Orthodox community and concepts of Zionism and secularism.  
 The Haredi relationship with Zionism is explored along with a brief synopsis of the 
history involved and the often contrary opinions some members of the ultra-Orthodox 
community have towards Zionism as the motivation for a secular state. Furthermore, the 
issue of Haredim and citizenship as well as the underlying concept of working within the 
system and the established framework versus non-recognition of the state lead to a discussion 
of anti-Zionist Haredim and the minority who utterly reject all connections with the state. 
This section also explores various facets of religious identity and the elements that comprise 
the arguments made for a particular religious way of life and the differences between the 
ultra-Orthodox and Religious Zionist outlooks as they pertain to the state. This is intrinsically 
tied to the concept of the state as a religious manifestation and the Haredi recognition or 
rejection of the state of Israel on that basis. Finally, this section concludes with an analysis of 
the Haredi will to rule, which is essentially an examination of the larger scenario and 
motivations of the ultra-Orthodox community in Israel. This ranges from a continuation of 
consociational policies maintaining balance in society (as evidenced in the various forms of 
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“status quo arrangements”) to a newfound political system based on religion in which ultra-
Orthodox religious prescriptions are followed by the entire state. 
Based on their religious fundamentalist beliefs, [the ultra-Orthodox] argue that the 
redemption of the Jewish people, its re-concentration in the Holy Land, and the eventual 
establishment of a Jewish sovereign theocracy should not be expedited by any political 
movement, not to speak of a secular-national movement like Zionism. Rather, Jewish 
redemption and revival, according to this view, depend on the coming of the Messiah. 
Therefore, both Sephardi and Ashkenazi Haredim reject the legitimacy of the state of Israel, 
which, according to their leaders, was founded and developed by the despised Zionist 
Movement. On a symbolic level, none of the Haredi factions and associations celebrate 
Israel’s Independence Day, they tear and burn the Israeli national “Zionist flag,” and ridicule 
the national anthem. On the social level, the Haredim prefer to live in their own quarters and 
enclaves – actually self-created ghettos – and abstain from mingling with the rest of the 
Israelis on a social basis, despise and denigrate secular and national-religious ideas, and reject 
Western culture, especially “Americanization.” (Sheffer, 1997, p. 131) 
 
 One of the key elements in understanding the motivations of the ultra-Orthodox 
community is the separation of the ideological and practical motivations of Zionism. In many 
cases, there is a tacit understanding and acceptance of practical elements of relations with the 
state. This includes aspects such as receiving funding, participating in the political process, 
educational institutions funded by the state, and so forth. However, for many in the Orthodox 
(and ultra-Orthodox) community in Israel there is a clear separation between Judaism and the 
Zionist portrayal of Israel as a Jewish state or the Jewish state. This distinction becomes 
more pronounced further along the spectrum towards ultra-Orthodoxy, yet is apparent in 
various forms across the Orthodox community at large. Separating elements of Zionism to its 
ideological and practical-based components is a process constantly in flux. An example of 
this is the observation of particular religious stringencies, applicable only in the land of 
Israel. These particular observances predate Zionism by many hundreds or perhaps thousands 
of years (Dawson, 1989, p. 65). These various observances clearly mark a distinction 
between a return to the biblical land of Israel and the creation of the modern state, though 
there are common threads that connect the two ideals (Bard, 2005, p. 64). The dual nature of 
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existence between the practical and the spiritual also serves to divide the practical aspects of 
the state from the conception of the biblical land with religious overtones. 
 Another example is the concept of a redeeming messiah; the redemption and return to 
Israel (as a religious land) are key elements and central tenets of faith for religious Jews. 
Maimonides, a preeminent medieval Jewish philosopher, references this as one of his key 
articles of faith (Angel, 2011, p. xviii; see Kraemer, 2010). The establishment of a Jewish 
theocratic state following the return of the messiah is contingent upon religious events and is, 
in the opinion of many Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox adherents, not at all related to the event 
of secular nationalism that created Zionism and the modern state of Israel. In this view, 
Zionism represents a shortcut, skipping the biblical promise alluding to a land of Israel that 
would resemble a version of religious hegemony for a secular nationalist state founded in a 
period of secular nationalism with very different motivations.  
 As a result of this fundamental disagreement regarding the very nature of the country 
of Israel versus the biblical land of Israel, the Haredi public demonstrates self-seclusion from 
the public sphere to varying degrees. The ultra-Orthodox community sees the underlying 
focus of its objection to an Israeli society that seeks to pursue secular and materialist pursuits 
unrelated to the furthering of traditional Orthodox Jewish values. In short, it views this as an 
effort to integrate its way of life though assimilation and integration. From this perspective, 
secular Israelis are not meeting their divinely ordained purpose and, therefore, are unable or 
unwilling to strictly adhere to many religious observances.  
 In the same vein, some Haredim object to the use of Jewish symbology and elements 
of Jewish identity as key elements in the creation, shaping, and formulation of Israel as a 
Zionist state. By using the philosophy and co-opting and linking historical Judaism and 
practice to state values, some Haredim feel that Zionism has co-opted elements of the Jewish 
experience, which has existed in the Diaspora for millennia. For example, “on the political 
level, the Haredim negate the legitimacy of the ‘Zionist State,’ reject its right to regulate the 
lives of those who reside in the Holy Land, and do not obey most of Israel’s civil, and even 
criminal, laws” (Sheffer, 1997, p. 132). Bridging these two extremes are Religious Zionists 
who seek to mitigate the changes to traditional religious observance of various elements and 
maintain that the modern state has a degree of religiosity. The way in which Zionism is 
interpreted as having religious elements and the way in which Zionism captures various 
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religious features (and the inherent religiosity of the state) are among the central 
disagreements the various ultra-Orthodox in Israel have.  
 
 1. Haredi relationship with Zionism 
The Haredi relationship with Zionism and the belief in the modern state of Israel as a 
religious identity connected through religion to the ancient biblical land of Israel are subjects 
of great disagreement among Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel. A former leader of 
Lithuanian ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel was adamant that “the Jewish people are still in 
exile, until the arrival of their redeemer, even when it is in Eretz Israel” (Stadler and Ben-
Ari, 2003, p. 21). The symbolic difference between Eretz Israel, the land of Israel mentioned 
in the Bible, and the state of Israel, which Zionism announces as being the Jewish state and 
the Jewish homeland, call into question the various key definitions of what “Jewish” really 
means. Zionism’s position as a secular nationalist movement is that the Jewish state can 
maintain its Jewishness without necessarily involving religious observances and practices. 
For the ultra-Orthodox, the observance and symbolism of the strict interpretation of Judaism 
is a key element in observing how they interpret the commandments and God’s will. At 
either end of the recognition of Zionism and complicity with state policies on various levels, 
all Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox Jews interpret the demands that the state places on them 
through the lens of religious Orthodoxy. This can very easily put the various sides at 
loggerheads and can exacerbate the ongoing tensions present between state secular priorities 
and those of the religious community in Israel on a multitude of fronts. Shafir and Peled note 
that  
the most common Haredi...position [is] distinguished by its rejection of ideological, though 
not necessarily of practical, Zionism. Most groups that adhere to this position, organized in 
1912 as Agudat Yisrael (AY), have been grudgingly willing to take part in the Zionist 
enterprise on a limited basis without endowing it any theological legitimacy. (2002, p. 139) 
 
They go on to point out that  
their co-operation with Zionism has been motivated by...the defense of their own material 
interests in a society where all material resources were controlled by Zionist organs. In that 
sense, co-operating with the Israeli State (or the pre-State Zionist institutions) was similar to 
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co-operating with non-Jewish government in the galut (exile), although the former is viewed 
by some Haredim as a greater abomination than the latter. (2002, p. 139) 
 
Moreover, Shafir and Peled conclude that “[their] other consideration was similar to that of 
the Religious Zionists, namely, an effort to minimize as much as possible the violation of 
Jewish religious codes in the society as presently constituted” (Shafir & Peled, 2002, pp. 
139–140). 
The following interviews illustrate how in Israel, unlike in the Diaspora, many of the 
tensions and problems in society come from these similarities, rather than dissimilarities, 
among members of society. Perhaps the very different way in which individuals in the ultra-
Orthodox community are exposed and contact members of the outside world creates a more 
difficult situation where members of the ultra-Orthodox community seek greater methods to 
protect their identity. It seems as if there is a slippery slope in maintaining identity in a strict 
and rigid sense against something that seems almost similar yet has so many differences, 
such as commonalities of religion and language, whereas in the Diaspora, the differences are 
much more clearly delineated. In a sense, the ultra-Orthodox community has to carve out 
meaning and purpose for its religious practices and way of life within the scope of the secular 
founding ideology of the state.  
Taking a small part of the Zionist experience and trying to reinterpret it through the 
ultra-Orthodox perspective in dealing with the many inherent conflicts this creates is no 
simple task. Yitzchak Cohen seems to suggest that a unique rift in this context has formed in 
the aftermath of the Holocaust and has resulted in an ongoing clash between the secular and 
ultra-Orthodox communities in Israel. As he suggested in the interview, this is the 
fundamental difference between secular-Zionist ideology and core ultra-Orthodox ideology. 
This perhaps is why there has been an ongoing and deepening rift since the time of the 
founding of the state, and this rift has deepened as religious and secular elements of society 
have drawn further apart. 
I think that when you live in a society and a culture where everybody is Jewish— I mean in 
Israel you're talking about, you know, I don't know what it is, 70 to 80% of the country is 
Jewish, and regardless of the Arabs that live there, certainly the Jewish population and the 
areas where they live, are close to 100% Jewish. I think those— so every suburb across Israel 
that you have Jews, it's pretty much dominantly Jewish. You're going to encounter all 
different clashes between the different types of Jews and the different backgrounds because 
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you have just Jews, and everybody's kind of at each other's throat. Now, it's hard for me to 
explain what that means, but I'll contrast that with America.  
 America, you're dealing with, really, a whole different demographic, and I think 
that's really what creates the problem in Israel that you don't find over here. We're talking, 
Jewish— you know, the ultra-Orthodox living in one place, the secular Jews living in a 
completely, entirely different place. In fact, some of them may never see ultra-Orthodox Jews 
in their lives, and certainly, I think—an even stronger factor, is that in Israel, the secular—
how do I say this— Israel—this is really a much stronger answer, and I think this will help 
you here. The state of Israel was founded on a very secular cultural perspective. You know, 
this is Israel, this is our new country. We're going to leave the shtetl behind, we're going to 
leave the whole idea of the old Jew, the cultural Orthodox religious Jew behind—we're going 
to start a new Jew. And because of that, there's a certain—I don't—I hate to use this word, 
but it's—it's a bit of strong word, but there's almost a certain hatred towards the Orthodox, 
or especially the ultra-Orthodox Jew and the way they look, and the way they conduct 
themselves, that the state was founded on, in order to put the past behind them, the European 
shtetl.  
 A lot of people believe that the Holocaust came about because of the way the Jews 
looked and the way the Jews acted. So, there was a certain infusion into the education system, 
in terms of building the kibbutzim, that Haredi Jews is how we don't want to be. Haredi Jews 
is not how we want to look, or act, or be. We are now a new country. We want to be just like 
everybody else. So, you don't have that anywhere else in the world because there was no one 
educating people to hate the ultra-Orthodox. There is no one telling them that this is not how 
we behave. And this was infused into the state of Israel, the founding of the state of Israel, 
and you still have plenty of it. There is a humongous rift between the secular Jews and the 
ultra-Orthodox Jews, and, therefore, anything that the secular Jews can find to put down the 
ultra-Orthodox, and view them as being less than good, to view them as something wrong 
with them, will happen. And certainly even from the ultra-Orthodox side, because it was 
founded with these principles, which is very anti-religious, anti-keeping of the Torah, anti-
following in the ways that they view Jewish people should be behaving, they—from their 
standpoint, also put down the state of Israel, also view the state of Israel as something that's 
corrupt and something that they should stay away from.… And because of that, I believe all 
the problems that exist between the secular and the ultra-Orthodox came about, and that is 
why there is a massive rift, and both sides continue to contribute to this hatred and to this 
distance between the two sides. And you won't find that here because living in America, the 
secular Jews are not judgmental, necessarily, of Orthodox. They're just ignorant and don't 
know any better. They were brought up secular, they don't feel anything for ultra-Orthodox 
and ultra-Orthodox should keep to themselves. So you don't really have the same kind of 
feelings that you have in Israel. (Interview with Yitzhak Cohen, 2011) 
 
 It is interesting to note that for many, the individual practice of religious rights is, 
from the ultra-Orthodox perspective, trying to impinge on the freedoms of the collective 
group. This is also the case vice versa; in light of this, Menashe Blum points out that there is 
great dissimilarity in the way in which the ultra-Orthodox community in the Diaspora and the 
ultra-Orthodox community in Israel function. 
In Israel it's not like that. In Israel, Haredim look at secular society as: They're trying to 
destroy my way of life. And secular Jews look at Haredim as: They're trying to destroy my 
way of life. That's not a live-and-let-live situation. So, it's nothing—there's nothing similar 
between the Haredi Jews in Israel and America except Halacha. But, the way they deal in 
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society is totally different. So here an American-Haredi person is a little bit more laid back 
and he's not as zealous, I don't think, as an Israeli-Haredi person. (Interview with Menashe 
Blum, 2011) 
 
 2. Haredim and citizenship 
 Citizenship, as perceived by the ultra-Orthodox community, is complicated and 
contains within it many nuances. The concept of belonging to and participating in the 
implicit social contract of citizenship often comes into conflict with the ultra-Orthodox 
perspective. As part of the social contract, many responsibilities are placed on the ultra-
Orthodox community and on Israeli society at large, in which some of the ultra-Orthodox do 
not participate in many respects. At the same time, citizenship generally can be viewed as 
“rights and responsibilities together as essential for any kind of citizenship” (Schattle, 2008, 
p. 33). The convergence of opinion among the ultra-Orthodox community is to maintain the 
status quo and occurs for a number of reasons.  
The vast majority of the ultra-Orthodox maintain citizenship and participate, to 
varying degrees, in some state processes, ranging from health care to varied levels of 
engagement with the employment sector, voting, and so on. They do not, however, generally 
participate in military service or other forms of engagement that change the social and 
religious status quo. It is important to note that a small minority of the ultra-Orthodox 
community, particularly among certain sects of Hasidim, disavow any participation in and 
acknowledgment of the state and refuse all forms of state funding. However, these are an 
extreme, though vocal, minority.  
Generally, in the ultra-Orthodox community, there is tacit acceptance (or muted 
protest) on various issues ranging from taxation, health care, voting, and the like. Other 
sensitive issues, such as military service and involvement in the secular education system 
(such as teaching the core secular curriculum in religious schools) have many in the ultra-
Orthodox community in favour of non-participation, as this is perceived to be strictly 
concerned with the larger affairs of Israeli secular society. Through time, however, a shift has 
occurred where elements of the ultra-Orthodox community have acquiesced and adapted to 
certain elements of obligations through citizenship. These obligations include financial, 
political, and other motivators in exchange for maintaining certain privileges accorded to 
citizens of the state. While many state programs and functions do lend themselves to some 
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forms of compromise, for example, in the case of teaching some elements of a secular 
curriculum in exchange for increased funding, these are half-hearted compromises when 
many members of the ultra-Orthodox community still maintain an ideological and, at times, 
religious divide from the state and its policies.  
 One of the key issues facing the ultra-Orthodox community in terms of citizenship 
and the rights and responsibilities inherent in this implied social contract is the symbolism of 
the ultra-Orthodox community participating in the affairs of the state. Many believe that this 
would imply tacit approval of secular government policies that for both religious and social 
reasons the ultra-Orthodox community does not wish to adopt. It is, therefore, the choice of 
the ultra-Orthodox community to accept and participate in certain elements of society and not 
participate in others. Over a long period of time, this strategy of increased Orthodoxy and 
partial involvement may have evolved from “forms of cooperative behavior that are passed 
on as superior strategies when it comes to the distribution of resources and survival (of the 
individual and the group)” (Mallet, 2011, p. 2). This then creates a new mechanism of dual 
existence with secular society. 
Devorah Nudelman touches on defining the Jewish state in the context of Judaism 
versus nationalism, or asking if they are indeed the very same thing. The context of being 
Israeli is clearly different from being Jewish. In fact, a percentage of the population does not 
only identify as being Jewish but belongs to other major religious groups. Israelis, however, 
define themselves as living in a Jewish state. Therefore, there exists an inherent conflict 
between the definitions and the perception of someone in a secular country. This occurs even 
more so when individuals who profess to be from the ultra-Orthodox community examine the 
situation where they are Israeli by definition living in Israel—they live in the Jewish state—
but unlike their secular compatriots, they practice a stringent standard of Orthodox Judaism. 
This, therefore, puts them at odds with secular Israelis who find that they are able to maintain 
both a Jewish cultural nationalistic and religious identity. This is perhaps akin to Israeli 
citizens who are not necessarily Jewish or for that matter, do not necessarily identify with 
national holidays of Jewish origin simply because it is not part of their religion. This shows a 
complex issue that exists in Israel and forms the crux of the inherent conflict in Israeli 
identity. 
But that’s—but then we’re getting back to the original point, that the laws are based on not-
appropriate foundations. If it’s a Jewish country, it shouldn’t be, am I Israeli or Jewish? 
Shapiro 121 
 
You’re Jewish; it’s a Jewish country, it's not—what an Israeli—oh, Israelis like being an 
Italian? No, an Israeli means you’re a Jewish person, and it’s a Jewish nation —that’s the 
nationalism, is the Jew—is the Yiddishkeit, is the Judaism. Not the, I’m an Israeli, so I eat 
falafel and I, you know, watch Beitar, whatever they’re called, you know. That’s not 
nationalism—that’s not Jewish nationalism. Jewish nationalism should be, here we have a 
Jewish country, we have—what are the public holidays? The public holidays are the religious 
holidays.(Interview with Devorah Nudelman, 2011) 
 
 One of the key elements of citizenship for the ultra-Orthodox population is the rights 
and privileges accorded to all citizens, chief among them voting rights. The high 
concentration of voting power in ultra-Orthodox voting blocs gives the population a 
disproportionate swing vote on certain key social issues. By maintaining various elements of 
citizenship and not having them tied to obligations of the state, the society has created a 
stronghold of religious voting power, which, in essence, creates leverage for the ultra-
Orthodox community to negotiate various sensitive issues.  
 Currently, for many in the ultra-Orthodox community, there is a dual existence: They 
participate in some elements of larger Israeli society as citizens and at the same time are 
supported by the state to learn Judaic texts as their profession. This dichotomy sets the 
worldly obligations of the individual against the other-worldly considerations of the ultra-
Orthodox yeshiva, striving for merit in the world to come. The current trend has been greater 
engagement with the larger secular society, which creates a difficult duality for many to face 
in terms of not only religious strictures and observances but for the fundamental question of 
citizenship and its implications. Sheffer explains: 
The growing Haredi communities…also provide a considerable challenge to the existing 
notion of Israeli citizenship. As in other religious fundamentalist communities and groups, 
there are splits in the attitudes in Haredi communities towards the rights and duties involved 
in being Israeli citizens. But while many of the Haredim expect to enjoy all civil and social 
rights Israel grants its citizens -- freedom of association, movement, speech, participation in 
the political process, housing, health services, support for their independent educational 
system, etc., these groups are far from accepting and fulfilling the duties of other Israeli 
citizens. Most important, they do not serve in the army, on the whole they do not pay state 
and local taxes, and, although they are forced to comply with Israeli laws and regulations, 
most of them do not recognize the supremacy of the Israeli parliament; above all, they 
denigrate the entire legal system and particularly the Supreme Court, which they regard as 
their archenemy. (1997, p. 136) 
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Blumen explains further:  
Initially, ultra-Orthodox Jews reinforced their anti-Zionist, distinctive, elitist identity, strictly 
eschewing state support in politics. However, as population growth threatened to erode the 
economic base of the “society of scholars,” they began to bargain for state support and 
political power. Legislation introduced benefits such as stipends for married yeshiva students 
and privileges such as exemption from military service for all religious women and yeshiva 
students” (2002, pp. 136–137).  
 
He adds that “modern Israel supports the non-productive existence of the [ultra-Orthodox] 
community, not only because of its political power (nearly 7% of the voters), but also 
because of its symbolic value as a unifying canon of Jewish past in a society of immigrants” 
(2002, p. 137). 
 
 3. Anti-Zionist Haredim 
 Anti-Zionist Haredim are typified by three central groups, Neturei Karta, Satmar, and 
the Eda Haridit, although there are a number of other smaller groups as well. All of the 
aforementioned groups have extreme views on Zionism and disagree on the current 
organization of Judaism in Israel and the legitimacy and place of the state in the context of a 
religious outlook. The belief of these groups is that the state is inherently fraudulent and 
possibly evil, as it was founded on principles of secular conquest and secular state formation 
rather than on religious principles. It is important to note that a core tenet of Judaism is the 
messianic redemption and renewal of the land of Israel. In the opinion of these groups, this is 
a far cry from the current state of Israel.  
Anti-Zionist Haredim, who are a vocal minority of Haredim in Israel, go beyond 
ignoring or not participating in the state and its functions and actively protest against, rebel, 
and refuse to participate in affairs of the state. They do so as they believe that religious 
strictures and dictates encourage and hasten the arrival of the Messiah (Green & Silverstein, 
2003, pp. 247–267). This belief stands in stark contrast to the current state of affairs (in 
secular Israel), which the anti-Zionist ultra-Orthodox see as both a threat to their way of life 
and a threat to the hope of the messianic redemption of the Jewish people (Waxman, 1987, 
pp. 175–192).  
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 Their refusal to accept Israel as a Jewish state comes from many different issues. 
Chief among them is their strict interpretation of Judaism and what it means to be Jewish. 
The key elements are the inherent religiosity of the state, the secular nature of Israeli society, 
and the liberal views of the secular majority towards Judaism and its observances. The 
Neturei Karta movement “derives its name from a passage in the Talmud which refers to 
those who devote themselves to the study of Torah as the guardians of the city” (Reich, 2000, 
p. 282) and seeks to establish a religious hegemony in the Land of Israel heralded by the 
coming of the Messiah. Until such a time as God establishes the Land of Israel, they view the 
state of Israel as an abomination, which has attempted to circumvent the larger plan of 
religion and has established a state against God’s will. They, therefore, work with various 
groups and movements to oppose the Zionist enterprise and the version of Judaism that 
Zionism promotes. This is particularly true in the links between Zionism and Judaism where 
many aspects of ancient Jewish ritual observance in history are co-opted by Zionism in order 
to create elements of the Zionist state. This is why Haredim seek not only to maintain a 
policy of noncontact and involvement with Zionists and Zionism, but they also believe that 
the Land of Israel would be best served by having foreign rulers until the dawn of the 
redemption. While this minority numerically makes up a very small fraction of the overall 
ultra-Orthodox population, they are extremely vocal and, therefore, have a greater degree of 
visibility and public presence than their numbers would otherwise support.  
Neturei Karta is a group of religious extremists who live primarily in the Meah Shearim 
sections of Jerusalem and in Bnei Brak. The group adheres to strict Orthodox views and 
follows the lifestyles…brought to Israel from Eastern Europe. Their dress codes are 
traditionally long coat and black hats of Eastern European origin. They oppose Zionism and 
have refused to accept Israel as a Jewish state. They oppose the use of Hebrew language 
for…communication because it is the holy language and because to do so would imply 
acceptance of Israel as a Jewish state. (Armstrong, 2001, p. 340) 
 
They believe that the Jewish state can be established only by God. Neturei Karta strongly 
oppose Israel and have indicated a willingness to work with groups such as the Palestine 
Liberation Organization and Arab states that oppose the Zionist enterprise (Reich, 2000, p. 
282). Avruch explains further:  
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From the perspective of the most extreme ultra-Orthodox anti-Zionists, the Neturei Karta or 
the Satmar Hasidim, the whole idea of a Jewish state explicitly not ruled by halakah is a 
simple one: it is an anathema, apostasy and abomination. It is not a “Jewish state” at all, but a 
“state of Jews” -- and bad Jews, at that. The state of Israel simply carries forward the 
rebellion against God that Zionism established. And just as Zionism brought upon the Jewish 
people divine punishment -- the Holocaust itself, in the most extreme views of some in this 
camp -- so, too, does Israel's very existence invite further retribution. Thus, diplomatic 
isolation, political setbacks, wars, terrorist attacks -- the very same things that messianic 
nationalists see as a task by God to allow Israelis to prove their redemptive worth -- are 
viewed by Haredi anti-Zionists as proof of God's continuing displeasure and his impending 
wrath. (2001, pp. 151–152) 
 
The Neturei Karta International explains its basic tenets:  
One of the basics of Judaism is that we are a people in exile due to the Divine decree. 
Accordingly, we are opposed to the ideology of Zionism, a recent innovation, which seeks to 
force the end of exile. Our banishment from the Holy Land will end miraculously at a time 
when all of mankind will reunite in the brotherly service of the Creator. (Neturei Karta 
International, undated/Herriot, 2009, p. 249) 
 
Telushkin adds that  
the Neturei Karta regarded “Ben-Gurion and the Zionist leadership as heretics, the moral 
equivalence of the ancient idolaters condemned by the Torah. In the years before Israeli 
statehood was declared, they repeatedly affirmed their preference for being ruled by either the 
British or the Arabs; what mattered most to them was that they not be ruled by Jews less 
religious than they” (2008, p.177) 
 
 It is important not to underestimate the fundamental arguments of anti-Zionist 
Haredim. While they do not reflect the majority of Haredim in their stance—the majority of 
Haredim to one extent or another acquiesce on practical grounds with the state, for example, 
using state services such as health care, social insurance, and educational stipends—there is a 
great deal of acceptance of anti-Zionist movements within the ultra-Orthodox community as 
they are champions of what is seen as core Jewish values that push back against the Zionist 
transformation of these values in the modern Israeli state.  
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The inhabitants of Mea Shearim are not altogether opposed to... [the Neturei Karta]. 
The...movement dedicated itself to important affairs that interest all of the quarter’s 
inhabitants. For example, this group walks through Mea Shearim twice a week with a large 
sign proclaiming that the daughter of Israel must dress modestly. The Neturei Karta is 
opposed to the desecration of the Shabbat by non-religious Jews: they block the entrances to 
the neighborhood before the day of rest begins in order to prevent cars from driving through 
it on this day (Meijers, 1992, p. 40) 
 
Moreover, “one routinely sees Missives posted on Mea Shearim’s walls denouncing the 
government, equating Zionism with Nazism, and condemning local residents by name for 
various ‘sins,’ such as installing televisions in their homes” (Telushkin, 2008, p.177). These 
actions put up barriers, both real and imagined, separating and isolating the ultra-Orthodox 
community from Israeli society.  
 
 4. Facets of religious identity 
 The ultra-Orthodox community as it currently exists in Israel is, to a great extent, a 
newfound social creation. This social order has formed in response to various external 
pressures. This organization of society represents an entirely new social paradigm, which in 
many ways reveals the inherent contradictions to an increased policy of Orthodoxy. While 
many in the Orthodox community claim a direct link to the distant biblical past, as well as 
more recent elements of Jewish history, this bypasses the creation of the state up to the 
present day. In fact, increased Orthodoxy, both in the contemporary period as well as 
throughout history, has been a reaction to increased secularization and changing societal 
values. Increased Orthodoxy can become a key element of identity, shifting focus away from 
preserving the modes and rituals of daily life to a focus on Orthodoxy in and of itself. For 
many in the ultra-Orthodox community, and perhaps in the larger Orthodox world, the 
concept of Israel as a Jewish state, and a mostly secular state, is a reason to increase 
Orthodoxy and “go to the mattresses” (Fußinger, 2012, p.13). The divisions that exist among 
the various ultra-Orthodox groups vary with the character and composition. Overall, many of 
these religious groups share common elements. Among ultra-Orthodox groups, there is an 
increased tolerance for radical elements to operate within society. This is evidenced by fringe 
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groups, such as the anti-Zionists, who adhere to a strict standard of religiosity counter to the 
ideology of Zionism (Porat, 1992).  
While anti-Zionist groups are discussed in this section, it is important to note that 
radical elements within anti-Zionism extend far beyond political disagreements with secular 
society. This can include disagreements over religious textual interpretation, rabbinic 
leadership, fundamental core values, and priorities. There is a great deal of tolerance for 
radicalism in the ultra-Orthodox community as the radicals use dialogue within the context of 
the larger ultra-Orthodox Judaism to claim legitimacy for their cause. For example, in 
advocating for stricter observance, fringe groups speak out, with great force, about the 
generally unspoken sentiment within the ultra-Orthodox community to be more proactive in 
religious matters in the larger context of Israeli society. The majority of the ultra-Orthodox 
community is generally hesitant to cross the borderlines between the ultra-Orthodox 
community and the irreligious population outside of their insular enclaves (Heilman, 2000, p. 
xx). However, movement in this regard by various radical groups has proved immensely 
popular within religious circles and thus difficult to silence by ultra-Orthodox leadership. 
Through this ongoing drive to reshape ultra-Orthodox Judaism, a new ultra-Orthodox identity 
is being formed, with its key characteristic being the willingness to engage in various forms 
of conflict. This is done to preserve the national soul and character of religion, and to engage 
in new conflicts with various competing forces such as secularization or Israeli laïcité 
(Charbit, 2009), Zionism, and secularizing influences.  
There are, of course, many other social issues among Jews in Israel. These other 
issues are generally perceived as far less important, from a social standpoint, than the 
divisions between the secular public and the ultra-Orthodox community. This is because 
classic examples of dividing lines in Israeli society such as the division between Ashkenazi 
and Sephardi Jews are slowly being bridged. As intermarriage rates between Ashkenazi and 
Sephardi Jews increase, and the stigma against the promotion and inclusion of Sephardic 
Jews—due in part to the Ashkenazi character surrounding the formation of the state and 
European influx—comes to an end.  
For example, Yonatan Smith shows how one option for integration is through 
marriage, and this can be seen through multicultural integration. He notes that his family can 
see this because of their perspective coming from, in this case, the United States, and they 
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see the place for integration through having an overarching national or perhaps social 
identity. 
I would say in the past it was definitely something that was of concern. But I think we're 
going in the direction—in the positive direction where everyone is accepted for their own 
viewpoints. And as an American, I'm more open to that. I mean I have my in-laws. I have two 
married children and both sets of in-laws are Sephardim and to me that's fine and it's great. I 
have no problem with that because we're looking at the individual. We're not looking at 
Ashkenazi or Sephardi or Hasidic or Litvish or things like that. (Interview with Yonatan 
Smith, 2011) 
 
In contrast, Yoav Daniel points to the sense that inequality exists. This is perceived as 
being something that still does exist. While it may be difficult to create change, it is no less 
challenging to create a new perception around inequality. 
I think it's improved a lot, but I have a feeling that it's— there are certain places where it 
might be a little bit harder. I have noticed that there are certain places where there are too 
many Ashkenazi names, and I think that there must be something going on, but as an outsider, 
I don’t why—I don’t know for a fact that that's true in the army. I have a feeling that it's true 
in the army, that they’re— that Sephardim are under-represented in the officers ranks. I 
went—what was it? There was—I guess—a think tank, or something, and I was noticing that 
all the names were Ashkenazi. I looked at 20, 30 names, and all of the names were Ashkenazi, 
and I was starting to think, what's going on here? (Interview with Yoav Daniel, 2011) 
 
 Not all see parity in society, as evidenced by the following interview excerpt, which 
casts a very pessimistic view on the equality between Sephardim and Ashkenazim in society. 
Unfortunately, no. The Sephardi community is very much oppressed. They are treated 
racially like a lower class here. (Interview with Miriam Jacoby, 2011) 
 
It is important to note that the Sephardi population in Israel currently makes up a far 
greater percentage than in most communities in the Diaspora (Safran, 2005; Roumani, 1988). 
This means that with changing attitudes, a greater degree of equality, understanding, and 
inclusion has made inroads in the ethnic divide. However, this cannot be said of the divide 
between the far extremes of religion and secularism. These are two intractable positions that 
essentially hold the middle (the majority), which ranges from secular to traditional to 
religious, hostage. The traditional centre is subject to the whims of the various religious and 
secular minorities arguing their case for state involvement. In other words, the fundamental 
debate is over the degree of entanglement the state has in religious policy and bureaucracy. 
Dowty notes that this is “far more than the Sephardi/Ashkenazi split, the conflict between the 
varying demands of religious observance is the most potentially disruptive threat to the unity 
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of Jewish Israel” (2001, p. 159). A key example, at the most basic level, is agreeing on a 
definition of what “Jewish” actually means.  
Israel, as the Jewish state, seeks to represent Judaism though the paradigm of 
Zionism. Yet, from the perspective of the ultra-Orthodox leaders who currently influence 
religious policy, the distribution of the population, based on religious tendency, is vastly 
skewed. A minority of the religious community using an ultra-Orthodox interpretation (of the 
fundamental meaning of Judaism) creates conditions for religious regulation. In other words, 
a small minority, highly regimented and organized, has a great degree of religious authority 
over the mostly uninvolved majority, regardless of religious affiliation (as it relates to the 
private sphere). Therefore, the majority of Jewish Israelis neither fall into the ultra-Orthodox 
category nor into the completely secular category as many pick and choose their observances 
on an individual level, yet are controlled in various aspects by religious policy.  
The division of Israeli society between religious and secular, however, does not conform to a 
dichotomous divide...Three major cultural orientations and three major publics, rather than 
two, can be discerned. Surveys conducted in the 1990s point to the existence of a large 
middle category...that includes respondents who describe themselves as “traditional” or “non-
religious” compared to a minority who would define themselves as “secular” or “religious.” 
The religious-secular divide...is a continuum in which most people select the rituals they 
participate in and the commandments that they obey. (Ben-Porat, 2008, p. 31)  
 
The breakdown on these divisions is not clearly defined. According to Dowty, “the 
dichotomous division of Israelis into ‘religious’ and ‘non-religious’ has been superseded by 
the common, threefold self-classification as ‘religious,’ ‘traditional,’ and ‘secular’ (or ‘non-
religious’)” (2001, p. 177). This division represents a construct which is in many ways 
imagined and representative of a spectrum with many gradients.  
 Unlike alternate forms of religious and social organization among Diaspora Jewish 
communities (such as the Reform and Conservative movements), in Israel the majority is not 
necessarily organized. In some respects, the observances of the traditional centre could 
represent that of the ultra-Orthodox community or something closer to complete secularism. 
Picking and choosing various religious observances runs counter to the ultra-Orthodox view 
of an overarching dominion of scriptural-based (and rabbinic enforced) religious policy. This 
way of life governs not only individuals and their observances, but also every aspect in both 
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the private and public sphere. As far as this crosses over into the territory of law and policy, 
the personal sphere in Israel, which, for the most part, is concerned with marriage, divorce, 
burial, and status, relies on ultra-Orthodox interpretations and stringencies. While this is not 
the case in the public sphere, the influence of religious policy can be felt there as well. The 
difficulty reconciling these two disparate conditions lies in the very meaning of Jewish 
identity and an understanding of what that identity means. This definition is in flux as the 
determinants behind it are shaped by various social and political considerations. This is true 
in many different social environments in Israel. Within the parameters of a religious context, 
in a nationalist context, in a societal context, and in a cultural context, the lines between 
public and the personal have become blurred.  
In this changing or shifting perception of the public and private, perhaps the context 
of an enclosed society amplifies the effects of uncertainly and a loss of control and identity. 
The ultra-Orthodox community presents uncompromising standards in its observance and 
cultural practices in order to hold the line and push back against secular integration. What is 
interesting is that the vast majority of Jewish Israelis follow some aspects of these dictates 
insofar as their personal and public life is concerned.  
At the extremes, the Haredi or ultra-Orthodox groups tend to isolate themselves from the rest 
of society and strictly observe the commandments. For most other Jewish Israelis, a bricolage 
of beliefs, identities, and practices can be observed. Jews who visit shopping malls on 
Sabbath, a secular practice that defies a religious commandment, will often decline to define 
themselves as secular and are likely to obey other commandments, kashrut observance, for 
example” (Ben-Porat, 2008, pp. 31–32) 
 
The clearly defined separation of three distinct groups along the spectrum of religious 
observance in Israel is touched on in the following interview excerpt. From one side, the 
ultra-Orthodox, to the opposite side, secular, and the traditional Jews in the centre, Miriam 
Jacoby notes that secular Israelis are completely “allergic” to religion. Therefore, the two 
polar opposites are fundamentally incompatible. The centre, where most traditional Israelis 
are grouped, is a meeting of minds between the extremes of religious Orthodoxy and 
secularism. 
It's been my experience with Israelis that you have—there are three kinds of Israelis. You 
have Dati Israelis, who are—whatever, they are religious, they understand, et cetera, you 
have Masorati Israelis, and then you have completely secular Israelis. And unlike secular 
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American Jews, secular Israelis are allergic to religion—like they break out in hives if you 
come near to them with a kippa, or tefillin, or anything. It's kind of creepy. (Interview with 
Miriam Jacoby, 2011) 
 
An interesting idea is how it is easier to maintain a religious identity in Israel because 
of the shared commonality between all Israelis, both secular and religious. Deena Friedberg 
discusses the commonalities rather than differences related to religious observance among 
what is perceived to be all Jews in Israel. 
Well, because it's a Jewish country, you know, and, like—when I was in […identifying 
information removed…], I was teaching in a public high school for a few years before I made 
aliyah. And then—like, they knew about Rosh Hashanah and they knew about Yom Kippur. 
And when I said I needed to take time off for Sukkot, the secretary kind of freaked out; what, 
another Jewish holiday? You know, not that I care for myself, but my son is in medical school 
[…identifying information removed…] and I'm afraid his professor's going to take off so 
much time. I said, well not everybody takes off for this holiday. And then, like, I took off and 
then I came back the next week and then I said to her, well, was your son's professor there? 
And she said, yes he was. But it was just this kind of thing—people having to leave early on a 
Friday. It's like, here, it's like—even secular people still say chag sameach because it's still 
their chag. So to me it's just a lot easier. (Interview with Deena Friedberg, 2011) 
 
It is possible to look at religion on both the macro and the micro levels. This is 
perhaps a reflection of attitudes from someone in the Diaspora looking at religion in Israel. In 
a Diaspora, where religiously observant people are fundamentally different from their fellow 
citizens in terms of religious observance, it is more difficult to integrate. From this 
perspective, being in Israel, which publically supports Jewish holidays, for example, would 
be an easier transition. However, once an individual does transition into Israel’s many 
nuanced, social, religious, ethnic divides, the complex social reality can be difficult to 
navigate. Even more so, within the ultra-Orthodox community, finding one’s place can be a 
daunting social exercise, which may not even be possible as religious social organization in 
Israel does not necessarily reflect that of the Diaspora.    
Is it a challenge? I think too much into things. Yes and no. The challenge is, I mean—in a way 
it's easier to, whatever your identity is, to just be, you know, who you are, because you're in 
Israel. So if you are Jewish, you are pretty much welcome here, is the feeling that I have. The 
challenge is if you're coming from outside of Israel, then it's a different sort of system in 
terms of where you fit, so it's—the challenge is figuring out which sect you fit into. (Interview 
with Leah Halpern, 2011) 
 
This follows with the idea that it is more difficult to be religiously observant in the 
United States. The reasoning is that wearing traditional clothing, such as worn by ultra-
Orthodox women, makes it more difficult to be socially accepted by peers from outside the 
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ultra-Orthodox community. Perhaps both because in Israel the ultra-Orthodox community is 
more insular as well as the fact that in Israel interactions with the ultra-Orthodox community 
are far more frequent than they would be otherwise. In North America, there is less pressure 
to fit into homogeneous community rather than heterogeneous mixed society. 
I think it's harder in the States. And I went back—before I made official aliyah—I went back 
to make aliyah, pack up and visit family, and I felt very self-conscious. Well I wore what I'm 
wearing, and I—on my head, and I felt a little self- conscious. And a couple—one time I went 
into an office, and somebody said, “oh I like your hat” (laughs). I think that's why a lot of the 
Haredi women over there wear sheitels [wigs] because you want to look like everybody else. 
Here you don't have to feel like you have to look like everybody else. It's definitely easy—
easier to practice here. (Interview with Rivka Lowey, 2011) 
 
There are commonalities among coreligionists in Israel even if the individuals in the 
society are not at the same level of observance. Devorah Nudelman notes that it is easier to 
be religious in Israel because of the many shared holidays and social nuances, which are 
observed to one degree or another, across the spectrum of the society, which is not 
necessarily the case in the Diaspora. This makes an interesting observation about the 
difficulty of maintaining an ultra-Orthodox lifestyle in the Diaspora and at the same time 
maintaining a religious affiliation; while it is possible, there are not as many areas of overlap 
with the rest of the society. Focusing on these commonalities is what leads to this opinion 
that religious observance of ultra-Orthodox Judaism is easier in Israel. 
I still think it’s easier [to be religious in Israel] because, you know, it’s just easier. Because 
even the—you’re on a bus on an Erev Chag and everybody says, you know, “Chag Sameach, 
Gut Yom Tov,” even non-religious people. It’s beautiful, you know. And I don’t know now 
about laws, maybe I’m going back to antiquated, you know—taking days off work, you always 
have to make up for it in chutz la’aretz, whereas here, generally, like we said, it’s a national 
holiday, public holiday, so, you know, it’s more—one problem is, so the Erev Shabbos—we 
don’t have a Sunday, like in chutz la’aretz, so, you know, it’s a bit more stressful. People are 
more worn out, we don’t have as much recreation time, but maybe we don’t need it because 
then everyone gets into trouble if you have too much recreation. (Interview with Devorah 
Nudelman, 2011) 
 
There are also pros and cons, both in the Diaspora and in Israel, even when living in 
relatively sheltered ultra-Orthodox communities. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to 
finding an environment where individuals are able to raise their children in a way that fits 
with their values without influence from the outside world. 
I could see it both ways. I think that it's very individual, and that's why you see some people 
who chose to be here and some people who chose to be there. You know—and somehow they 
understand that they'll be more successful in the place that they are. You know, I know 
Haredim who have flocked here knowing what the spiritual rewards would be, but I also 
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know a lot of people who vow not to come. And obviously they're not coming to align with the 
state, but even to come and live within an enclosed Haredi community they haven't come, and 
they understand that where they are right now is going to be the place for them spiritually to 
raise their families. So really, it depends on the family and the person.... I think that the 
communities in general in the Haredi world make a very concerted effort to be insular 
because, you know— really, in every country, the children shouldn't speak the language of 
the streets because that gives them access to the streets. Like we said before, it doesn't mean 
they should never speak that language, but while they're growing up, they shouldn't have 
access to the streets. Every child deserves that chance to live a very simple life when they're 
young. When they get older it might be something else. So here in Israel, there's also that 
challenge. (Interview with Moshe Auerbach, 2011) 
 
It is important to gain insight into the nuance between defining oneself and being 
ultra-Orthodox in Israel. Belonging to a certain social element within the ultra-Orthodox 
community becomes increasingly difficult and requires dealing with many new issues, which 
may not be relevant or matter within the context of the Diaspora. As Ephraim Lerner notes, 
he crosses the boundaries between the elite of secular education and the elite of the ultra-
Orthodox world, yet at the same time, perhaps due to his background in the Diaspora, he 
does not see a conflict between these two disparate worlds. He also notes that an individual 
needs to spend more time reflecting on how he fits into the social fabric and what exactly this 
means in the context of his co-religionists who are coming from a very different place in 
terms of balancing their priorities of religion and secularism within the context of the state. 
You want to find your niche, if you will, your particular group that you want to be identified 
with. And it’s so easy, the borderlines are not that well defined and—and I look at myself as a 
Haredi, okay? But mine—many of my friends might say, “hey, wait a minute, you’re a 
Haredi, what are you teaching in university for?” It doesn’t make sense. On the other hand, 
very secular or modern Israelis might consider me part of them because, thank G-d, I have a 
very good education and I’m teaching at a high level. So it’s nebulous. It’s kind of hard to 
really stake out your place. ... That’s a sociological phenomenon right there, because in the 
United States we have a lot of non-Jews…. The fact that you’re a Jew in itself makes you 
stand out, so you have a much easier time defining yourself; it’s not so competitive. Here, if 
you’re a Jew, so what? Everybody’s Jewish (laughs). So you're going to have a much harder 
time to really define your particular market, niche, whatever you want to call it. (Interview 
with Ephraim Lerner, 2011) 
 
 Social creation 
 When examining the various facets of religious identity in Israel, we see that religious 
communities are themselves divided on numerous issues. These divisions extend across 
religious communities of all faiths in Israel, and appear in various forms. At times, these 
internal divisions run contrary to what would ostensibly be the position most beneficial to the 
group as a whole. This is particularly true in the context of issues with political and/or 
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religious significance. Therefore, many decisions made by elements of the community (or the 
community as a whole), may reflect decisions made with various alternative considerations 
or ulterior motives.  
These issues transcend politics as they become crucial to fundamental belief, identity, 
culture, and religion. A number of these facets will be explored in this section, which 
examines the ultra-Orthodox community in terms of a social creation and focuses on issues 
relating to ongoing fault lines within the community, the essential meaning of Jewish identity 
in the ultra-Orthodox context, and tensions and clashes relating to sensitive issues. These 
elements are linked to religion as key factors of identity for the ultra-Orthodox community. 
Identity and related concepts derive power of conviction and force through various forms of 
agency and power-related issues through scripturalism and religious ritual. Interpretation of 
various religious positions of leadership and a brief examination of scriptural interpretation 
and organization are crucial to understanding the various perspectives related to religious 
identity. Finally, this section examines the borderlines between religion and various aspects 
of secularism and the willingness and interest of the ultra-Orthodox community to engage in 
secular politics in Israeli society at large.  
 
 Increased tensions and clashes regarding sensitive issues  
“Church” and state relations (or synagogue and state relations in this case) in Israel 
have always included tensions and clashes (Liebmann & Yehiya, 1983). Tensions have 
increased related to sensitive issues such as social, religious, and political changes. There are 
many reasons why the religious–secular divide has become headline news repeatedly during 
the past decades. Central to the ongoing debate over the place of religion is the idea of the 
status quo, which regulates a balance between change and maintaining a degree of 
separation. The conception of the status quo is often a catalyst for social unrest as each side 
jockeys for position (Edelman, 2000).  
The idea of a measured balance, in which each side seeks to use power to its benefit, 
ultimately creates a somewhat even-handed dichotomy. This solution represents a degree of 
stability, even though forward-looking progress is not necessarily possible to achieve. This is 
because the status quo system of compromise relies on a measure of inefficiency in order to 
maintain stability. In other words, the opposing forces at work, using policies of the status 
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quo, affect a form of mutually assured destruction in social and political terms (Fox, 1999). 
This prevents issues of state and religion from changing in a meaningful way outside the 
scope of state and religion. In this context, each relatively minor issue is raised to the spectre 
of a national crisis, and doing so prevents dealing with issues at a lower and more mundane 
level (Peres, 1995). Sensationalism is used by both sides to promote their particular agenda. 
This approach prevents overall progressive change (Myerhoff, 1990; Lehmann & Siebzehner, 
2006). Nevertheless,  
the conflicts to date have been marked more by verbal than by physical violence between 
religious and secular Jews, and neither camp has been able to score clear victories. This 
condition seems to reflect the great variety of doctrines within Judaism, including an element 
of ethnicity that allows even those individuals who proclaim their lack of belief in any Jewish 
religious doctrines to remain part of the Jewish community. (Sharkansky, 1997, p. 149)  
 
But, according to Dowty, “far more than the Sephardi/Ashkenazi split, the conflict between 
the varying demands of religious observance is the most potentially disruptive threat to the 
unity of Jewish Israel” (2001, p. 159). These divisions are long standing, and speak to the 
very fundamental elements of Judaism. They reflect the larger issues surrounding state and 
religion in Israel. 
These issues, by and large, stem from religious or social incidents and have become 
politicized. Issues relating to state and religion have become elements of movement on 
various levels of political and bureaucratic government and administration. The pattern is 
ultimately to smooth over divisions in order to re-engage with a (newly) formulated, 
balanced, status quo. According to Dowty, each side recognizes that  
it cannot push the other past a certain point without threatening Jewish unity—which all 
regard as a supreme value—as well as endangering its own interest. Religious spokesmen 
deny any intention of trying to use State power to regulate citizens’ private lives, while even 
ardent secularists agree that Israeli State and society should in some way reflect its Jewish 
roots. (2001, pp. 168–169) 
 
While ultra-Orthodoxy seeks to further politicize various issues to the detriment of secular 
society and vice versa, the overall progress that has been made since the formation of the 
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state in the unique context for ultra-Orthodoxy has meant that secularism has increased, and 
the ultra-Orthodox population has become more withdrawn. 
The conflict [between the ultra-Orthodox and secular elements of Israeli society] is rooted in 
an old and unresolved question in national identity. “Is Israel a Jewish state, with the 
emphasis on Jewish, or is it a state for the Jews, a regular, modern, democratic place where 
Jews are in the majority?” Israel's Zionist founders were almost exclusively secular—in many 
respects, anti-religious—and they saw Judaism principally as a nationality. But in deference 
to tradition and as a way of securing the support of the Orthodox minority, they made certain 
concessions to religion; restricting commerce on the Jewish Sabbath, for instance, and 
leaving such matters as marriage and burial in the exclusive hands of rabbinical authorities. In 
the past 20 years, religious political parties extracted further allowances as they joined 
various government coalitions. (Beyer, 1998, p. 1) 
 
Yehuda Aronson advocates a greater degree of religious education for Israeli society 
in order to provide more background in religion and related subjects. This would, he 
maintains, not only provide increased cultural understanding and sensitivity towards the 
ultra-Orthodox community but also help secular Israelis understand their origins and return to 
the perceived version of Judaism. This is further complicated by political struggle to find 
agreement, which politicizes religion and becomes the focus of social divisions and tensions. 
In essence, the place of religion in society relates to how the state views and relates to 
religion. From this outlook, the question is: Is this perspective changing, or ultimately, is it 
still a struggle to incubate the ultra-Orthodox viewpoint into the vision for a modern Israel? 
Obviously, many things have changed from the creation of the Zionist ideal to the current 
status quo. How dissenting opinion factors into these issues from both a historical perspective 
as well as from an ongoing political and social perspective is critical to understanding where 
things are going in the context of modern Israel.   
The leaders should get together and—the secular leaders would have a weekend retreat, a 
Shabbos retreat with some of the, you know, maybe the good martziv (phonetic) they call 
them now—the instructors, whatever, and have a course in what Yahadut's all about. They 
should just get it, you know, like here, this is what we're about, this is what we're trying to do, 
and we understand what you're trying to do, but look, there is conflict over here and let's try 
to work it out, before it comes— before the issues come up. That would be—that would be 
helpful. There's still—it's still a political struggle over here. It—I don't see it happening. It's 
not going to happen. It's not the way Israeli society is built. I'll add another point over here. 
Knowing a little bit about history and stuff, if you just look at what's going on, you know, 
right now, you can say, oh yeah, there's you know, secular versus religious. You have to go 
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back two generations, three generations— you see the continuation of how the Medinat 
Yisrael came into the founding of Medinat Yisrael, and its leaders, and also the—let's say the 
European community—you know, what was going on over there, and how they were trying to 
build Torah communities. And then all of a sudden we got a medinah thrown into our laps in 
1948, and each one now took this new opportunity and each one was trying to get their—the 
most out of it.  
 The secular people were trying to, number one, fight what they believed was anti-
Semitism, you know—if we have our own state, we won't have all this anti-Semitism, went 
back to the Dreyfus trial and all that stuff. And so this was a dream come true for them, a 
golden opportunity, we have our own medinah. What's a medinah? Lihiyot am chofshi 
b'artzenu, you know, to do whatever we want. You know, we don't have to worry about this 
anti-Semitism, you know, but at the same time they don't have any Jewish values at all. Free 
to do as—what your heart desires. They said oh, we have a mesorah, we still have a Torah 
and we have a mission, which—and now, if those two things come together—and now it's just 
a matter of—the beginning of the society was built on conflict already. That is something that 
can't change. As long as you're continuing—you know, the leaders are continuing in the—
well they built—they set up a system of government and the religious are trying to do their 
thing. This thing cannot be changed. Even if we get a majority—so using their rules we'll beat 
them at their game, they'll still be—they'll still hate us, they'll still not really understand 
what's going on. They're still not going to get it, okay, unless there's a basic shift in 
understanding of what's going on. But the rules as set up—even the way that we elect the 
government, it's just—the whole thing is built already on what was going on before. It's not 
going to change, you know, it's not just using the rules that exist will move this way or that 
way and a little thing here or there. It's not going to change the actual conflict. Throw that 
into the Arab conflict, so you have an internal conflict, and you have an Arab conflict from 
the outside, and then you have the general world, the U.N. and all that kind of stuff together, 
and then you have a nice time bomb that we're sitting on, and that's Jewish history in a 
nutshell there (laughs). (Interview with Yehuda Aronson, 2011) 
  
 Haredi claim to religion  
 Among the ultra-Orthodox community in Israel, there is a clear claim to religion as a 
key element of Jewish identity. This claim stems from a number of beliefs including a 
continuity in the Jewish people from biblical times until their true descendants—essentially 
the keepers of the faith—the contemporary ultra-Orthodox community. This can be seen 
through how “Haredim often style themselves as the she'erit Yisrael [the remnants of Israel], 
the sole surviving progeny of the original Chosen People, and the unique bearers of Jewish 
authenticity, who in their everyday lives adhere without compromise to the Jews’ covenant 
with God”. (Stolow, 2010, pp. 44–45) By representing themselves as the keepers of tradition, 
the ultra-Orthodox present a moral high ground for the various stringencies and rabbinic 
interpretations that seek to safeguard their particular way of life.  
The interpretation of many of these elements has become progressively Orthodox in 
outlook due to increased pressure from secular society. The ultra-Orthodox community, 
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therefore, uses Rabbinic Judaism to maintain an authentic version of the religion, which 
safeguards tradition and strict interpretation. This serves a dual purpose: to maintain practice 
and principles of Orthodoxy while at the same time stemming from a fundamental underlying 
textual base, which shares a commonality to Judaism throughout the ages.  
One cannot take at face value the claims of apologists who describe the contemporary Haredi 
community as the embodiment of an “unbroken chain of tradition” from Moses at Mount 
Sinai “down through the most violent and turbulent periods of the past, and to this very day.” 
On the contrary, as we have seen, Haredism is a product of cumulative ruptures, migrations, 
displacements, and social catastrophes, and as such, its situation is radically distinct from the 
technological, institutional, socioeconomic, and cultural arrangements of historic Jewish 
society. (Stolow, 2010, p. 104) 
 
Nevertheless, Orthodoxy becomes easier as society contracts around outside external forces. 
 Ephraim Lerner makes an interesting case for the amount of outside secular influence 
that is filtered into the community. Perhaps because of the very nature of the ultra-Orthodox 
community in Israel, which tends to be far more insular than similar communities in the 
Diaspora, there is less involvement with secularism even if that secularism is not inherently 
religious, nor anti-religious. It is also interesting to note that the communication method of 
placing public notices is both powerful and ubiquitous in its message. It shows that even 
though an individual, a group, or a small minority of the ultra-Orthodox community is 
putting up posters, due to a lack of technology in the ultra-Orthodox community, posters 
have become the standard way of communicating with the community at large. It’s also in 
many cases nameless and all-powerful because it represents the consensus in supposedly 
religious terms of the will of the ultra-Orthodox community. Lerner goes on to say how in 
the Diaspora this is not necessarily the case and that the Diaspora shows a fundamental 
underlying tolerance towards things that do not exactly fit in with the ultra-Orthodox 
community way of life. This is perceived as the line between absolute corruption of the 
community, or perhaps the perception of where that line is, as far more lenient in the 
Diaspora than it is in Israel. This makes an interesting case for the threat of integration and 
assimilation the ultra-Orthodox community feels from secular Israelis. 
The Haredim here are far more extreme, far more extreme. I’ll give you an example. I was 
again in Bnei Brak—I have family in […identifying information removed…] so I commute. 
There were signs all over that on Chol HaMoed Pesach they’re going to show Jule Verne’s 
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“Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea” for free, and all you see is fish and wildlife way 
under the water. You see greatness of Hashem, of G-d, and everybody should come. The next 
day, all over the place were these big posters, don’t you dare go to this [particular] place. If 
you do, it’s a chilul Hashem, and you’re desecrating the word of G-d. Why? Because these 
pictures were taken by a non-observant Jew who did it on Shabbos, or something like this. It 
was just so preposterous. In America they’d never give in to that. They’d say, if there’s no 
naked women, what’s the problem? It’s only fish, you know. So I think in America, they’re far 
more tolerant, far more tolerant. Here’s another good example. In America, if you say, I want 
to be Haredi, I want to get a high school degree, that’s fine. Even though many of the 
yeshivas kind of don’t really don’t push the—the, you know, high school diploma, but if you 
want to that’s fine. In fact, in […identifying information removed…] Yeshiva, Rav 
[…identifying information removed…] told me that if you cut classes you’ll be sent out of 
yeshiva. Now he’s one of a kind. Most other yeshivas, they let you cut. But here, a high 
school? Are you crazy? I was in a yeshiva here, and they caught some student studying a high 
school course on their own, and they were thrown out right away. So here they’re far more 
rigid, or strict. (Interview with Ephraim Lerner, 2011) 
 
 Scripturalism  
 Reliance on scripturalism serves many purposes in the ultra-Orthodox community. 
From formalizing elements of public communal and private life within the community to 
relying on rabbinic authority as the ultimate decider, whatever system exists in the various 
subsets of the ultra-Orthodox community derives its ultimate authority from scriptural 
interpretation.  
Haredi Orthodox Judaism can be characterized by its emphasis on scholastic and legalistic 
approaches to Jewish textural sources and by its overarching effort to organize, specify, and 
extend knowledge about legitimate conduct and about the true workings of the social, natural, 
and cosmic order, as derived from sacred books. This form of religious “scripturalism” is 
radical and uncompromising in its promotion of continuous, intensive engagement with 
canonical Jewish literature and its stringent application in all areas of life. (Stolow, 2010, pp. 
51–52) 
 
This leads to increased regulations regarding all aspects of life and a top-down structure of 
authority in which biblical and rabbinic text are considered to be the highest authority yet 
often require contextual interpretation by one’s rabbinic authority.  
Indeed, the Haredi investment in the text as the sole guarantor of legitimate conduct has been 
part and parcel with the movement's promotion of stricter norms within the framework of 
halakhic decision making, affecting what in halakhic language can be called a “swing 
towards humra” (stringency). Haredi scripturalism has thereby served as the gateway to an 
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ascendant form of asceticism within modern Jewish society: a reclamation of the pristine 
authenticity of divine revelation through uncompromisingly stringent interpretations of 
Jewish text and unqualified embrace of the “hard life” that such readings entail. (Stolow, 
2010, pp. 105–106) 
 
In its various forms, this formalizes to some degree the power structure relationship within 
the ultra-Orthodox community—from the textual sources to the adherence. Adherents seek 
guidance on all matters of function and behaviour in their private lives as well on a larger 
scale across the community as a whole.  
The master-disciple relationship cultivated in the yeshiva provides the model for the spread of 
what in Haredi circles is known as da'at Torah (knowledge of Torah): a specifically 
charismatic source of religious, intellectual, and legal authority that permeates the Haredi 
enclave...Leading teachers and scholars of the Haredi world are seen to possess esoteric 
knowledge that authorizes them to issue ex cathedra pronouncements in the realm of 
Halachah and in all other matters of everyday conduct, “their sole authority being their 
position as rabbis immersed in the study of Torah”(Stolow, 2010, p. 53).  
 
Stolow explains further that these teachers and scholars 
are known as the gedolim: the great Torah sages of the yeshiva world, who stand at the 
pinnacle of an army of students, cultural brokers, and other agents responsible for mediating 
their da'at Torah through the production, promotion, distribution, explication, translation, 
vulgarization, application, and defense of Haredi interpretations of Jewish sacred texts. (2010, 
p. 53) 
 
 In terms of leadership, the ultra-Orthodox community has a number of different 
structures, such as an extremely short progression where one merely has a rabbi to whom he 
turns for guidance to a longer progression where each successive rabbi will have someone to 
whom he turns, with the ultimate authority a mutually recognized authority in religious text. 
Other elements of the ultra-Orthodox community have a more strictly defined structure 
within their community: Among Hasidim, the rebbe personifies the invincible leadership of 
the sect, interprets various scriptural references, and represents for followers the ultimate 
authority for the various scriptural and rabbinic texts. How these directives are applied to all 
elements of life depends on the interpretation and directives of one’s rabbi. Yet the 
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commonality that all ultra-Orthodox communities share in terms of power-sharing 
agreements with religion is that Halacha is interpreted and prescribed through both textual 
references codified in Jewish law as well as through the classical sources of biblical exegesis. 
 
 Borderlines  
 Various borderlines, both tangible and intangible, separate aspects of Orthodoxy and 
secularism in society. When increased Orthodoxy is viewed as a contraction from numerous 
external threats that challenge it, such as secularism, integration, and assimilation, coupled 
with various ideological and religious perspectives on Zionism and the state of Israel, a 
situation is created where not only does the ultra-Orthodox community seek to preserve 
hegemony over its customs, values, and beliefs, but also the borderline between their 
community and the larger unobservant Jewish population becomes blurred. While there is a 
withdrawal by the ultra-Orthodox from the secular values presented by society, yet at the 
same time as they believe they have a moral superiority in matters relating to Judaism and 
ultimately believe in theocratic orientation to governance, their influence extends beyond the 
borders of their society into the larger public sphere. It is these loci upon which the seams of 
tension and confrontation often appear. Concerning religious observance, blurred lines 
separate the ultra-Orthodox from the Orthodox communities and from the larger religiously 
traditional segment of the Israeli population; it is difficult in some respects to draw distinct 
dividing lines regardless of attempts by the ultra-Orthodox to withdraw from the public 
sphere.  
 There has been a concerted effort to withdraw from the public sphere to closed and 
sheltered enclaves of the ultra-Orthodox community. This is done for a number of reasons 
and is an ongoing process with the involvement of secular society as a matter of informal 
policy that has been going on for a number of years. Among the reasons for this withdrawal 
from the public sphere in terms of wholly religious areas is, for example, the ability to 
control to a greater degree the immediate domain and to extend Orthodox hegemony within 
the religious community. This is done through withdrawal from secularizing influence as 
well as having a greater degree of influence concerning various aspects governing daily life 
within the local community on both the spiritual and the physical plain.  
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Because the absorption capacity of [Haredi]...neighborhoods is limited and the cost of 
housing relatively high, over the past two decades Haredi quarters have been built in 
development towns and especially designed towns and suburbs...In these urban enclaves 
members are provided with all the services necessary for every day community life: yeshivot, 
synagogues, kosher shops, ritual baths, or bookstores. Moreover, they are involved at all 
levels of managing, planning, and maintaining municipal services. (Stadler et al., 2008, p. 
219).  
 
The borderlines are therefore a nexus of ongoing shifting tensions between the ultra-
Orthodox community and the external world, both for the greater Orthodox society, the 
traditional society, and the avowedly secular society as various issues draw the two sides into 
ever-increasing contact and conflict. Sharkansky explains further:  
Several problems stand in the way of a systemic, quantitative reckoning of who wins specific 
confrontations over religion, and of determining whether religious or anti-religious interests 
have been more successful in recent Israeli history. Activists who work for some issues claim 
that their positions are based on “Jewish norms” or would benefit the Jewish state, but they 
do not claim that they are religious per se. After a dispute begins there may be public quarrels 
between Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox rabbis over what constitutes an issue of religious 
importance and what the correct view of the religious interest is. There is also a lack of unity 
among authorities in the Christian and Muslim communities. According to one scholar, the 
issue is an endemic one in political disputes with a spiritual content: one special problem has 
been in the other-worldly orientation of these deeply religious people; another problem has 
been religious particularism, where theological disputes have inhibited political cooperation. 
(1997, p. 161) 
   
5. War: Religious Significance and Interpretation 
  The various wars that Israel has faced during the life of the modern state have had, 
for many in the ultra-Orthodox community, religious significance, and overtones. 
Considering the stance of the ultra-Orthodox community towards military service, this is a 
very interesting phenomenon. However, taken from the wider perspective of the ultra-
Orthodox community, being the guardians of Israel’s spiritual and indeed by extension 
physical well-being, this can be understood. Within the context of Israeli wars, particularly 
those in 1967 and 1973, the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War, new trends began to 
Shapiro 142 
 
emerge with a re-engagement by ultra-Orthodox community towards Israeli society and vice 
versa.  
 There are several distinct themes in the Haredi literature dealing with Israel's wars of 1967 and 
1973…I have divided them into three categories: the first portrays Israeli society in a generally 
positive light, emphasizing the shared condition of Haredi and non-Haredi society. Themes in 
this category include the miracle of these wars, the new religious faith or a new potential for 
religious faith amongst secularists as a result of them, and other positive remarks about Israeli 
society. The second category includes items critical of Israeli society such as caution about 
raising renewed hopes, doubts about the depth of religious renewal within Israeli society, 
criticism of Israeli leaders who refuse to recognize the miracles that God wrought in the wars 
and more general criticisms of Israeli society. The third category includes themes that, at least 
superficially, are neutral in assessing Israeli society. They include analysis or description of the 
wars, their causes and lessons, their outcome and the feelings of depression which followed the 
Yom Kippur War. (Liebman, 1995, pp. 171–172) 
 
The victories of the Israeli Defense Forces were equated by the ultra-Orthodox as miracles 
having significant spiritual overtones and being in line with the precursor steps required to 
bring about the Messiah and the ultimate redemption. These beliefs amongst the larger 
secular population brought about a period of spiritual reawakening, and religious values were 
more widely sought than in the past. Here we see a merging of Zionistic values with ultra-
Orthodox sentiments related to miraculous military victories viewed through the lens of an 
ultra-Orthodox ideology. The common bond between the ultra-Orthodox community and 
secular Israelis was forged by the immediate danger faced by the country. This also relates to 
the existential threat of an outside force threatening to overwhelm the country. Mutual 
recognition of both the physical and spiritual nature of guarding the country was certainly 
raised to a higher position in the minds of Israelis.  
 The tragedy and trauma of the [Yom Kippur War] and the deep scars it left on Israeli society 
would serve, so anticipated, to invoke in Haredi eyes the age-old experience of the Jewish 
people since the destruction of the Temple. It would make it easier for the ultra-Orthodox to 
view Israeli society and even the state of Israel as being within the rhythms of Jewish history. 
This feeling ought to further reinforce a sympathetic attitude on the part of Haredim towards 
Israeli society. (Liebman, 1995, p.171) 
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In time, these attitudes somewhat faded, and contemporary thought is often at odds regarding 
the place of religion and fundamental religiosity of Israeli society. However, this feeling of a 
shared experience and a basic commonality still unites the ultra-Orthodox community.  
 Yet, in the context of the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War, as well as other 
conflicts that Israel has been involved in, many in the ultra-Orthodox community see these 
(punishments) as a direct correlation for the sins committed by secular or perhaps for all of 
Israeli society. This common perspective of encountering difficult situations and interpreting 
them as God’s punishment for sins is a coping mechanism that can be understood throughout 
Jewish history. The attendance of repentance and reform are reinforced through these types 
of extreme experiences affecting the entire state. It is in this way that these two opposing 
views can be brought into harmony. Both victories as miracles, as well as wars as 
punishment, factor into a religious ethos and act as a spiritual barometer for the society as a 
whole in times of difficulty.  
 Frequent allusions to the miracle through which God saved the Jews of Israel in general and the 
Israeli Army in particular strengthen the Haredi sense of identity with society and the feeling 
that God cares for the Jewish state. Stressing God's miracles does not diminish the 
accomplishments of the army or the state in Haredi eyes. First of all, miracles are not 
inconsistent with human accomplishment. Second, miracles point to God's sympathy for an 
undertaking. In the Haredi mind, this has more positive value than human achievement. By 
associating Israeli achievements with miracles, Haredim are able to celebrate Israel's victories 
because they have legitimated within a religious context. (Liebman, 1995, p. 172) 
   
6. The Will to Rule 
The concept of the will to rule for maintaining control over various aspects of the 
Israeli state is difficult to conceptualize with a fractured populace governed by an uneven 
consociational equilibrium. In regards to the ultra-Orthodox community, there are “sharp 
[tensions] between its rhetoric, which states strict adherence to its religious fundamentals, 
and the change in reality” (Hakak, 2009, p.115) There is a barrier, which must constantly be 
re-imagined separating the ultra-Orthodox community from external secular forces, that is 
adaptive in a way that allows for some forms of societal advancement while at the same time 
maintaining a strict status quo. This is done for numerous reasons, most importantly to 
prevent assimilation and intermarriage, seen as widespread among secular Jews in general 
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and to a lesser extent among secular Israelis. “The [will to rule]...tendency is viewed as 
especially problematic where there are no constitutional separations between public and 
private spheres or where fundamentalists from competing traditions claim the same ‘identity 
defining sacred spaces’” (Billings & Scott, 1994, p. 185). The ultra-Orthodox community, 
therefore, feels that its brand of Judaism is the only legitimate and lasting source of religious 
continuity, and members of the community are required to maintain this strict line to ensure 
continuity of Judaism as a religion. This argument puts the control in other matters of politics 
and society into perspective as the ultra-Orthodox community believes that without its 
guidance many facets of the religion would be lost entirely.  
Besides the religious legitimacy that the ultra-Orthodox community feels that it 
embodies, the community is generally politically passive. What would ostensibly be political 
goals with a religious bent, such as bringing about the final redemption or using tools of the 
state to achieve religious goals, are left aside to more practical everyday considerations. 
While the belief in redemption and the Messiah are deeply held religious and spiritual goals, 
in politics, the ultra-Orthodox tend to focus on the present. The legislation and funding 
arrangements it seeks aim to support the spiritual efforts of the ultra-Orthodox. Unlike 
Religious Zionists, the ultra-Orthodox community seeks to leave the actualization of the final 
redemption to a higher power and not become involved with bringing about radical religious 
changes as this would be presumptive without the appropriate signs. 
The anti-Zionist Orthodox and the ultra-Orthodox Haredim, on one hand, and the religious 
nationalists, on the other, view geulah, Redemption, differently. The Haredim are essentially 
political passivists. The majority of them hold that the ways of God are beyond the ken of 
men and that while one must live every minute as though Mashiach, the Messiah, will come 
the next, ultimately it is shameful to try to guess, and sinful to try to coerce, the End of Days. 
(Avruch, 2001, p. 148) 
 
This relates to one of the fundamental differences between Religious Zionists and the ultra-
Orthodox community in terms of the inherent religiosity of the state of Israel and the position 
of the state in Judaism and vice versa.   
 The status quo and the ability of the ultra-Orthodox community to attempt to shape 
certain aspects of public opinion, policy, and so on are possible because of the wide spectrum 
of Israelis who do not necessarily fit into one category or another. As discussed extensively 
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in this thesis, there are no clear delineations among various levels of religious observance 
and Orthodoxy, and while some lines may potentially be drawn, these indicators are not 
standardized across all the various measurements one would use to identify the population. 
“The division between secular and religious Jews in Israeli society is particularly interesting 
because there is no clear definition of who is religious and who is secular in Israel” 
(Pedahzur et al., 2000, p. 22). Therefore, in terms of religious belief, if not outright 
observance, many secular Israelis would indeed fall under the umbrella of the ultra-Orthodox 
camp and may potentially be swayed by certain aspects of the ultra-Orthodox interpretation 
of Rabbinic Judaism.  
An interesting facet in this relationship is that in terms of activity, engagement, or 
lack thereof with the state, and economic involvement, the ultra-Orthodox sector is often 
compared to the Arab sector in the way in which its interacts with the state. It is interesting to 
note that, while there are distinct similarities, the ultra-Orthodox community does not 
function or act as a minority group in the country. If anything, the ultra-Orthodox community 
utilizes its numbers to collectively collaborate through voting on certain issues and often sets 
policy through a large consistent minority disproportionate with their numbers. Perhaps one 
of the reasons why this is so, is because of the self-realized rule of the ultra-Orthodox 
community to act as the spiritual guardians of Judaism. As a result, the ultra-Orthodox 
community feels a responsibility and partnership with secular Israelis even if this is not 
reciprocal. Therefore, the two distinct sides of the social integration argument are not 
necessarily arguing from completely irreconcilable perspectives; rather they have the ability 
to find common ground if their various roles are recognized.  
 The Haredim consider themselves the genuine Jews and see the secular as “babies in rapture.” 
They strive to maintain a lifestyle that is religious and distinct from that of secular Jews, 
while they also practice a (population) expansionist policy, leading to confrontations in mixed 
neighborhoods over lifestyles...the struggle between the Haredim and the secular Jews is for 
cultural control of Israeli society. Through parliamentary and extra-parliamentary 
engagement, both sides strive to preserve the cultural patterns that distinguish them. 
(Pedahzur et al., 2000, p. 22) 
 
Because of this position, the ultra-Orthodox community views secular Israelis as 
simply ignorant of the religious dictates and feels a responsibility towards educating, 
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reforming, and publicizing the spiritual nature of their contribution to the state. A great 
degree of separation protects the ultra-Orthodox community from external influences. At the 
same time, there exists an engagement with secular society, in order to promote various 
political, economic, and social benefits. As a Jewish state, Israel has sought to reach an 
accommodation and understanding between its secular Zionists and religious Jewish 
identities. But, when these two often opposing attributes are in competition with each other, 
is often religious identity and sensibilities based on Judaism (as determined by the ultra-
Orthodox community) take precedence. This internal conflict angers many secular Israelis 
who feel that there is an uneven balance between the religious and secular aspects of the 
state. At the same time, this fundamental fracture is something that was not clearly 
envisioned by the early Zionist founders of the state. Their thinking, to include the greatest 
number of people under the umbrella of Judaism and Zionism, did not take into account the 
place and politics of religion. This makes sharing religious commonalities between Jews 
from the Diaspora and those in Israel an ongoing social and political challenge. Within a 
rapidly developing (capitalist) secular democratic society, which values monetary gain and 
represents the antithesis of a spiritually dominated inward looking society of scholars, ultra-
Orthodox Judaism presents itself as an alternative to secularism and secular values. “In recent 
decades, ultra-Orthodox Jewry has increased its population whereas modern Jewry is in 
decline due to assimilation and intermarriage. This bolsters the ultra-Orthodox claim to be 
the only authentic Jewish identity” (Blumen, 2002, p. 136).  
The social structure within the ultra-Orthodox community is designed to ensure a 
buffer between external influences and the internal influence the community has over its 
members. In this way, though by no means completely inclusive, a sense of hegemony in 
spiritual and corporeal manners emerges and is distinctly felt by members of the ultra-
Orthodox community.  
 This way of life, indeed this form of social existence, trying to create an enclave, a 
community within a bubble protected from external influences, is a new product of 
intentional social engineering within the Israeli context. Participation in civil duties, such as 
National service, or economic activity, is considered a violation of their obligation to Torah 
study and of community taboos. Most ultra-Orthodox males stay at yeshiva until the age of 
40, during which time they abstain from military service required of other Israeli males, do 
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not participate in the labor force and maintain a modest lifestyle with high dependence on 
State support. (Stadler, 2007, p. 188) 
 
As noted elsewhere, this has followed a familiar pattern throughout Jewish history in the 
Diaspora. Yet the traditions being followed in the Israeli context have a new dimension in 
that the ultra-Orthodox community is now insulating itself from coreligionists. This requires 
societal effort to establish new patterns of life, new determinations of what is and what is not 
acceptable practice within the community and within society at large, making a 
determination of how best to reinterpret and reproduce societal norms, which reflect these 
stringencies, and often reinterpret potential leniencies in tradition and Jewish law to this end. 
The act of controlled society, for example, the design and use of public spaces, the type of 
dress appropriate in the community, and the interactions among members of society 
(gendered interactions and otherwise), are all representative of creating a distinction between 
the community and the outside world.  
 Another central aspect of Haredi [lifestyle]…focuses on presenting the body in public and, 
particularly, through the mode of dress. While Western culture, influenced by consumer 
culture, stresses dress and personal presentation in public as a central site for self-expression 
and self-realization, in Haredi society, dress manifests the commitment of the individual to God 
and the community. The distinctive and uniform dress, alongside other external attributes such 
as side-locks and a beard, are designed to distinguish the Haredi male from his non-Haredi 
surroundings and prevent him from perhaps being swallowed up and affected by them. (Hakak, 
2009, p. 109) 
 
The focus within the community is, on one hand, spiritualism, the pursuit of higher 
goals between man and God. Yet the performance of these religious rituals takes place within 
the context of carefully planned public spaces with clearly defined roles for the various 
members of the ultra-Orthodox community. Creating a distinct mode of speech, dress, 
education, and perhaps even way of thinking, adds a degree of protection from assimilation 
and integration into secular society, creating in many cases unsurpassable barriers between 
the ultra-Orthodox community and its secular counterpart.  
Through this process as well, there is a distinct politicization of religion with 
allegiances being outwardly made towards a code of conduct, re-evaluating the meaning and 
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context of duty to a higher authority versus the demands of the secular world. The rhetoric 
relating to these distinctions has been steadily ratcheting up. As can be seen in the section 
discussing large scale protests, the locus of conflict and the dialog used to express this 
conflict has shifted from the immediate to the larger spiritual manifestations of secular 
society attempting to impose its will on religious practice and thought and religious society 
pushing back against these external influences. The will to rule and the expanding ideal of 
cultural shift are directly tied to the history and practice of exclusion and inclusion of the 
ultra-Orthodox community in the larger Israeli society.  
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Chapter 3 
Inclusion and Exclusion 
 
 Numerous ongoing processes exclude the ultra-Orthodox community from 
participating in the public sphere of Israeli society. In some respects, this exclusion is self-
imposed as members of the ultra-Orthodox community in various ways decline from 
participating in the larger Israeli society. In other aspects, secular society has, for decades, 
discouraged or mitigated the potential contribution of the ultra-Orthodox community to 
Israeli society (Ben Rafael & Sharot, 1991, p.247). While this paradigm seems relatively 
stable and relates to the homeostatic process outlined in the theoretical framework, at the 
same time, an additional process of inclusion facilitates a great deal of power within the 
ultra-Orthodox community. This includes the bureaucratization of religion, which means that 
many in the ultra-Orthodox community are de facto involved in creating public policy and 
law at various levels. This can range from the Knesset, where ultra-Orthodox representatives 
seek to consolidate power on issues of concern to the community as well as enshrine a 
particular ethos within the larger Israeli society, to having control over key ministries such as 
the organs of religious control, which contribute to a great deal of power over the individual 
in the personal sphere.  
 This dual process of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion of the ultra-Orthodox 
community creates a unique circumstance. The situation in which the ultra-Orthodox 
community presently finds itself in Israel and the increasingly disproportionate leverage the 
community has in terms of negotiating power with the larger secular society is 
unprecedented. Patterns of behaviour in the ultra-Orthodox community can be understood as 
a replicating system, in which social behaviour is institutionalized and reproduced. Giddens 
explains this as:  
A society is a cluster, or system, of institutionalized modes of conduct. To speak of 
“institutionalized” forms of social conduct is to refer to modes of beliefs and behaviors that 
occur and recur – or, as a terminology of modern social theory would have it, are socially 
reproduced – across long spans of time and space. (Giddens, 1982, p. 8) 
 
Across the spectrum, patterns of inter and intra social conformity can be seen as a dynamic 
response to internal and external pressures. These responses have a wide reaching impact; 
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their very existence causes external elements of the system to adapt and change their 
positions (as can be seen with secular society during debate over religious issues). The 
preservation of values is a key element to the continued social adaptation of the ultra-
Orthodox community. This is done by projecting clear lines of control and attempting to 
institutionalize social practice. This can be seen in the theory put forward by Giddens: “Many 
other aspects of social life may be institutionalized: that is, becoming commonly adopted 
practices which persist in recognizably similar form across the generations. Hence we can 
speak of economic institutions, political institutions, and so on” (Giddens, 1982, p. 8). These 
institutions, and the memory they seek to collectively create, extend to religious institutions 
and the codes governing daily life, to the interpretation and actualization of textual 
documents. Preservation of these systems and institutions is an integral part of the continuity 
and preservation of a religious identity, separate from the external world and its influences 
(Dinstein, 1996, p. 202). This represents a unique occurrence in the context of Jewish history 
as the ultra-Orthodox community attempts to create a society that is reflective of key values. 
At the same time, this excludes the many secular Jews who do not necessarily want to 
participate in the ultra-Orthodox world view. This separation is, however, not complete as the 
politics of the personal sphere are governed by religious bureaucracy. Therefore, while 
secular Israeli society at times seeks to embrace elements of the ultra-Orthodox community 
in order to form a more egalitarian and cohesive society, it nevertheless rejects religious 
viewpoint and control over the private sphere.  
 It is important to note that “against the backdrop of perpetual siege, the complexity 
and intensity of fault lines undercutting the nation...have become axiomatic…[y]et, Israel has 
maintained a remarkable degree of stability” (Lim, 2009, p. 28). The degree in which these 
issues threaten the core functioning society is perhaps under- and overestimated on the 
various sides of these contentious issues. The increasingly vocal opposing forces of 
Orthodoxy and secularism speak to the underlying conflict of inclusion and exclusion. 
Through various aspects of consociational arrangements and the various compromises that 
have been made over time, which at times are made in order to ensure the political 
prominence of one group or another, issues continue to be fiercely debated on the social and 
political national playing field.  
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Israel is unique in its structure and in the way it functions as a democracy. At the 
same time, it takes into account its unique features, such as its overwhelming Jewish 
population. What is fascinating about this excerpt from the interview with Yitzchak Cohen is 
that it notes that the state encourages religion and, indeed, religion is able to flourish and 
grow under the status quo. What is interesting is that this is far from being a traditional ultra-
Orthodox refrain of state interference into internal religious politics and for the many reasons 
listed throughout the thesis, it is apparent that state-sponsored religion or even religious 
practice, which is in conjunction with the state, is often highly problematic. This presents an 
interesting viewpoint, which does not necessarily agree with the way in which religion is 
traditionally limited or must coexist with the secular state government. 
That's a good question. I don't know which governments you're referring to, but if you mean 
any other country, I mean, it's—I would say that in Israel, it's a very unique situation. I mean, 
you don't really have a country like Israel almost anywhere else in the world. I mean, you 
have a lot of Arab countries that have a lot of Muslims, but their whole—they don't have a 
democracy. And then you have countries like the US and Canada and England and 
throughout Europe, that really are not countries that are like a Jewish country. You don't 
have a country where it's a unique situation, where it's just for one type of people. So I would 
not even be able to say that you could compare Israel to any other country because of its very 
unique situation of, you know— I don't know what it is—80% Jews, but you have so many 
different types of Jews and so many different considerations. But they do certainly allow for, 
you know, religion to thrive, and allow it to, you know, grow, and be what it wants to be. 
(Interview with Yitzhak Cohen, 2011) 
 
It is also important to consider the management of expectations. The state can provide 
a religious experience in many different ways. This relates to how religion is used by the 
state as a vehicle of social cohesion. Menashe Blum notes the particular way in which Israel, 
created as a Jewish state, does this. There is an expectation that the state revolves around 
religious, rather than cultural, principles. 
I guess it also has to do with the expectations. In America, that type of government, it doesn't 
expect anything of me, so therefore they don't step on me religiously; I can do whatever I 
want. But here my expectation as, say, a frum Jew is different. I expect this to be a Jewish 
state; a Jewish state means Halacha. It doesn’t mean just culturally, so I expect more and 
since I'm not getting that, the government is not a Torah government, then it's not the same as 
America, it's not the same as another government because I expect more because it's a Jewish 
state. If it wasn't a Jewish state, I wouldn't expect it, but since it is, I do expect it, at least I 
expect more. (Interview with Menashe Blum, 2011) 
 
A. The Intersection Between Government and Religion 
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 There are many intersections between state and religion in Israel. Unlike numerous 
other countries that have a separation between religion and state, in Israel, the place of 
religion is complicated as religion maintains a complex relationship among various aspects of 
the state. 
If you have a public school that's funded by the government then, I believe, that they do have 
a right to decide what criteria they are going to be, and especially if they feel that something 
is perhaps breaking the law, or something of the sort, if they're going to fund it or not. 
However, again—you know, dealing with these issues—and really, I—the central issue of all 
these questions that you're asking is, you know, how involved does the government wants to 
be in the matters that ultra-Orthodox people are running their lives, and whether or not it 
breaks the law or, and how they're going to treat it. And I think that when you're dealing with 
a government that is run, mostly, by secular Jews— whether or not you have Orthodox Jews 
in the government, I think the majority is ultra-Orthodox— I mean is secular, and there are a 
lot of feelings between ultra-Orthodox and secular that needs to be addressed and dealt with 
on their own level. So when you're dealing with these sensitive issues, I think the government 
in Israel should be sensitive from their side to the Orthodox public in what their needs are 
and, at the same time, the ultra-Orthodox should realize that they're benefiting and living in a 
country that allows them to live how they'd like, and needs to abide by the laws of the 
government. (Interview with Yitzhak Cohen, 2011) 
 
This chapter looks at the processes of exclusion and inclusion of the ultra-Orthodox 
community. It specifically examines the ways in which power is consolidated and used by 
the ultra-Orthodox community over the remainder of society through bureaucracy and 
religion. This takes many forms, and there is a pattern of reciprocation that ties Israel as the 
Jewish state to formalized religion in various aspects such as the symbols of the state and the 
various cultural and social organizations within Israel—even among the most secular 
citizens.  
 Intersections between government and religion primarily focus on the divisions 
between the various spheres of society with distinct boundaries and the public and private 
aspects of life in Israel. Yet, there are numerous examples of state involvement in both the 
private and public sphere in terms of religious policy. Also examined in this section is the 
topic of civil religion: how the state uses various symbols and cultural constructs in order to 
create a commonality for Israelis across the religious spectrum and how various 
governmental policies seek to define the religious basis for the state within both the dialog 
relating to Zionism and various religious considerations that take aspects of Judaism into 
account.  
From the dubbing of immigration to Palestine [as] aliya (pilgrimage), through the choice of 
the Star of David and the seven-branch candelabrum (menorah) as the official emblems of the 
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State, to the celebration of Jewish religious holidays as national holidays, traditional Jewish 
themes abound in Zionist lore. (Shafir & Peled, 2002, p. 149) 
 
 Using Jewish symbolism as a uniting commonality in Israel is a key element to creating and 
preserving a shared Zionist identity. 
 
 1. The Chief Rabbinate  
 The government institution of the Chief Rabbinate, which is part of the Ministry of 
Religion, appoints rabbis, has budgetary discretion over religious functions of the 
government, sets standards, and is the prime vehicle for ultra-Orthodox influence in the 
larger Israeli society. Control of the Rabbinate is primarily through ultra-Orthodox 
bureaucrats and functionaries who are directed by their ultimate authority in Halacha, with 
rabbis taking an extra-political stance where the leaders are not directly state employees. Yet, 
they are able to have considerable influence over the religious policy administered through 
the government. 
 The Chief Rabbinate appoints community rabbis to all interested congregations across 
Israel, as well as inspectors of kosher food production and kosher certification. They are 
responsible for the appointment and administration of judges in religious courts and are the 
ultimate authority for various funding initiatives. In deciding budgetary allocation for 
religious funding, many factors are taken into consideration. This includes the overall budget 
for religious purposes, as well as the additional construction or refurbishment of all 
synagogues, churches, and mosques in Israel (Sharkansky, 1997, p. 152). The internal 
appointments to these bodies have a critical influence on policy, the stringencies of religious 
law observed, and the way in which funds and resources are allocated. 
 Although non-Orthodox religious groups are not officially recognized, there are 
situations where the government allocates funding or land rights or permits for the 
construction of places of worship even though a particular group is not recognized. With an 
increase in religiosity and the shifting of boundaries in society with the ultra-Orthodox trying 
to stake clear boundaries surrounding sensitive issues, the extra-governmental leadership of 
the ultra-Orthodox community often makes controversial decisions in sensitive issues 
regarding conversion, the question of Jewish identity, personal status, the performing of 
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marriages, divorce, and burial. In some instances, there are certain issues that allow a citizen 
to turn to the civil courts, for example, in the case of civil litigation. This option is not 
possible in issues of the private sphere, such as marriage or conversion. The widespread 
effects of religious hegemony in the Rabbinate can be felt in all aspects of society and 
equally affect religious and secular Jews across the spectrum as aspects of Jewish law as 
interpreted through ultra-Orthodox standards are turned into governmental policy. “Haredim 
have taken up more positions within the official Rabbinate Authority; that has made policies 
on conversion and dietary laws more stringent, impinging more intensely on the lives of 
secular people” (Beck, 2010, p. 24). Therefore, as Dowty points out, “the power of the 
Rabbinate in matters of personal status, marriage, and divorce impinges on every Israeli, no 
matter how secular” (2001, p. 170). This control affects individuals through the personal 
sphere in a very different manner from the way religion is used in the public sphere. As a 
result, individuals face religious government bureaucracy on their own, rather than as a 
collection of individuals with collective power.  
 
 2. Spheres of Religious Influence 
 In terms of public policy stemming from the dictates of the ultra-Orthodox 
interpretation of Judaism, many aspects of the personal sphere that relate to marriage, 
religious status, burial, and so on are overwhelmingly controlled by religious policy. Among 
the contentious issues in the personal sphere, for example, are questions of valid conversion. 
It is interesting to note how this differs from the public sphere (see Barzilai, 2010, pp. 27–
40). The dominant force of the ultra-Orthodox community in the Rabbinate is very clear in 
only accepting ultra-Orthodox standards and stringencies related to the application of 
governmental policy and religious law. Unlike many other aspects of laws based on Judaism, 
for example, the Passover law, matters of the personal sphere are not general laws that affect 
society as a whole; rather, they are elements of bureaucratic policy that change in regard to 
ongoing redefinition in the ultra-Orthodox community regarding these matters. The burden to 
prove Jewish status, for example, is, therefore, much more difficult in terms of qualification 
and burden because of the ultra-Orthodox interpretation of religious dictates and the 
subsequent application of these religious issues in government policy (Brownfeld, 2010, p. 
49). The liberal outlook the majority of secular Israelis take on personal matters relating to 
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religion is often nullified by religious policies, for example, those that prevent nonreligious 
marriage such as civil unions or various status issues, which are determined by religious 
qualification. Religious involvement in the personal sphere is present in Judaism through the 
increasing influence of the Rabbinate (Sheffer, 1997, p. 119), as well as by other religious 
governing bodies for the other recognized religions in Israel. 
 
 Personal  
Only religious marriages among coreligionists are possible in Israel. “Had the choice 
of non-religious marriage been available to Jews in Israel, Orthodox Jews would have 
refrained from marrying non-Orthodox ones because of their concerns that religiously 
illegitimate unions, sanctioned by civil courts, may have occurred in the candidate's family's 
past” (Shafir & Peled, 2002, p. 142). Because individuals cannot have civil marriages, 
intermarriage is not permitted, and there are many complications when couples attempt to use 
the civil court system for divorce as there are religious implications. However, it is 
interesting to note that marriages performed outside the country and considered valid in the 
jurisdiction where they are performed will subsequently be recognized in Israel. Many 
couples that are unable for various reasons to obtain authorization from the Rabbinate to 
marry in Israel marry in a foreign state in order to have their status recognized civilly in 
Israel (Fox, 2008, p. 242). This is done in numerous places, but it is particularly prevalent in 
Cyprus because of that country’s proximity to Israel.  
Under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, Israel recognizes these marriages 
performed in foreign jurisdictions because of international agreements. In this one particular 
aspect, there is a degree of separation between church and state: Within Israeli territory, all 
marriages must go through the religious authority, yet marriages performed outside the 
country are recognized, and aside from religious considerations, put on equal footing with 
religious marriages performed within Israel. This is of particular impact to Israelis from the 
former Soviet Union who are often not recognized as Jewish by the Rabbinate according to 
ultra-Orthodox standards. As conversion normally requires a stringent level of Orthodoxy to 
be compliant with ultra-Orthodox dictates, a compromise is able to be had when these 
citizens wish to marry. When an individual is unable to obtain consent to marry from the 
Rabbinate, travel to Cyprus or elsewhere is seen as a viable alternative. The numbers of 
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citizens taking advantage of this option are staggering. This problematic situation is so 
widespread, that “by 1996 roughly 20% of all marriages took place outside the official 
Orthodox framework, either as unrecognized marriages or marriages abroad” (Dowty, 2001, 
p. 174). This situation allows for options yet limits the availability of marriage options within 
Israel.  
 Further complications arise in dealing with the issue of divorce in Israel, particularly 
with the ability for citizens to obtain divorce in a civil court. Under Jewish law, a husband is 
able to ask for a religious divorce and remarry even while completing a simultaneous process 
in secular court, while the woman is not able to obtain a religious divorce through the secular 
court (Woods, 2008, pp. 33–34). A woman in this situation, where she is able to obtain a civil 
divorce and not a religious one, is not able to remarry under Jewish law. By extension, 
permission to remarry in Israel would not be granted by the Rabbinate. This situation, which 
is created by an issue in Jewish law, presents an extreme burden and difficulty for many 
women who are unable to legally remarry as their former spouses obstinately use this 
element of Jewish law against them. In order to partially remedy this situation, many aspects 
of family law have been moved to secular courts. These changes can been seen in “[a] 2006 
Supreme Court ruling remove[d] issues of alimony, child custody, and inheritance from the 
religious courts” (Fox, 2008, p. 242). Therefore, in a case when religious and secular partners 
deal with issues of family law, there will not be any unfair considerations based on religious 
elements.  
 Another aspect of the religious influence that the Rabbinate has on the personal 
sphere is that of abortion. Abortion in Israel is legal when the criteria are met that it is 
necessary to save a life for the physical health of the woman or for issues of mental health, in 
addition to numerous scenarios such as rape, incest, fetal impairment, and other 
considerations (Fox, 2008, p.242). There is also the ability to navigate the system 
bureaucratically to obtain an abortion (Portugese, 1998, pp. 148–149), but generally, “it is 
not allowed for economic or social reasons and is not available on request” (Fox, 2008, 
p.242). In order to obtain permission for an abortion, approval has to be granted by a 
committee of two physicians and a social worker who are appointed by the Ministry of 
Health or the hospital where one seeks an abortion. Generally, this is not a contentious issue, 
and abortion is generally non-problematic. Obtaining consent from the committee is 
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generally a straightforward process, and there is not any undue influence in the way in which 
approvals for abortions are granted. However, the abortion committees currently do not take 
elements of Halacha into account when making considerations and may allow an abortion 
that runs counter to Jewish law.  
 The Rabbinate has asked repeatedly and pressured the government to be allowed to 
appoint rabbinic authorities to abortion panels to provide a Jewish religious perspective. 
However, there is a great deal of fear among secular Israelis that this will be another nexus of 
control and power the ultra-Orthodox community will seek to exercise on secular society, 
and this request has been rebuffed numerous times. Nevertheless, medical committees for 
abortion are still a contentious issue and the fault line in the relations between secular and 
ultra-Orthodox Israelis (See Francoeur & Noonan, 2003, p. 602).   
While there are many elements of religious influence in the state of Israel, certain 
points of state and religious contention are often part of an ongoing compromise that seeks to 
establish shifting boundaries between the public and the private spheres. One example, which 
the ultra-Orthodox authorities, through the Rabbinate, have attempted and failed to legislate, 
is that of Sabbath observance. In Judaism, Saturday is the Sabbath and the day of rest. Yet in 
Israel, Saturday, being the only weekend day, has gradually turned into a capitalist society 
style vacation day, as seen among other developed and relatively affluent nations. This 
means an increase in “hedonistic” values, which have then become open to cultural 
influences and are reconnected to new cycles of consumption. Even though there has been a 
ban on commercial activity on the Sabbath in the past, a recent survey estimates an average 
of 600,000 people participate in commercial and leisure activities on the Sabbath throughout 
Israel. This change can be understood by the fact that “in earlier years…commercial activity 
on Saturday was restricted; since the early '90s shopping centers located outside city centers 
cater to the desires of a growing secular public” (Shamir & Ben-Porat, 2007, p. 76). There is 
a distinct duality to this situation where secularism is on the rise, yet public ordinances and 
laws based on religious sensibilities are on the increase. 
Although this technically violates aspects of the ultra-Orthodox hegemony over the 
place of religion in the private sphere, the border of this issue has been shifted more closely 
into the public sphere. “Changes in leisure and recreation patterns have clearly undercut 
traditional religious practices, and the growth of Sabbath entertainment reflects this” (Dowty, 
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2001, p. 173). This is recognized by both secular society and the ultra-Orthodox as an issue 
on which there can be compromise outside of the exclusionary zones of ultra-Orthodox 
neighbourhoods 
 
 The Question of Who Is a Jew? Questions of Jewish identity 
 As a Jewish state, Israel needs to make a key determination of who is Jewish in order 
to determine what criteria are necessary for one to claim Jewishness. Being Jewish in Israel 
extends beyond merely religious identity and is a key element to other facets of national life 
such as a determining factor in one’s ability to immigrate to Israel. As Judaism has been and 
is interpreted to be a large number of elements from an organized religion to a culture and 
social group, it is important that there be a clear definition of what it means to be Jewish in 
the context of the state. Key to this issue is  
the question of recognizing non-Orthodox converts as Jews in immigration policy and legal 
status [which is] … critical to non-Orthodox religious groups in Israel and elsewhere and 
[has] acquired wide practical significance with the high number of mixed marriages among 
immigrants from the former Soviet Union. (Dowty, 2001, pp. 171–72) 
 
In this matter, where the public and private sphere overlap, there is the contentious 
ultra-Orthodox position that claims authority over fundamental elements of practiced 
Judaism such as conversion by trying to shape the religious practice and policy of what it 
means to be Jewish. The fundamental defining element of Jewishness becomes both an 
inclusive and exclusive process in which the ultra-Orthodox definition and religious 
stringencies regarding Judaism through matrilineal decent take precedence over other 
interpretations of determining who has Jewish status. In essence, this means that a religious 
minority controls the core definition regarding the religious character of the majority. For 
Israeli citizens, this can have wide-reaching implications on personal status issues, such as 
marriage, burial, etc.; Jews living in the Diaspora must meet the ultra-Orthodox criteria in 
order to be eligible for citizenship in Israel on the basis of their religious affiliation.  
Jewish identity is a critical element of national unity and is an important element in 
the cohesive nature of the national structure. There are many justifications the ultra-Orthodox 
community uses to carefully police, monitor, and determine criteria for Jewish status. Among 
these fears is the breakdown of society. In the ultra-Orthodox view, that would occur, from a 
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religious perspective, with biblically prohibited illegitimate unions. The claim, since the 
foundation of the state in 1948, is that civil marriage, which is sanctioned through the courts 
or which takes place outside the country, would allow citizens to bypass biblical injunctions 
against, for example, members of the priestly caste marrying a divorcée or other such 
prohibited unions.  
Problematic cases from the perspective of Jewish law, such as when one of the partners is 
non-Jewish or doubtfully Jewish, or when a cohen and a divorced woman wish to be married, 
have been settled in practice by the expansion of legally recognized non-marriage forms of 
cohabitation, such as common-law marriages, and by civil marriages conducted in other 
countries. (Shafir & Peled, 2002, p. 142) 
 
This work-around solution creates intrinsic issues for the Orthodox Rabbinate and presents a 
severe challenge to the status quo and the authority of the Rabbinate.  
 In reality, this well-established loophole that citizens are able to be married and have 
those marriages recognized by the Interior Ministry and not through the Rabbinate represents 
a shift in the Rabbinate’s ability to regulate and control its religious domination over the 
private sphere. Nevertheless, citizens remaining in Israel who wish to be married inside the 
country must obtain permission for a marriage license through the Rabbinate to ensure that 
the proposed union is legitimate. Intermarriage between religious groups, for example, 
between ultra-Orthodox and secular groups, is not very prevalent, and, therefore, creates an 
added level of difficultly for secular Israelis who seek to be married under the auspices of the 
Rabbinate. In order to prove one’s Jewishness at times can be the equivalent of proving a 
negative where there is no formalized proof that one has a particular religious affiliation 
beyond what the records of the Interior Ministry have listed for the individual’s religious 
affiliation at birth. In a nutshell, this is the dilemma faced by many secular Israelis who have 
difficulty getting through the Rabbinate even though they are completely Jewish.  
There are many reasons that can be attributed to the overall decline of marriage in the 
state of Israel between 1948 and 1995. In comparison to other developed countries, Israel 
experienced a 46% decline in registered marriages versus 27% elsewhere (Shafir & Peled, 
2002, p. 142). However, as the statistics only refer to officially registered marriages in Israel 
and not citizens who are married in other jurisdictions and seek recognition through the 
Interior Ministry, there may be a large disparity in the number of people seeking recognition 
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of their marriages and the number of marriage licenses granted for religious and other 
reasons. Issues such as these are fundamental to questions of religious identity. Therefore, 
determining which religious standard should be used to determine who is Jewish, and, by 
extension, what government policy will reflect, are among the most contentious and 
fundamental issues facing the state of Israel today. This continues to be the case as “since the 
mid-1990s the establishment of civil family courts has eroded the role played by rabbinical 
courts in family matters other than the performance of [the actual] marriage and divorce” 
(Shafir & Peled, 2002, p. 142) and, as a result, weakens the authority of the Rabbinate. 
 A telling example of this situation of key identity recognition is at play in two 
aspects. In the first, the ultra-Orthodox community has sought for many years to change the 
Law of Return, particularly to increase the stringency of conversions to be equivalent with 
ultra-Orthodox standards and, therefore, confine immigration of Jews to Israel who meet 
ultra-Orthodox standards. But Shafir and Peled explain why this religious stringency does not 
work:  
This…definition is too restrictive, however, in view of the demographic aim of Zionism, to 
maintain and increase the Jewish majority in Israel. As a result, the Law of Return was 
amended, in 1970, so that only one Jewish grandparent is now required in order to entitle a 
person and her/his spouse and minor children to the privileges provided by the law. Thus it is 
estimated that up to 25% of immigrants from the former Soviet Union are not Jews by 
Orthodox definition...[A]s marriage, divorce, and burials are all under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of religious authorities (whether Jewish or non-Jewish), these non-and-doubtful 
Jews run into problems when they come to need these services, unless they first convert to 
Judaism. (2002, p. 145) 
 
Nevertheless, “the Orthodox parties are still struggling to restrict the definition of a Jew in 
the Law of Return…by having the law read, following the word ‘converted,’ ‘in accordance 
with the Halacha’ (Shafir & Peled, 2002, p. 145). In a sense,  
the definition [as it now stands] covers people who may have converted to Judaism according 
to non-Orthodox procedures. In 1989, an attempt to institute this change was narrowly 
defeated in the Knesset, after the Reform and Conservative Jewish establishments in the US 
threatened to cut their contributions to Israel. In this case, then, when Orthodox political 
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power came to be up against the basic Zionist interest, it could not prevail. (Shafir and Peled, 
2002, p. 146)  
 
Attempts to retake control over the core definition of Jewish identity from the Rabbinate, and 
by extension, the ultra-Orthodox minority, have generally not been very successful in the 
past.  
 Despite past unsuccessful attempts to change the Law of Return, the oversight of 
immigration to Israel is controlled by the Interior Ministry that uses a very different criterion, 
not one based on Halacha and ultra-Orthodox religious rulings. As this area is also critical to 
the ability of a Zionist state to attract Jews from the Diaspora, although status issues, such as 
conversion and marriage in Israel, are under the purview of the Rabbinate, immigration is 
not.  
 The second major nexus of contention in the debate over Jewish identity is the 
establishment—as noted elsewhere—of family and civil court, and the expansion of civil 
court into various matters that had previously been under the jurisdiction of the religious 
court. With the consolidation of power through the secular court over issues of Jewish 
identity, for example, questions about religious and secular procedures for divorce, decisions 
that are not based on Jewish law and can, therefore, potentially be more equitable and 
egalitarian, seek to advance legal protections and liberal values for secular and religious Jews 
alike. While this may contrast with various elements of the Rabbinate's control over religious 
policy, a religious divorce and civil divorce still work hand in hand, though from a different 
viewpoint, not necessarily from the perspective of religion.  
The idea of having Jewish elements integral to Zionism has always been present in 
the development of secular policies of statehood. This is apparent from the Second Zionist 
Congress in 1898 when issues of Jewish religion were discussed in the context of a modern 
planned secular state, as well as in the 1935 Congress where there was an attempt to 
theoretically examine the elements of Judaism that have a historical basis such as Sabbath 
observance and dietary laws in the public sphere in the context of the formation of a modern 
Jewish state.  
The arrangements discussed in the status quo letter (of Ben-Gurion) had deep roots in 
 Zionist practice.…The educational autonomy of the Zionist religious movement 
 inside the bounds of the yishuv...dated back to 1920. In 1898 the Second Zionist 
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Congress resolved that “Zionism will not act in any way to infringe upon the Jewish 
religion.” In the Nineteenth Congress, in 1935... [it was stated that] “no public desecration of 
the Sabbath was to occur, and dietary laws were to be maintained in public institutions”. 
(Shafir & Peled, 2002, p. 149) 
 
In contemporary Israel, there has been a continual push against adopting the 
separation of church and state by various interested parties. One of the key issues for liberal 
Israelis is the dilemma of how to address the issues, conflicts, and various concerns of 
individual rights and their commitment to the ethno-national definition of state. This is 
discussed in more detail in its religious context in the section on “Who Is a Jew” that 
examines the criteria and religious considerations involved in the very fundamentals of 
Jewish identity in the Israeli content. Yet in the sense of liberal democracy, the question is 
broader as state and religion, generally, and issues of religious identity, more specifically, 
create a contentious borderline between religious and secular poles of society and the 
fundamental question of what it means to be Jewish in the Jewish state, and, indeed, what it 
means to be Jewish generally. These issues are important to address from both the secular 
and religious elements of society as they are critical components to maintaining the status 
quo.  
The status quo arrangement is based on a strategy of a dual approach by liberal 
secular Israelis: gradually eroding the religious status quo through legislation and judicial 
action and finding practical ways of circumventing religious constraints on individual rights. 
This concept reaffirms the general movement towards increased secularism in Israeli society 
and increased contraction and Orthodoxy among the ultra-Orthodox community who seek to 
claim and entrench its version of religiosity outside the public sphere. In this way, religious 
policies do not necessarily on a day-to-day basis impact the nonreligious in terms of daily 
life. Yet, at the same time, the impact and influence of the ultra-Orthodox community on the 
private sphere as well as in politics mean that there is a great deal of involvement in secular 
society but at a distance. 
One of the key reasons Israel has had a difficult time in separating religion and state 
is that doing so would create a decisive resolution of the various issues at hand. The status 
quo arrangement relies on a fundamental imbalance that constantly needs to be addressed or 
displaced through ongoing compromise in order not to lend the appearance of one side taking 
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advantage of the other. Yet, even though there is seemingly an equilibrium between the 
secular and religious elements of society and that Israel positions itself as being a liberal 
secular democracy, the state itself still renders secular policies and institutions in a concerted 
and decisive manner. This creates an inherent conflict since many elements of the 
government, for example, at the political level as well as in the bureaucracy, are generally 
secular. This reflects the overall diversity of the country as well as the development of 
secularism in Israel. This is endorsed by Israeli secularists who see these institutions as a 
mechanism through which the religious elements in Israeli society will have less persistence 
in public life and allow for the withdrawal of ultra-Orthodox daily life from secular society.  
One of the difficulties in examining the way in which the status quo is formed by 
secular government institutions and the religious community attempting to maintain a 
balance is the concept that the status quo constantly needs reinvigoration and new conflicts in 
order to perpetuate itself and to be understood as constantly striving to maintain a balance on 
religious issues. This comes down to the very nature of adopting elusive formulas in order to 
maintain the status quo, which necessarily divides the secular and religious balance within 
the state. This balance would not be sustained if it were not for constant participation in the 
process and without sufficient resources from all parties that preserve the status quo; a 
potentially ruinous situation would erupt and completely throw the equilibrium of state and 
religious issues into chaos. It is in this way that both sides are entrenched in their positions 
utilizing the status quo and striving for an arrangement that does not necessarily benefit 
either side with a clear victory, yet maintains a system in which incremental victories are able 
to be achieved. 
 Through compromise on fundamental issues, religious and secular elements of 
society are able to prioritize the issues that are of critical importance to them and use these 
issues as the bouncing principles for the status quo. Although issues are open for negotiation, 
the ultra-Orthodox community ensures that its concrete positions on which it is not willing to 
compromise are not up for negotiation. For example, this would include the issues regarding 
yeshiva students and military service in which the ultra-Orthodox compromise on the status 
quo in a way that suits them.  
Each subsequent change creates a new status quo that serves as a current starting point for 
further negotiations. In some issues…the Orthodox community has succeeded in pushing the 
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line of the status quo in directions favorable to its interest. In other areas…the nonreligious 
communities have enjoyed the upper hand. What is important for our purposes is that there 
has scarcely been a deal cut, a compromise broached, or a coalitional agreement signed in a 
religio-political matter that did not appeal to the status quo as a relevant, regulative principle. 
(Cohen & Susser, 2000, p. 19) 
 
 The religious-secular conflict in Israel is complex and at times irrational because it 
involves an emotional ideological value on basic principles that characterize the essence of a 
Jewish state. The conflicts and issues that the ultra-Orthodox have waged protests over are 
numerous because these issues are key determinants to the form and function of the Jewish 
state. For the ultra-Orthodox community, Jewish values are at a higher level than simple 
political or socially distributed justice. Thus, a minority of the population feels that it should 
impose its religious views on the majority for its own good. This issue becomes complicated 
because it affects the entire Jewish community of the state, and often there are opposing 
views from both sides of the political spectrum. The state itself has a mechanism in which it 
manipulates and prevents the ultra-Orthodox positions from being considered in a 
dispassionate and businesslike way, and often the state will create circumstances for 
compromise, which do not necessarily undermine the high principles and ultimate values of 
the ultra-Orthodox communities and yet allow for ongoing compromise.  
The previous “status quo” was incompatible with the demographic, economic, and political 
changes. Officially, religious orthodoxy still holds the monopoly over significant aspects of 
life [for example, marriage]…and laws [that] protect the status of the Sabbath. In practice, 
however, alternative marital arrangements and commercial interests are rapidly secularizing 
the public sphere and rendering old arrangements irrelevant. (Ben-Porat, 2008, p. 3) 
 
The status quo agreement, which is an informal set of relations that have developed through 
time, deals with the fixed habits and demands of ongoing coexistence with formulas that do 
not fit either side’s worldview or basic way of life. In this way, struggles and conflicts are not 
immediately dealt with but are often mitigated and dealt with in numerous ways. The 
agreement acts as a pressure valve to issues that otherwise would require compromising on 
principles or faith-based values and allows for both secular and religious society to negotiate 
the best possible arrangement without clearly creating a winner or a loser.  
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There are many reasons why the struggles of the religious/secular divide require a 
solution such as the status quo or one that can be perceived through the theory of 
consociationalism. This is because of fundamental demographic, economic, and political 
changes that have occurred in the country over time. This can also be attributed to the unique 
social situation in which the ultra-Orthodox in Israel now find themselves, which is an 
entirely new construct in the greater context of the Jewish Diaspora. This calls into question 
the relevancy of religion in the modern state as well as previously negotiated religious 
controls over various aspects of the public sphere.  
The Orthodox minority controls a monopoly on marriage, which is put into policy 
through the Israeli Rabbinate, an element of the state. This is also the case with more public 
laws, such as laws dictating public Sabbath observance. And it is interesting to note that 
while there are various loopholes to create non-Orthodox marriage, such as recognition by 
the state of marriages performed abroad and marriages registered in other jurisdictions, it is 
still impossible to bypass religious laws dictating policies for marriage in the country. Yet 
this is not the case for Sabbath observance, which does have many loopholes and is for all 
practical purposes not observed among the secular majority in Israel regarding shopping, 
public attractions, and other businesses open on the Sabbath. This, therefore, calls into 
question the relevancy of status quo-type agreements, which although created for historical 
purposes to maintain control over the Jewish people, in keeping with biblical prohibitions 
against forbidden liaisons as discussed extensively elsewhere, for the majority of Israelis, it 
becomes an issue of identity and convenience to be recognized within a particular context in 
Israel. 
There are also interesting jurisdictional issues that factor into this discussion. As the 
status quo and other religious legislation impact the personal sphere rather than the public, 
there is an effort to maintain the same type of pseudo-religious recollections and 
commonality presence in the early state period today. This includes the decision to require 
public institutions to maintain kosher observance, ostensibly maintain a series of Sabbath 
observance laws, and exempt ultra-Orthodox men and women from military service. While 
each of these aspects is further complicated and nuanced by the many aspects of negotiated 
compromise between secular and religious elements of society, part of this agreement is in 
exchange to create an establishment that works on issues of monopoly, marriage 
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arrangements, Jewish conversions, and burial. The ensuing picture is that the personal sphere 
is wholly dominated by laws that are applied to citizens individually, and public policy is 
often ignored and not nearly as strict as policies that are enforced through the Rabbinate 
versus other government bureaucracies. The key purpose of public observance of religious 
elements is to instil a religious commonality regardless of religious observance, yet personal 
sphere issues are geared towards the control of the individual at a much more personal level. 
The result is that there is no clear separation between church and state, and also, in a sense, 
regardless of the status quo, personal sphere issues are under the jurisdiction of the religious 
authority in individuals’ personal lives. 
Although status quo agreements do not resolve all the issues, flexibility exists to 
continually reopen the door of negotiations over these particular issues. Issues that cannot be 
solved through practical, ad hoc, negotiation on a communal level are passed to the realm of 
the secular and religious political and social elites. Because of the inherent conflict 
compromising would put social and political elites into, the issue is often not resolved at this 
level and is transferred to two local levels—municipal or judicial—or the issue is shelved 
entirely in order to avoid additional pressure on a particular dispute. It is interesting that this 
applies to, in the case of marriage, the prohibition of civil marriage, conducted under the 
aegis of all religions, whereas the Rabbinate performs only religious Jewish marriages and 
requires confirmation of the validity of a marriage performed in other jurisdictions in order to 
consider it to be a Jewish marriage. And this is the same for other major religions in Israel as 
well. Yet, even though the official recognition of a particular marriage must be done through 
the Rabbinate, various loopholes have been created in which a secularist or, for that matter, 
any citizen who refuses to be married by an Orthodox rabbi can either be married abroad or 
register a marriage from abroad and receive recognition of that marriage from the Ministry of 
the Interior, bypassing the Rabbinate entirely.  
 The status quo arrangement is generally somewhat flexible as the elements under 
debate are often involved in a give-and-take in which each side strives to achieve the best 
negotiated position for that particular issue, which may in turn require compromise on other 
issues, even those tied into deeply held religious convictions or beliefs (Ben-Porat, 2008, p. 
31). An example of this, as discussed previously, is local authorities who have loosened the 
various laws concerning commerce and entertainment on Sabbath and Jewish holidays 
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because of a tacit recognition of the secular majorities' demands for these venues. Issues 
concerning the Sabbath specifically are generally more localized as there needs to be little 
coercion to maintain policies against shopping on the Sabbath or Jewish holidays in religious 
neighbourhoods. However, due to the nature of these policies, which affect the public rather 
than private sphere among secular society, they are often not implemented or policed in the 
same way with the effect of creating many leniencies in the public sphere.  
The status quo was…based on the “freezing” of early agreements and understandings 
between religious and secular and new compromises of the same spirit. Thus, in the new state 
it was decided that kashrut (Jewish dietary laws) would be observed in the public institutions, 
the Sabbath would be respected, ultra-Orthodox men and religious women were to be 
exempted from army service, and the religious establishment would have a monopoly 
over…marriage arrangements, conversion to Judaism, and burial. [Thus] all citizens, 
regardless of personal belief, are under the church jurisdiction in significant areas of their 
personal lives. (Ben-Porat, 2008, p. 31) 
 
 The public sphere issues as they relate to the secular religious conflict are numerous 
and involve aspects of the nature of public space, the language used in Israel and its biblical 
origins, the symbols of the state, official holidays, and so on.  
The intensity of Israel's secular-religious conflict reflects the opposing visions these 
communities pursue in regard to the very nature of the Jewish state. What is at stake is a 
politics of Jewish identity, a struggle over ultimate values rather than distributory justice, 
over the whole rather than the parts. Inevitably, [these conflicts] assume all the ardor and 
intractability of struggles over high principles and ultimate values; in struggles such as this, 
constitutions are formidable obstacles to consociational “muddling through”. (Cohen & 
Susser, 2000, pp. 20–21) 
 
It is, therefore, an interesting counterpoint between the rights of individuals and their 
obligations and the collective rights awarded to a minority that can have access to national 
decision-making political processes and the rights of the majority in both the personal and 
public spheres in the way in which policy impacts their everyday lives. Various elements of 
control and acceptance of the social contract are involved by interacting with the state in 
various ways. This is no more apparent than in the state’s use of religious symbolism and 
elements to form what is termed a civil religion, which has a uniting character.  
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 While Reform and Conservative rabbis, and lately the government of Israel, demand 
pluralism in conversion, Orthodox and Haredi rabbis adamantly insist that the authority to 
convert should remain exclusively in the hands of ultra-Orthodox rabbis. This causes a deep 
rift in Jewish identity and is a central example of the difficulties caused by recognizing one 
particular stream of Judaism over others in determining fundamental religious rights and 
membership. This issue is particularly contentious as an example of ultra-Orthodox control 
over policy; if a non-ultra-Orthodox definition of conversion that does not follow the strict 
dictates and interpretation of Halacha were adopted, the public face of religion in Israel—and 
perhaps by extension the ability to influence that policy through the Rabbinate—would be 
greatly diminished.  
 What is interesting regarding conversion is that converts to Judaism with non-
Orthodox conversions performed outside Israel are recognized as being Jewish by the Interior 
Ministry and for all practical purposes are able to immigrate to Israel. Yet in Israel, they may 
not be considered Jewish by the Rabbinate and, therefore, not eligible for services such as 
marriage, divorce, and burial. This creates a difficult situation with Diaspora communities 
who, much like in Israel, are primarily non-Orthodox and, thus, feel illegitimate in the 
context of religious recognition in Israel. Even more so, as noted elsewhere, the leadership of 
these non-Orthodox religious groups are not recognized by the state due to Rabbinate policy 
and, therefore, conversions that they carry out in Israel are not recognized at all.  
The status quo arrangement that developed …was that conversions made abroad -- even if 
they were Reform and Conservative -- would be recognized by the Ministry of the Interior. 
By contrast, a conversion undergone in Israel would be recognized only if it were 
Orthodox.…This state of affairs was based, it should be emphasized, on precedent rather than 
on written law. Hence, the offensive of the Reform and Conservative movements zeroed in 
on this weak link. They applied to the Supreme Court to have their own Israeli conversions 
recognized in Israeli law. (Cohen & Susser, 2000, p. 123)  
 
If at some point in the future, the government would recognize the authority of non-ultra-
Orthodox groups, the paradigm for a fundamental element of religious identity established 
through conversion will radically shift the balance of power and the hold the ultra-Orthodox 
community has over religious legitimization through particular standards.  
 
Shapiro 169 
 
 The community sphere 
 The communal sphere has many aspects of influence by the ultra-Orthodox 
community and a great deal of Jewish policy relating to the national experience in terms of 
public society. The Rabbinate has control and reach in communal religious standards through 
the religious councils and by providing rabbis who are certified and ordained through the 
Rabbinate to local communities. In this way, communities throughout Israel have rabbis 
coming from a single point and are generally heavily influenced by Orthodox and ultra-
Orthodox viewpoints. The rabbis involved in this program of regional representation are 
funded through both national and municipal funds and controlled through the Rabbinate. It is 
interesting to note that the Druze community receives similar funding as well. There has been 
a trend within the government to become more flexible in terms of issues relating to religious 
policy, and this is reflected in the ability of organizations to apply for government funding to 
build and maintain holy sites since 2002. “A law allows for the establishment of Jewish 
religious councils in communities. Those councils are funded by national and municipal 
funds. Only the Druze receive similar funding” (Fox, 2008, p. 242). This means that religious 
institutions that are not recognized through the Rabbinate, therefore, are not provided 
funding.  
 Each chief rabbi is elected to a tenure position as a rabbinical elder/leader and, in 
essence, becomes a government functionary often with the equivalent of a cabinet level 
position relating to the implementation and policy of religion as applicable through Israeli 
law. Even though the chief rabbi position is normally not held by a member of the ultra-
Orthodox community, much of the bureaucracy is made up of ultra-Orthodox Jews. Although 
the leadership tends to be outside government influence, there are occasional high level ultra-
Orthodox rabbis who become rabbis of various cities, though not the chief rabbi. This, 
therefore, means that the power of the chief rabbi in Israel is considerably weakened by 
external sources of authority, which the ultra-Orthodox community follows rather than the 
chief rabbi who represents a bureaucratic position rather than a position of religious or moral 
authority for the ultra-Orthodox community. The Rabbinate interacts with the community on 
a significant level as a state-funded body that controls life-cycle events and officially 
recognizes religious institutions in each locality. There can, therefore, be a degree of variance 
among the different branches of the Rabbinate though, generally, for the reasons mentioned 
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above, they tend to have a standardized level of understanding, such as their relationship with 
funding various non-Orthodox groups.  
 State-funded rabbis carry out the requirements of the Rabbinate when it comes to 
officiating at life-cycle events. Rabbis are required to be recognized by the Rabbinate, both 
from within the institution of the Rabbinate as in the case of regional rabbis, and other rabbis, 
such as the ultra-Orthodox, who may not be officially part of the Rabbinate, yet are certified 
as recognized and differ greatly from non-Orthodox rabbis. This is a critical issue as there is 
a great desire to have the power and authority of a recognized rabbi in order to become both 
part of the councils that pose a monopoly over life-cycle ceremonies and as a form of 
political patronage, which is reflected in the various positions which the Rabbinate takes. 
“The local religious council (a State-funded body)…controls life-cycle events and officially 
recognizes religious institutions in each locality” (Wagner, 2010, p. 48). These positions are 
expected to be carefully followed by the delegates of the Rabbinate on a bureaucratic level 
and on a wider level of religious standards. All rabbis who are approved by the Rabbinate, 
whether they strictly belong to the governmental bureaucracy or if they function outside it, 
are expected to maintain strict standards of religiosity and interpretation of various aspects of 
Jewish law. The daily functioning of government bureaucracy in the Rabbinate means that 
“under these circumstances, rabbinical councils that possess a monopoly over lifecycle 
ceremonies are largely creatures of political patronage, and control of these agencies is 
strictly a matter of political muscle” (Wagner, 2010, p. 49). This is often at odds with the 
majority of secular Israeli society. 
It is this critical issue that determines the Rabbinate’s stance on various matters and 
whether Jewish law can be interpreted with stringency or with leniency. In many instances, 
pressure from the ultra-Orthodox, both within and outside the Rabbinate, has increased the 
overall level of Orthodox standards set by the Rabbinate for all recognized rabbinical 
authorities. Therefore, there has been an ongoing trend to shift towards ultra-Orthodoxy even 
by non-ultra-Orthodox rabbis in the Rabbinate, such as Religious Zionists. The net effect of 
this increased ultra-Orthodox policy means that the Rabbinate is required to stipulate policies 
that are more at odds with the secular majority, which in many cases seeks policies of 
leniency while still working within the framework of the Rabbinate, and increased numbers 
of non-Orthodox Israelis seek alternative means outside the framework of the Rabbinate.  
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 On a communal basis, this is particularly difficult. Many of the positions the 
Rabbinate adopts, whether as matters of interpretation of Jewish law or matters of policy, are 
widening the rift between secularism and the demands of the government to find compromise 
on religious matters for the benefit of the largest segment of the population. Any form of 
compromise is not being met by the hard line position of the Rabbinate and various elements 
that seek to increase the Orthodoxy and religiosity as maintained in Jewish law and 
government policy. In order to ensure that a “true” Judaism is preserved through adherence 
of ultra-Orthodoxy as well as through government controls over the personal sphere in the 
secular population, the line separating the personal sphere and the private sphere, as 
discussed in this chapter, often shifts to accommodate various positions in the overarching 
hegemony of the Rabbinate and ultra-Orthodox population within the private sphere. 
Conversely, many issues have been drawn into the public sphere, and, therefore, the effects 
of regulation have lessened during time. Despite these shifting borderlines that exist between 
the community and the individual, there are distinctly entrenched areas of religious policy 
that differentiate the two primary spheres of religious policy and its application.    
 
 The state sphere and the status quo 
Before the enablement of the status quo agreement, there were many conflicts 
between the dominant secular and minority religious groups, which occurred frequently 
during the early Zionist period. This particular issue was recognized as a real threat to 
political and social cohesion and potentially threatened internal breakup within a Zionist 
state. During both the prestate and the early state period, the issue was negated through a 
series of consultations and trade-offs with various stakeholders on religious issues. This, 
therefore, led to a perpetuation of compromise in order to ensure stability underlying the 
Zionist Project, which sought to unite religion and secularism under the umbrella of secular 
Zionism. Collectively, these issues that were negotiated through pragmatic agreements and 
consensus building during the early stages of the Israeli state are what are known as the 
“status quo arrangement”. 
 The status quo arrangement as a social solution is integral to the compromise and 
ongoing balance among the various Jewish groups in Israel. More generally, it also can be 
perceived in both the inter- and intra-relational agreements among adherents of various 
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religions and religious groups in Israel, and this ongoing policy extends beyond religion and 
politics. There are many aspects of the status quo policy, which is an unofficial rebalancing 
of various state and religious priorities in order to avoid confrontation and maintain a 
homeostatic balance among the various parties. From issues regarding marital status to 
commerce on the Sabbath and other religiously inspired laws, a principle of mutual veto 
addresses many fundamental issues by creating and reinforcing ongoing stability, although at 
times it is uneven. In this context, even if individual issues are not settled to the favour of one 
group or another, both sides can partake in the balancing process and thereby feel that they 
are stakeholders in the process. “Controversial issues in the area of religion and state…have 
been resolved on the basis of the mutual veto principle, known in Israel as the ‘status quo 
solution’” (Don-Yehiya, 1999, p. 89). This necessarily creates a system of mutual 
determination where in this context ultra-Orthodox Jews control many aspects of religion in 
the private sphere and many aspects of Judaism relating to citizenship.  
 The status quo arrangement was originally formulated in a letter from the prime 
minister of Israel, David Ben-Gurion, to the Orthodox political party Agudat Yisrael on June 
19, 1947 (Dowty, 2001, p. 166). This letter outlined what is, in effect, the framework 
regarding the status quo arrangement between religious interests and secular interests in the 
future state of Israel. In essence, it became the basis of a complex bargaining process of how 
the status quo arrangement, informal as it was, would give leverage to both sides of the 
equation and provide a theoretical counterbalance on most divisive issues (Korn, 2005, p. 
23). The status quo arrangement serves as a reference guide for bargaining and recognizing 
various aspects of religiosity in Israeli society, such as Jewish Sabbath observance. Other 
examples of status quo negotiations include state funding of religious public schools and the 
compromise of leaving jurisdiction over marriage and divorce in the hands of religious state-
funded authorities. However, there are some anomalies in the practical application of the 
status quo, especially regarding issues of public religion, such as banning transportation on 
the Sabbath as a whole (Dowty, 2001, p. 166).  
  Additional problems arise from judging the outcomes of individual confrontations. Is it a 
success if one side gets a law enacted, but the measure is seldom enforced or is implemented in 
ways which are criticized by those who support its enactment? And how does one assess a 
situation where the same problem (for instance, controversy over public modesty, Sabbath 
observance, or the availability of non-kosher food) arises again and again, but each time with 
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slight variations and the nature of the demands and subtle differences in the way the issue is 
resolved. But what if a particular controversy simply disappears from the public agenda 
without a resolution? In some circumstances the most persuasive conclusion is that neither side 
has one. Religious activists have scored some victories, but so have secular Israelis. It is 
difficult to weigh the closure of a road against the opening of a restaurant, discotheques, and 
cinemas on the Sabbath. The score is a tie, more or less. (Sharkansky, 1997, p. 162) 
 
The ultra-Orthodox community controls the non-Orthodox segment of the population’s 
freedoms in areas of family, dietary laws, and Sabbath Day observance; generally, the ultra-
Orthodox position symbolizes the ethno-principle of the Jewish historical claim to Eretz 
Yisrael. The status quo relationship essentially means that the ongoing cycle of withdrawal 
and exclusion from mainstream secular society is tempered by the ultra-Orthodox 
community’s ability to enforce its interpretation of religious dictates upon the secular 
majority. In this way, the ultra-Orthodox community has a great degree of inclusion in public 
discourse regarding civil legislative and policy issues relating to the personal sphere, for 
example, the regulation of marriage, conversion, and burial.  
Orthodox Jews ... have not only been awarded the full range of citizenship rights...but have 
also been given control of other people's rights, as in the areas of family and dietary laws and 
in regard to the observance of the Sabbath in the public sphere. The privileged status 
according to Orthodox Jews...has resulted from their symbolizing the ethno-national principle 
of Jewish historical continuity and Jewish claim to Eretz Yisrael. (Shafir & Peled, 2002, p. 
137) 
 
As these are issues that are caught up with and relate to the essential character of Israel as a 
Jewish state, the position of the ultra-Orthodox community has for these and other reasons, 
such as political power, a great deal of influence in secular society even though there is an 
ongoing process of self-exclusion and other forms of exclusion by the mainstream 
population.  
 When Ben-Gurion created the status quo agreement, he guaranteed to ultra-Orthodox 
rabbis that they would be an integral element to the functioning of the state. “Ben-Gurion 
was sympathetic to those survivors of the Holocaust and was confident that secular Zionism 
had already triumphed. He was willing to let these remnants of the Diaspora Jews have their 
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way until they died a natural death in the new State” (Beck, 2010, p. 23). This was viewed as 
a compromise to Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox Jews who sought to increase the religious 
aspect of the state and have their version of Judaism recognized. In order to give recognition 
to Holocaust survivors, these elements of Jewish religious practice allowed a degree of 
religiosity into the secular Jewish state that was being created.  
 The thinking of Ben-Gurion was to incorporate these elements of religious practice, 
which had all but vanished in the Holocaust, in the newly established state of Israel and allow 
ultra-Orthodox Israelis and ultra-Orthodox Jews in the Diaspora to be able to comfortably 
practice the elements of Judaism they considered to be of paramount importance. Ben-Gurion 
believed that these elements would inevitably die out because of the decline of religion post-
Holocaust and leave only a secular Jewish state behind. Obviously, this was not the case, and 
the ultra-Orthodox segment of the population has increased to epic proportions. This has 
created new stresses and frequent disagreements on the various issues that comprise the 
status quo balance among the varying levels of the religious and nonreligious population in 
Israel.   
 The status quo is challenged in a number of different ways. Ben-Porat identifies four 
divisive issues in contemporary Israeli life that challenge the religious status quo and have 
increased in their contentious nature since the founding of the state of Israel (2008, p. 30). 
These borderline issues are critical to understanding the flexibility of the status quo and the 
underlying negotiations it entails.  
 The first issue relates to the “rise of an ideologically liberal secularism” that focuses 
on a Western style separation of church and state and the protection and creation of civil 
rights (Ben-Porat, 2008, p. 33). Many secular Israelis wish for Israel to move closer to these 
values and to cease the institutionalization and governmental claim over the private sphere 
and religious policy. With a typical secular democratic separation of church and state, Israel 
would be able to focus on other issues. This comes out of increased dissatisfaction with the 
Rabbinate and the way in which religion is enmeshed with government, laws, and 
bureaucratic policy. This is significant because the Rabbinate, through the co-joining of state 
and religious policy, has been placed in charge of all matters relating to the personal sphere 
such as marriage, divorce, and the fundamental question of who is Jewish. “There is a broad 
consensus that Israel should be a ‘Jewish state,’ but deep controversy exists over the meaning 
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of the term, from a secular perception of a Jewish culture and a nation to an Orthodox version 
of a theocracy” (Ben-Porat, 2008, p. 30).  
  A recent survey from the Smith Institute for the Hiddush Foundation for Freedom of 
Religious Equality published that 80% of the Israeli public is dissatisfied with the policies of 
religion and state, 86% expressed discontent towards the various policies, and 61% of non-
ultra-Orthodox participants expressed that they would support a secular government without 
religious parties. Based on the data in this survey, the Israeli public is dissatisfied with the 
policies set by Haredi political parties, which include the future progress for secular society 
and the various rights controlled by religious groups in the private sphere (The Jerusalem 
Post, November 24, 2010). 
Uri Regev, the general director of Hiddush, an attorney and rabbi, maintained that “citizens 
want to establish a leading government instead of being submissive to religious policy set by 
a minority. To implement a declaration of freedom from religion and conscience it requires 
the state to remove Yeshiva stipends supporting a segment of the population to withdraw 
from society using government funding and to take away the monopoly of the Rabbinate over 
marriages, divorce, and the private sphere.” Regev also emphasized that “the data represents 
the fact that the Israeli public is fed up with policy being set by the Haredi political parties 
and feels that their future and rights are being given up to the religious groups The public 
wants a leading government, not a submissive government. The public desires a government 
which will finally implement the promise of the Declaration of Independence relating to the 
freedom of religion and conscience. The public wants a government that will not pass yeshiva 
stipends and will take away the monopolistic control of marriage and divorce by the ever-
more-Haredi rabbinate.” Using the same metric, similar questions were asked of the Haredi 
population, 91% of whom said that they were dissatisfied with religious state policy, and 64% 
expressed discontent with the way in which religious policy is carried out by the state (The 
Jerusalem Post, November 24, 2010) 
 
 According to Ben-Porat, the second issue that challenges the status quo is the issue of 
Jews from the former Soviet Union, who often are Jewish enough to make aliyah and move 
to Israel under the auspices of the Jewish Agency, yet once in Israel, are not recognized as 
Jews by the Rabbinate. This affects over 300,000 immigrants, who immigrated in large 
numbers in the 1990s. Many immigrants did not see themselves as Jewish along the same 
rigid requirements as the Rabbinate in Israel (Wylen, 2000, p. 404). This is perceived to be a 
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major point of pressure to reaching an accommodation on issues of religious policies and not 
necessarily abiding by the strictest interpretation of Jewish law in determining one's 
Jewishness. This would be a major challenge to the Rabbinate, as through their strictly ultra-
Orthodox interpretation, they limit the discourse of who is considered Jewish.  
 A directly applicable example is that conversion often does not have the same 
standards for the fundamental question of determining an individual’s status and Jewishness 
as qualifications by other ministries. This issue, therefore, brings pressures on the Rabbinate 
and the government to find new forms of accommodation and ways to interpret existing 
religious policies regarding status and conversion in order to find a more lenient compromise. 
These issues have become a major challenge for the Rabbinate to interpret its standards on a 
strictly ultra-Orthodox basis with stringent criteria because this would limit the number of 
Israelis considered to be Jewish. As noted elsewhere, the government has tried to put in place 
various stop-gap measures that seek to further the government’s goal of recognizing Jewish 
status among citizens who would not meet the criteria set by the Rabbinate because of 
religious stringencies. By trying to interpret and find leniencies, the government has sought 
to develop various loopholes through which people could claim Jewish status; however, since 
these programs are not widespread and are contentious, a great number of people still grapple 
with the central issue of recognized Jewish identity and status on both a personal and 
bureaucratic level. This dilemma involves the central issue that ultra-Orthodox religious 
interpretation of Jewish law as set forth by the Rabbinate has very narrow criteria, which do 
not match the life experience of the majority of secular or traditional Jewish Israelis.  
The third issue in contemporary Israeli life that affects the status quo and religion is 
the advancement of Israeli society in the public sphere as it transforms into a consumer-
driven society in which “commercial activity on the Sabbath is a striking example of the 
crumbling status quo and the growing insignificance of formal rules” (Ben-Porat, 2008, p. 
33). “The constraints of religious politics were demonstrated again in the '90s, when 
shopping centers on the outskirts of towns began operating on Saturdays and drawing large 
crowds” (Shamir & Ben-Porat, 2007, p. 84). This is a rapidly evolving area of social change 
in Israel. 
Increased consumerism in Israel has led to an increase in commercial businesses open 
during the Sabbath that cater to the large segment of the population that is not Sabbath 
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observant and wish to be able to shop on Saturday. For many reasons, such as Sunday being 
the start of the work week and the weekend, ostensibly only taking place half a day Friday 
and all day Saturday, prohibitions and regulations regarding the ability of businesses to be 
open on the Sabbath are mainly ignored in nonreligious areas (Shulevitz, 2011, p.45) This 
represents a particularly relevant example into the way in which the status quo has shifted in 
favour of secular Israelis, with large crowds utilizing Saturday as the day of increased 
commercial activity as opposed to religious areas where all commerce and motorized traffic 
comes to a standstill for the observance of the Sabbath.  
 The fourth issue that affects the status quo is the Working Hour and Rest Law. This 
law seeks to declare a day of rest and vacation in which employers are required to give their 
employees a day off. The Working Hour and Rest Law authorized the minister of labour to 
permit work on rest days: 
if he is convinced that ceasing work...is liable to inflict major damage on the economy, on an 
ongoing work project, or on the provision of a vital service to the public…The law was 
interpreted differently by religious groups and secular groups… [and] these differences were 
resolved by informal agreements and local arrangements between the Orthodox and secular 
communities or, at times, brought to the Israeli Supreme Court for adjudication. 
Overall…commercial activity was a relatively minor issue in religious-secular relations [in 
the early pre- and post-state periods]. (Shamir & Ben-Porat, 2007, p. 81) 
 
This particular law has different proponents in both religious and secular groups for reasons 
of worker equality and rights to the observance of the Sabbath. In these issues, the minister of 
labour has the authority to clarify issues and ensure that the day of rest, which is taken, does 
not inflict damage on the economy.  
Aspects of Jewish law are enforced upon the country's population based upon [the] “status-
quo” agreement where the situation that existed at Israel's founding remains in force. A 
number of restrictions are enforced on the Jewish Sabbath and religious holidays. Most 
businesses must close and most busses and national airlines do not operate, and the streets in 
some ultra-Orthodox Jewish neighborhoods are closed to vehicles. (Fox, 2008, p. 242)  
 
Through the ongoing use of the status quo, these issues are resolved on an informal or case-
by-case basis instead of being generalized into larger issues that would affect the entire 
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country. Employers, therefore, need to apply to the Ministry of Labor if they are going to 
permit a workday on the Sabbath, and often these cases may be brought to the Supreme 
Court for adjudication and interpretation of the position of the law. Generally, the issue of 
commercial activity during holidays and on the Sabbath is relatively minor compared to other 
labour issues facing the court.  
 The status quo arrangements in this area have generally resolved many of these points 
of contention on a smaller scale, and the days of rest, which can be interpreted as a religious 
day of rest, are generally either on Sunday or Saturday. However, in the context of 
consumers and clients, business establishments struggle with catering to the needs of their 
consumers and the days in which they are interested in making purchases. As noted earlier, 
due to Israel's weekly schedule of Sunday being the first workday of the week and ending 
with Friday being a half workday, religious days of rest and worship are generally carried out 
by Muslims on Friday, Jews on Saturday, and Christians on Sunday, though this can vary to a 
great degree as secular members of all three major religions seek to maintain commercial 
activity during these days of rest in order to cater to the demands of their customers (Cohen 
& Susser, 2000, p.51). It is, therefore, apparent that consumer demands have created a new 
form of localized regulation in which some areas, which do not offend religious sensibilities, 
have stores that are open during a religious day of rest, and in other areas that do have 
religious members, stores remain closed. Thus, behavioural changes, which have happened in 
regard to Sabbath and the consumer, have changed into modes of commercialization and 
secularization.  
 Even though secularizing patterns have developed concerning the issue of shopping 
on the Sabbath, there are many contentious issues regarding budding neighbourhoods or even 
established neighbourhoods in which religious sensibilities are offended by having stores 
open on the Sabbath. In these contentious border areas or even in areas that have a more 
general character, ultra-Orthodox Jews have successfully used boycotts in order to preserve 
the status quo and seek to rebalance the secular demand for increased shopping on the 
Sabbath and the Orthodox requirement for all commercial trade to shut down on their day of 
worship. 
 An example of one such boycott is how the ultra-Orthodox community forced El Al 
airlines, which was formerly the state-owned national carrier, not to fly on the Sabbath. In 
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1992, the airline decided to concede to demands, and until privatization, the government 
generally did not operate the airline except in exceptional circumstances on the Sabbath 
because of the boycott. However, once the airline was privatized, it faced new consumer 
boycotts as it renewed operations on the Sabbath to certain locations but yet relied on the 
heavy traffic of ultra-Orthodox flyers (Dunbar, 2009, pp. 27–28; Mazie, 2006, p.163). After 
privatization, El Al started again to operate on the Sabbath, yet religious passengers still 
continued to fly on the airline. “Recently, the privatized El Al faced a consumer’s boycott 
because of claims that the airline had begun to operate on the Sabbath in certain locations. 
The solution to that crisis kept El Al grounded on the Sabbath, its seats crowded with 
religious passengers” (Kosmin & Keysar, 2009, p. 89). Generally, there is minimal violation 
of religious tenets regarding Sabbath observance, and the airline continues as before, seeking 
to minimize flights on the Sabbath, though this is not always possible.  
Religious parties' demand that the government enforce the law and shut down businesses that 
operate on the Sabbath led to some political controversies, but because limited budget is 
allocated to enforcement agencies, and many stores circumvent the laws by hiring non-Jewish 
workers, and finally because the revenue from operating on Saturdays is greater than the 
potential fines, the commercialization of the Sabbath continues unabated (Shamir & Ben-
Porat, 2007, pp. 82–83) 
 
Still there is an economic reality: Due to the large number of secular Israelis, both Jewish and 
of other religions, and due to the fact that revenue is greater than the potential miniscule fines 
that business owners face for operating in contravention to the Working Hour and Rest Law, 
the commercialization of the Sabbath and the widening of commercial interests have 
expanded.  
Ultra-Orthodox concerns about the religious character and fundamental nature of the 
state can take many forms. The considerations that the religious community has about 
violations of Jewish law in the public sphere, for example, compromising on stringencies 
regarding the Sabbath, are often a minimal compromise that entails greater stringency in 
ultra-Orthodox neighbourhoods, such as entirely banning the use of motor vehicles on the 
Sabbath compared to secular areas where no such prohibition exists. The same type of trade-
offs can be seen in other areas such as commerce and kosher status where the ultra-Orthodox, 
seeking greater control over their immediate area, will arrive at a compromise on issues 
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involving the public sphere. This is not the case in the private sphere, as noted elsewhere, 
where religious elements control state policy. A particularly topical example of this can be 
seen in negotiations about allowing pornography to be displayed on cell phones and other 
wireless devices, or a lack of regulation as a bargaining chip for other issues (Deibert, 2008, 
p. 306). Ultimately, the government, which included religious political parties in its coalition, 
decided to allow the sale and subsequent taxation of pornographic material. Even though this 
issue runs counter to the ultra-Orthodox position, it was seen as an issue of concern with 
larger implications for practical compromises on other issues. Thus, even though on these 
issues the ultra-Orthodox community is amenable to change, there is a clear divide between 
religious and secular elements.  
Israeli society wants both to preserve, and at the same time, try to enhance the way of 
life for citizens, which can take very different forms based on religious viewpoint. Another 
example of the status quo in the public sphere is the controversy regarding the use of bathing 
suit ads displayed in public bus stations. Other controversial advertisements include 
encouraging organ transplantation, promoting equal opportunity for women on local religious 
councils, establishing physicians’ rights to conduct autopsies without the consent of family 
members, or investigating archaeological findings. In all these examples, advertising is seen 
as invading the public sphere insofar as an opinion that is not ultra-Orthodox is being put into 
the public realm. At the same time, backlash against any of the advertisements or a larger 
response towards the origination of these advertisements is put into place by the ultra-
Orthodox community, and this can take many different forms. From localized protests to 
wider societal boycotts, pushing the line separating religion and secularism in the public 
sphere has become a contentious issue, particularly on the borderlines. 
 For religious status quo issues, a clear linkage has developed between religious and 
secular concepts as well as an ideological cleavage on the form and shape the public sphere 
should take. For the ultra-Orthodox community, many issues have become politicized 
religious issues and, therefore, have gained national attention and entered into the realm of 
issues that can be potentially negotiated with secular society. Other such issues, however, 
have not been given the same level of national attention and are relegated through the use of 
the status quo agreement to a lesser status. The status quo agreement is commonly used in 
preserving religious and secular leaders’ positions and building an equilibrium that, while at 
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times is unsustainable and often untenable, supports the constant shifting of positions among 
various levels of authority in order to ensure continuity in ongoing non-resolution. The policy 
of the status quo arrangement was implemented in the pre-state era, and its purpose is and 
was to neutralize political issues and controversies and, most of all, to avoid any decision that 
would create conflicts (Don-Yehiya, 1999, p. 89).  
Some of the practices that are preserved by the status quo principle were introduced in the 
pre-State era. A prime example is the authority of the religious courts in Israel in matters of 
personal status, which is based on the legal system introduced in Palestine by the Ottoman 
rulers and subsequently adopted by the British Mandatory government. In many cases, the 
status quo principle is used to preserve political accommodations reaching negotiations 
between religious and secular leaders. (Don-Yehiya, 1999, p. 89) 
 
One of the critical reasons for the introduction of the status quo principle in the pre-state era 
was that it allowed the preservation and accommodation of political factors, and for both 
religious and secular movements, it allowed—and still allows—negotiation on various levels. 
In effect, the creation of a separation between the personal sphere and the public sphere 
allowed ongoing political negotiation on a communal level that did not directly impact or 
infringe on the rights or abilities of individual citizens to, for example, worship in their 
various religions. This also means that social reform can be implemented, and various ideas 
regarding the population can be discussed outside the realm of religious policy. This, 
therefore, allows for accommodation and balance even if no real solution to the problems 
under discussion is ever reached. 
 It is important to understand that the status quo agreements and principles do not 
prevent conflicts regarding religious issues. It is apparent that the interpretation of the status 
quo, which is an informal arrangement among various members of society much like an 
implicit contract of citizenship, is an open venue to confrontation among rival parties 
regarding religion and state. It is also important to understand that both sides in the religious 
and secular political camps seek accommodation rather than outright victory in order to 
perpetuate the status quo and gain the acquiescence of their political opposites. In this way, 
particularly in the factional makeup of Israeli political power that constantly relies on a 
coalition government in order to rule, various ideological issues can be dealt with outside the 
political sphere, allowing each side to support minute victories for their disparate causes.  
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In many disputes between religious and secular political groups, both sides claim to be 
defending the status quo and argue that the other side is trying to violate it....Nevertheless, the 
status quo principle is usually effective at dealing with confrontations over issues of religion 
and state. It helps mitigate the conflicts and make it easier for the disputants to negotiate and 
reach an agreement. (Don-Yehiya, 1999, p. 89) 
 
As the agreement is informal and in practice is both undocumented and constantly in flux, the 
arrangements that either side reaches are constantly reinterpreted and renegotiated based on 
new fault lines in the ongoing contention between religiosity and secularism in the Israeli 
context. 
Another key aspect of the status quo arrangement is that issues about which 
proponents can be extremely passionate and, indeed, feel that violations of these policies 
directly relate to their religious freedom or/and civil liberties is that the various complaints do 
not acquire public legitimacy and, therefore, become a validation or a root cause of new 
legislation declaring victory for either camp. Thus, as a whole, the status quo system must be 
both flexible and dynamic in order to be able to adapt itself publicly to new circumstances 
and conditions. This is often done by moving issues through various levels of government, 
relegating issues that could potentially become of national importance to local matters to be 
dealt with by the bureaucracy or shifting contentious issues between potential arbiters such as 
the Supreme Court and the Knesset, thereby moving the issue back and forth because it is a 
“political hot potato” that often requires a clear decision rather than ongoing negotiation. On 
the whole, these issues are often resolved by symbolic victories on particular issues of 
contention, with equilibrium being regained over the overall picture as the trend towards 
secularism increases, while increasing levels of hegemony are found within the ultra-
Orthodox community itself over its own affairs.  
This indicates that both in the public sphere and in the private sphere, small issues are 
being negotiated in favour of secularism, and due to the ultra-Orthodox communities’ fear of 
eroding assimilation, a counterpoint is the increasing contraction of the ultra-Orthodox 
community and increased regulation over their circumstances.  
The status quo principle does not prevent changes in the existing situation; it merely limits 
them, restrains them, and prevents them from attaining public legitimacy and official 
validation by means of legislation....It is essentially a flexible, dynamic system that adapts 
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itself to new circumstances and conditions, but enables the parties involved to ignore de facto 
changes by withholding from them official recognition and public legitimacy. (Don-Yehiya, 
1999, pp. 89–90) 
 
Despite the changes of power that the status quo arrangement represents, religious parties in 
the Knesset largely prevented any substantial changes to existing laws particularly in areas of 
church and state relations. The ultra-Orthodox community feels that the current situation and 
the acquiescence of the majority of secular Israelis suit their needs at the moment. Existing 
arrangements have been channelled into two distinct types of initiatives.  
The first is that the Supreme Court and the judiciary are committed to liberal values 
that challenge the existing church-state relations. Judicial decisions have, therefore, 
demanded that ultra-Orthodox men enter the military, that the import of non-kosher meat be 
allowed, and that the state recognize gay marriages. With all these issues happening through 
judicial process rather than through a political or a legislative one, public face and the 
appearance of ultra-Orthodox political gain are not lost as the implementations of judicial 
court decisions must be carried out by the government bureaucracy. Relegating an absolute 
decision by the courts to administrative and bureaucratic levels means that in a real sense, 
much of the key elements under discussion do not change.   
For example, the court decision that recognized gay marriage was not challenged by 
the political parties in a major way as gay marriage falls outside the purview of the Rabbinate 
(Wintemute & Andenęs, 2001, pp. 391–411; see Simon and Brooks, 2009, pp. 105–107). 
Yet, there is still no secular alternative to the services offered by the Rabbinate (such as 
being married in a civil service). Therefore, although compromises were seemingly made, 
control over the private sphere and marriage for heterosexual couples was not affected in the 
slightest. This, therefore, represents another aspect of the balance maintained between a 
judicial decision setting clear policy and the administrative implementation. The actual 
process of marriage is carried out through the city government, and this creates a second tier 
and an entryway into the public sphere for marriage. The situation is fluid, and same sex 
marriages still have many challenges to overcome (see Merin, 2004; Kenji, 2012; Ho & 
Rolfe, 2011; Triger, 2012). 
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Second is the circumvention of legal, semi-legal, or illegal rules. This refers to secular 
Jews who refuse to be married by an Orthodox or ultra-Orthodox rabbi. They, therefore, 
travel abroad in order to be married outside the authority of the Israeli Rabbinate. They are 
then able to be married and patronize business establishments or commercial interests that 
operate on the Sabbath or are non-kosher, all of which may be issues with the Rabbinate in 
Israel (Shamir & Ben-Porat, 2007, p. 83). In all these cases, secular society would seem to be 
circumventing the Rabbinate and their control over the personal sphere. However, 
compromises of this nature do not directly impact the Rabbinate, which still has absolute 
control over Jews living in Israel much as other religions do over their populations. 
 
 McDonald's in Israel 
 An excellent example of the fault line between the public sphere and the private 
sphere regarding religious policy and the response of the ultra-Orthodox community to new 
forms of opposition was the introduction of McDonald’s. The McDonald’s chain was first 
introduced in Israel in 1993 during the peace process. Within a very short time, the 
McDonald’s franchise for the country opened 80 restaurant branches and determined through 
market research that some of them would be kosher in areas where there was a demand for 
religious dietary observance, but the stores generally were not kosher (Noel, 2009, p.61; 
Griswold, 2012, pp. 117–119). The public showdown, which ensued on the basis of many 
branches not being kosher and not being closed on the Sabbath, underlined a fundamental 
difference in ideology and was a test of wills for secular Israelis and the religious sector of 
society.  
 The status quo, in the situation regarding McDonald’s, was on tenuous ground, and 
throughout the 1990s, more than 80 new restaurants continued to be opened throughout 
Israel. For both the kosher, as well as the Sabbath issues, McDonald’s was interpreted as 
being an affront to religious Jews, and this resulted in a government showdown trying to 
enforce Sabbath commerce laws and essentially trying to enforce policy that was already in 
place but generally ignored. In 1997, this led then-Minister of Labor Eli Yishai of the Shas 
religious party to force McDonald’s to close its branches on Saturdays. McDonald’s, through 
its Israeli CEO, Omri Padan, explained that there was a need to operate on Saturday as well 
as a need to sell non-kosher foods as this is what consumers demanded, even though the 
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government had attempted to enforce the law regarding Sabbath openings. He equated the 
government challenge brought to McDonald’s to a fundamental issue of freedom and civil 
rights and underlined the fact that he was willing to fight for what McDonald’s viewed as a 
fundamental issue of ideology and a test of the limitations contained in the Sabbath laws. 
McDonald’s restaurants that are kosher are required to adhere to Jewish dietary standards as 
well as being closed on the Sabbath. Although generally, the issue of Sabbath observance is 
distinct from that of kosher status, the Rabbinate will not grant kosher certification to a 
business that is open on the Sabbath even if it uses only kosher products.  
 The government attempted to force its hand through a public display of force by 
going against the trend of the status quo. In this case, small accommodations were sought in 
order to balance the issue and move it away from a contentious focal point between religious 
and nonreligious elements of Israeli society. Since McDonald’s not only had opened more 
than 80 branches across Israel, but also was a popular and internationally recognized brand, 
this case created a high-stakes and high-profile target for the government to make an example 
and to show that Saturday commerce laws could be enforced and that the company could be 
required to ensure that a larger number of its stores were kosher. There were a series of trials, 
and during 2000, McDonald’s paid about 80,000 shekels (about U.S. $20,000) in a fine for 
opening various branches on the Sabbath. To bolster its case, the company ran a public issue 
campaign against the Ministry of Labor warning that Israel will become a theocracy like Iran, 
but it failed to change the Sabbath opening laws the ministry used against it in court (Shamir 
& Ben-Porat, 2007, p. 84). 
The lessons of this scenario were many for the ultra-Orthodox community as it 
showed that it was able to bring pressure to bear on the majority and enforce a law that was 
being flaunted by the majority of society. In this particular case, instead of reaching a 
compromise, which would have ultimately led to more stores being closed on the Sabbath or 
more stores being kosher, the ultra-Orthodox community in essence won its day in court, yet 
failed to achieve real results. For McDonald’s, paying a $20,000 fine was definitely worth 
the financial gain it would make through keeping branches open. These same branches 
remained open, and the law continued to be ignored to great economic gain (Kook, 2002, pp. 
163–164).  
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This case is highly symbolic of the secular, global, religious, and local cleavages 
present in Israeli society. The lessons learned by the ultra-Orthodox community from the 
McDonald’s incident were that religiosity and religious laws that had become unenforceable 
were not effective tools against the growing commercialization and secularization of Israeli 
society. Ultimately, the majority of citizens has the right to decide when stores will be open 
as long as those citizens patronize the various establishments. This situation is perhaps one of 
the focal points that foreshadowed ever-increasing public protests. The protests resulted from 
increasing frustration in the ultra-Orthodox community, even though officially there are 
many gains to be had through negotiations. The benefits in terms amending the status quo 
and various regulations in bureaucratic policy and laws were potentially great. Though this 
was not the case in this instance, it seems that, overall, gains are steadily being made by 
secular society.  
With the changing nature of the public sphere and the ultra-Orthodox community 
concentrating in distinct neighbourhoods and withdrawing from mixed and secular 
neighbourhoods across the country, more immediate gains are made in terms of control over 
the immediate local environment. Nevertheless, on a national scale, much of the influence the 
religious population has on the public sphere is being eroded and transformed into greater 
controls in the private sphere through the authority of the Rabbinate. Although more 
McDonald’s restaurants have become kosher, the majority are still open on the Sabbath and 
not kosher; this continues despite the symbolic fines the McDonald’s franchisee in Israel 
pays when a complaint is made by the government.  
Many issues, such as the availability of adult content on cell phones or various 
religious policies in the public sphere, are also viewed as a challenge to the 
traditional/religious way of Israeli life; yet, as they are not governed by the Rabbinate per se, 
these areas are amenable to change. They, therefore, place the religious and secular elements 
of Israeli society in conflict as each tries to preserve and enhance its way of life.  
  
 3. Civil religion 
 Civil religion in Israel is an interesting phenomenon. Whereas church and state are 
conjoined in Israel, many laws emerge supported by religious dictates. It is interesting to note 
that many of these laws, such as the prohibition of selling leavened bread on Passover, laws 
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governing the personal sphere, and many others, have a basis in religious law; yet they are 
not dictated by religious law as the particularities of the law are normally set by the majority 
of the Knesset, who tend not to be religious, as reflected in the demographics of the state of 
Israel. Nevertheless, many aspects of Jewish law, or Halacha, continue to influence the way 
in which civil laws are passed, creating a type of civil religion that applies to all outside the 
context of religious observance. For example, on the High Holy Days in Israel, especially on 
Yom Kippur, most secular Israelis choose not to drive, as they observe the holiday; yet, this 
is not enshrined in law as an act that is forbidden. Many laws, such as the requirement to 
serve kosher food in government facilities, are, in fact, enshrined in law, though the food is 
not necessarily up to the higher kosher standards of the ultra-Orthodox community. This 
creates a law acceptable to most in the population without being viewed as being coercive. In 
this way, a public observance can theoretically be enacted without extending past what the 
secular majority is able to internalize on the basis of a shared history, culture, and society. 
These societal norms are, therefore, meant to serve as a cultural and religious reminder of 
particular observances, yet not enforce observance of these rituals on an individual basis or 
formally police these requirements themselves.  
Clearly Israel is not among states committed to the maximum separation between religion and 
state...neither is the modern Jewish state a theocracy, governed by religious clerics or 
religious laws. Rather, Israel ranks somewhere in the middle of the spectrum, together with 
European states that have “established,” state-supported religion but strong respect, at the 
same time, for religious freedom. (Dowty, 2001, p. 161) 
 
In 1947, David Ben-Gurion, who at the time was the chairman of the Jewish Agency, 
sent the status quo letter to the Agudat Yisrael party in order to win their support. They had 
previously dropped out of the pre-state yishuv in 1925 because of disagreements on the 
future structure of the state in terms of the intersection between religion and state. The status 
quo letter, as written by Ben-Gurion, was, therefore, a compromising peace offering in order 
to bring back the Agudat Yisrael party. The arrangement outlines four major points, which 
can be understood at the same time as both reconciliatory and compromising from the 
perspective of the secular government that sought to form a more inclusive society. These 
four points include: First, that the Sabbath, which is designated as Saturday, will be a 
national day of rest; second, that keeping kosher will be observed in all government kitchens 
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and facilities, such as in the military and the court system and so on; third, religious courts 
will maintain exclusive jurisdiction over the personal sphere, including marriage and divorce 
and other related issues; and fourth, the status quo letter sought to preserve the autonomy of 
the religious educational system so that there would be limited interference from secular 
society in the way Orthodox Israelis educated their children and, by extension, shelter them 
from secular indoctrination. In the ensuing years of the state, all these points have been 
challenged and have adapted in many different respects with various additional elements 
added on or compromised, yet the underlying structure of the status quo arrangement remains 
the same till the present day.  
The particular issues in the public sphere are very unevenly applied, unlike issues that 
affect the private sphere. The application of religious values and interpreted Jewish law in 
Israeli society can be considered another form of civil religion, which attempts to affirm 
greater religiosity and commonality in religion in Israel. Therefore, it follows that various 
traditional symbols of Jewish identity have become significant symbols in public life, though 
not necessarily in a Jewish context. This can be interpreted through the various symbols of 
the state, which have a correlation to ancient Jewish religious symbols. These symbols and 
other forms of civil religion do not indicate a higher level of religious observance, but they 
do indicate an increasing willingness for the appropriation and secularization of various 
religious elements to form a cohesive national identity that encompasses all aspects of 
society, both religious and secular (Dowty, 2001, p. 166; Yadgar, 2011, p. 36–44). Not only 
are these symbols visible in the public sphere, but using Jewish symbols has the effect of 
diluting their religious context and re-forming them into symbols of national unity and those 
of a civil religion. Collectively, the initial motives behind co-opting religious symbols as 
symbols of the secular Zionist state sought to create a unified civil society. The effect has 
become mixed, particularly with the advent and increase of Religious Zionism, which sees 
religious significance in some current forms of civil religious practice. While this is not the 
case for secular Israelis, religious public symbols play a major role in shaping their collective 
identity, though not necessarily in a religious sense.  
 It is interesting to note that the Rabbinate itself in a national survey found favour with 
only 12.6% of respondents who indicated that a ruling by the Rabbinate would take 
precedence over an active law issued by the Knesset (Dowty, 2001, p. 178). Therefore, it is 
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doubtful that various forms of civil religion or the implementation of religion through 
interpretations of Jewish law by the Rabbinate will pose a serious threat to democracy or 
greatly unbalance the status quo. “If this is the case, and if the general picture painted here is 
accurate, what if anything is a threat to the status quo?” (Dowty, 2001, p. 178). Much of the 
authority that the Rabbinate has in the public sphere is merely symbolic for the public, yet it 
can be difficult or impossible to overcome for individuals.  
 It is important to note that Orthodox influence has increased in two important areas 
that were not mentioned in the original status quo letter, yet have emerged through ongoing 
negotiation with secular society. First, as discussed extensively elsewhere, is that Orthodox 
women and Orthodox yeshiva students are exempted from mandatory military service. 
Second, there is an important debate in Orthodox society about the very basic concept of 
“Who Is a Jew?” in which it becomes increasingly important for the Orthodox to define a 
Jewish Israeli— the citizen and the person—within the context and boundaries by the terms 
dictated by the Rabbinate. The result is, therefore, that Orthodox Jews in various contexts are 
unashamedly getting a number of privileges to very significant aspects of Israeli society, 
which pertain to citizenship rights, duties, and the rights and duties of other Israelis (Shafir & 
Peled, 2002, p. 141). Finally, Jewish family law regarding marriage and divorce allows 
rabbinical courts to have exclusive jurisdiction over these matters in Israel. It is important to 
note that this follows from historical periods in the Ottoman Empire and British Mandatory 
Palestine even before the pre-state period (Raday, 1992). The jurisdiction of family law was 
officially recognized as being the providence of religious authorities in Palestine (Shafir & 
Peled, 2002, pp. 141–142). Therefore, the resulting law is officially that nonreligious civil 
marriage and interreligious marriages are not available in Israel with limited exceptions.   
 
 4. Religious basis for selected laws  
 Numerous laws in Israel have religious connotations or aspects. Some of these laws 
are made to preserve the status quo arrangement between the secular and ultra-Orthodox 
segments of society, while others act as a reflection of Israel’s roots as a Jewish state (Barak-
Erez, 2007, pp.3–15). It is interesting to note that while many of these laws do not 
necessarily conform to Halacha, the interpretation of religious law, they do acknowledge the 
unique cultural and religious identity inherent in Jewish Israeli society. Examples of religious 
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bases include Passover laws, laws governing the personal sphere, work on the Sabbath, and 
the use of kosher-food regulations in government institutions, as well as numerous other 
issues.  
 In this section, the religious bases for a sampling of laws in Israel are discussed. 
These laws follow the borderline of religious intention and observance and a public secular 
interpretation, which acts as the cornerstone of a uniting civil religion in Israel. Therefore, 
the stringencies that the courts have applied to these various laws cannot be compared to the 
religious dictates and religious legalistic reasoning behind the various aspects of Jewish law. 
Jewish law itself has many different requirements. Nevertheless, these laws impact Israeli 
society since they preserve the status quo arrangement between the secular and ultra-
Orthodox segments of society. In the final estimation, many of these laws are a reflection of 
Israel’s roots as a Jewish state and are essential in formulating a civil, yet secular, society. In 
fact, since these laws do not necessarily conform to Halacha (Englard, 1987), they are often 
perceived by the ultra-Orthodox community as a double-edged sword. While the original 
intent of the laws is to preserve facets of Jewish religion in society, because they do not 
necessarily conform to Jewish law, they, therefore, threaten the unique culture and religious 
identity inherent to ultra-Orthodox Jews within the larger Israeli society. Among the 
examples discussed in this context are Passover laws, the various laws governing the 
personal sphere, laws prohibiting work in its various forms on the Sabbath, less than strictly 
kosher (according to ultra-Orthodox stringencies) food regulations in government 
institutions, and others (Lerner, 2009).  
 In one example, Sabbath observance, which has biblical roots, is interpreted in 
Rabbinic Judaism as the prohibition to work and do business on Saturday, the day of rest. 
However, by Orthodox interpretation of Rabbinic Judaism, this is extended to a variety of 
prohibitions, including travel and work on the Sabbath and the use of electricity. Because this 
particular element separates observant Jews from non-observant Jews and is one of the 
aspects of the status quo arrangement, it becomes the focal point of many secular–religious 
debates (Shamir & Ben-Porat, 2007, p. 81). Sabbath observance is extensively kept to a 
certain degree. Nevertheless, as it relates to public sphere regulation, it is not evenly applied, 
and Sabbath is a day of leisure and shopping for the majority of secular Israelis in areas 
where they choose to engage in commerce and leisure. The government strictly prohibits 
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Jews from working on the Sabbath, and establishments are required to pay fines, when and if 
the law is enforced. The government in the past proposed to rectify the issue by identifying 
non-Jews who are allowed to work on Saturday by Jewish law, such as members of the 
Druze community. However, in reality, this is very unevenly applied, and Jews who do wish 
to work on the Sabbath in areas that support this type of economic activity are generally not 
barred from doing so.  
Every year, businesses pay fines if they are caught employing Jews in economic activities. A 
business open on Saturday is immune if they can prove, with the help of government identity 
cards, that its employees are non-Jews. Those handing out the tickets for Saturday work are 
drawn from members of the Druze minority. (Beit-Hallahmi, 2007, p. 160) 
 
 Another such law is that of kashrut, or kosher, which relates to Jewish dietary laws. 
These laws are institutionalized and well-defined in national institutions and have various 
third-party kosher certification agencies that employ a bureaucracy of inspectors and 
oversight to ensure that kosher is being kept in public establishments. This stems from the 
fact that Orthodox Jews will not eat in a non-kosher establishment; thus, having an inclusive 
policy towards kosher status in government establishments will not prohibit Orthodox 
citizens from participation in these offices, establishments, and institutions. However, this 
issue is slightly more complex as there are various levels of kosher certification, and often 
the kosher certification issued by the local Rabbinate certifying kosher status is not 
acceptable to more stringent ultra-Orthodox. The certificates are issued by kosher inspectors 
on behalf of the local municipality’s Rabbinate office.  
The kashrut system, therefore, signals to religious people where to shop and eat and forces 
entrepreneurs to make a clear choice with respect to whom they are catering. Large numbers 
of Jewish Israelis keep kosher, including many of those who shop on the Sabbath, so the cost 
of being non-kosher is supposedly higher. (Shamir & Ben-Porat, 2007, p. 89) 
 
Thus, keeping a kosher establishment becomes an important factor in purely economic terms 
to ensure a city clientele even if that clientele is non-religious.  
 
 Demographic developments and Sabbath observance 
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One of the key reasons for the shift in perception and policy in the public sphere is 
demographic developments that have occurred during the past decades. With a projected 
demographic trend of steady increase in the ultra-Orthodox population (Elazar, 1991; 
Landau, 2003), there is no questioning that reformulation of the public sphere in areas that 
have become increasingly religious is taking place. This is due to the changing character of 
various neighbourhoods, primarily in the centre of Israel, especially in Jerusalem and Bnei 
Brak, while many large mixed and secular neighbourhoods have increasing numbers of ultra-
Orthodox Jews and a withdrawal of secular Jews from these areas. The changing nature of 
these communities, therefore, has a heavy influence on common spaces and the patterns of 
life in these areas. This relates to many different aspects, such as Sabbath observance, which 
has changing patterns in both mixed and entirely religious neighbourhoods in the 
aforementioned cities. There are  
extensive…disciplines associated with traditional observance of the Jewish Sabbath; they 
involve prayers, social meals, study, and refraining from any invasive manipulation of Earth's 
resources. Thus, among many other restrictions, no creation of fire, no writing, no farming, 
[no driving] and no business [are] permitted for 25 hours (Gopin, 2002, p. 235) 
 
Moreover,  
demographic developments have also affected the emergence of changes in the religious 
status quo.…Thus, there are increased pressures to close roads to all kinds of traffic on the 
Sabbath and Jewish festivals. Most of the changes of this sort characterize cities of Jerusalem 
and Bnei Brak and the result of population fluctuations that have led to the “Haredization” of 
streets in residential areas. (Don-Yehiya, 1999, pp. 90–91) 
 
In addition, there has also been heavy influence on particular areas of civil policy in the 
public sphere, especially that of advertisements. In many cases, advertisements seek to push 
the envelope in terms of making a statement or gaining attention for a particular product, and 
this often runs counter to ultra-Orthodox sensibilities and has been a point of contention, 
particularly in their neighbourhoods (Efron, 2003, p. 145).  
Despite protests from advertising agencies and complaints from non-religious Jews, the ultra-
Orthodox continue to heavily influence advertising in public places. In 1990 the Knesset 
outlawed “excessive” exposure of human anatomy and sexually suggestive photographs in 
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outdoor advertising media. Thus, fashion ads, in particular swimsuit ads, have retreated to the 
pages of magazines (Christianity Today, 1992, p. 77) 
 
Even when advertising is not necessarily directly tied to immodesty and even at times when 
various advertisements appear outside strictly Orthodox neighbourhoods, it is still a focal 
point of social discord. The ultra-Orthodox believe that they are exposed to this material as 
they venture forth into the public sphere, for example, in the case of mixed neighbourhoods 
or secular neighbourhoods, which may contain employment, recreation, shopping 
destinations, et cetera. It is, therefore, apparent in the case of advertising that the boundary in 
the public sphere relating to the regulation of the public message, even within secular 
neighbourhoods, is constantly being shifted towards inclusion in private sphere politics and, 
thus, religious regulation. At the same time, a counter to this can be seen in secular cities, 
such as Tel Aviv, which have no qualms about various types of ads being displayed in public 
because of the largely secular character of the city. By staking out advertisements as a key 
indicator of religiosity or secularism, the net effect of these changes is that an established 
pattern begins to emerge about the way in which people regard various neighbourhoods and, 
by extension, may view the character and nature of the entire city. Therefore, the boundary 
line between the public sphere and the private sphere is often moved to encompass larger 
sections of the private sphere and apply religious morals and interpretation to them. 
 
 Passover Law 
 The laws regarding the observance of Passover are particularly interesting. According 
to Halacha, ownership of bread and all leavened products on the Passover holiday is 
absolutely forbidden. A form of spring cleaning is undertaken by religious individuals who 
rid their homes of bread or put away and sell, at least for the period of Passover, any 
leavened products, or derivatives thereof, they may own. Along these lines, a law was first 
established in 1956 to preserve this unique cultural aspect of Passover observance in Israel. 
The law forbids the sale of chametz, or leavened products, during the course of the Passover 
holiday (Mahler, 2004, p.71; Mazie, 2006, p. 44). This law has, for the most part, in the past, 
been observed at the municipal level; this means that in major cities such as Jerusalem and 
Tel Aviv, the majority of businesses do not sell leavened products, and if a store or restaurant 
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chose to do so, it would receive a municipal fine. The specific law, The Sale of Bread and the 
Festival of Matzot (Prohibition of Leaven) Law, 5746/1986, revised from its previous form, 
is better known by the paradoxical name the Chametz Law. Although it is a national law, it is 
enforced on a local level rather than a national one. As a result, many Arab and Christian 
areas do sell leavened products on Passover without repercussion. Many secular Israelis who 
choose to eat leavened products during Passover go to these locales in order to do so.  
 A very interesting recent case involving the sale of leavened products on Passover 
happened when a restaurant in downtown Jerusalem sold hamburgers with regular (leavened) 
buns on Passover (Zino, 2008). Although many non-kosher restaurants choose not to sell 
leavened products to make them attractive to the majority of Israelis who do not eat leavened 
products on Passover, this particular restaurant, which was itself not kosher, chose to sell 
hamburger buns with their hamburgers privately on their premises. As a result, the city 
inspector gave the restaurant a fine of 5,000 NIS (about $1,400 CAD in 2012 dollars) and 
reprimanded the restaurant for selling leavened products on Passover in violation of a 
municipal ordinance based on this national law. The restaurant fought this prohibition in 
court. It came before Tamar Bar Asher-Tzabann, a religious judge in municipal court, who 
ruled that the intention of the law was to remind Israelis of Passover, the observance of the 
holiday, and the rituals associated with it, and not necessarily to force all citizens to abide by 
the Orthodox interpretation of the holiday. In other words, this allowed an interpretation of 
the state’s position in terms of religious rights, giving it the ability to enforce a particular law, 
which has to be in proportion with the rationale behind it. The judge ruled that as the sale of 
chametz took place in a private area, it was not considered public, a major criterion of the 
law, which stipulates public sale of leavened products. The case was, therefore, overturned, 
much to the consternation of the Haredi public, who sought to enforce a unified law 
applicable to the Jewish population of Israel to observe the religious dictates as they relate to 
the sale of chametz on Passover.  
 An amusing anecdote emerged in the aftermath of this case (Kay, 2009). During 
Passover, a young Haredi man entered a supermarket that sold leavened products; he was 
completely nude, except for a sock covering his private areas. Shortly afterwards, the 
individual, who had repeated this protest several times in past years, was arrested for public 
indecency. During his hearing, he asked the judge: How is it possible that if the store is able 
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to sell leavened products during Passover on the rationale that it is not a public location, but 
exposing oneself in the same location is considered public indecency? Obviously this claim 
was in jest, but it spoke to the heart of the matter: Are all areas, even if they do not contain a 
large concentration of religious individuals, susceptible to the ultra-Orthodox interpretation 
of religious dictates? A more involved perspective can be observed when it comes to the 
personal sphere, in which government policy, for the most part, is in line with the ultra-
Orthodox interpretation of Halacha. 
 
 Personal sphere laws 
 The issues surrounding the personal sphere are of great contention in Israel. 
Officially, most government religious policy, especially that established by the Ministry of 
Religion, is dictated by the ultra-Orthodox minority in the country, which seeks to enforce a 
strict interpretation of Halacha in state affairs. As there is a co-mingling of religious policy 
with the state, as opposed to a separation of church and state, religious policy, in fact, is a 
very large factor in the everyday lives of many Israelis. For services such as institutional 
funding, marriage, burial, divorce, conversion, et cetera, the ultimate authority is the 
Rabbinate, which, as a branch of the government, sets policy and is run with an ultra-
Orthodox agenda. 
 Paradoxically, the vast majority of Jewish Israelis strongly agree that Israel is a Jewish state, 
but strongly disagree about what a Jewish state means. The source of this disagreement is 
largely the role of religion in public life.  Previous arrangements known as the “status quo” 
that manage the differences are being eroded by demographic, economic, and political 
changes and new agreements are difficult to reach. The religious-secular divide in Israel is a 
contemporary source of concern as relations between religious and secular are perceived as 
deteriorating to a potential “culture war” and a threat to Israel's social fabric. (Ben-Porat, 
2008, p. 173)  
 
This cleavage, more than any other, represents a host of other complex identity issues related 
to religion and the state and has never been fully explored in the public forum for the sake of 
the consociational status quo. 
 Perhaps the most contentious issue in Israel, and indeed, a difficult challenge for the 
government, is the question of “Who Is a Jew?” The “controversy is probably the most saline 
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and familiar of secular-religious issues in Israel. The passion it aroused (and, in different 
forms, still arouses) relates to the fact that it calls into question the very criteria of belonging 
to the Jewish people” (Cohen & Susser, 2000, p. 33). This is a particularly important 
question in Israel due to the Right of Return: The ability of any recognized person of Jewish 
ancestry to immigrate to Israel is reliant upon that individual’s identity as a Jew.  
From the religious-halachic perspective…one's Jewish identity…is measured not by the 
degree of one's faith or observance, but rather by one's ethnocommunal origins: anyone born 
to a Jewish mother is Jewish, even in the total absence of faith…whereas a deeply devout 
individual lacking maternal Jewish origins is not. In sharp contrast, the modern secular view 
understands identity as a freely chosen, consciousness-determined quality that cannot be 
imposed by formal, external criteria such as those provided by Halacha. One is, in this view, 
what one says one is (Cohen & Susser, 2000, p. 33) 
 
This distinction speaks to the very nature of the state and Jewish identity, the place of 
consociationalism versus a multicultural state built from the components of its disparate 
citizens. 
 The Jewish Agency, tasked with outreach to the Jewish population in the Diaspora, 
arranges aliyah, or immigration to Israel, through various programs. According to the Jewish 
Agency, one can be culturally Jewish (Walzer & Lorberbaum et al., 2006, p. 435) or, indeed, 
not meet the rigid definition of Orthodox Judaism, in order to move to Israel. Numerous 
immigrants, including largely those who have come in the immigration waves from Russia 
and Ethiopia, find themselves in a situation where they are full-fledged Israeli citizens, serve 
in the army, yet are not recognized as being Jewish by the Rabbinate, a government ministry. 
This leads to a situation where they are unable to marry within the country or partake in 
various personal-sphere services dictated by the government.  
 One potential loophole to this has been the creation of a military program called 
Nativ, a conversion program in the army, which is extremely basic (Cohen, 2008, p. 118). It 
allows converts, in a very short time, to have a government-sanctioned conversion that does 
not necessarily conform to ultra-Orthodox standards; rather, it meets a minimum basis as 
dictated by the largely National Religious Military Rabbinate (Soeters & Meulen, 2007, p. 
131). This type of conversion fulfills the requirements by the civilian Rabbinate as well and 
allows someone stuck in the situation of not being able to fully receive religious recognition 
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as being Jewish to have a quick conversion and, in many cases, still remain secular. This 
would not be possible with an ultra-Orthodox conversion as the ultra-Orthodox rabbinical 
courts require that one not only complete extensive studying during the course of at least a 
year, but also maintain a religious lifestyle following the conversion.  
In a recent case, a woman sought a divorce after more than a decade of marriage that 
had taken place in a religious court. The religious court judge ruled that as the woman 
converted but did not maintain a religious identity, her conversion was retroactively nullified, 
thereby invalidating her marriage and, as a result, none of her children was considered 
Jewish. This was immediately challenged in a secular court, and it was ultimately found that 
the religious judge overstepped his boundaries as is it unclear, but unlikely, that a religious 
judge can retroactively nullify a conversion that was properly executed and done in good 
faith (Dorff, 2007, p. 7; Einhorn, 2009 p. 176). The status of the religious courts in the public 
sphere is very much a topical issue of great importance for secular Israelis and is intrinsically 
linked to the many other issues related to state and religion.  
 
 Kosher in government 
 One of the accommodations of the government to the status quo, since the founding 
of the state, has been that all state institutions, including the armed forces, government 
offices, et cetera, are required to abide by Jewish dietary laws—the laws of kashrut. “All 
institutions that receive money from the public treasury—including the army, schools, 
hospitals, universities, and government missions abroad—must observe Jewish dietary laws” 
(Arian, 2009, pp. 88–89). Interpretation of these laws varies from sect to sect, and a uniform 
set of guidelines has been established by the government to ensure that all branches of the 
government have a simplified and unified version of kashrut laws and dictates. This is 
particularly an issue in the armed forces where the military standard, though strict, was 
perceived by some to be lax in certain areas, and, due to religious request, a greater degree of 
kashrut was created allowing ultra-Orthodox soldiers access to food that they would consider 
more kosher, meeting the stringencies of their particular rabbis and sects.  
 The requirement to have all establishments in government facilities kosher, such as 
the cafeteria in the Knesset, has been challenged numerous times as many see it as 
discriminatory. For example, non-religious or non-Jewish members of parliament are 
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required to maintain a kosher standard, which they claim essentially violates their freedom of 
religion. In reality, however, individuals have the option of eating non-kosher food anywhere 
they like, including in a government office, with the exception of kosher-regulated eating 
areas. While this is not always the case (as offices in the military with kosher certification), 
alternative possibilities are available if one is interested in options beyond kosher. Balancing 
freedom of religion and the dictates of Jewish law is complicated and currently follows ultra-
Orthodox practices, as do many government policies and decisions.  
While kashrut is observed in public (State) institutions, the market creates many alternatives 
for those interested in non-kosher food. The power of secularism in terms of demand and 
supply is one reason why many in the religious public remain skeptical of the ability of 
religious consumerism to influence the public sphere (Shamir & Ben-Porat, 2007, p. 89) 
 
B. Political Sociology 
 Politics in Israel are particularly fractious. There has never been a majority 
government in the history of the state. Few local political parties or interests are reflected in 
the Knesset, which is comprised of national political parties. Within most of national politics, 
as the centre of the country where the majority of Israelis live is so small, parties are able to 
reach out to many very different demographics (Mahler, 1981, p. 60; Steinberg, 2008, p. 
315). With the exception of ultra-Orthodox parties, and perhaps Arab parties, Israelis 
generally do not vote along strict sectarian lines; rather they vote for many different issues on 
the public agenda, as well as along the lines of religious, political, social, and economic 
platforms. Because of this, ruling of the Knesset is comprised of a coalition government 
formed with parties that make up the majority in the Knesset. Political manoeuvring is often 
done using political compromise and, as a result, many issues, particularly those regarding 
the ultra-Orthodox, are difficult to push through without first forming a consensus. Even 
determining the underlying numbers can be difficult as  
political polling doesn't work very well in Israel. Many pollsters failed to predict Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's narrow victory... [in 1996]. Critics from the right wing say 
that's because the pollsters undercount such important, and largely conservative, voting blocs 
as ultra-Orthodox Jews and Russian immigrants (Contreras, 1999, p. 46) 
 
Shapiro 199 
 
Except for a brief flirtation with direct election for prime minister, which only lasted one 
term, Israelis generally vote for a list composed by each political party in which their top 
candidates are listed, and depending on the number of seats they receive, are allotted 
accordingly. 
There have been various movements within Israeli history by the ultra-Orthodox 
community to become part of, or separate from, the Israeli political scene. For many years, 
the ultra-Orthodox viewed involvement with the state political process as de facto acceptance 
of the secular nature of the Israeli state and chose, for the most part, to remain on the 
sidelines. Though this was the case for many years, a new trend has begun to emerge where, 
due to religious voting blocs that maintain strict party discipline, the ultra-Orthodox can 
introduce a great deal of political leverage, perhaps even disproportional leverage, in a 
political parliamentary system that has never had a majority government.  
Given the nature of the Israeli polity, in which a large ultra-Orthodox swing vote can 
make or break a coalition, many key issues are decided in favour of ultra-Orthodox interests 
to enable the political system to run smoothly. Ultra-Orthodox leadership for many years, 
even following the change in ultra-Orthodox political organization, chose not to lead 
government ministries for many of the same reasons. This, too, in time changed, where 
control, for example, of the Education Ministry by the ultra-Orthodox—or for that matter, 
other crucial ministries such as the religion portfolio or the Interior Ministry—are perceived 
to be key elements to the social, economic, and cultural factors necessary to maintain what 
many ultra-Orthodox consider their traditional way of life. This radical shift in political 
dynamics has had a great effect on the way in which the political process functions in Israel.  
 
C. The Haredi Education System 
 The Haredi educational system and, indeed, the education system for all Israelis are 
issues of great contention and part of the most fundamental fault lines in the religious/secular 
debate. What fundamental school systems teach and what they do not, what is purposely 
included and excluded, and what is subsidized and what is not, are all crucial aspects of how 
society shapes and re-enforces itself. This section briefly examines secular versus religious 
schools with a particular emphasis on funding. This is important to understanding the 
emphasis the ultra-Orthodox community places on the religious education system and the 
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way in which, through political manoeuvring and allocation of public funds, the secular 
government attempts to influence or extend a degree of control into the ultra-Orthodox 
educational sphere. 
To properly appreciate the connection between Israeli secular culture and Judaism, it is useful 
to examine the State education system. The State school system in Israel for Jews (there is a 
separate system for Arabs) is divided into two parallel sub-systems, one religious and the 
other “secular.” Children of the religious subculture (not the ultra-Orthodox), raised 
according to Jewish Orthodox beliefs and behaviors, attend State religious schools. There is 
also an independent Orthodox system, which is State-financed, but directed by the ultra-
Orthodox community. What can be observed is that even the “secular” state schools follow a 
curriculum with large doses of Old Testament texts and Orthodox law. The State rationale for 
this is that they are building blocks of Jewish national identity, and without them such an 
identity would be totally devoid of content and meaning. The main difference between 
rabbinical Judaism and what is taught in Israeli state schools is the relative absence of the 
Talmud, which is perceived as an expression of Diaspora culture. In contrast, the State favors 
the Old Testament, representing a mythic, glorious, Jewish past rooted in the promised land. 
(Beit-Hallahmi, 2007, p. 163) 
 
This section examines the state education system, various elements of recognized schools, 
what it means to be an official school, and exempt schools. It also examines the various 
levels of education in the ultra-Orthodox community from primary schools cheder through 
Yeshiva Gedoleh-Kollel and, ultimately, the importance that these educational institutions 
have within the ultra-Orthodox community.  
 
 State educational system 
 The current education system in Israel traces its roots to the pre-state settlement movement. 
There was a need to balance the educational curriculum with many vying factors. It was also 
important, in light of the many different backgrounds coming to a new society, to have a common 
educational approach.  
Under the British mandate, the Yishuv enjoyed complete autonomy in educational matters. In 
addition to the three official school systems of the Yishuv, one of them Religious Zionists 
(Mizrachi), AY [Agudat Yisrael] had its own independent school system. In 1953 the State 
education law extensively abolished the independent school systems and established two state 
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systems instead, one secular and one religious, the latter under the de facto control of the 
NRP [National Religious Party]. The independent system of AY [Agudat Yisrael] was 
brought under state financing, without real state supervision (Shafir & Peled, 2002, p. 141) 
 
Within the state educational system today, there are various educational opportunities for 
Israeli citizens. More specifically, within the educational system examined in this thesis—
that of the ultra-Orthodox—there are various degrees of secular education brought into the 
school curriculum, and, as a result, there is a corresponding degree of government funding 
for schools in each particular type of framework. This thesis will examine a number of these 
educational arrangements.   
 It is interesting to note that the degree of educational acquiescence of schools 
participating in teaching the mandatory secular curriculum, in Hebrew known as the LIBA, 
says a great deal about the schools’ educational approach. This speaks to the way in which 
they balance secular and religious subjects in order to get public funding as well as teach the 
core religious subjects that their community requires (see Topel, 2012, pp. 63–64). There is a 
wide range in educational offerings depending on the framework. The completely integrated 
schools teach a full religious and a full secular curriculum, while at the opposite end, the 
extremely Orthodox schools teach no secular subjects and offer a fully religious curriculum. 
Religious schools without a secular educational component, in many cases, receive little to 
no funding. There are many different opinions as to the place of education in the ultra-
Orthodox community.  
 The repercussions of required primary secular education are apparent in many 
aspects. This is the case not only in funding shortages for schools (such as the prime 
minister’s lunch program for schools that teach the full secular curriculum), but also with 
educational outcomes. The transitional programs that many groups have tried to institute aim 
to bring ultra-Orthodox students, both males and females, to the educational point where they 
are able to be competitive in the workforce. A fundamental lack of basic secular subjects 
makes these efforts difficult, and much bridging work is required in order to find a 
compromise for ultra-Orthodox matriculation within the secular education system. 
 Historically, Haredi schools refused to accept government funds and sought support from 
outside the government and even outside the country. This was due to their refusal to submit 
their curriculum to government scrutiny and conform to the scholastic demands of the 
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Ministry of Education. However, due to economic and political factors, a number of 
arrangements have been institutionalized that permit many [of these demands]. (Bogoch, 
1999, p.125) 
 
The state provides free primary education to all its citizens, yet there are various school 
boards that govern the implementation and accreditation of schools outside the purview of 
the Ministry of Education, such as those with various religious backgrounds. New situations 
become complicated when communities try to balance the social needs of the community to 
preserve hegemony over educational matters, yet at the same time wish to integrate in the 
long term and not be faced with the challenges inherent in educational gaps.  
Various forms of state-supported religious education -- from national religious schools to 
Haredi -- have been available to parents who prefer it. Parallel to these religious educational 
systems, a secular or national education system serves roughly 75% of Israel's children 
(Cohen & Susser, 2000, p. 10) 
 
 1. The recognized but not official schools 
  
 In the recognized but not official school educational construct, the school is 
recognized as an official school, and many, if not all, teachers are accredited and licensed 
through the Ministry of Education; secular subjects are taught, if not to the full extent of the 
curriculum, as a significant part of it. These schools, however, are run as religious schools or 
schools having a primarily religious mandate and, therefore, do not fully fit into either the 
secular Ministry of Education-run schools or into the grouping of an ultra-Orthodox school 
with its primary educational method that of religious instruction. These schools are 
recognized but not official as they receive lesser funding than a school that is recognized and 
official and under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. 
Haredi schools [decided] to accept government funding while retaining … control of the 
curriculum and the criteria for hiring teachers in their institutions. Basically, there are two 
types of arrangements between Haredi schools and the government: the “recognized but not 
official” schools, and the “exempt schools.” (Bogoch, 1999, p. 125) 
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The Ministry of Education's category of “recognized but not official” schools includes not 
only Haredi schools but Christian schools and other educational institutions that prefer not to 
follow the government curriculum. In this arrangement, the school receives about 90% of the 
funding per pupil that the public schools receive. Teachers at these schools are not employees 
of the government, but rather of the school or public body associated with the school (such as 
a church). The schools thus have greater leeway in employing teachers, although in theory 
they are supposed to work according to the hours and pay structure that are set by the 
government (Bogoch, 1999, p.125).  
Conflicts over religious education were resolved in Israel on the basis of granting religious 
schools a vast degree of autonomy in conducting their own affairs, and allocating them 
governmental resources according to their proportional share of students. The systems of 
religious education have retained their autonomy even after the enactment of the Law of State 
Education (Don-Yehiya, 1999, p. 89) 
 
 2. The “exempt” schools 
 Exempt schools are a third category: schools that are exempt from oversight by the 
Ministry of Education; schools in this category normally represent the majority of ultra-
Orthodox schools. “The arrangement characterized as ‘exempt’ refers to the exemption of 
parents who send their children to these schools from compliance with the compulsory 
education act, which requires children to attend recognized schools” (Bogoch, 1999, p. 126). 
Compared to secular schools, the per student funding rate is significantly lower and varies 
depending on how much of the secular curriculum subjects is taught at the school. Yet 
authority for the curriculum taught at these schools lies with their independent school boards, 
such as a religious school board, rather than the Ministry of Education.  
 This arrangement has been in place since the 1970s, and although there are still 
requirements for the physical plant of this school and accreditation or licensing of teachers 
through various organizations, the standards for an exempt school are much more relaxed 
compared to the rigorous standards the Ministry of Education sets for secular schools. In the  
arrangement, [which] was set up in 1974, schools in the “exempt” category receive but 70% 
of the funding per child that public schools receive…[and they] are completely independent 
regarding curriculum, teachers, school hours, and so on. The school buildings must meet 
certain safety requirements and children at these schools are insured as are children in other 
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schools in the public system. However, other than basic budgetary matters, there is no 
supervision by the government (Bogoch, 1999, p. 126)  
 
This allows religious schools to have a greater degree of autonomy; therefore, they are able 
to instruct their students with a particular emphasis on religious rather than secular subjects 
and still receive a degree of funding. 
Despite the fact that there is so little interference by the government in exchange for funding 
they receive, it is still a major ideological statement for Haredim to enter into this 
arrangement and accept government funds. One Talmud Torah that had previously not 
received any funds and decided to become one of the “exempt” schools had a vigil outside 
the school every day at lunchtime where Psalms were said by members of the Haredi 
community who object to this perceived defection. In another case, a girls’ school that joined 
the “exempt” arrangement appeared in the Ministry of Education listings of “exempt” and 
“recognized” schools under a different name from the name that appeared on the school 
building by which it was known to the community at large, in order not to publicize its new 
status. In addition to these two arrangements, there are some Haredi schools that have opted 
to be associated with the regular state religious schools, and those students may even have to 
write state matriculation exams. On the other hand, there are still some schools that have 
remained completely independent and have no official connection with the government 
whatsoever. (Bogoch, 1999, p.127) 
 
 3. Primary schools: cheder 
The cheder, the primary school, is the centre of educational transmission, the first 
step in Haredi education. Schools such as the cheder that teach in a pedagogical style 
concerned with learning by rote as well as social acculturation into the ultra-Orthodox 
community have seen increasing numbers of students in recent years. “The percentage of 
pupils in ultra-Orthodox primary schools increased from approximately 11% in 1995–1996 
to approximately 27% in 2007–2008” (Yitzhaki, 2010, p. 14). There are many factors behind 
this, but the cheder has seemed to be crucial to the transmission of social and cultural values. 
The fundamental concepts of ultra-Orthodox life are transmitted, and societal norms are 
generated through an ongoing process of educational instruction. The cheder is the first 
formative building block in a lifetime of education and is seen as a crucial first building 
block towards achieving scholarly greatness through successive programs. At this level, the 
Shapiro 205 
 
ultra-Orthodox cheder perhaps also serves weaker students who continue along with their 
peers but might otherwise be less encouraged to continue to successive levels of scholarly 
knowledge and perhaps would be diverted to something else. Due to peer pressure and other 
factors, these students stay within their society loosely involved in some type of Jewish 
learning.  
Haredim transmit their culture and values from generation to generation....We observe how 
they are transformed into Haredim. Indeed, through its teachers and rabbis, students at each 
successive educational level are introduced to a version of life that makes them conscious of 
their own tradition and protects them against acculturating to secular influences. Some of the 
most profound passions of Haredi Judaism were actually observed in the classroom...as little 
Haredim were being fashioned (Shaffir, 1993, pp. 459–460) 
 
 4. Yeshiva gedolah/kollel 
 The yeshiva gedolah, or literally the higher yeshiva, is the equivalent to a high school. 
This is where graduates of the yeshiva ketanna (the little yeshiva), the cheder primary school 
and middle school, matriculate to. The distinction between yeshiva gedolah and kollel is that 
members of the kollel are more loosely organized and usually become members of a kollel 
after they marry. It is important to note that the kollel is not merely an educational institution; 
it is an all-encompassing social environment. Within the yeshiva, there is significant peer and 
authority approval for leading a life that tends towards the study of higher Jewish texts in the 
yeshiva world. Belonging to or being associated with a particular yeshiva has financial 
repercussions both in terms of stipends and other payments from the government as well as 
private funding. In addition, there is a social dynamic outside the yeshiva, in which members 
of the yeshiva family will also be associated with each other in a social environment, 
including wives who work while their husbands study in yeshiva on a daily basis.  
There is one economic incentive for Haredi men to excel in their studies.  Arranged marriages 
are still a Haredi norm. The best Talmudic scholars often marry daughters of well-to-do 
Haredim. The men are supported by their fathers-in-law, who often provide furnished 
apartments and substantial stipends. But the well-to-do are on the wane. Most Haredi men 
marry women with career prospects as bleak as their own. Like the men, women are 
forbidden by Haredi leaders from studying in universities, for fear they will be brainwashed 
by secularist teachers. (Makovsky, 1997) 
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There have been some changes to this pattern, with some individuals in the ultra-Orthodox 
community seeking education in vocational schools. These newly created schools are gender 
segregated and provide an environment tailored to the religious and cultural nuances of the 
ultra-Orthodox community (Lupo, 2003; Cohen, 2006). There are many issues with this 
approach, however, as the schools tend to be of lower academic status and offer only a very 
narrow array of program options (Finkelman, 2011).  
 The yeshiva is the quintessential expression in Israel of ultra-Orthodox values and 
continuity and has for a great part shaped the current situation with ultra-Orthodox learning 
in Israel. This stands in stark contrast to the situation in the yeshiva in the Diaspora in which 
yeshiva learning at a higher level is usually based on merit, and the yeshiva itself operates as 
a meritocracy promoting the most learned or skilled to positions of authority and, ultimately, 
communal leadership.  
For over a century, Jewish communities in Eastern Europe and the United States have 
supported a few of their best and brightest would-be rabbis, giving them stipends to study the 
Talmud. But what's happened among Israel's Haredim in recent decades is that all males are 
expected to become full-time students...[it is argued] that only if all men are funneled into the 
system and insulated from modern life will first-rate Talmudic scholars emerge. (Makovsky, 
1997) 
 
Due to the overwhelming numbers of ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students who choose to stay in 
the yeshiva rather than integrate through national service of some type or join the labour 
market even at a more advanced stage, the role of the yeshiva in Israel’s ultra-Orthodox 
community has dramatically changed. It is, therefore, important to understand how the 
yeshiva relates to society and what can be done to integrate the yeshiva structure itself and 
the social elements of its students into a larger social paradigm that is more productive for 
many and leads to greater opportunity for the gifted view.  
 Haredi fundamentalism is predicated on the yeshiva as the exclusive site where the authentic 
version of Judaism may be learned and where one can actualize the Haredi lifestyle. This 
community is thus comprised of a plethora of yeshivot, and all men and their families must 
belong to a specific yeshiva. What is of significance is that the yeshiva is a “total institution” 
that covers the entire breadth of the lifecycle of the individual, and as a place of prayer and 
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study, a framework for socializing and leisure, and a community center providing material aid, 
housing, and psychiatric support. The yeshiva scholar is asked to withdraw from all worldly 
practices and totally devote himself to intellectual and spiritual activities. He is considered a 
virtuoso of text and, as such, interprets sacred codes governing everyday behaviors. Torah 
study is the goal to be sought all day long, and interrupting this duty, for any purpose, is 
defined as a sin. For this reason national service (particularly the army), or economic dealings, 
or other state duties are considered profanations of the study of Torah and therefore violations 
of central community taboos. (Stadler et al., 2008, p. 220)  
 
 The primacy of yeshiva learning in Haredi society is crucial to its position within the ultra-
Orthodox community. On the whole, the yeshiva is a critical contributing factor to the 
spiritual sense by which the overall community governs itself. Within the Haredi sphere of 
influence, a social framework is established as a bulwark against secularization, and a certain 
ethos is transmitted through learning. This seeks to counter outside secular influences, and 
interruption of this process through various forms of integration or interruptions such as 
participation in national service runs counter to this yeshiva mission. From the ultra-
Orthodox communities’ perspective, the yeshiva is perceived as a critical element in 
perpetuating the spiritual well-being of all Israelis even if this is not recognized by secular 
society. It is, therefore, a critical mission of the ultra-Orthodox community to perpetuate a 
system that expands on these values.  
From the Haredi perspective, the yeshiva's unique character, its indispensability to Jewish 
flourishing, justifies its controversial release from near-universal obligation [of serving in the 
military]….Yeshivas are total support systems and total socialization frameworks that aim at 
enclosing the student fully in the world of Halacha, learning, and holiness….Hence, 
disrupting the course of study or adulterating the totality of the yeshiva environment by years 
of army service is seen as profoundly damaging to the yeshiva's entire raison d'être (Cohen & 
Susser 2000, p. 22) 
 
 The yeshiva as a nexus of social cohesion is an essential part of the transmission of 
values and the reinforcement of societal norms. It is, therefore, apparent that the role of the 
yeshiva within the ultra-Orthodox community from pre-statehood days to the present 
interaction has increasingly grown. This can be analyzed through many different avenues 
such as the complete evolution of life cycle issues, marriage, financial responsibility, 
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integration into the job market, and so on. In addition to the strictly textual basis for learning, 
studying in the yeshiva and its associated periphery reinforces and perpetuates a cycle of life 
within the ultra-Orthodox community that influences its members. This becomes a function 
of the way in which the ultra-Orthodox community creates the fabric of many aspects of its 
communal life.  
 As a result of the central role the yeshiva plays in the ultra-Orthodox community, 
there is a great degree of insulation from secular society with the goal of seeking to create a 
society of learners. These differences can vary widely in terms of the age of yeshiva students 
from high school to middle age and beyond, including the age of various lifecycle events 
such as marriage and the age at which individuals in the community have children. In 
addition, many other factors create a society with stark differences to secular or even 
moderately religious society. It is apparent that the yeshiva and the lower-level educational 
institutions that prepare students for the yeshiva are at the core of the ultra-Orthodox 
community’s propagation of religious values. Understanding the yeshiva structure is crucial 
to understanding the underlying motivational factors of the ultra-Orthodox community. 
The haredim managed to halt the demographic erosion and to build a kind of closed 
community that could shut out unwanted influences.…Young men were kept in school not 
only through their childhood and adolescence but long past their marriage, and in an 
environment from which all secular education and influences were carefully excluded....What 
made this isolation possible, paradoxically, was the greater flow of funds from the 
outside….Most of these funds came from the State, either through direct subsidy of 
“independent” haredi schools or through the employment of haredi women as teachers in 
State religious schools. (Dowty 2001, p. 179) 
 
Moreover,  
State subsidies for yeshivot are based on enrollment, so yeshivot have no interest in 
terminating their students, bona fide or otherwise. Thus in 1993 the number of full-time adult 
male yeshiva students reported by the Ministry of Religious Affairs was 50,000, and in 1997 
it was 71,000. These numbers, the accuracy of which is notoriously doubtful, represent the 
entire cohort of draft eligible men in the Haredi communities. Both the numbers and the 
phenomenon of entire cohorts that go on to advanced religious studies in yeshivot are without 
parallel in Jewish history. (Shafir & Peled, 2002, pp. 143–144) 
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The current conditions of ultra-Orthodox education have not developed in isolation. 
Funding and social attitudes over time have led to the important profile of yeshiva education 
to the exclusion of all else within the ultra-Orthodox community. This means that once this 
particular system is firmly entrenched, it becomes increasingly difficult to untangle what has 
become a complex social issue. It is interesting to note that this state of affairs is unique in 
the Jewish historical experience, certainly in the Diaspora, but in the context of Israel as well. 
In order to untangle this situation for the benefit of Israeli society as a whole but also for the 
conditions of the ultra-Orthodox community, new approaches need to be undertaken. The 
natural societal development of this system, through reinforcement and other measures, has 
made the possibility of intervention difficult. Nevertheless, it is critical to improve social and 
economic conditions. Further complicating this is the status quo, which involves yeshiva 
learning as the primary goal of the ultra-Orthodox community in Israel. This is a central facet 
of the ultra-Orthodox community and is a reflection of a long-standing historical truth. 
Developing a social standard in which a particular reality is represented makes it difficult to 
address the usefulness of large segments of the population learning in yeshiva. Therefore, 
this issue must be addressed as part of a comprehensive examination of ultra-Orthodox 
education and funding and must critically involve the ultra-Orthodox community in this 
process. The ultra-Orthodox community must realize the importance of maintaining a 
homeostatic balance within its community as well as in Israeli society as a whole.  
 
 5. Funding 
 There is a constant struggle for funding for ultra-Orthodox institutions. This difficulty 
arises between the gap in funding for religious and secular education, particularly in 
institutions that are geared solely towards religious teaching. This creates a constant struggle 
between secular and religious educational schools for funding. Yeshivas are, therefore, 
required not only to compete with secular institutions for funding from the government, but 
also with fundraising from private sources as well. The push for funding ties religious 
schools into the larger state economic picture and creates a focus point of tension. Due to the 
contentious nature of ultra-Orthodox nonparticipation in Israeli society, this particular issue 
of funding can and often does expand into a host of other—perhaps nonrelated—issues that 
surround the secular and religious divide.  
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 For the ultra-Orthodox community, funding is recognized as critical to expand the 
essential interests of the community. This follows all the other aspects of privileges and 
rights associated with maintaining a society of learners set apart from secular society. As 
noted elsewhere, this is moving in the opposite direction of historical ultra-Orthodox norms. 
While there has always been a degree of separation from secular society, this has usually 
been coupled with a great degree of self-reliance, using the secular government as a primary 
source of funding while at the same time having a strict line of nonparticipation within 
secular society, delineating the inherent paradox in ultra-Orthodox education.  
For the ultra-Orthodox parties, such funding is an existential interest, as it allows the 
existence of a society of learners, exempt from military service and work, which has 
characterized Israel’s ultra-Orthodox society for the past three decades in complete 
contradiction to what is common among ultra-Orthodox Jews in Europe and the United States 
(Naor, 2008, p. 79) 
 
The issue of funding came to a head when university students recently protested to the prime 
minister about funding for ultra-Orthodox educational institutions when university students 
are not being funded at all or at similar levels.  
The budget was found already to include a provision for the contested benefit for the 
Haredim. At dawn on October 27th [2010], university students released a gaggle of loudly 
crowing cocks on the pavement outside Mr. Netanyahu's quiet suburban home. “Wake up, 
BB,” they chanted before being carted off by police. “The students are worth more.” (The 
Economist, 2010, p. 50) 
 
Many secular university students feel that it is crucial for the government to re-evaluate its 
stance vis-à-vis the ultra-Orthodox educational institutions and reprioritize secular students 
who currently bear the brunt of their own educational expenses and further down the line are 
responsible for paying the taxes that subsidize the ultra-Orthodox community yet do little to 
subsidize secular education.  
 
D. The Military and the ultra-Orthodox Community 
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 One of the most contentious issues that currently face the ultra-Orthodox community 
and secular society is that of military or national service. “As a rule, ultra-Orthodox men are 
not drafted to the Israeli Defense Force. They comprise a legal category of those for whom 
‘Torah studies is their sole craft’ (in Hebrew: Toratam omanutam)” (Hakak, 2009, p. 112). 
This particular issue is one of many fault lines in relations among various segments of Israeli 
society, yet this particular one of national service holds a particular degree of tension. This is 
because national service, which is commonly viewed as a form of military service (though 
there are exceptions), is perceived by the ultra-Orthodox community as fundamentally 
undermining its essential way of life. Indoctrination in secular values, military culture, and so 
on creates in the eyes of the ultra-Orthodox community someone who is the antithesis of a 
lifelong Torah learner. One of the key arguments that run back and forth along this particular 
issue is two very different negotiating points relating to the interpretation of military service. 
For the ultra-Orthodox community, the physical aspect of military service, which is the most 
questionable in terms of exposure to outside influences, is interpreted as being less valuable 
than the spiritual contribution that the ultra-Orthodox community makes to Israel as a whole. 
The exact opposite is true when the secular community views the spiritual contribution the 
ultra-Orthodox community makes as insignificant and greatly protests the lack of physical 
participation in national service. This underlines a fundamental difference between these two 
camps with very different ideas of what national service or military service is and can be.  
From a broader perspective, understanding how military service - and the controversy 
surrounding it - interacts with the ultra-Orthodox community is part and parcel with issues of 
identity. Learning Jewish subjects is considered for ultra-Orthodox men to be their primary 
vocation, and for such, they receive exemption from military service. Throughout time, for 
the ultra-Orthodox community, the military exemption has generally become an entrenched 
attitude. This differs from the outlook of the Jewish Diaspora. In the Diaspora, national 
service (though not usually military service) is understood to be an important part of 
contributing to society. Perhaps this is a different way to view the state and represents an 
element of the drive towards preserving religious autonomy with all the associated societal 
and financial implications. All the controversies surrounding military service and the ultra-
Orthodox community intensify an “us versus them” complex in which the ultra-Orthodox 
community feels apart and alienated from Israeli society and vice versa.  
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Yitzchak Cohen notes that military service may be a barrier to individuals in the ultra-
Orthodox community, but at the same time, things are changing. The way in which the 
military affects society is changing, and there is now greater accommodation for ultra-
Orthodox individuals to participate within the military framework and, as a result, become 
included in society. Moreover, the military, perhaps, is changing in terms of societal 
importance, yet exactly how this would work remains to be seen. 
Yes actually, I believe it does. Well, you know what, if you asked me the question 10 years 
ago or even 15 years ago, I would say it does. Now it's a little bit different. They have—the 
fact that the government, and many politicians, and other people, have created ways for 
Orthodox people to serve in the military through different—like Nahal Haredi, for example, 
where they can be involved with other— just men, because they won't be around women, and 
they keep a high level of kosher, and davening in the morning, and all that sort of stuff, I 
think that it— right now, maybe we could say it doesn't necessarily serve as a barrier, but 
certainly before they had those ways for them to serve, and still keep everything they wanted 
to, it did serve as a barrier, because obviously people look down on people that didn't serve 
in the military, and they didn't have a way to do it. ... I don't necessarily think that every 
ultra-Orthodox person will still want to serve in a Nahal Haredi group, or in a Hesder 
Yeshiva. They might just find it still unacceptable based on their standards, and I feel that it 
is important to accommodate what their needs are. And since that's something that they can't 
do, I think they shouldn't necessarily be looked down on, and I think they should be accepted 
in the workforce and accepted in society, when they're ready to join. (Interview with Yitzhak 
Cohen, 2011) 
 
 Even though the specifics of military service in terms of numbers, in terms of 
manpower, and in terms of the actual need for ultra-Orthodox individuals to serve in the 
military is debatable, there is no doubt that this controversial topic has thrust the military 
service debate into a central position in the Israeli internal political dialogue. “The peace 
process has lessened the Israeli army's need for every last available soldier. Indeed, the cost 
of maintaining a large army has led the military to recruit more selectively among females 
and to avoid enlisting immigrants who arrive in Israel in their 30s and 40s” (Sharkansky, 
1997, p. 88). Nevertheless, there are constant and ongoing negotiations with the ultra-
Orthodox regarding the status quo. This particular issue, which has often been played out as a 
game of brinkmanship between the ultra-Orthodox community and the government, where 
each side has tried to push the other to see how far it will compromise, has left this situation 
with a great deal of disproportional importance. Military service is perceived by the ultra-
Orthodox community as being a decisive end to their way of life while on the flipside, 
secular society sees military service as integral in the development of a cohesive national 
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identity. While there are various alternative frameworks, they do not necessarily bridge the 
gap in a definitively inclusive way.  
Many Israelis are also aggravated…that Haredim are extended full voting rights and social 
services, while at the same time are exempt from military service. This…has become a 
sticking point because compulsory military service is central to the life and identity of all 
secular Israelis. Most Israelis resent that the Haredim garner the benefits of a burgeoning 
economy and strong military while contributing little to either. (Simon, 1998, p. 14) 
 
Thus, for the majority of ultra-Orthodox men, military or national service remains a 
contentious issue with regular ongoing flare-ups regarding the status and requirements of 
ultra-Orthodox individuals to serve the state.  
 
 1. Historical perspective on military service 
Military service has historically been a contentious issue between the secular public 
and ultra-Orthodox community. However, in recent years, this debate has become more 
politicized. The debate has been a feature in various forms throughout the history of the state, 
and it is intrinsically linked with the development of a number of religious concessions to the 
ultra-Orthodox that David Ben-Gurion established through the status quo.  
  There are several elements to this. First, it is interesting to note that while limited 
exemptions were handed out from the founding of the state, exemptions continue to the 
present era. It was always the intention of Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, to 
have an integrated military as the ideal. This can be analyzed in a number of ways from the 
initial structure of the idea in which all citizens, regardless of religious group or entity, would 
be required to fulfill the same set of initial obligations. This aspect did not change, yet 
deferments or exemptions were given out; over time declaring his vocation as full-time 
higher level Jewish learning allowed an individual not to serve in the military.  
A mixture of motives induced Ben-Gurion to promise some concessions…[for military 
exemptions] as early as 1947. A charitable interpretation suggests that he sympathized with 
the need to salvage a way of life that the Holocaust had all but wiped out. Clinical 
pragmatism was probably equally germane. [As the] Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry 
was pondering…Palestine's future, it was important to give the Haredim as little reason as 
possible to [oppose] establishment of an Independent Jewish state.… hen the IDF came into 
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existence the following year, Haredi females were excused duty altogether and draft 
deferments were granted to some 400 male students. (Cohen, 2008, p. 131) 
 
 Second, from the creation of the state, Ben-Gurion discouraged separate units such as 
the modern day Nahal Haredi, a separate religious unit that takes into consideration various 
religious sensitivities for a military unit. During the creation of the state, it was important to 
Ben-Gurion that all military units would be equal, and there would not be additional elements 
that would serve to separate soldiers serving in the same unit and distinguish among them in 
a country newly formed of immigrants from the Diaspora. Around the world, social cohesion 
was a crucial factor, and dividing soldiers on the basis of religious beliefs could only be 
perceived as a contentious move to further divide individuals separated by language, history, 
and culture.  
David Ben-Gurion, acting simultaneously as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, waged 
a campaign to build a homogeneous army. He eliminated pre-State special units -- the 
Palmach and the Etzel -- which bore an external ideological and political identity...During the 
1948 War of Independence, leading rabbis of the religious camp demanded that a separate 
military framework for religious soldiers be formed. (Drory, 2009, p. 162) 
 
Religion, therefore, was used as a social lubricant to unite disparate individuals into common 
culture and society without taking it to an extreme. Through time, this has led to members of 
the ultra-Orthodox community not serving in the military at all, and as a result, this thinking 
was reformulated allowing ultra-Orthodox soldiers to serve in their own units.  
Third, due to the structure of the country and religious freedoms, the ideal structure is 
built to accommodate the sensitivities of religious soldiers regardless of their level of 
affiliation. Soldiers, therefore, have religious rights within the context of the military.  
Religion does not exist as a segmented subculture within the overall Israeli military fabric. 
Rather, it constitutes one of the IDF's integral components. Within the force, traditional 
Jewish rites and symbols intrude on life in numerous spheres and at various levels. Besides 
addressing the specific requirements of troops who profess orthodox Jewish beliefs, they also 
act as integrative referents for the IDF as a whole. In the latter capacity, they generate a 
symbiosis between religion and military service that, even if not altogether unique, is 
certainly more pervasive than experienced in other modern armed forces. (Cohen, 1999, p. 
389) 
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This is viewed by religious soldiers as a way to preserve their religious integrity and beliefs 
while at the same time serving in the largely secular military.  
Balancing these factors while maintaining a system of religious rights and, at the 
same time, accommodating the majority of soldiers, who often tend to be secular, create a 
difficult situation that has been playing itself out in the military since the creation of the state.  
Ben-Gurion's credo influenced the relationship between religion and military service in Israel 
in three crucial respects. First, it rejected the notion that religious and secular citizens possess 
different sets of national obligations.…Military service was equally incumbent on both 
communities. Second, the same principle of equality also precluded religious troops from 
serving in segregated military formations…. However, …the military had also to 
accommodate itself to the particular needs of religious personnel.…the entire IDF framework 
needed to be structured in ways that would not alienate religiously observant troops or require 
them to contravene the dictates of traditional Jewish law. (Cohen, 1999, p. 388) 
 
Nevertheless, although Ben-Gurion determined to create an integrated army, which 
ultimately would lead to the creation of an integrated society formed in a common 
experience, through time the ultra-Orthodox community has both withdrawn as well as has 
not been embraced by the secular military hierarchy. This is one of the most contentious 
issues in the religious/secular debate and is crucial to understanding how reintegration or 
some form of integration can happen to form a cohesive or perhaps multicultural Israeli 
society.  
 The IDF itself emerged from what had the potential to become a civil war among 
various independence movements in British Mandate Palestine vying for military and 
political control. Upon the formation of the state of Israel, the newly formed Israel Defense 
Forces became decidedly apolitical, and the military was driven to create a new form of 
social cohesion that did not rely on previous political identities or ideologies. The 
commonality among the Jews arriving from the Diaspora post-Holocaust, as well as Jews 
emigrating from Arab countries, was the underlying commonality of Judaism. Judaism was, 
therefore, used as a secular tool for uniting despaired individuals and creating a Jewish 
secular identity. This extends to many areas of the military historically, as well as in its 
present incarnation.  
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For example, each military base has, as its slogan, a passage from the Bible. Each 
soldier is sworn into the military using a Hebrew Bible if he or she is Jewish; otherwise a 
Koran or New Testament or other type of book is used. For religiously observant soldiers, 
linking the state’s history with the current military is of key priority, and sites such as the 
Western Wall or Masada feature prominently in military lore and are distinct elements in the 
creation of a secular Jewish ethos.  
Remarkable…is the extent to which each major rite of passage in the Israeli military 
experience is suffused with ceremonies that deliberately arouse profound Jewish 
connotations.…At his or her induction, every new recruit receives a copy of the Bible -- 
which religious conscripts necessarily consider to be a sacred work and which secular troops 
have also been taught at school to regard as the most formative text in the Jewish literary 
corpus. Similarly evocative are the venues selected for the staging of passing-out parades. On 
completion of basic training,…each new cohort of paratroops is formally enrolled in 
Jerusalem by torch-light at the “Western Wall.” The site is well chosen. Quite apart from 
being the sole remaining relic of the Second Temple destroyed in the year 70 CE, and hence a 
place of religious pilgrimage, the Western Wall is also located in the heart of the Old City 
where the paratroop corps was in action during the Six-Day War of 1967. In infantry brigades 
similar ceremonies take place at the heights of Massada, the last bastion of resistance to 
Roman rule during the Jewish rebellion of 66-70 CE. (Cohen, 1999, p. 392) 
 
The difficultly this poses for religious soldiers is that aspects of Judaism are taken in a 
secular context and reinterpreted to teach the military a lesson or create a secular identity 
based on common Jewish ancestry. This is opposed by many in the ultra-Orthodox 
community who see it as warping fundamental values and promoting the military as a 
religious Jewish organization, when, in fact, it is an extension of the largely secular state 
government. This contradiction—the inherent religiosity of the state and the military—
creates a conflict for many in the ultra-Orthodox community who do not necessarily believe 
in the religious supremacy of the state in matters military. Added to this, the use of religious 
symbols in the IDF is perceived as an attempt to create a new social paradigm through the 
military, based on the traditions, history, customs, and so on, of religious Judaism.  
 
 2. The military service debate 
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The military service debate is an excellent example of the distance between religious 
and secular Israelis regarding issues of security and the mortal and spiritual dangers society 
faces. The ultra-Orthodox view their participation in Jewish learning as an equally important 
contribution to the security of the state as that of their secular counterparts serving in the 
military. Religious learning takes on a new degree of social importance as it creates a society 
that is fully encompassed by the goal of male religious learning and all the associated social 
facets that come with an insulated life of religious service. 
The issue of tolerance and acceptance within society is of great importance. It is 
important to have a cross-cultural understanding between the religious community and 
secular society. Because they occupy the same real space, yet may indeed be quite separate, it 
is important to accommodate these very different perspectives. Eliezer Weiss also notes that 
in his opinion, the age of enlistment in the military does not necessarily reflect ultra-
Orthodox priorities, and this is a contentious issue, which needs to be discussed in terms of a 
holistic view of understanding religious priorities. 
Yes, in a few ways. One, they don't know what— if you don't do the army you don't know 
what— if you always live in a religious community, you go to religious schools, you live in a 
religious neighborhood, you don't know what the general society is, you're going to function 
differently than if you do know what that is. You're going to be less tolerant because you don't 
know what the general world is. The army could be a very, very big factor in changing the 
way things are, if everybody had to go. Everybody, again, with exceptions—specific 
exceptions. ... that's why for instance, I don't think an 18-year old is ready for the army. 
Maybe at 20-22, I don't know what the breaking point would be, it depends on the boy. Like I 
said, I have sons who have been in the army and I never agreed that they should do it at age 
18. If they have a strong enough base in Torah, then they can have the interaction with 
society at large, but if they're not mature enough for that, then they're not ready. (Interview 
with Eliezer Weiss, 2011) 
 
The religious education reinforced in the yeshiva is critical to preserving the ultra-
Orthodox social order, and religious leaders believe that involving the ultra-Orthodox 
community in military service would diminish the ability of the ultra-Orthodox community to 
function.  
Spiritual guides of the Haredi community have always evinced an uncompromisingly 
resistant attitude towards conscription in the IDF…Over the long haul of history, they 
contend, the scrutiny of the Holy Texts have contributed far more than any other activity to 
the survival of the Jewish people. In the future too, diligent study of the Divine Law will 
continue to constitute Israel's primary lifeline as much to physical security on earth as to 
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spiritual salvation in heaven. Thus: “other than the Torah we have no security; neither 
soldiers nor the IDF will help us.” (Cohen, 1999, pp. 394–395) 
 
The fear of integration and assimilation is ever present, and unlike historical periods of 
integration, the distance separating the secular and religious has never been narrower. The 
threat of secular individuals speaking a common language and, for the most part, aware of 
the religious particularities of Judaism would create an easier avenue to transition to 
secularism. The idea of military service is, therefore, viewed by the ultra-Orthodox 
community as being a vector to accomplish social integration at the expense of losing 
religious beliefs and mode of life.  
In contrast to other Jewish groups in Israel, especially the Zionist religious streams, Haredi 
leaders decided that in order to revive and reinforce Haredi culture they must keep members 
in the yeshiva away from the army. The ideal of masculinity and piety was to be attained only 
through a life of abstinence, ritual, and profound study, rather than becoming soldiers and 
defending the secular state. (Stadler et al., 2008, p. 221) 
 
Secular citizens see national service in its various forms as the most important type of 
participation in the state. Despite a shift in national identity and various political upheavals 
throughout the years, it is still seen as an important facet to societal integration. This attitude 
does not extend to the ultra-Orthodox, and the attitude the ultra-Orthodox have towards the 
military has changed through time with the hardening of the position against military service.  
In early 1999, 200,000 ultra-Orthodox Jews…protested against the Supreme Court rulings 
viewed as hostile to their way of life. Nearby, 50,000 secular Israelis organized a counter-
demonstration. One of the issues concerned extending the law allowing military exemptions 
for students in the yeshivoth. The rate of religious exemptions historically was about 4% of 
the annual number of enlistments. In 1998, the rate doubled to 8.2%. Over the last decade, the 
number of enlistments each year grew by an aggregate total of 50%, but the number of 
exemptions increased by 350%. For secular Israelis whose children complete their 
compulsory military service, the outrage is palpable. (Stein, 2002, p. 88) 
 
Over time, the attitude that military service is in direct confrontation with the Torah 
lifestyle practiced by individuals in the ultra-Orthodox community has emerged, concomitant 
with the idea that military indoctrination is the antithesis of the values and the ideal religious 
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society that the ultra-Orthodox community strives for. Entrenched opposition supporting 
resistance to military service has become formidable and formalized over time, as evidenced 
by the ongoing shifts in the status quo arrangements.  
This process involves both religious and secular elements of society during a long 
period of time, and there naturally are dissenters to these widely drawn lines in both camps. 
There are some ultra-Orthodox individuals who wish to participate but feel that military 
service is taboo and would hurt their chances of social integration, marriage, and so on. On 
the secular side, there are those that consider the ultra-Orthodox to be simply unfit for 
military service because “their loyalty is to their rabbis, not to any army commander. They 
also stop to pray three times a day, insist on food more kosher than the army now supplies, 
have no job skills because of their restricted education, and cannot mix with women -- who 
make up 30% of army personnel” (Beyer, 2000, p. 32). There are many supposed barriers to 
service, many of which can be worked around through compromises on both sides and a 
willingness to form new types of relationships with soldiers which take their backgrounds 
into account. This way of thinking has shown success with many minority groups and now 
needs a social change to bring up the level of acceptance of national service within the ultra-
Orthodox community. 
Deena Friedberg starts with the traditional refrain that the military already has enough 
soldiers who are secular and conscripted and, therefore, does not need to resort to drafting 
ultra-Orthodox soldiers. She continues to say that there must be equality in the way in which 
individuals are drafted into the military. This means that much as secular society would like 
members of the ultra-Orthodox community to be drafted into the military or an alternate 
program, secular individuals should be required to participate in a yeshiva program that 
would expose them to some of the values and teachings of ultra-Orthodox society. This 
would create a more comprehensive society while not necessarily giving an advantage to one 
side or the other. Clearly, this is a goal of the ultra-Orthodox society, which seeks to educate 
with its interpretation of Judaism. Perhaps in a more general sense, offering a program that 
has some type of Jewish educational component, which includes religious societal views, 
could benefit a secular society and vice versa. 
Well, first of all they have enough soldiers that they don't have to draft anybody, and a lot of 
secular guys are opting out by leaving the country, so I don't think it should be forced. I 
think— somebody said, yeah, we'll send all our guys to the army, but you send your guys to 
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yeshiva for one year as well. That would be very interesting. Maybe instead of, like, forced 
military conscription, everybody should, like, have, like, some kind of, like, mechinah 
program. One of my sons did that— he had like a year in mechinah where they prepare him 
for the army. So they should have something like that, where they could expose themselves to, 
like, a yeshiva background and also like a sort of army background. And the best thing to do 
is to try to see how we could, you know, unify, pull together. (Interview with Deena 
Friedberg, 2011) 
 
 However, there is now appreciation on both sides of this issue that new ways of 
thinking need to be brought to the issue as secular leadership in the political sphere and the 
military see the need to become more inclusive. This is not only for ideological reasons but 
also due to the looming demographic crisis (Kaufman & Skirbekk, 2012, p. 198) as the ultra-
Orthodox community outpaces the secular community many times in terms of the growing 
numbers of their population. On the religious side, there is still a great deal of hostility 
towards outright service, yet the addition of ultra-Orthodox military units and the creation of 
some national service frameworks has made more options palatable. There is still no 
widespread solution to this issue, and it remains contentious. It probably will remain so until 
the army experience will be viewed less as social engineering of the ideal Israeli and will be 
seen as a way to participate in an egalitarian fashion and not necessarily be restricted to 
compromising one’s individual or societal values. At the same time, the underlying hostility 
towards national service with the goal of creating a society of learners is not itself necessarily 
based in factual history. This may be a reflection of ideals that do not exist now and perhaps 
never existed in the past. Finding a common ground has proved difficult, and the military 
service debate continues to be a focal point of societal integration, with each side rallying for 
a contribution it sees that it makes to the overall society in both the spiritual and the physical 
realms.  
Nevertheless,  
in their opposition to the drafting of women for military service, the ultra-Orthodox were 
joined by the national religious community. The latter were not entirely comfortable with the 
position they adopted, however. They were discomfited by the feeling that in exempting 
religious women from service they were being derelict in their duties as committed Zionists 
who supported the national efforts of the young state. Hence, they urged their women 
followers not to exercise their right of exemption. They encouraged religious women to enter 
army service in the framework of certain religiously sponsored military and agricultural units 
(nahal). (Cohen & Susser 2000, p. 26) 
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While women in the national religious camp excluded themselves alongside the ultra-
Orthodox community, alternative frameworks were created to encompass other types of 
national service. This alternative service is more appropriate to the outlook of the national 
religious individuals who would not otherwise serve in the military for religious reasons, but 
have options that meet both religious and ideological considerations. Moreover,  
each of the parties to the struggle [regarding women serving in the military or National 
Service] was allowed to adopt a solution it found suitable. The Haredi camp succeeded in 
avoiding inclusion of its women in the National Service. The national religious chose to 
implement the idea despite the absence of legal compulsion to do so. At present, national 
religious women, on a voluntary but widespread basis, serve in the National Service under 
government aegis. (Cohen & Susser, 2000, p. 27) 
 
This example shows how it is possible to find an ideological middle ground and a framework 
that works for both the national interest and the religious and social considerations of various 
groups. While gender is one aspect of the ongoing disagreement over service, there are many 
others, and these aspects must also be taken into consideration to propose a new framework. 
 
 Haredi ideological motivations for non-service: history 
 Historical reasons for the Haredi ideological motivation for non-service are many and 
have changed through time. The constant is that from the creation of the state, there was an 
appreciation of the need for draft deferrals, and this may have happened for numerous 
reasons. It is quite possible that Prime Minister Ben-Gurion decided not to enforce the draft 
for the ultra-Orthodox community out of concern over dwindling numbers following the 
Holocaust and understanding the need to rebuild Torah Judaism. It may also be possible that 
there were political considerations involved, which encouraged Ben-Gurion not to force this 
particular issue in order to win political concessions in other areas. What is known is that a 
series of draft deferrals have been issued for the ultra-Orthodox community and have 
throughout the history of the state always included political, as well as religious and social 
dimensions, to this argument. While not formally written into law, these types of exemptions 
relate to the ideological basis for not serving in the military and the theological perspective 
that the higher level Jewish learning that the ultra-Orthodox community engages in 
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contributes to the spiritual well-being rather than the physical. According to the ultra-
Orthodox community, this is equally as important and a great contribution towards the 
spiritual welfare of the state, without which the state could not exist.  
These policies have led to the emergence of a new cultural paradigm, something 
previously not seen before in the context of Jewish history in the land of Israel nor in Jewish 
history in the Diaspora. By creating a situation where multiple generations have been 
involved with a particular ideological position to national service, the status quo has 
ultimately emerged not as a reflection of ancient history but as a new social creation closely 
tied to the ultra-Orthodox experience in the state of Israel. However,  
Haredi communities in Israel have grown exponentially in size and cohesion since 1948…[and 
they] now wield much greater political leverage than they once possessed, with a result that the 
scope of the accommodation reached in 1947 has been considerably expanded….In 1997 alone, 
28,376 Haredi males (almost 7.5% of Israel's total conscript pool) were granted deferments 
from military service on the understanding that “the study of Torah [Jewish law] is their 
profession” -- a growth of some 17% since 1995 and a figure far in excess of anything 
imagined by either Ben-Gurion or his contemporaries. (Cohen, 1999, p. 395) 
 
  3. The central place of military service in Israeli society  
 The origins of military service were for both practical military reasons evidenced by 
the various wars in Israel’s past and the great degree of national security that required 
maintaining control over relatively large borders in a demographically small country. Yet the 
military, aside from being an institution, also has wide-reaching social effects that impart a 
common starting point for Israeli citizens transitioning from teenage years into adulthood. 
This includes various Zionistic cultural religious values that are intended to homogenize 
people from disparate backgrounds who immigrate to the country from all walks of life. It 
also reinforces Hebrew as the national language and serves as a transition point for both new 
immigrants and Israeli citizens to transition from the military into lucrative civilian positions. 
This is a learning experience as well, as noted by Litan: “For many people, 
their…compulsory service may be the only time in their lives where they mix for an 
extended time on equal footing with others from very different backgrounds” (2002, p. 44). 
The military is central to Israeli society and has a very important place in the genesis of 
Israeli society since the founding of the state.  
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Every citizen reaching the age of 18 must join the army by rule of law. Men have to serve for 
three years and women for two years. They are paid a symbolic salary, meaning they are 
actually obliged to volunteer to serve in the army. After they are released from duty, most 
Israeli men, and to a limited extent also women, have to serve in the reserve forces 
approximately one month per year for 20-30 years. For several decades, the deep 
militarization of Israeli society ensured that most people would serve in the army and 
relatively few have used the available justifications for not serving, e.g., religious reasons 
(especially for women), conscientious objection, or mental or physical disability. (Mizrahi, 
2008, p. 157) 
 
The role of military service has changed during time, yet military service, in its various 
forms, is both an integral part of the security of the state and a mechanism of social 
engineering. The stated goal of the military is that the military shapes society and society 
shapes the military.  
 The army shapes society by embodying the values and ethos of the founding Zionist 
principles. This is carried forward in the current era. Both in imaging the state initially and 
through the state formation period, the military has been seen as an agent of homogenization 
and a way to integrate disparate people from extremely different backgrounds, cultures, and 
societies into the new Israeli society. David Ben-Gurion stated that 
 while the first mission of the IDF... is the security of the State, that is not its only task. The 
army must also serve as pioneering educational force for Israeli youth, both native born and 
immigrants. The IDF must educate a pioneering generation, healthy in body and spirit, brave 
and faithful, which will heal tribal and Diaspora divisions and implement the historic mission 
of the state of Israel through a process of self-fulfillment, by building the homeland and by 
making its deserts bloom. (Cohen, 2008, p. 31)  
 
 Essentially, this type of cultural programming serves to structure society along the 
lines of those who serve and those who do not. “Enlistment automatically architectures two 
distinct ‘tiers’ of citizenship…thereby creating a divide between those included in the most 
meaningful of all Israeli citizen rights and those excluded from it” (Cohen, 2008, p. 130). 
With this distinction come many social consequences. The immediate repercussions of 
service or non-service have changed through time, and each particular era takes on new 
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meaning in the context of the particular social issues. While the military as a means to 
cultural homogenization is touted as the national integrator, there are still many obstructions 
to creating a truly homogenous society. Military service does perhaps create a baseline of 
commonality established through various individuals in society, but on many levels there 
remain deep rifts.  
Notwithstanding Ben-Gurion's promotion of the IDF as a tool capable of inculcating 
citizenship as well as comradeship, the chances that conscription might eradicate Israel's 
societal differences were always slim. Cross-country studies of similar attempts to employ the 
military as a tool of social engineering indicate that not even under the best circumstances do 
armed forces perform as well as transmitters of allegedly homogenizing national norms. 
(Cohen, 2008, p. 108) 
 
It is interesting that the military can often also precipitate perhaps unintended national 
change and integration. Military service is itself a meritocracy, and, as such, it had an effect 
on the integration of the Mizrachim (Sephardim) during the initial formation of the state 
where great numbers of Jews from Arab countries arrived in Israel and were integrated 
through military service. The same can be said of other rifts, such as cultural backgrounds, 
language, heritage, history, and religion, despite the fact that an overarching commonality of 
Judaism exists. The integration of religion into the military is at times difficult. It does not 
necessarily reflect a homogeneous society. The aspirations of religious integration in society 
were not necessarily as successful as Israelis may have hoped. This is perhaps a reflection of 
the divided nature of religion within Israeli society itself. A simple answer to this dilemma 
posed during the formation of the state to Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, 
was that religious people would serve wholly within their own units. However, this was not 
possible as seeming to give into a particular division would merely exacerbate the long-term 
detrimental effects of maintaining distinct military units and, by extension, distinct elements 
of society. This would, as a result, signal that society was not meant to be homogeneous 
rather than separate elements. Historically, considering this happened after the integration of 
Israel’s military for various competing factions (such as the Haganah, Etzel, Lechi, etc.), this 
distinction to integrate religious soldiers within larger secular units took on a very important 
mandate. 
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Ben-Gurion dismissed suggestions that the IDF follow the segregationist precedent set by the 
Haganah, which had allowed religiously observant volunteers to serve in their own 
homogeneous units. “The creation of religious [military] units,” was predicted in 1949 to a 
delegation of national-religious leaders, “[to] result in the creation of anti-religious units”' and 
thus undermine precisely the integrative ethos that conscription was supposed to promote. 
(Cohen, 2008, pp. 111–112) 
 
 Instead of separate units, ultimately, Ben-Gurion decided to create integrated 
homogeneous units that contained both religious and non-religious soldiers. This was done 
under the first chief military rabbi, Rabbi Shlomo Goren, who saw the military rabbinate as 
the mediating body between secular and religious soldiers and sought to maintain a line of 
religiosity in an overly secular atmosphere. This was done in various ways. Integration of 
Jewish religious practices in the IDF also served to bolster the IDF’s mandate as the protector 
of the Jewish state and also helped to create commonalities within various units. Religious 
practices, which were considered to be important in the overall structure of the military, 
included the ability to receive religious materials, such as prayer books and other religious 
items, time allotted to prayer services, and a place in which to conduct prayer. In addition, a 
number of regulations were created to make the IDF more acceptable to religious soldiers. 
These included times for prayer, observance of kashrut in the military, Sabbath observance, 
and other organizational functions that sought to ensure that religious practice was more 
easily carried out in the day-to-day military life.  
 One of the interesting ways in which religious ceremony and practices were 
incorporated into the military is the many military traditions that have a particular Jewish 
character. This is interesting because over time, while perhaps the initial reasons for creating 
integrated units faded, and in contemporary times, the IDF has an ultra-Orthodox battalion, 
there are many religious elements that have become practically secular in nature, yet hail 
from religious origins. This includes the Friday night Kiddush service in which all soldiers, 
regardless of rank, religion, or background, participate as a military tradition, and each stage 
of the life cycle of a soldier in the military includes various ceremonies with religious 
significance. Many of these ceremonies are tailored to conform to particular religious beliefs, 
such as a swearing-in ceremony for Christian soldiers in the IDF uses a New Testament in 
the place of an Old Testament as used for Jewish soldiers. Nevertheless, the very fact that a 
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Bible is used and the way in which religion is included in almost all aspects of the IDF create 
a unifying commonality in which religious soldiers may feel more comfortable. By 
maintaining basic commonalities throughout the entire institution, such as kashrut, a soldier 
is more likely to be able to find commonalities, at least in certain respects, and as a result, the 
transition from citizen to soldier is eased somewhat.  
By far the most long-lasting of Goren's contributions to the moderation of religious-secular 
differences in the IDF was to initiate military rights in which both segments of the 
complement could jointly participate. For instance, he institutionalized the convention, which 
is still observed, whereby every Jewish soldier on active service, regardless of background 
and rank, attends a ceremony of blessing the wine (kiddush) that precedes the Friday evening 
meal and marks inauguration of the Sabbath. He also established a tradition whereby each 
major rite of passage in the Israeli military experience is marked by a pageant deliberately 
suffused with Jewish connotations. To this day, every new Jewish recruit receives a copy of 
the Old Testament, prefaced by an introduction that is written by the IDF Chief Rabbi of the 
day (Christians receive the New Testament, Muslims the Koran and Druze a Medallion). 
Likewise, passing-out parades are frequently held at Masada or the Western Wall in 
Jerusalem, venues suffused with Jewish associations to which the military chaplain, who is 
always one of the speakers, conventionally makes reference. (Cohen, 2008, p. 113)  
 
The IDF is central in Israeli society on many levels and is a uniting factor among 
many in society. The army has historically been a social barometer allowing for transitions 
into society. While the military started with particular values, these changed over time as a 
reflection of the people serving in society. It is interesting to note how the institution of the 
military changed to become more inclusive and at the same time, changed the proto-Zionist 
Israelis serving in the military as social elite, as well as the less upwardly mobile new 
immigrants, particularly from non-Western societies. This meant that as a whole, the military 
was generally an important social integrator and through time adapted to the various cultural 
and social norms developing in Israel. While this change is positive and inclusive, there 
remains the issue of what happens to those who do not serve. The percentage of the 
population that does serve is very large, and this, therefore, marginalizes those who do not 
serve, such as members of the ultra-Orthodox community. As the military becomes 
ubiquitous in its presence in Israeli society, this has the effect of increasing the exclusionary 
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nature of military service for those who do not serve. Among people in the ultra-Orthodox 
community who do not serve, there exists a great deal of exclusion moving towards building 
an insular society and isolation because an individual did not serve in the military and has a 
more difficult transition into civilian life. This trend is slowly changing from historical highs 
when the national survival has been perceived in the context of military service. While 
through time this has been changing, the centrality of military service in Israel is still 
relevant. Military service in Israel among both secular and religious Israelis who serve in the 
military is a wide-reaching institution that an individual in civilian life will encounter in 
many different contexts. This paradigm carries through by the military reserves in which 
most men, and some women, following their military service, serve for a short period every 
year. This reinforces the hegemonic nature of the military ethos from a societal perspective, 
as well as reinforces the institution of the military and a shared commonality that exists 
among those who serve. For those who do not serve, the exclusion that they face on a societal 
level is even greater. Perhaps this is why some religious groups encourage their members to 
serve in order to gain access to various means of upward mobility in society. However, this is 
certainly not the norm.  
The reason that the military at its core is seen as a flaw is its secular and Ashkenazi 
background deeply entrenched in the Zionist enterprise. While this has certainly changed 
through time, and the military in its contemporary form has a far wider range of ethnic 
diversity, religious diversity, and so on than found at large in some segments of Israeli 
society, there is still a give-and-take between the stringent military hierarchy and the 
elasticity of Israeli society. Therefore, “the military remains an important institution for the 
achievement of social status and citizenship rights” (Ben-Porat & Turner, 2008, p. 198).  
   
 4. Repercussions of non-service 
 There are many repercussions of non-service, including non-service in all the various 
available forms from military service to national service and other programs. Two of the 
critical factors associated with national service are economic integration in terms of the 
available opportunities for an individual having successfully completed national service, as 
well as social integration. It is interesting to note that the idea of non-service takes place at 
two distinct levels. On one hand, this issue very much involves the individual and is centered 
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on the individual’s participation in national service. This is essentially a choice that each 
person is required to make individually. On the other hand, there is certainly a social 
component to this issue as well. Many social factors exist within, for example, the ultra-
Orthodox community, as well as other factors that could influence an individual’s decision to 
complete national service or serve in the military. This situation leads to intensely complex 
questions regarding the place of religion in both the public and private spheres. This issue is 
dealt with on both the societal as well as the individual level and has very different 
repercussions and perhaps very different motivating factors at each level. One of the crucial 
factors that underline the repercussions of non-service is that exclusion—either by choice or 
from being excluded for various reasons—leads to increased poverty.  
 One side effect is economic. Because deferment is conditional on the recipient devoting 
himself to full-time study, Haredi youngsters cannot openly join the national workforce. This 
situation deprives the economy of a potential pool of productivity -- and increases Haredi 
dependence on charity and social security welfare. More important still are the wider social 
repercussions. Over the years, Haredi and secular groups have clashed, sometimes violently, on 
a wide range of issues that both communities consider to be cultural markers...instead of 
helping to alleviate tension thus generated, conscription (more precisely, the non-application of 
conscription to Haredim) very much aggravates discord. (Cohen 2008, p. 131) 
 
Because of the way in which national service is intrinsically tied to economic opportunity, 
the system, therefore, precludes a choice by the individual in many cases.  
 The social framework in which one either does or does not participate in national 
service has been strengthened through time by strict guidelines within the ultra-Orthodox 
community and repercussions from secular society on the outside. This essentially 
strengthens the threat of assimilation through military service on a community level and 
makes it difficult or impossible for individuals to overcome this even if they wanted to.  
Yocheved Saks observes that preventing various individuals from participating in 
society simply creates a black market for labor and so on because of the consequences that 
would otherwise be faced. She makes the point that the values and the fundamental workings 
of society have to be in concert in order to achieve a balance that benefits all members of 
society, not simply the select few. 
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(Sigh). There's—look, all that does is drive Haredi society underground. All it does is create 
a cash society. Here we go back to Torah again. In David Hamelech's army, you couldn't—
you couldn't fight in David Hamelech's army if you talked after Baruch She'amar. You know, 
we're talking about respect for Torah law. If the army had respect for Torah law, and if it 
could be proven that people weren't degraded because of being Haredi or asked to do things 
that they should never ever have been asked to do because they were Haredi, this never 
would have happened. (Interview with Yocheved Saks, 2011) 
 
This state of affairs can also be seen as a further preservation of the status quo where in the 
past, the ultra-Orthodox community maintained a strict and distinct separation from secular 
society, and secular society, for various reasons, did not necessarily enforce its will on the 
ultra-Orthodox community. This creates a duality in which the status quo is preserved, and 
the issue of service or non-service is played out at a higher level than the individual.  
 The commitment of the ultra-Orthodox to the yeshiva, on the one hand, and the possibility that 
if they’re not in the yeshiva they will be drafted into the army, on the other, also has economic 
consequences. The ultra-Orthodox have a low participation rate in the work force...and are the 
poorest sector in Israeli society after the Arabs, with large families relying on State support. 
Consequently, questions of welfare and child support are at the heart of the religious party's 
agenda. The other, no less important, component to the agenda is the struggle to preserve the 
status quo against the challenges that are rapidly eroding it. (Ben-Porat 2008, pp. 32–33) 
 
Yet, despite the fact that participation in national service has in the past been seen as merely 
symbolic, and, ultimately, the numbers did not matter one way or another, a new reality is 
beginning to form in the minds of secular society. Due to the increased poverty of the ultra-
Orthodox sector resulting from non-integration in the workforce as well as an inevitable 
demographic shift as population numbers increase at a far greater rate among the ultra-
Orthodox community, new importance will be placed on national service. By necessity, this 
discussion has changed the military and the way it views the ultra-Orthodox community as 
well as creating the potential for significant social change. 
 Service in the IDF has been seen as an important social marker, which at its core, 
creates a common and shared experience for the majority of Israelis. “A young man…at the 
Mir Yeshiva told a reporter that probably half of his cohort would like to be recruited, but 
‘they are afraid about what people will say about them, they are afraid that such a step may 
hamper their chances for a good marriage’” (Stadler & Ben-Ari, 2003, p. 43). Should there 
be increased numbers of the ultra-Orthodox community serving in the military in whatever 
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form they choose, this will perhaps have a great impact on the social mobility the ultra-
Orthodox community currently lacks.  
Thanks to the “baby boom” experienced in Israel after the end of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, 
and to a large extent of recent immigration from the former USSR and Ethiopia, the high 
incidence of non-enlistment by the ultra-Orthodox community does not seriously affect Israel's 
military potential. Its primary importance is symbolic; by choosing not to participate in such 
large numbers in what is still generally regarded as the most significant of all national 
obligations, members of the Haredi community have reinforced the marginal status that their 
particular codes of dress and manners in any case make likely. More seriously still, their non-
service has also helped to stimulate societal contention. At a time when most Israeli youngsters 
are still required to devote two or three years of their lives to conscript service, and they obey 
summonses to reserve duty for some two decades thereafter, the sight of so many Haredim who 
recognize no such obligation generates a resentment and friction. Thus, instead of being a 
shared experience that might perform a bridging function between the religious and secular 
segments of the population, conscription has become an issue that intensifies their discord. 
(Cohen, 1999, p. 396) 
 
This issue, generally, is an ongoing point of contention between secular and religious Israelis 
and has been extremely contentious in the past. By reaching a new understanding, these 
disagreements could be mitigated, and this particular issue could be a starting point for a new 
discussion regarding state and religion in the Israeli context. 
There have been previous attempts to include the ultra-Orthodox community in 
national service, but due to various reasons such as internal and external pressures within the 
ultra-Orthodox community as well as the perception by the secular society towards the 
importance of creating an all-inclusive structure, these attempts were not necessarily 
successful.  
For a short period between 1956 and 1960 some Haredim undertook military service in units 
meant for Haredi boys who did not see themselves as scholars and who thought they could 
make a life for themselves in a “religious” unit of the army (Nahal). However, as the society of 
scholars became the norm in the Haredi world those who chose this option were viewed as 
losers, men who could not succeed in the yeshiva. (Stadler & Ben-Ari, 2003, p.18). 
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There are many social barriers to integration in general, and in specific, the individual needs 
to have more options both within his community as well as within society at large. This may 
not necessarily include the individual serving in some form of national service rather than 
non-service. Change of societal attitudes is required to find the best equilibrium between 
learning and national service and not necessarily relying on the propaganda of one extreme or 
the other. It is only through these measures that societal attitudes will begin to shift, and new 
forms of participation in the state will become apparent. 
 
 5. The Tal Law 
 As integration of the ultra-Orthodox into the IDF as well as society at large has been a 
lingering issue, “the Supreme Court charged the government to craft…legislation which 
would clarify the military status of the ultra-Orthodox” (Efron, 2003, p. 64).  
On August 23rd, 1999, then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak appointed a 10 person commission 
headed by Retired Justice Zvi Tal as well as six religious members to propose legislation on 
the issue of yeshiva draft deferments…According to the Commission's proposed law, 
deferments for yeshiva students would continue with no limit on their numbers....However, 
the proposal introduced a new concept —a so called decision year...giving yeshiva students 
reaching the age of 23 a free year in which they may pursue work or further study vocational 
training without being subject to the military draft. (Maizie, 2006, p. 190) 
 
Once the year of decision ends, the individual has several options: He may return to yeshiva 
and continue to enjoy deferments from IDF service; he may enlist for a shortened, four-
month period of service, or he may commit to one year of civil national service within the 
Haredi community (Maizie, 2006, p. 190). Choosing another path is a de facto recognition 
that one is no longer a full time learner in yeshiva. This arrangement, where the student is 
classified as  
“His Torah is his profession”...declares that Torah study is his professional activity, receives 
deferral from military service in order to study at his chosen yeshiva. Form 7302, Clause 3, 
states: “I hereby declare that ‘the Torah is my profession,’ and that I am currently not 
working, nor am I engaged in work or employment of any kind, paid or unpaid.” (Drory, 
2009, p. 164) 
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The Tal Commission law  
begins by noting that the system of deferrals was “as old as the state of Israel itself.” It began 
with an edict issued during the War of Independence, on March 3rd, 1948, saying that “a 
decision has been reached that yeshiva students...are exempt from military service.” In 1949, 
David Ben-Gurion…extended the exemption. It was not until 1951 that he formalized this 
policy. (Efron, 2003, p. 64) 
 
Thus the Tal Law framework, a legislated change to the system of military service was 
established, and in “2002, the Israel parliament (Knesset) approved a five-year deferment law 
for yeshiva students based on recommendations of [the] committed headed by Justice Zvi 
Tal” (Fleischer & Gal, 2007, p. 63). The law was extended for another five years in 2007 
(Cohen, 2008, p. 132). It is important to note that the number of yeshiva students has 
multiplied extensively since the time the exemption was first enacted. “The yeshiva world 
has grown, from an estimated 35,000 during the 1980s to more than 72,000 at present” 
(Stadler et al., 2008, p. 222). 
The Tal Committee worked long and diligently, [although] it failed to find a panacea....After 
acrimonious debate, the “Service Deferral Law” incorporating this proposal was passed in 
July 2002. Fifty-one Knesset members voted in favor, 41 opposed, five abstained and 22 
absented themselves from the chamber. With far less fanfare, the law was extended for 
another five years in 2007 when the voting was 56 to nine. (Cohen, 2008, p. 132) 
 
It should be noted, however, that “even the chairman of the commission…Tzvi Tal prudently 
announced that he too was dissatisfied with the commission's findings, but he insisted they 
represented the best possible beginning of a solution to a problem that had festered for over 
50 years” (Efron, 2003, pp. 63–64). Under the law, students are able to defer their military 
service for several years, meaning that at age 18, after having studied in a preparatory or 
senior level yeshiva, they can make a decision about working versus continuing their 
religious studies.  
 The Tal Law was primarily aimed at ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students, while 
“Orthodox Zionists...felt that the Tal Commission had endorsed the mistaken notion that 
army service somehow conflicts with religion” (Efron, 2003, p. 70). Yeshiva students, once 
they became of age for military service, could then choose whether to join the army for their 
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mandated conscription or to continue to learn in yeshiva. Studies would generally continue in 
an upper level program referred to as Beis Midrash or Kollel. The Tal law enables yeshiva 
students to stay in yeshiva and to “choose after a year of work at age twenty-three, whether to 
continue their yeshiva studies, to enlist in the army, or to serve one year in a civic-service 
program” (Fleischer & Gal, 2007, p. 63). Most Haredi authorities saw these 
recommendations as threatening the community's very existence (Stadler et al., 2008, p. 222). 
It is important to note that it is illegal to work under the yeshiva exemption status for 
the army. While army service is deferred, students must remain in yeshiva until they become 
ineligible by age or through having many children, or they are forced to de facto serve in the 
army. Therefore, the Tal Law gives yeshiva students the option to join military service for 
usually a shortened period or stay in yeshiva until they are ineligible for military service, 
which is approximately 26 to 30 years old. As an answer to this, Nahal Haredi, or Netzach 
Yehuda, was formed to allow soldiers to complete their military service in a battalion that 
includes combat units, support and logistics, command and control, and many other ancillary 
positions. This move has had real results, “[b]y establishing and maintaining [Nachal 
Haredi]...the IDF signals that it is a 'People's Army' that is, that including of Haredi soldiers 
expresses the fact that it encompasses all major groups in Israeli society while taking into 
account their special needs” (Stadler et al., 2008, pp. 222–223). 
In this unit, a soldier is able to acquire practical, real-world job skills as a driver or 
soldier or many positions in-between. It is important to note that these ultra-Orthodox units 
differ from regular military structures in that on the base, under normal circumstances, there 
are no women present, either enlisted soldiers or officers; the food in these divisions, unlike 
the regular rigorous standard maintained by the Military Rabbinate on all army bases in the 
IDF, is only Mehadrin (or kosher food with an extra-strict level of kosher supervision); and 
they adhere to a much higher level of religious observance. This includes mandatory prayer 
times and many functions as a unit for observance. In the military, in general, soldiers have 
more flexibility to select from the various religious options available to them; however, in 
these units, religion is integrated into the functioning of the unit.  
There is also the threat of exclusion and alienation from the ultra-Orthodox 
community for individuals participating in service in the military. Initially, when people 
would join the army, it would be much more difficult for them upon the completion of their 
Shapiro 234 
 
military service to return to ultra-Orthodox society; they would find it much more difficult to 
find a spouse as society would exclude them on the basis of their seeming secularization in 
the army. However, as time goes on, this route becomes more acceptable to society at large, 
and members will be encouraged to participate in the armed forces as a practical financial 
decision, which will provide a valuable entrée into society at large.  
In religious units, individuals generally start when they are older as they have to come 
to the decision to serve in the army, which usually happens after they have to choose between 
leaving yeshiva and working. To facilitate them working or pursuing any type of secular 
higher education, they have first to serve in the army; therefore, the majority of individuals in 
this situation are already older and married with a more developed family, and they are more 
self-confident in the approach they are taking in terms of the army without the religious 
element of military service that religious Zionist soldiers have.  
 The Tal Law expired in 2012. The legal situation around a similar arrangement is 
being addressed by the Knesset in various ways. Ongoing evaluation and analysis will 
contribute to the direction a new legal framework will take and will determine if the program 
has been a success and whether the program should continue. It is possible that a new legal 
framework is needed to address military, societal, and socioeconomic issues in a more 
comprehensive way. Numerous other frameworks could serve the same purpose of 
integration and perhaps address the original intention of the law in comparison to some of the 
shortcomings of the Tal Law. 
 
 6. Nachal Haredi (Netzach Yehuda) 
 In the religious Netzach Yehuda unit, originally known as Nachal Haredi, many 
soldiers coming from ultra-Orthodox backgrounds do not see a correlation between the 
holiness and sanctity of the land of Israel and their role in the IDF. Many of these soldiers 
join the IDF for socioeconomic reasons and to integrate further into Israeli society. They are 
not doing so for religious reasons in the same way that Religious Zionist soldiers see their 
mission to participate in the modern state of Israel. Indeed, many ultra-Orthodox groups see 
the current state of Israel as the antithesis of the historical Jewish state and believe that it is 
not until the Messiah returns that the state has any legitimacy. While the original members of 
these types of units were exclusively the outcasts of the ultra-Orthodox community, the 
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program has begun to gain traction within the ultra-Orthodox community itself. It has 
become a more acceptable way to enable both soldiers and families to survive in harder 
economic times, as it presents “an option for Haredi youth that would increase their 
opportunities to enter the labor market and ameliorate the rampart poverty among Israel's 
ultra-Orthodox Jews” (Maizie, 2006, p. 190). Military service is then viewed as a tacit 
acceptance of state authority; instead of service for idealistic reasons, it becomes an avenue 
for short-term financial gain and long-term options.  
Miriam Jacoby discusses the fact that individuals in the ultra-Orthodox community 
are able to serve in their own units in the military and are able to maintain the religious 
character of their community; serving in the military does not necessarily mean that one is 
forced to assimilate. Therefore, she points out that even though this is not a perfect situation, 
it is still possible to maintain a balance between the military and ultra-Orthodox life without 
necessarily giving up one or the other. 
I think they are a good idea. Like, we want these people incorporated—the only way to 
incorporate a group into society in Israel is through the army or sherut leumi, National 
Service, so I think they are a great idea. Haredi units in the army are terrific. It's getting 
these people to serve, at the same time giving them what they need. ... If they don’t want to be 
assimilated, they are not going to assimilate. I learned this in college. If you don’t want to 
assimilate, you don’t have to assimilate... Right, but at the same time they [ultra-Orthodox 
soldiers serving in religious units] still have to—no matter how separate they are, they are 
still going to be fighting, they are still going to be learning, they are still going to be having 
tfassim [forms], and they are going to be— they're doing something. It’s a little bit. It's not 
100%, but it’s a little bit. (Interview with Miriam Jacoby, 2011) 
 
 In terms of finances, soldiers, especially those who are in their mid-20s, now see the 
army as a way to survive economically. The average soldier enlisted in the army at large 
receives approximately 300 to 700 NIS (New Israeli Shekels) per month. In comparison, a 
religious soldier with one to two children, who serves in a non-combat position and travels 
home on a daily basis, receives vastly increased pay of approximately 3,000 to 4,000 NIS per 
month, based on the benefits available to soldiers from difficult socioeconomic backgrounds 
living with children and a willingness to volunteer in the IDF (Rubin, 2012, p. 177). In many 
cases, this salary is higher than what the person could make either learning in a communally 
supported yeshiva or working at a job, as many ultra-Orthodox yeshivas do not train their 
students in any practical or applicable job skill for the larger secular Israeli society.   
 Because most Haredi men get no more than basic education in math and science, even those 
who want to work can't get jobs in the technology industry. Those who do serve in the army 
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don't qualify for the high-tech units that produce entrepreneurs. One attempt to address this is 
an army program called “Wisdom in Khaki” that offers haredi men training in computers and 
communications work. These men apply these newly acquired skills in the intelligence branch 
of the army. When they finish their service they are equipped to find high-tech jobs. 
(Ackerman & Odenheimer 2010, p. 17) 
 
Netzach Yehudah [“Eternal Judah”] is “an almost totally segregated [battalion] formation” 
(Cohen, 2008, p.133). Segregation is in the form of gender separation, as well as external 
influences secular soldiers are exposed to, encompassing a wide range of prohibited 
activities, from entertainment options to unit vacation venues.  
Nahal Haredi began in 1999 and was sanctioned by leading rabbinical figures of the 
Haredi world, some of whom regarded the unit as a potentially convenient dumping-ground 
for young Haredi men [who lacked an] attitude for intensive studies….[Nevertheless], Haredi 
negotiators…drove a hard bargain, placing a ceiling on the number of Haredi youths who 
could be drafted, and insisting that they serve in an environment completely of their 
own….They demanded guarantees that the young men…would be sequestered from contact 
with females…[allowed] regular contact with their rabbis and granted all the freedoms 
required [to observe] Jewish Orthodox rituals in accordance with the stringent Haredi 
requirements (Cohen 2008, pp. 132–133) 
 
Netzach Yehuda  
is a combat unit numbering a few hundred men, based on an exhaustive course of training, 
and assigned active operational duties. Yet because it is specifically designated as Haredi it 
enjoys special conditions designed to serve the religious needs of soldiers such as special 
time periods for prayer and Talmud study. Moreover, not only is the command structure in 
religious hands (modern-Orthodox individuals are commanders), but teachers and religious 
“supervisors” are brought in from outside to oversee ongoing observance and indoctrination 
(Stadler et al., 2008, p. 222) 
 
Netzach Yehuda soldiers are expected to perform at least two years of combat service, after 
which they can spend the year learning a trade or studying for matriculation exams (Perko, 
2002, p. 101-119).  
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 Most recruits serve in communication and computer-oriented positions. They come 
from all over the country and from most of the ultra-Orthodox groups—Gur Hassidim, 
Litvacks, Sanz Hassidim, and Sephardim. There is also a significant increase in recruits 
coming from more extreme communities such as Beitar Illit and Modi'in Illit. “‘The program 
Bina in Green is tailored to fit the needs of the Haredi recruits…[It offers] a gender-oriented 
environment with no women, mehadrin kosher food, afternoon prayer time, and [for some 
soldiers, leave]...on a daily basis” (Shoychat, 2010, p. 7). The special accommodations made 
for ultra-Orthodox soldiers have made serving in a religious unit a more palatable option for 
some in the ultra-Orthodox community. 
The Netzach Yehuda unit celebrated its 10th anniversary in 2009 with a celebration at 
Hebrew University Mount Scopus Campus. Current and former soldiers of the battalion 
attended, as did Deputy Defense Minister Matan Vilna’i. A common theme sounded by the 
speakers was the skepticism with which the project was initially greeted compared to the 
tremendous progress it has made in 10 short years. More than 2,500 soldiers have passed 
through the Nahal Haredi program and the sight of bearded men with payot in uniform is no 
longer the shocking sight it once was in insular Haredi enclaves.  
Yehuda Aronson makes it seem that the secular government is trying to be 
accommodating on the surface, yet this might not necessarily be the case. He notes that 
individuals who are not suited for the highest echelons of Jewish learning need to have other 
functions in society. Essentially, participation in national service becomes a resulting 
function of the ability of an individual to sit and learn in yeshiva. Aronson points to the 
importance of where the value is instilled—through the military or national framework—and 
it is important to recognize that foreign values are imposed by secular society in the context 
of military service. According to Aronson, this acknowledges that instead of including ultra-
Orthodox cultural and religious values, particular secular values are being presented to 
soldiers, and this comes down to a fundamental question of power and religion. In essence, 
he speaks to the hegemony and power of the government to set the agenda towards the 
members of the ultra-Orthodox society as it pertains fundamentally to their way of life. This, 
therefore, presents a cause for alarm for individuals who seek to stay within their small social 
circle and maintain their traditional religious lifestyle. 
Outwardly, it seems that they're trying to be more accommodating. That may not actually be 
true. It may be a cover-up for something else that's going on, which probably is true. On the 
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other hand, the—a certain amount of it for certain types of people—it's a good thing. People 
who are not just cut out to just learn all day—it would be good to have—you know, get them 
integrated, get a job or whatever, and if they don't have army service or whatever they—
they'll be in trouble. They'll be on the streets. That's the at risk youth movement—it has a 
good side to it as well. But again, the way it's being run, and by whom it's being run—that 
may not be the ideal, but it's—a lot of it comes down to the—it boils down—it's not the issue 
that they're arguing up here. It's that— this issue, we could live with. It's what's right behind 
that. ... if right now we allow the government to dictate like, you know, where the boys are 
going to go, they're going to step into the schools and they're going to start stepping into—to 
dictate everything, and that's a problem. And we don't want them—the secular government to 
dictate our way of life. We have our rabbanim to dictate how—what direction we're supposed 
to take in life. (Interview with Yehuda Aronson, 2011) 
 
According to the founder of the program, the success of Nahal Haredi gave the IDF 
the confidence to create frameworks for Haredi servicemen in other branches of the military. 
The Air Force, for example, has opened a program called Blue Dawn, which trains Haredi 
men as airplane mechanics and technicians. “‘The Nahal Haredi today is setting an example 
both in spirit and in the military expertise to all the battalions in the Israel Defense Forces,’ 
said Rabbi Tzvi Klebanow, director of the Netzah Yehuda nonprofit organization, which 
provides some financial support to the battalion” (Sokol, 2011). Despite the successes of the 
program, cultural acceptance is still a major barrier to wide spread acceptance of national 
service in the Haredi community.  
 
 7. Alternatives to military service 
 The government has created various alternatives to military service and allows ultra-
Orthodox individuals to compromise and fulfill their obligation to national service in many 
different ways. For many in the ultra-Orthodox community, military service above and 
beyond the special units discussed elsewhere presents an alien way of life simply 
incompatible with ultra-Orthodox values. Through various alternative frameworks, both 
within and outside of the military, some accommodation is taking place allowing for greater 
integration and social cohesion. Nevertheless, although the reasons behind these programs 
are sound—to end the welfare trap created by social pressures to remain in learning 
indefinitely and allow an individual options—these frameworks run counter to the intention 
of Israel’s founding principles (see Kanaaneh, 2009, pp. 31–34; Shafir and Peled, 2002, 
pp.143–145).  
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Menashe Blum maintains it is of great importance for there to be increasing 
communication between the ultra-Orthodox community and the rest of society. This 
conversation, he mentions, must be in the context of reaffirming the importance of religious 
priorities within society. 
Ultra-Orthodox Jews believe that the ultimate goal of life is sitting and learning Torah. And 
they believe that the soldiers are protected, and Israel is protected, by them learning Torah. 
And if the other side can't see that, and they don't understand that, then they're never going to 
—  they can't understand why those people are in yeshiva and not in the army. ... And from 
the haredi point of view, they say, I don't have to sit — I don't need an army. All I have to do 
is say Tehillim and HaKadosh Baruch Hu will protect me. So what do I need the army for? So 
therefore why should I go in the army? The two sides can't see the other side, they just don't 
understand it. (Interview with Menashe Blum, 2011) 
 
 David Ben-Gurion, upon the establishment of the state, had a vision of the IDF as 
Israel's sole defence organization and would not consider the establishment of ultra-Orthodox 
or Orthodox units. This is due to the fractured nature of the initial Israeli defence forces, 
which were an amalgam of various groups fighting against the British Mandate for 
independence. It was feared that creating socialized groups would be opening the door to 
maintaining old allegiances to pre-IDF forces and would create an inevitable rift within the 
military. Over time, various ultra-Orthodox units have existed, although these individuals 
have not had complete support of the entire ultra-Orthodox community.  
Menashe Blum also talks about an escape mechanism community that would allow 
for a transition into the ultra-Orthodox community. He discusses a way that creates a 
productive and realistic approach to specialization where the entire society does not 
necessarily follow one particular path but has multiple options in order to achieve a greater 
degree of economic success for those who are not necessarily interested in staying in yeshiva. 
In essence, this perspective looks at changing the status quo and making it more along the 
lines of what is observed in a Diaspora. 
I think it's a very good thing. I think, I mean, I have a son who went through Nahal Haredi 
and it's a very good thing. I don't think everybody that's in yeshiva wants to be in yeshiva.   
They can't leave yeshiva, they can't get jobs because they haven't done the army. But this 
gives them an option of going into the army in a very very closed type of environment which 
does not affect their Yiddishkeit and enables them to do something productive with their lives. 
Not meaning the Torah is not productive, but they can't do that, they don't want to do that, 
and this gives them an option, another option, and I think options are good. (Interview with 
Menashe Blum, 2011) 
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 Alternative frameworks allow individuals to serve within their own communities at 
non-military positions ranging from police services to park rangers, ambulance attendants, 
school tutors, and so on. They have approximately the same type of pay scale as the military 
with shortened service, allowing individuals to fulfill their obligation of national service and 
present more options in terms of societal integration. An individual following civilian service 
or national service would be able to legally seek employment in the job market and would no 
longer be a prisoner of the system, which forces men to remain in the yeshiva for several 
decades until they’re able to pursue other options. 
Yoav Daniel talks about the way in which military service or alternate programs are a 
form of secular hegemony over the ultra-Orthodox community. He maintains that the very 
structure of the programs is being done for the wrong reasons. Rather than trying to be 
inclusive and provide options, the military is trying to mold the ultra-Orthodox community, 
instead of taking the unique approaches the ultra-Orthodox community has to offer and 
integrating them within the secular society. 
I think it's legitimate, but I know that there is an underlying—I think that some of the people 
who are behind it, they have ulterior motives. They want to create a revolution and instead of 
recognizing that these kind of frameworks are appropriate for a certain segment of young 
men, it's not—that it shouldn’t be imposed on everyone, that they have no business coming 
along and changing a whole society's worldview. (Interview with Yoav Daniel, 2011) 
 
 Various alternatives to military service are being proposed for ultra-Orthodox 
individuals in order to exempt them from their requirement for military service and integrate 
them into the job force. While, in the past decade, numerous programs have been created to 
accomplish this, notably Nahal Haredi in the army and a helicopter technician/mechanic 
course in the air force, these programs do not reach far enough into the ultra-Orthodox 
community. Therefore, they do not have the impact necessary to reach an ever-growing ultra-
Orthodox population of military age, unable, or unwilling, to serve in the military. A number 
of these new programs will be examined in the context of their integrative and potential 
benefit to the ultra-Orthodox population.  
 
 a. National Service 
A new service paradigm has been created as an alternative to military service called 
National Service. National Service, or in Hebrew, Sherut Leumi, has primarily been a 
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program for Religious Zionist women who choose not to serve in the military but wish to 
contribute to the state. It offers alternative placements in various civilian settings such as 
hospitals, educational institutions, park service, et cetera. After considerable debate, this 
program has recently expanded to two new target populations: Israeli Arabs and the ultra-
Orthodox.  
Yonatan Smith underlines the importance of contributions to society and the 
importance of providing alternate service options for the ultra-Orthodox community. 
National service takes many forms, and there is a great degree of flexibility in terms of 
finding an option that balances the needs of the community and the demands of the state. 
Well, I think that everybody should provide some kind of service to the society as a whole.  I 
think that's a wonderful idea and I think that people that are not, for religious reasons, able 
to serve in the military should provide an alternate kind of service. Now before we talked 
about gemach to be in some way a— to incorporate the ability to give of oneself and to give 
to society as a whole and view that as gemilut chasadim for the general population. 
(Interview with Yonatan Smith, 2011) 
 
National Service for ultra-Orthodox individuals means that one is able to serve in his 
or her local community, contributing on a local basis where that individual can see real 
change and integrate into society. Through the National Service Program, participants are 
paid the same type of wages and benefits as one who serves in the military and upon 
completion of the program, are able to receive similar benefits to a noncombat soldier, such 
as tuition reimbursements or an allotted sum of money that can be used for various purposes 
such as starting a business or education, and the ability to fully integrate into society.  
Army duty, or alternatively National Service, is a prerequisite for young Haredi men seeking 
to join the workforce -- which has been a growing phenomenon in light of the global 
economic downturn that has diminished financial support from abroad. While legal 
limitations on employment might be removed at the end of a civilian service stint, a young 
Haredi man who has dedicated most of his life to Torah study will not necessarily have 
sufficient tools or training to start a career without the new [job training and alternative 
military service] initiative. (Mandel, 2011) 
 
The response to the National Service Project for ultra-Orthodox men has been 
considerable, with the program being completely full, albeit with limited numbers, as the 
project expands. Presenting alternatives to military service, such as National Service, allows 
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those who do not wish to remain under the status of learning in yeshiva, until they are 
otherwise exempted from the military, to participate in their local communities, receive 
compensation for the work that they are doing, and, most importantly, substitute the 
requirement for military service with participation in National Service.  
Upon completion of National Service, there is a great potential for individuals to 
pursue other options (although this has not yet been studied as it is a fairly new program), 
and the barriers that military service presents to the ultra-Orthodox are no longer a factor. In 
this open environment, whether one chooses to return to yeshiva learning or pursue other 
avenues such as employment or education, the ultra-Orthodox are able to do so, and this 
fundamentally changes the underlying pressure dynamics of the ultra-Orthodox community 
regarding training and education.  
 
 b. Civilian Service 
Civilian Service, or Sherut Ezrachi, is differentiated from National Service, Sherut 
Leumi, by a number of factors. While Sherut Leumi seeks to employ individuals in a variety 
of national, regional, or local community settings such as schools, rehabilitation hospitals, 
ambulance service, police service, et cetera, Sheirut Ezrachi seeks to place individuals in a 
similar setting within their own communities. This provides the opportunity for ultra-
Orthodox individuals to continue to learn in yeshiva, yet for part of the day, to be able to 
volunteer in a local grade school to tutor, for example. This new program (Lee-St. John, 
2007, p. 56) provides the opportunity for ultra-Orthodox individuals who do not wish to 
leave their enclaves of study and religious environments to remain within their communities 
and not be exposed to the outside world.  
Leah Halpern notes that while the programs geared towards the ultra-Orthodox 
community may, in fact, be engineered to preserve particular traditions and a way of life, 
they do not exactly meet those needs because, after all, they are part of the military. It is 
important to note that she says there is not a conflict between religious values and military 
service; therefore, the permissibility of military service is possible. 
I think that if it's—I mean, I don't know what the practical—I've spoken to people about this 
and—and, what I hear is that, they say that they're geared towards Haredim, but they're not 
really. So I don't know. If that's true, then obviously they have to work harder, but I think 
theoretically it could work. I think that if, if they take into consideration whatever your 
religious needs are and—not only take into consideration, but respect it, then, yeah, then why 
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shouldn't it work? It's not—it's not in conflict with the Torah, I don't think. (Interview with 
Leah Halpern, 2011) 
 
While this program does not represent the integrative advances National Service does, 
it still gives individuals the option to take advantage of various educational and financial 
opportunities once they complete the program. While in the program, much like military 
service, the individual receives a stipend for his volunteer work. In the case of many ultra-
Orthodox individuals—who have a difficult financial situation, or a large number of children, 
or many other socioeconomic factors—this support can be quite substantial and could allay 
the expenditures of other governmental departments such as National Insurance (Bituach 
Leumi) that might otherwise have to fund yeshiva learning.  
There are currently 1,582 Haredim taking part in civilian service, in fields of welfare, public 
security, public health, immigration absorption, and environmental protection, according to 
data provided by the Civilian and National Service Authority (Mandel, 2011) 
 
The advantage of this program is that the individual can more or less maintain his or 
her lifestyle, particularly under the aegis of the Tal Law, while becoming exempt from 
military service and earning money. There are numerous advantages to this system as a way 
of contributing to the resources within the ultra-Orthodox community and essentially helping 
fund many institutions’ lack of teachers and tutors due to a loss of funding. Through this 
promotion of communal services, the government is essentially able to promote options 
within the community that can ultimately lead to a dramatic shift: No longer encumbered by 
the restrictions of military service, one would be able to turn towards various economic 
opportunities or pursue higher education to that end. 
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Chapter 4  
Political and Social Consequences of Exclusion 
 
 This chapter examines the political and social consequences of the various institutions 
and actors that have built and perpetuated a system of social and religious norms, which 
essentially seeks to preserve the status quo rather than strive towards a comprehensive 
settlement or agreement. Chapter 3 focused on the various ways in which the ultra-Orthodox 
community is included or excluded from the larger issues in mainly secular Israeli society 
while at the same time retaining some political power and control over various bureaucratic 
aspects of religion and elements of self-determination. There are many consequences to the 
current structure of the social system. Through disproportionate voting power and with deep-
seated incompatibility of values and perspectives, neither side can readily reach a mutually 
beneficial agreement. Elements of an ongoing process of separate communities within Israeli 
society, moving apart into distinct units, require a new paradigm.  
 It is important that contentious social elements are addressed in a way that fosters 
future growth and creates the potential for a more inclusive society. This must include input 
and respect and value the contributions of the various communities. As a whole, this type of 
cooperation would represent compromise and be an essential element of a larger and more 
integrated society. This is examined in a number of ways from various issues facing the ultra-
Orthodox community, including education and national service, to factors such as gender 
equality and new emerging social paradigms that seek to change the fundamental patterns of 
life not only in the ultra-Orthodox community but also in the larger secular society. 
An example of gender and social divisions can be seen in the following interview 
with Yocheved Saks. She makes an interesting point that professional education is integral 
for gaining equality. This particular question about the divide between Ashkenazi and 
Sephardi segments of society can be extrapolated to a wider-ranging study of the ability of 
the ultra-Orthodox community to gain a larger role in society through professional education. 
It is interesting that Saks uses the idea of gender equality as an example for gaining parity 
and looks at both racial and religious factors through this paradigm. 
I think slowly but surely Sephardi Jews are getting more professional education, and 
certainly they are brilliant. Their Torah is like nothing—I remember listening to the Porat 
Yosef Torah even when I was here in '70-'71. Did you ever hear of Porat Yosef Torah? It 
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could cross your eyes, it's incredible. They are—they're brilliant Torah scholars, brilliant. 
No, I think that because they are slowly but surely entering the professions, that... Don't 
forget that there is a certain—at least from what I observe, there is a certain condescension 
of men towards women in Sephardi societies that is not as palpable in Ashkenazi societies. 
So, you know, that has to wash through the families. Here we go back down to the microcosm 
again; that you know, women have to feel themselves equal. You have somebody like Adina 
Bar Shalom—you know who this is? She's Rabbi Ovadia Yosef's daughter. She's the—as it 
were, the chancellor of the—I think they call it Hamachon HaCharedi. They're training all 
kinds of professionals there. 
(Interview with Yocheved Saks, 2011) 
 
Deciding what the state is to whom is no easy task. Indeed,  
the majority of ultra-Orthodox do not recognize Israel as the Jewish state that the Bible says 
will lead its people to redemption. According to them, the Jewish people are “apart from 
history,” under divine protection, and a secular national movement like Zionism will not be 
the harbinger of deliverance. (Pedahzur et al., 2000, p. 22)  
 
Bridging this gap to create a more inclusive progressive society is the key to the 
advancement of Israeli society as a whole. Whether it is the old or new vision of the state, 
accommodation can be made without resolving the issue of the intrinsic religious character of 
the state in a manner that serves both the interests of the state and its component 
communities. 
 
A. Social and Economic Issues 
 1. Halacha, the driving force behind the UO community 
 The ultra-Orthodox community operates by repeating various cultural, societal, and 
religious forms of observance. This is done through an ongoing process of textual 
interpretation and reinterpretation where the pattern of life from the largest issues of life and 
death and the direction of the community to the smallest issues governing dress, food, 
customs, interactions, and so on are based on textual interpretation. This happens in different 
ways depending on the particular structure of the sect or group in question, but on the whole, 
textual interpretation and reinterpretation are key facets to life in the ultra-Orthodox 
community. Issues of some significance and mundane everyday issues may have different 
customs or interpretations in Jewish law, and groups with different ancestry, customs, or 
origin may have slightly different customs as textually interpreted through their various 
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rabbinic authority figures. While generally, the hierarchy of rabbinic authority is somewhat 
decentralized, again depending on which particular group is being examined, the power to 
shape society and meet new challenges stems directly from the interpretation and 
examination of various textual references, both ancient and modern. This process does not 
yield the same results uniformly. There are often disagreements among authorities and 
diverging opinions on leniencies and stringencies or perhaps even the meaning and attention 
of a particular custom or law and how it is to be interpreted and applied. 
Yocheved Saks makes an important point that despite outward appearance, the ultra-
Orthodox community is not governed by monolithic rules standardized across all parts of the 
community. Rather, each individual follows his or her particular rabbi. Overall, a pattern of 
leadership emerges across the entire community, which is both intricate in its complexity and 
at the same time, extremely nuanced and detailed. There can be many different opinions 
regarding not only the letter of the law, which in many cases is not widely up for 
interpretation, but also the spirit of the law—the way in which individuals live every aspect of 
their lives. 
Here we go again. You see, these are questions that more or less my clients have asked me at 
various times. I always say that the difference between—let's say between Catholicism, 
Judaism, is that Judaism is not run by dogma. Judaism is run by—Judaism is a custom-
religion. It's custom-designed to fit every Jew. And because it's custom-defined to fit every 
Jew, that's why every Jew, if they're smart, will find themselves a rabbi, and aseh l'cha rav is 
essential. You have to have someone who can guide you. And if you don't have that, you go 
nowhere. How do I define Halacha? And I can tell you a lot of funny stories about people, 
you know—it just happened last night where someone had to ask a very unusual kind of 
question. And this question—if he had asked this question to any other rabbi, the rabbi would 
have probably totally freaked out because it was a really unusual question pertaining to 
marriage et cetera. And this person was perceptive enough to know that he better not ask 
anybody else and he better ask my husband (laughs)— when I heard my husband answer the 
question, I said to myself—I said to him, oh, good for so-and-so; he knew to ask this only to 
[…identifying information removed…]. (Laughs). (Interview with Yocheved Saks, 2011) 
 
 The product of this system is a master of sacred text whose reference group is composed of 
other masters of Jewish text. It is the praise of his peers which the halakhic authority most 
avidly seeks, their opprobrium which he most assiduously avoids. As a result, those with the 
authority to innovate or at least legitimate new modes of thought, new outlooks, new attitudes 
within Orthodoxy are least likely to do so. (Liebman, 1998, p. 405) 
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This source of authority could be used in a socially progressive manner yielding positive 
change, however that is interpreted, or conversely, this type of control could be used to 
maintain or strengthen the status quo. Regardless of the direction the interpretation of Jewish 
law takes, the overriding commonality is the ubiquitous nature of Jewish law in the patterns 
of life within the ultra-Orthodox community. This has far-reaching effects outside the ultra-
Orthodox community as well, ranging from customs practiced among secular members of 
Israeli society to the underlying principles guiding government policy. 
 New and complex situations are dealt with in this manner—from the latest 
advancements in biotechnology to the interpretation of how various technologies should be 
used within the context of Jewish spiritual life. This process necessarily becomes very fluid 
with the ability to quickly adapt to new situations by reinterpretation of millennia of tradition 
and law. To fit the particular circumstance, this mechanism becomes key to adapting to the 
changing world surrounding ultra-Orthodox Judaism. This is particularly important as 
questions emerge relating to technological advancement and the resulting rapid pace of 
societal advancement and external influences. This is, perhaps, a modern parallel to the 
Enlightenment and continues to the present day. In the ultra-Orthodox community, Halacha 
provides the guiding principles to maintain authentic Judaism as interpreted by its users. 
 Halacha is at the surface, a compendium of rabbinic text interpretations and dictates 
spanning thousands of years, stemming from interpretations of the written and oral Torah. 
This includes exegeses and descriptions codifying every conceivable aspect of daily life and 
ritual expounded upon and discussed at length through millennia, including contemporary 
interpretations. Within the ultra-Orthodox community, in Israel, the textual basis of religion 
is not set apart from everyday practice. Rather, it is practiced and acted out with exacting 
accuracy. This applies to both the direction of communal and social matters as well as the 
personal, as “matters of Halachah, bearing on practical matters of conduct (Freudenthal, 
1998, p. IX)” are seen throughout ultra-Orthodox life. It is a process that leads to 
reinterpretation and reinforcement in an ongoing cycle as individuals collectedly absorb, 
correct, re-establish, reinterpret, and continue the chain of tradition. In Judaism the present 
reality of Judaism is linked in an “unbroken chain” to Sinai and Moses. This is meant to be 
indicative of an unchanging reality.  
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Haredi religious authorities, writers, publishers, and other cultural agents must defend the 
purity of the Haredi enclave through moral arguments about the ethical and cosmological 
ordering of the universe and through ever more precise and disambiguated prescriptions 
governing both public and private life. Alien cultural practices, commodities, and lifestyles 
must be assessed, resisted, selectively appropriated, or replaced with acceptable substitutes. 
Outsiders must be won over, neutralized, or kept at a distance. Yet all such strategic efforts 
invariably require defenders of the Haredi enclave to master the use of speech genres, 
managerial techniques, and modes of cultural activity found in the “outer world” domains of 
advertising, fundraising, political lobbying, secular scholarship, popular music, and fashion. 
(Stolow, 2010, pp. 103–104) 
 
Halacha itself is slow to change and adapt to new circumstances in terms of social evolution 
and often acts to counteract assimilation and integration in foreign societies. This is not to 
say that Halacha is stymied by new technologies or new circumstances. Rather, Halacha is 
often at the forefront of biological, biomedical, and technical advances where new 
interpretations of centuries-old rules can lead to potential leniencies still within the confines 
of the strict dictates of Jewish law.  
Nevertheless, it is still difficult to gain forward traction and attempt to change some 
of the underlying contentious issues. It can even be difficult to address potentially 
contentious issues using the present-day, non-hierarchical system with multiple sects and 
divisions (as outlined in Chapter 2) without one clear leader. This lack of centralization in the 
ultra-Orthodox world, and to a greater degree in the Jewish world at large, means that one’s 
opinions may vary greatly depending on which particular rabbi that person follows and how 
that rabbi interprets Jewish law. That does not mean that there are no standards. On the 
contrary, textual references create many clear delineations of what can and cannot be 
interpreted and reinterpreted. In many ways, similarities in the ultra-Orthodox community in 
Israel outweigh the numerous distinctions when it comes to the interpretation and 
observances surrounding Jewish law.  
Yoav Daniel discusses a lack of centralization of rabbinic authority in the Diaspora, 
while this lack of centralization is by no means the case in Israel. Due to the geographic 
proximity of ultra-Orthodox communities and the more cloistered nature of the ultra-
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Orthodox community in Israel, it may be possible that rabbinic authority is concentrated to a 
greater degree in Israel than in the Diaspora in general. 
(pauses) One difference is—I heard that rabbinical authority is different in America because 
you don’t have communities that are as tight-knit. You know, you'll have people spread out 
across the whole country, so someone can't come in and say this is what the rabbis say; 
everyone has to do this. You know, things like cellphones. Even if there is a worthy cause, or 
maybe not such a worthy cause, you just can't get it done, which has advantages and 
disadvantages. (Interview with Yoav Daniel, 2011) 
 
 2. Principled accommodationism 
 Orthodox Judaism as a whole has been forged and moulded during time through 
response to outside secularizing forces. The constant threat of assimilation has caused a shift 
within the religion as a reaction to secularization and, as a consequence, opposition to 
compromise. Yet for the ultra-Orthodox community in Israel, there is a degree of 
accommodation within the religion to encompass both the spiritual and the physical realms as 
ends to ensure the continuity and stability of Jewish Orthodoxy.  
An interesting example of this is the perspective taken by Chief Rabbi of British 
Mandate Palestine, Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, who created a symbiosis of Zionism and 
religion. In essence, he argued for the inherent religiosity of Israel and Religious Zionists 
who were building towards a dream of the ultimate redemption by settling the land of Israel. 
The settlers who were not religious, the secular Zionists, did not necessarily realize the 
reasons behind their actions, but they too were ultimately contributing to both the physical 
and spiritual well-being of the Zionist enterprise with all its religious overtones.  
 [Principled accommodationism] was formulated by the ultra-Orthodox Rabbi A.I. Kook 
(1865-1935), chief Ashkenazi rabbi of [British Mandate] Palestine from 1921 until his death. 
According to Kook's famous “synthesis” Zionist settlement in Palestine was the “advent of 
redemption” (atchalta degeula), a preliminary but essential stage in the holy process of 
redemption. Secular Zionists, while indeed sinners, were unknowingly carrying out God's 
will in setting up physical prerequisites for the final spiritual redemption. Although final 
redemption required that all Jews repent and return to religion, the preparatory work done by 
secular Zionists was potentially and partially sacred, and so were its perpetrators. (Shafir & 
Peled, 2002, p. 139) 
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According to Rabbi Kook, this is indicative of how a religious goal, such as the inherent 
spiritual dimension of settling Israel, can be met by incorporating a secular-type endeavour.  
 As a defence mechanism, the normal response to external pressures is continued 
isolation and withdrawal. This response serves to safeguard the practices, religious values, 
and way of life established by the community over time. This may be further characteristic of 
a contraction of base values and stringencies in observance to increased Orthodoxy in order 
to maintain what is perceived now to be the status quo. This change is, in fact, significant of 
a build-up over a long period of time and not only a response, rather an ongoing increase in 
values and social norms. Principled accommodationism does work in some respects, yet it 
cannot meet the long-term goals of the ultra-Orthodox community. This is particularly true 
when the fundamental values of the ultra-Orthodox community and the surrounding secular 
society stand in opposition to developed and entrenched “religious” beliefs.  
 
B. Institutions and Change 
 1. Working towards common goals 
 An anecdote serves to illustrate this process: A recent nationwide safety campaign 
that targeted drivers to slow down on highways as well as to ensure that their seatbelts were 
fastened did not make an impact at all in self-segregated exclusively Haredi neighborhoods 
and towns. In these locations, access or willingness to partake in communications generally 
available throughout the society, such as TV, secular newspapers, Internet, and so on, did not 
have much of an impact. Therefore, both on a practical level, as a money-saving element, as 
well as the importance of the underlying message, traffic safety officials visited various 
rabbis and asked them to include a message of road safety in their sermons or in various 
dialogues that they had with members of the community and its institutions. This is fitting 
with this study as Durkheim stated that “[s]ociology can then be defined as the science of 
institutions, of their genesis and functioning…[b]y ‘Institutions’...‘all beliefs and all modes 
of conduct instituted by the collectivity’” (Thompson, 1992, p.14). Perhaps this is 
contextualized in the rabbi-community relationship in this example.  
 The overall impact of this type of influence may generally be the same as advertising 
in other venues among secular society, but due to the top-down organization of Haredi 
society, these messages may be much more potent and afford an opportunity of working 
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through the system rather than coming from the outside. Another example of this institutional 
process is the discussion of various ultra-Orthodox military units that have been created. In 
these units, ultra-Orthodox rabbinical leaders were not only part of the consultative process 
to the formation of these units but are also integral to the ongoing operation and staffing of 
these units with members of their own community. 
 
C. Military 
 1. Military exemptions and deferments 
 The issue of exemptions and deferments from national service or military service by 
ultra-Orthodox men is a particularly difficult issue of contention between secular and 
religious politicians. The exemption or deferment from military service started in the pre-
state period with the accommodations made for the Agudat Yisrael party and were 
formalized after the establishment of the state when David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime 
minister, agreed to exempt Orthodox yeshiva students from recruitment in the military, which 
was imposed on the rest of Israeli Jewish society. This exemption was a result of political 
considerations and also was partially due to Ben-Gurion’s sympathy for the Orthodox 
community emerging from the decimation of the yeshiva world after the Holocaust. Initially, 
therefore, 400 students were exempted in 1948 from military service and were able to study 
full time instead, but by the 1990s, this number had reached more than 30,000. One of the 
difficulties with this particular exemption was that it was never formally legislated, “rather 
the minister of defense uses his authority to ‘postpone’ the conscription of yeshiva students” 
(Ben-Porat, 2008, p. 32). 
Shas refused to bow down to hegemonic secular militarism as the Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox 
parties did, instead unhesitatingly presenting the root of studying Torah as no less worthy, if 
not more so, than the military one. Shas thus constructed an alternative pattern of rewards 
for an increasingly ultra-Orthodox population in the form of a huge project of Mizrachi 
yeshivas. This route offered greater material and symbolic rewards than military 
participation, which, for such young people, had meant either “dropping out” or taking a 
marginal position in the blue-collar segments of the military. However, the ethno-national 
groups not only challenged the Ashkenazi hegemony in discourse and politically; they also 
increased their practical hold on the IDF. (Levy, 2008, p. 130) 
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More recently, the Israeli Cabinet has approved reform in recruiting the Haredi community 
into the Israel Defense Forces. These reforms, which have been attempted at various stages 
for political and social reasons, have not reached fruition, and as of summer 2012, yet 
another round of negotiations over this particularly thorny political issue were being carried 
out, specifically in relation to the Tal Law. In general, reform in recruiting members of the 
ultra-Orthodox community grants exemptions to all yeshiva students age 22 and above on the 
condition that they perform one year of national service (Mazie, 2006, p. 190). This was 
discussed extensively in the section in Chapter 3 dealing with the Tal Law and the Gabai 
committee. Numerous debates take place regarding inclusion of various programs in civic or 
national service as opposed to security or military service. Examples of these programs 
include frameworks such as the national ambulance service, community police force, the 
prison service, and the national parks service. A yeshiva student from age 24 to 26 who is 
single would be obligated to perform one year of national service in any one of these types of 
programs. Above age 26, yeshiva students would be obligated to perform national service 
with other organizations within the Haredi community. Over a set age, usually early 30s, 
members of the Haredi community would generally be exempt from service, creating a large 
disparity between the ultra-Orthodox population and that of the secular community 
(Horowitz & Kimmerling, 1974).  
 Defence Minister Ehud Barak supported the decision obligating Haredim to carry part 
of the national burden and participate in national service programs. He has said that these 
decisions will the double the number of available positions within five years and that ultra-
Orthodox men will still enroll in national service or other programs (Navot, 2007, p. 74). 
While this is perceived as a significant revolution with hope for successful results within the 
various elements of the security and economic burdens the country bears, the hope among 
secular leadership is that this trend will be a catalyst for the integration of members of the 
ultra-Orthodox community within the larger Israeli society and the economy. 
 By the 1990s, the number of potential recruits exempted from yeshiva surpassed 10% 
of the total draft. This number has been growing exponentially because of the significantly 
higher birthrate among the ultra-Orthodox community compared to the secular community. 
Due to growing power in the cohesion of Haredi political parties, the exemptions have 
jumped exponentially from 400 in 1948 to 8,257 in 1977, which was the first year that Haredi 
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parties joined the government coalition and, therefore, had increased political power. These 
numbers continue to grow; by 1985, there were 16,000 deferrals or exemptions, 35,000 in 
1999, and as of 2007, almost 50,000. This number is continually increasing, presenting 
secular society with a worrying demographic trend regarding the future recruitment pool for 
state security.  
 Claiming to be the authentic guardians of Judaism's traditional values, their resistance to the 
draft is uncompromising. Haredi spiritual leaders insist on service exemptions for women on 
the grounds that military duty violates Orthodox standards of modesty. They're equally 
adamant that Haredi males too deserve to be excused conscription, primarily so that they 
might dedicate themselves to study in the sacred textual canon. (Cohen, 2008, pp. 130–131) 
 
Women who claimed exemption from the draft were once required to have their application 
verified by a rabbinical board, but this is no longer the case. Instead, and largely in response 
to the arguments that appearing before such a tribunal infringes on the privacy of Orthodox 
Jewish women, “since 1981, girls applying for exemption on religious grounds have simply 
been required to submit a pro forma declaration. Presently some 20% of all potential female 
recruits are estimated to avail themselves to that option” (Cohen, 1999, pp. 395–396). 
       This creates an interesting gender/performance dichotomy in which the traditional 
gender roles in the ultra-Orthodox home are somewhat reversed, yet this has not led to 
fundamental changes in the ultra-Orthodox community. The fundamental disagreement over 
national service is that secular Israelis are frustrated with the way in which Haredim are 
exempted or defer their service. It seems unfair to secular Israelis that their children are 
required to perform military service. On the flip side, Haredim challenge that “if the 
government knew how much [Torah] students protect the State's wellbeing through their 
study, it would put guards in the schools making sure their learning is never interrupted” 
(Cohen 2008, pp. 131–132). 
 The system of granting exemptions and deferrals to military service is not explicitly 
legislated. Therefore, in a vacuum of clear direction and in many cases social appeasement, 
the idea has developed for adopting an official policy without legislation to attempt to 
minimize draft deferments. Even with the official policy in place, within the military 
proportionally, the potential number of draftees from within the ultra-Orthodox community is 
not growing. The aggregate 12.1% of the available male pool that did not enlist in 1980 grew 
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to 16.6% in 1990. By 2007, the overall numbers of potential draftees who were not recruited 
reached 25%. Haredim count for 11% of the total 25% and comprise the largest single group 
in the category of nonparticipation in national service (Cohen, 2008, p. 134). 
 From the 1980s, various activists began to protest what they described as “discriminatory 
practices” and demanded the annulment of the exemption [of Jewish Israelis from military 
service on the basis of yeshiva learning]. In 1999 the government appointed a committee to 
find a practical solution to the problem after the Supreme Court ruled the exemption process 
inappropriate. The committee’s recommendations, legislated by the Knesset (Israeli 
parliament), which attempted to limit the number of exemptions and encourage the Orthodox 
to join the army, were largely unimplemented. (Ben-Porat, 2008, p. 32) 
 
One of the issues is that due to the fact that the exemption for Torah study is not explicitly 
legislated, the minister of defence uses his authority to postpone the recruitment of yeshiva 
students from year to year. Even when secular groups have in the past demanded the 
cancellation of the exemption and a legislative law, which clearly states the parameters of 
deferral, ultra-Orthodox political parties have circumvented these appeals. This particular 
issue has not been brought before the courts; however, frameworks in which military service 
can be done through a transitional period, such as the Tal Law, have been brought to the 
courts and are still an issue of great contention in Israel.  
The cabinet…approved the reform in recruiting the Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) community to the 
Israel Defense Forces (IDF). The reform grants exemptions to all yeshiva students aged 22 
and over, on condition that they perform one year of National Service. Twenty-three ministers 
supported the measure, while Minister of Minorities Avishay Braverman (Labor) voted 
against, and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Intelligence and Atomic Energy Dan 
Meridor (Likud) and Minister of Industry, Trade and Labor Binyamin Ben-Eliezer (Labor) 
abstained. The reform is in fact no different from the wholesale exemption proposed by the 
Gabai Committee. The only change concerns the inclusion of what the cabinet calls Civic 
(security) Service. This is in fact 12 months of voluntary service in emergency frameworks 
such as Magen David Adom ambulance service, community police force, or the prison 
service. According to the original plan, yeshiva students up to the age of 24 who were 
married but without children, and up to the age of 26 if they were single, were obligated to 
perform one year of National Service. Above those ages yeshiva students could perform their 
National Service in other organizations such as Haredi non-profit organizations. But the 
Shapiro 255 
 
reform today will require yeshiva students up to the age of 26 to undertake their National 
Service in emergency organizations, and only above that age will they qualify for other forms 
of service.  
 Minister of Defense Ehud Barak welcomed the decision and said, “This is the right 
step  in the right direction in allowing Haredim to be part of carrying the national burden.” 
 Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said: “This decision will provide for the doubling of the 
number of ultra-Orthodox young men enrolled in National Service. We were talking about 
doubling them within five years and we mean that most ultra-Orthodox young men in their 
draft year will serve in National Service within five years. This is a revolution, a significant 
revolution. It will have repercussions regarding the division of security and economic burden 
in the country. It will have very great consequences for the integration of the ultra-Orthodox 
into society and the economy.” (Weissman, 2011) 
 
 Members of the ultra-Orthodox community have sought to utilize the liberal values 
that empower the individual standpoint as a stronger negotiating system within the 
framework of the legal system. In much the same way that secular artists, athletes, models, 
and other luminaries receive exemptions or deferrals from the military to pursue what is 
understood to be something more valuable to the national interest, ultra-Orthodox Israelis 
would like to equate their religious study as being critical elements in the national interest.  
 Since the 1990s, soldiers have begun to negotiate with the army in person or via their families 
or other networks. These negotiations can determine the individual's role in the army, the 
condition under which he/she serves, restrictions on his/her service and military function, and 
even the very fact of his/her serving at all. The strengthening of liberal values and their partial 
infiltration into the modes of action among governmental institutions, have empowered the 
individual's standpoint, and put him/her in a stronger negotiating position, sometimes with the 
assistance of the legal system. The media has featured many stories of artists, athletes, and 
models that choose not to serve in the military as it would interfere with their careers. (Levi, 
2008, p. 126) 
 
A concurrent trend has been occurring since the 1980s in which a socio-cultural process has 
increased the level of individualization in Israeli society. By 1990, there was a similar decline 
in national-military ethos, which, in turn, weakened the motivation for individuals throughout 
Israeli society to serve in the military. Other states have faced similar crises of confidence in 
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the national order, but in Israel, this phenomenon has been termed a motivational crisis. 
Many potential soldiers as well as reserve soldiers, as part of these social changes, have 
either not participated in the draft and done initial military service or do not continue to serve 
in the reserve forces. Members of the ultra-Orthodox community see this as a similar trend 
even though in the 1990s an increased number of citizens avoided national service for 
reasons related to religion, mental and physical health, and passivism (Mizrahi, 2008, pp. 
157–158). 
 Rabbi Uri Regev, the president and CEO of Hiddush - Freedom of Religion for Israel, 
an umbrella organization of the worldwide Progressive, Reform, Liberal, and 
Reconstructionist movements, maintains:  
 The repercussions of a growing number of Haredim in Israel are that it is has triggered debate 
over the future of the preparedness of the army. Ten years ago, 7% of those subject to the 
draft were exempt on the basis that they were studying in yeshivas. Now that figure is almost 
14%, which adds up to 65,000 exemptions. During [David] Ben-Gurion's time 60 years ago, 
there were only 400 exemptions. [Moreover], according to Rabbi…Regev…:  
 An increased number of Haredim in Israel will impact the army as “Currently in Israel, 26% 
of first-graders study in ultra-Orthodox schools. The army is saying that if nothing changes, 
in 12 years we will be facing a 26% exemption rate on the basis of studying in a yeshiva...and 
that there would not be enough of a draft base to draw from. Even now the declining draft 
corps has forced the army to cut the number of permits it gives to young Israelis who want to 
spend a year doing community service before going to the army.” (Ain, 2011) 
  
 2. Haredim and service in the military 
 Haredi communities have been growing rapidly and continue to do so, particularly in 
recent years. The number of individuals in the ultra-Orthodox community not serving in the 
military has expanded greatly due to the military service exemption granted to yeshiva 
students. Generally, military service is mandatory for all Israeli citizens. For men, this 
requires three years of service and for women, two years of service, starting at age 18. 
Various factors such as age and other considerations are taken into account when calculating 
the length of time for national service. For example, women who are married, pregnant, or 
are mothers are generally exempted from national service.  
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Israeli-Arab men, except for those who belong to the Druze or Circassian minorities, 
and all Israeli-Arab women are administratively exempt and not called up due to the inherent 
conflicts of interest in their service. Jewish women are also exempt if they declare military 
service violates their religious beliefs and are able, if they are interested, to participate in 
national service and alternate frameworks. However, few ultra-Orthodox women choose to 
take part in this option. National service or civilian service has strong ties to the national 
religious movement in Israel and, therefore, is not perceived as a viable alternative by ultra-
Orthodox women. It is important to note that various new programs have come into effect 
regarding alternatives for both ultra-Orthodox men and women, yet these frameworks have 
not met the need of the large number of people seeking an alternative to military or national 
service. In addition to outright exemptions, there are also many ultra-Orthodox and some 
national religious yeshiva students, much like students in Druze high schools, who are 
granted postponements of their military service until the end of their studies and may 
participate in joint programs that combine academic studies with their military service. 
Unlike various college or university transition programs into the military, ultra-Orthodox 
students do not generally serve in the military even after they graduate from yeshiva and 
continue onto other institutions of Jewish higher learning within the community (Shafir & 
Peled, 2002, p. 143).  
 This relates to the fundamental question of the importance of secular education and 
the opportunities it presents for members of the ultra-Orthodox community. By establishing a 
relationship between yeshiva/high school or college/yeshiva equivalence, ultra-Orthodox 
individuals, much like their Religious Zionist counterparts, will be able both to gain access to 
academic knowledge in various fields and use this specialist knowledge as part of their 
national service or through national service alternate frameworks. This model would allow 
ultra-Orthodox individuals to integrate on an economic level, without the cultural and social 
compromises that the ultra-Orthodox community generally rallies against. Instead, through 
programs that seek accommodation to religious values and teach secular subjects, new 
opportunities could be found for ultra-Orthodox individuals who wish to pursue a career in 
the larger Israeli workforce but are unable to do so. The limited numbers of programs that 
have sought to fulfill the demand for these types of services have generally been successful. 
Shapiro 258 
 
However, greatly increased capacity is needed in order to meet the future demand in terms of 
the ongoing issues over a potential demographic crisis. 
 In the 50 years between 1948 and 1998 70,000 deferments of military service, most of them 
de facto exemptions, had been granted, mostly to Haredi yeshiva students. In 1999 they 
were held by 30,400 people. The rate in which deferments had been granted has been 
accelerating rapidly in recent years: 2.5% of the male draft eligible cohort were granted 
deferments in 1968, 5.3% in 1988, and 9.2% or about 3,900 men in 1999…. 
Since only full-time yeshiva students...are eligible for deferments, and since 
deferments become exemptions once their holder reaches the age of 41 (35 if he has four 
children or more), most of these students continue to study, or at least be registered in 
yeshivot, and do not enter the labor market for many years if at all. Thus while the average 
age of leaving a Haredi yeshiva in Israel is 42, in the US, where no special privileges are 
accrued to yeshiva students, the average leaving age [from yeshiva] is 20 [to] 25. (Shafir & 
Peled, 2002, p. 143) 
There may be other solutions, such as changing the way the IDF operates, such as creating an 
all volunteer army. This would allow for the ultra-Orthodox to join the national service or remain 
apart on their own terms. This idea is one of many options, but may not fully replace the long held 
ideal of the IDF as a national integrator.  
 
D. Large Scale Protests 
 An interesting facet of the borderline between the ultra-Orthodox community in Israel 
and the rest of Israeli society, both religious and non-religious, can be seen in the physical 
and powerful displays of solidarity the ultra-Orthodox community participates in when they 
are protesting a particular issue. It is difficult not to notice an immense sweeping crowd of 
hundreds or thousands dressed in identical garb and protesting, praying, chanting, or wanting 
to be heard. In a society based on a religious hierarchy where the individual has very little 
sway and as a society that feels cut off and under-represented in the upper echelons of 
political power, those who consider themselves the guardians of Israeli's spiritual soul protest 
in order to make themselves seen and heard. Perhaps the protests themselves are part of an 
ongoing social message. 
The actual outcome of this controversy seems less important than the continuation of conflict 
that it represents. Indeed there is not likely to be an outcome of any permanence. Rather, each 
demand and each demonstration will serve as a stage in a continuing dispute that will erupt 
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sooner or later over one or another site or issue. Each controversy is likely to feature demands 
by religious or secular Israelis to restore the status quo, but each side will be thinking of a 
different status quo. (Sharkansky, 1997, p. 168) 
 
Many of the violent protests are only instigated by a tiny fraction of the ultra-Orthodox 
community, and many of the violent protests are only participated in by small groups of 
followers. Yet these loud voices, if unopposed, can come to represent sweeping 
characterizations of the entire ultra-Orthodox community. They can paint a picture of single-
minded intolerance, aggression, and backwardness when a counteracting message by the 
majority of the community preaches tolerance, inclusion, and understanding. Large-scale 
protests, both peaceful and otherwise, have been a major feature of the tensions on the 
religious/secular social divisions both in terms of physical space and in terms of public 
opinion.  
Policymakers cope with the demands of religious and anti-religious activists by employing 
several tactics that have been less thorough or that treat the details and avoid basic conflicts. 
The policymakers urge moderation, engage in prolonged discussions, offer concessions, and 
delay rather than cancel projects. On some occasions, delay provides time for splits within the 
religious or secular camps to show themselves, or wears down the activist. Deliberation 
focuses on particular instances of conflict. Policymakers do not try to resolve general terms of 
principles of Shabbat, kosher food, or other general issues that lie behind specific disputes. 
(Sharkansky, 1997, p. 166) 
 
It is interesting that this type of movement of making one's voice heard in large-scale 
public protests, normally participated in only by men, shows a lack of faith in ultra-Orthodox 
political leadership. These protests often reach the rhetorical dialogue of placing the secular 
government against the sage advice of leading rabbis, the righteousness of the Torah versus 
the secular evil of the Supreme Court, and so on. Social issues are often carried to this 
extreme because, at the edge of these controversies surrounding religion, there is very little 
compromise to be made. In other issues, such as the state of military service, or educational 
funding, or many other situations, some compromise is able to be made. In some cases, a 
solution may be found in which neither side actually is at an advantage, and the status quo 
agreement allows for separate but equitable divisions of power and funding.  
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The collective power of the ultra-Orthodox community cannot be underestimated. 
The ability of the ultra-Orthodox community to effectively work together on social protest 
issues and to boycott certain products or services en masse gives the community considerable 
clout. The overall spending power of the “ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) market is estimated to be 
worth about $1.5 billion a year. Its consumer power, as a form of collective action, is supposedly 
enhanced, first, by the 'social capital' of the community and, second, by the obedience to religious 
authority (Shamir & Ben-Porat 2007, p. 85). 
Regarding other examples, such as travel on the Sabbath (a forbidden activity for the 
ultra-Orthodox community), and in this particular case, the use of city parking lots on the 
territorial edges of an ultra-Orthodox community, there are many disputes. Tensions have 
risen to a new level leading to ongoing, often violent, and sweeping protests over the use of 
parking lots in this peripheral outlying area of religious neighbourhoods. With an ongoing 
campaign to secularize bus routes (Israel Be Free, 2012) in various areas of Israel without a 
large Orthodox population, these initiatives are receiving very little public protest (Tabory & 
Shalev Levtzur, 2009, p. 263; Evans, 2011, p. 241). Rather, it is the visible, the nearby, and 
the present that fly in the face of traditional Orthodox values. If on these particular issues 
there can be no significant compromise and even more so if compromise is interpreted as 
“selling out” or betraying deep seated fundamental values of ultra-Orthodoxy, the only 
remaining option is to inform the public in an explicit way of the ultra-Orthodox 
community’s displeasure.  
 Anti-religious Jewish politicians [have] accused the ultra-Orthodox of trying to upset the 
status quo by demanding the Sabbath closing of major roads near [their] neighborhoods. 
Religious activists responded that the status quo has already been upset by the city's secular 
community, which kept numerous pubs, discotheques, and restaurants open seven days a 
week. The next stage of the controversy witnessed the playing out of a familiar ritual over the 
course of several Sabbaths: large gatherings of ultra-Orthodox Jews, shouts about the sanctity 
of the Sabbath, overturned dumpsters, stones thrown at traffic, the use of mounted police, 
some injuries among protestors, counter protests by the secularists, brief arrests of the 
protestors, statements by Teddy Kollek and police officials about the rule of law, 
proclamations by the Orthodox rabbis about the sanctity of the Sabbath. Finally, the police 
toughened their posture and reached an agreement with the rabbis to limit protests to a certain 
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period. Sabbath traffic continued -- but not via the exit that led into the religious 
neighborhood -- and the protest died. (Sharkansky, 1997, p. 163) 
 
During the research phases of this thesis, four particular large-scale protests took 
place in Israel and were both unexpected and dramatic in their scale. These are not the only 
protests that happened in Israel, nor are they exclusively the only issues, but these four 
examples offer an insight into a feeling of despair and any quality the ultra-Orthodox 
community feels when trying to make their views known and the religious considerations 
they expect from secular society.  
 
 Example 1: parking lots and Sabbath observance 
 An interesting protest took place and occasionally still takes place over the Jerusalem 
city municipal parking lot near the Old City. The parking lot was opened by the city to 
provide for traffic overflow of guests wishing to visit the Old City on the Sabbath, which 
could include non-Jews as well as secular Jews. A dangerous situation arose of visitors 
parking their cars along public roadways, potentially blocking traffic and potentially 
impeding delivery and access for emergency services. Jerusalem City Hall proposed opening 
for free the municipal parking lot and staffing it with non-Jewish city employees as not to 
offend the religious sensitivities of the ultra-Orthodox community that borders the area of 
City Hall and the parking lot.  
With increased regularity, ongoing demonstrations were carried out in front of the 
parking lots on a weekly basis on the Sabbath, and as the protests grew in scale and size, the 
police became more involved. This has become a major area of contention and “the ultra-
Orthodox have brought thousands into the streets to protest the opening of Jerusalem parking 
lots on the Sabbath” (Mitnick, 2010, p. 1). Additional reporters started covering these weekly 
protests, which often turned violent. With increasing regularity, the media carried images of 
ultra-Orthodox men being dragged in handcuffs into police cars following protests on the 
Sabbath. The parking lots themselves are not directly inside religious neighbourhoods, but 
they are relatively close to the common boundaries of the ultra-Orthodox neighbourhood 
where automobiles are generally prohibited from driving during the Sabbath. This would 
potentially be a significant disturbance. This issue over consideration of the ultra-Orthodox 
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community’s values was and is felt strongly by many in the ultra-Orthodox community. As a 
result, even though the protests did not have a great degree of numbers, the regular repetition 
of these protests and the way in which the protests were carried out created public awareness 
of these issues and reopened another aspect of the difficulties ultra-Orthodox Israelis feel 
they encounter in Israeli society (Nahshoni, 2011).  
Yitzchak Cohen seems to suggest a live-and-let-live policy in which borderlines 
between the ultra-Orthodox community and the city governments are very clearly delineated, 
and despite what individuals in the ultra-Orthodox community may think, both parties are not 
trying to encroach upon each other’s territory. This opinion is, in its essence, perhaps a 
reflection of the Western liberalism seen among ultra-Orthodox Jews in the Diaspora 
transplanted into the ultra-Orthodox community in Israel. 
Personally, my opinion is that it's a city parking lot, and things that are run by the city in 
areas where there are people driving anyway—which I'm assuming in those areas, if they're 
needing to have them open, that people would be driving there anyway, that they should 
allow it to be open, and that the ultra-Orthodox should not involve themselves in telling the 
city how they should be running city things, such as parking lots, when they're in areas where 
people are driving anyhow. (Interview with Yitzhak Cohen, 2011) 
 
In contrast, Yoav Daniel takes a very clear exception to any move that may adversely 
impact the hegemony the ultra-Orthodox community has over their territorial sphere of 
influence. By encroaching on physical territory, a new reality is being created defining the 
borders of the ultra-Orthodox community. In many ways, this has an ideological aspect in 
which secular society functions outside the boundaries as it wishes without taking heed of the 
ultra-Orthodox viewpoints for control over the spiritual welfare of the entire country. This is 
indicative of the underlying conflict that puts each side against the other and devolves into an 
ongoing debate over liberalism versus religion and so on. 
Well, there's always the segment of Haredi society that anything that looks like an inroads 
against Sabbath is—you have to start throwing rocks. But there—sometimes the issues are 
more complicated. You can't—you know, closing a road—there are non-Jews who use roads 
too. Who are you to say—if you are going to decide which—I think everyone would agree that 
there are certain streets that should be closed. If you're in a very small street in the middle of 
a huge Haredi neighborhood, so why can’t you close a street? And on the other hand, if it’s a 
main thoroughfare and there are non-Jews using it and there are all kinds of—and it's not 
really disturbing you, so who are you to close it? And, in fact, even if you close it, so you're 
not preventing—even if you have the intentions of preventing Shabbos desecration, you're not 
doing that, because people are not going to all of a sudden—ah, see a roadblock, stop their 
cars and get out and say, where can I spend the night for Shabbos? You're just closing your 
eyes—putting blinders on. So the challenges, the in-between territory, which streets are 
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legitimate to close? Which parking lots are legitimate to close? (Interview with Yoav Daniel, 
2011) 
 
Deena Friedberg points out that while there are certainly two perspectives on this 
issue, each side did not necessarily define victory for its point of view in certain terms. This 
led to the situation becoming exacerbated by scrutiny in the media, by ongoing tensions, by 
continued fights with ultimately not very much being accomplished rather than seeking a 
new way in which to preserve, or perhaps rebalance, the status quo. Contextually, this issue 
seems to be another challenge to the status quo, seeking to reinforce the boundaries that exist 
around the ultra-Orthodox community and perhaps find a new way to meet the challenges of 
secularism pressing in on the boarders of the ultra-Orthodox community, both literally and 
figuratively. 
It certainly brought out a lot of, like, harsh opinions on both sides. Like, oh, why are those 
crazy Haredim telling us what we can and cannot do on Shabbat? We want to drive around, 
what's it their business? And religious people are saying, like, why are these secular Jews—
you know, Jerusalem is a holy city, and people should at least recognize that. If they want to 
do whatever they want in Tel Aviv, or wherever they live, it's okay. Not that it's okay, okay, it 
doesn't impinge on us to some extent. In Yerushalayim, Ir Hakodesh, why are they doing 
that?...There's no real need for it. And I think they turned it into an issue, which, instead of 
trying—I mean, like I have my opinion of this mayor—I mean, he's made a lot of weird 
decisions, but, like, especially emphasizing religious differences when they don't have to be. 
... It was very nasty at the time it was going on. And it's the same thing, like years ago with 
Bar Ilan Street being open on Shabbat and people got really nasty. We have friends who live 
right near there, and she said it was really scary for her kids to look out the window on 
Shabbat and see people throwing rocks. And this wasn't Arabs; this was Jews throwing rocks 
at each other—the police coming in on horses. And she said they did not have a peaceful 
Shabbat for weeks until they managed to kind of resolve it by coming up with some kind of a 
compromise. The street was closed at certain times and open other times and whatever. I 
mean, if they wanted to find a way of, you know, trying to calm down the situation, I think 
they could have. But sometimes it's just something (inaudible) and people on both sides who 
are very hotheaded both turn it into more of an issue than it needs to be. (Interview with 
Deena Friedberg, 2011) 
 
Ephraim Lerner discusses an interesting territorial shift within neighbourhoods as 
more ultra-Orthodox individuals enter a neighbourhood; slowly the neighbourhood changes 
in character and becomes more religious. While it would seem that members of the ultra-
Orthodox community move into a neighbourhood and secular people leave, although this is 
sometimes the case, there is also a case to be made for individuals simply becoming more 
religious or secular individuals tolerating or living within an increasingly religious 
environment. While perhaps there are many neighbourhoods in which it is difficult or 
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impossible to reach equilibrium within the neighbourhood itself to accommodate both 
perspectives, this does happen sometimes, and this could be indicative of the way in which 
the ultra-Orthodox community operates in the Diaspora. In many communities, the ultra-
Orthodox community is firmly entrenched within a larger secular or non-Jewish community, 
and this is dealt with in a way that allows for the preservation of identity and at the same 
time, respects the outside culture and values insofar as they do not encroach on the ultra-
Orthodox way of life and threaten to assimilate or integrate their community. 
We have once a year a meeting of all members of the apartment, of 33 families. And the 
question was whether we should have a Shabbos elevator. So this lady said her mother’s not 
well, she lives on the fourth floor—just leave the Shabbos elevator for an hour for Shabbos 
and you can go up and down and that’s it. And there were very vocal non-religious people 
who started yelling, we’ve never had a Shabbos elevator until now, we’re not going to start it 
now, and so on. So another lady spoke and said, look, I was here when we first came in. 
Those buildings were—went up in 1973. And she said when Sukkos came, there were no 
sukkas around at all. And she put up a sukkah, you know, for Sukkos. The people threw rotten 
eggs at the sukkah. Today, you walk on the street, you can’t find a place on the sidewalk to 
put up a sukkah, they’re all over. So the Haredim are, slowly but surely, moving in and taking 
over, and that’s what the secular are not really happy about, but–but trying to stop it, I don’t 
see they’re going to be successful. (Interview with Ephraim Lerner, 2011) 
 
 The ultra-Orthodox community attempts to strengthen its “theoretical” borders and 
ensure that the periphery of its individual neighbourhoods remains strictly observant and 
Orthodox in character. This philosophy is closely tied to Orthodoxy. The periphery areas 
then become involved in a difficult division between secular and religious factions. An 
example of the tensions around Sabbath observance can be seen in the following example. 
In January 2005, thousands of Orthodox Jews gathered to protest against commercial activity 
on the Sabbath. Rabbi Rafael Halperin, the owner of a large optical retail chain who 
organized the event, described the current status of the Sabbath as a “cancer in the nation's 
body” and called for strict enforcement of the laws. He urged his listeners to take the 
initiative and not count on law enforcement: “we are a strong economic force of half a 
million people.” So he informed his audience of about 324,000 Jews, who signed a petition 
declaring that they would not set foot in stores that operate on the Sabbath...He explained 
elsewhere: “we will boycott and prove to store-owners that it is better for them to close on 
Sabbath.” (Shamir & Ben-Porat, 2007, pp. 87–88) 
 
The historical geographic contraction of the ultra-Orthodox community into disparate 
neighbourhoods from secular society can be perceived as a strengthening of corporate 
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position of the community against assimilation from secular Israelis. Perhaps this latest trend 
of concern with the border areas of those neighbourhoods represents a further step along this 
process of ensuring that the core relationship within the neighbourhoods will not be disturbed 
by secularizing influences.  
 
 Example 2: archaeology and the ultra-Orthodox 
 Wide-scale protests have been carried out in Israel over the treatment of 
archaeological artifacts and human remains. From the ultra-Orthodox perspective, human 
remains, particularly those of Jews, are sacred in nature and it is required to ensure their 
proper treatment (Grauer, 2012, p. 25). Normally, this would require that human remains 
would not be disturbed out of consideration for their sacred nature. Yet, within the 
parameters of Jewish law, various solutions may be arrived at to facilitate disturbing human 
remains. These solutions, however, must follow stringent and specific guidelines relating the 
treatment of human remains (Nagar, 2011, p. 614). Sensitivity on this issue often surpasses 
strict religious textual interpretation and takes on a complex social dimension as well.  
 Two large-scale protests were carried out by the ultra-Orthodox community over 
archaeological remains. One of the large scale protests was carried out in Jaffa where 
Byzantine-era human remains were moved without consultation with the ultra-Orthodox 
community as is normally the case (Bahn, 2012, pp. 84–85; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2010, 
p.124). The interesting aspect of this episode is that there is not a large ultra-Orthodox 
presence in Jaffa. Protesters were bussed from ultra-Orthodox enclaves around the country 
and formed a large visible presence in Jaffa making their positions widely known. The 
mobilization aspect of this protest shows how external organization, from a broad base across 
the spectrum of the ultra-Orthodox community, can be mobilized on a particular issue. This 
is done in order to shape and sway public opinion and provide instant and immediate 
feedback to leadership (political or otherwise) of the importance of this particular issue. 
Thousands upon thousands of people involved in a protest naturally necessitate a very large 
police presence with its own complications, and such large-scale assemblies are guaranteed 
to receive media attention and significant discussion within Israeli society. 
 The second incident, the Barzilai Hospital in Ashkelon, involves another town that 
normally does not have a large ultra-Orthodox presence. The hospital was in the process of 
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building a new emergency department, and in the preparatory work for building the 
foundation of the building, a large ancient graveyard was discovered steps from the existing 
building. Various proposals were made to relocate the building, which would not entail 
disturbing the graves located nearby. In the end, however, due to financial considerations, the 
project went ahead as planned (Sofer, 2010). The Antiquities Authority carried this out using 
workers to remove the ancient skeletons from the graves at night. This presented a fait 
accompli to the ultra-Orthodox community the next day.  
 In this case, the normal procedure would have been to consult with the ultra-Orthodox 
community and involve them in finding an acceptable solution (El-Haj, 2002, p. 270). For 
various reasons, in this case, a consultation process was not carried out, and this led to large-
scale protests. These protests sought to raise the issue of burial sites and construction on the 
national level and reinforce their importance to the ultra-Orthodox community into the public 
consciousness (McGeough, 2012). Assembling on a grand scale caused this story (which 
would be otherwise relegated to the back pages of daily newspapers) to be featured on the 
front page of newspapers. The articles displayed pictures of seas of ultra-Orthodox people 
and outlined the religious, moral, ethical, and controversial nature of this particular incident.  
Archaeology is often a very contentious subject in Israel. It represents both Israel’s 
connection to the biblical Israel, but also at the same time, for the ultra-Orthodox community, 
it holds a place of special importance with emphasis placed on the treatment of human 
remains. This is especially true for Jewish human remains, and there is a great deal of 
sensitivity around this issue. This is not always reflected in the government consultation 
process with the ultra-Orthodox community.  
Yitzchak Cohen identifies several factors relating to the ultra-Orthodox community 
and archaeology, such as inherent connections to the past. The ultra-Orthodox community 
sees these cemeteries or archaeological remains as tangible and spiritual connections of the 
past and, therefore, demands of the state that policies be in accordance with strict religious 
dictates. In order to balance these two factors to ensure that religious sensitivities are taken 
into account when dealing with archaeology, communication is key. Only through a detailed 
and exhausted consultation process between the ultra-Orthodox community and the secular 
government can responsible policies related to archaeology be found, which do not 
compromise religious precepts. Without such an agreement, large scale protests and 
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controversy will continue to plague archaeological exhibitions as the rift between the secular 
and religious population widens on this issue.  
I think that's actually very important. I think that the religious Jews have a connection all the 
way back to the time when some of these archaeological sites were actually not 
archaeological sites, but were being used. And the state should be consulting with 
observant—not necessarily ultra-Orthodox, but observant Jews—who they feel are 
representative of the Orthodox Jew, as a public and as a whole. It doesn't necessarily have to 
be ultra-Orthodox. My opinion is that perhaps the Rabbanut in Israel, or some other 
organization in Israel that represents the vast Orthodox population—or observant population 
in Israel, get their opinion about how to treat these sites, and how they should go about 
dealing with certain areas where there, perhaps, are graves that should not be defiled. 
(Interview with Yitzhak Cohen, 2011) 
 
Menashe Blum looks at how using the paradigm of religion to interpret secular state 
policy is the only way to placate the ultra-Orthodox community. Within the framework of 
Halacha, there is the ability to meet the demands of a changing society. This, however, 
requires a meeting of minds and a great deal of discussion. Blum suggests that controversy 
can be mediated by discussion, but this perspective is one-sided as it only accommodates the 
religious perspective rather than a more holistic view. 
As a religious Jew, that Halacha takes a position in everything that goes on, and archaeology 
in the state of Israel, also there are halachic issues. Moving cemeteries—there are halachic 
ways to do things and I think if—for instance, in the hospital case there was a need, and I 
think a legitimate need, then there needed to be a way to halachically remove the bodies and 
build this emergency room, or whatever it was, for the hospital. I don't see that—especially 
since the chances are they weren't even Jewish. I think both sides need to be sensitive, again, 
to the needs of the other side. But if you don't want to see the needs of the other side, it's very 
hard.... In black and white: I have a need, a secular need; therefore I should be able to do it. 
You have a religious need, therefore, I should prevent you from doing it. There's no 
crossover; there's no understanding. And if I did have understanding, then there would be a 
halachic way to deal with it because there is a halachic way to deal with it. Graves are 
moved, halachically. Right, people can be taken from—dug up in America and brought to 
Israel. There are ways halachically to do these things. (Interview with Menashe Blum, 2011) 
 
In much the same vein, Yehuda Aronson examines this issue through the religious 
paradigm and emphasizes the need to be sensitive for the ultra-Orthodox community’s 
considerations. However, there is an interesting contrast in this interview to how human 
remains and archaeological finds are treated in the Diaspora. In a way, perhaps secular 
governments in the Diaspora see things in a very different light, and there may be a degree of 
myopia in Israel in which religious views are not necessarily taken in the same way since 
after all the entire country is, for the most part, coreligionist. Aronson emphasizes the 
cultural and religious point of view while taking the historical perspective into account. 
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Finally, and of importance, he touches on a central issue to this and many other aspects of the 
social unrest in Israel related to the ultra-Orthodox community: how pressure ultimately 
motivates movement (and change). Without applying pressure into the right areas, it becomes 
increasingly difficult for the ultra-Orthodox community to have a voice in public affairs, 
particularly on issues of great importance for spiritual or religious reasons. 
The government in the Land of Israel should represent the values of Judaism, which it 
doesn't. And if upheaval of cemeteries, which is a—even by non-Jews that's a desecration of 
our —of the ancestors, which—it seems goyim could understand that concept, but for some 
reason even the secular Israelis don't, and they don't want to, and, therefore, that's a chillul 
hashem, so it's a very bad thing....This is a very fundamental question. The people in power in 
the secular government, they just don't get it. They don't get what the religious people want. 
They don't know what it's all about. They're looking at it from a total—a bird's-eye-view, 
which is, let's see how we can get ahead in what they consider society and financially and 
what's good. So if I need—a shopping center is more important, or I need a street—who cares 
about the dead people from 500 years ago? You know, the now and me is more important 
than any value system, and they just don't get that. They don't realize that that's not who we 
are and that's not what we're here for. If they would, I think the whole picture would be 
different. I don't think they want to get it, so how to deal with that problem? You know, say, 
could I speak to you for a second? Let me explain this to you? They don't want to hear it. I 
don't think they would want to hear it. Their—their function as being their—they're doing 
their job is to—they're—what they do in life, and they gotta just do it. I don't think they're—I 
don't think you're going to change it just by a brief encounter, you know, just have someone 
explain it to you. After they see someone doing something wrong, why are all these rabbis 
yelling and screaming? You know, what am I doing wrong? You know, I'm just trying to help 
everybody, trying to help society. But you're going to shop at my shopping center also, you 
know, what's the big deal? They don't—I don't think—they don't see the big picture....When 
you do something wrong, and that's blatantly wrong, the only way things get done here is by 
yelling and screaming and hafganot (laughs). That's the way it works here; talking doesn't 
work. I think, in that way, maybe Americans or whatever are more open-minded. They have a 
lobby—let's talk about this, let's discuss this. Here, you know, you just—you gotta come to the 
table (laughs)—that's the only language you understand. (Interview with Yehuda Aronson, 
2011) 
 
 Example 3: Münchausen by proxy 
 A very interesting large-scale protest took place during the same period relating to an 
ultra-Orthodox woman who stood accused of deliberately starving and abusing her child 
(Berlin, 2012, pp. 267–268). What normally would have happened in this scenario would 
have been quite different from the way that ultra-Orthodox considerations were taken into 
account in this particular case.  
The details of the story are complex, but simply put, the woman was accused by a 
secular social worker of abuse. The child was brought to the hospital for observation. The 
mother was caught further abusing or attempting to starve the child and the mother was 
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placed under arrest. In the media, “Haredi leaders...claim that she is innocent and that the boy 
is weak because he suffers from cancer. They have likened the arrest to an anti-Semitic blood 
libel, and even called for a boycott of Hadassah hospital where the boy was taken” (Jeffay, 
2009). As not to offend religious sensitivities, the woman’s remand was changed to house 
arrest at a prominent rabbi’s home. A public initiative was carried out in the ultra-Orthodox 
community to paint the mother in a completely different light from how she was being 
accused in the secular press. She underwent a psychological evaluation, and during this 
process, an enormous crowd of more than 100,000 ultra-Orthodox protesters thronged to the 
streets of Jerusalem and staged a massive wide-scale protest. The interesting thing about this 
protest is that it was not in favour of child abuse nor was it directly in support of this 
particular woman or her story despite that seeming to be the purpose of the protest. Rather, 
this assembly came together to protest something much more basic and fundamental. The 
protests revolved around the concepts of intrinsic hegemony for the ultra-Orthodox 
community over their own neighbourhoods, institutions, and community.  
From the beginning of this issue, it was dealt with as an external issue by the secular 
authorities. Rather than having a religious social worker who is in touch with the particular 
needs and social composition of the community, the ultra-Orthodox community felt that they 
were being judged by an outsider with very little appreciation of the internal workings of 
their community. In a similar fashion, the justice system, as well as the medical authorities, 
was not necessarily consulting ultra-Orthodox community leaders and rabbis to discuss their 
input on the case; they were rather treating this as an external issue.  
Yitzchak Cohen illustrates a perception of the one-sided nature of the media. The 
media are seen by the ultra-Orthodox community as being a reflection of secular society’s 
goals and values, and, therefore, the way that the ultra-Orthodox community is portrayed is 
often negative. Without control over the message of the media, the ultra-Orthodox 
community fears that the media will spread secularism and foreign values and ultimately 
influence its population. The media are, therefore, apart from the ultra-Orthodox community, 
but at the same time, there is a degree of secular journalism focusing on the ultra-Orthodox 
world, and this, perhaps, has an effect on internal ultra-Orthodox community affairs as well. 
While these two spheres are usually somewhat separate, there is no doubt that the ultra-
Orthodox community is aware of the perception among secular Israelis as portrayed in the 
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media. The real question is how to shape and control this message in order to have a more 
religion-friendly dialog in a greater national forum in which spiritual aspects, as well as 
practical aspects, could be discussed. 
From what I understand there was a woman who was allegedly abusing one of her children. 
I—a lot of the information that I heard was through the news media, and a lot of times it's 
hard to know if anything's been exaggerated, or things are not necessarily to be believed at 
face value. However, assuming that some of these allegations are true, certainly I believe that 
caring city individuals, who are understanding of the religious population—or the ultra-
Orthodox population, perhaps should be involved in assessing the situation and evaluating 
what needs to be done. I'm not sure whether the people that were involved from the city were 
people that were truly concerned with helping this individual and her children, or perhaps 
were just looking to find faults in ultra-Orthodox Jews. It's hard to know where that lies 
because, as I said before, because of the rift between the secular and the ultra-Orthodox 
population, it's very hard to recognize whether something is being judged based on certain 
feelings towards a segment of the population or, perhaps, the reality of the situation....Well, I 
think that it—the media blew it out of proportion. I think that—you know, the media, which is 
run secular side, made it into a bigger deal, and made the Haredi public, as a whole, look 
bad, and I think it's unfortunate, because (inaudible) isn't necessary (inaudible) the ultra-
Orthodox population as a whole, and when you make it into a big controversy, especially in 
the media, it just (inaudible). (Interview with Yitzhak Cohen, 2011) 
 
In a closed society, a mechanism for working from inside the community is required, 
which can ease the transition of foreign values. In this case, Yoav Daniel discusses social 
workers working within the ultra-Orthodox community and, indeed, there are many things 
that can be done, such as training secular social workers to have additional sensitivity and 
understanding in the ultra-Orthodox world. Conversely, ultra-Orthodox individuals who 
work as social workers within their own community can be trained to take into account the 
unique situation and sensitivities of the ultra-Orthodox community to outside involvement. 
I can't get to the bottom of it. There is so much mystery surrounding it, you know. There's a 
lot of speculation; was she totally wacko? I mean, yeah, you need social workers to step in. 
Again, it might have been more intelligent for them to do it through the community since, 
especially since, they were dealing with such a closed community, you know, that obviously 
there are going to be objections to the secular social workers coming in and—even religious 
ones. You can't just barge your way into such a closed society. (Interview with Yoav Daniel, 
2011) 
 
Eliezer Weiss, however, shows that some of the structures that are required to deal 
with cases involving external support, such as the role of social workers, already exist in the 
ultra-Orthodox community. If the secular state took advantage of some of these internal 
networks such as community leaders or rabbis and through them talked to their community, 
these relationships could be used to form a bridge between secular and ultra-Orthodox 
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society, ultimately leading to a greater degree of recognition and allowing a common dialog 
regarding shared values. In such a scenario, standards of the state could still be enforced and 
upheld without contentious internal issues hidden by the community. At the same time the 
ultra-Orthodox community could feel that its religious dictates, customs, and way of life are 
being respected and taken into account. 
Okay, again, I don't know much of the details, but I certainly know that the mossad, the—
what's the word—the establishment, that's the word, the establishment, as a rule, have no 
clue about Haredi life. And the way social workers will sometimes do things, for Haredi 
families it's just the wrong way to do it. If there was child-abuse, there are things you can do, 
you go to the person's rav, you could—nobody wants child-abuse; no rabbanim, and not 
social workers. But the question is how you deal with the problem....The average Israeli, and 
I'm talking average—meaning not in Jerusalem, at least, don't know many Haredim. Okay, so 
they don't know—all they do is see how he's portrayed in the newspaper, and that's not 
usually very favorable. Okay, so if all you know is what you read in the newspaper, you know, 
like the stories in the American Midwest. You've got a Jew, and the guy starts feeling his 
head, where are your horns? Because a Jew is supposed to have horns, because that's what 
they learned, that's all they know; they never met a Jew before, or they never met a Haredi, 
so they don't know what—they don't know. (Interview with Eliezer Weiss, 2011) 
 
Ruchama Spiegel reiterates the point that there needs to be a solution developed in the 
community. This can be done through various methods, such as training ultra-Orthodox 
social workers or coming up with a way that is sensitive to the needs of the community, as 
well as respects the privacy of the community overall and does not necessarily expose the 
community to media scrutiny while dealing with issues that have wider interests. 
Well I think, from what I understand now, there are more Haredi social workers and things 
getting in the scene. There’s definitely suspicion on the side of Haredim towards social 
workers and—you know, they’re going to take your kid, I mean that’s another—you know, as 
far as that; like separating a mother from her kids and things with—. Of course I—you 
know— there’s a lot of dispute over the whole medical condition that they claimed that she 
has that in general concerned me. I mean I did some research, and it was, like—other people 
say that it's a medical—you know, where there’s medical negligence, this is their way to kind 
of try and cover it up. There’s definitely suspicions there, so a social worker who's going to 
come in, not from that background, would probably have a harder time trying to solve the 
problem she’s trying to solve. (Interview with Ruchama Spiegel, 2011) 
 
On this same issue, Yehuda Aronson takes a very narrow view of the outside secular 
media and makes a claim that the secular media distort certain facts related to the ultra-
Orthodox community in order to sell newspapers or gain publicity. Because this issue is a 
very contentious one, he also reiterates the need for sensitivity and understanding as well as 
an internal perspective rather than outside officials seeming to challenge the internal 
hegemony of religious leaders within their own community. 
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The press over here completely distorts any facts of what actually went on. It's possible to 
take the—to paint the picture of a certain few facts, bend the truth a little bit, and paint a 
completely different picture. So what the press is saying happened and what actually 
happened is completely two different things. Then you hear the opposite side, you hear—the 
rabbis are going and making a hafganah against what happened over there, and I think 
they're also missing it because they don't—I don't think they're—again, they're looking at a 
completely different—....I think in this case it was—again I don't remember the exact details 
here—there may have been a certain amount of what they consider—the government or 
police or whatever—considered abuse. Whether or not that's true—I don't know the 
personality involved, it depends on the situation— you know, the individual situation, and—
but the fact that they stepped in and were dictating— especially here—it's a very emotional 
issue, with, you know, parent, child—you know, affects everybody. And that they were trying 
to say we are going to have the last word on what happens in your family—that could have 
ramifications besides this particular issue over here, so that hit a raw nerve in the—by the 
rabbis—that we don't want all these secular people—because today you say the parent is 
telling the child to keep Shabbos; oh you're—that's child abuse—you're not letting him—
you're not letting him go to—to do—to be free—you're enslaving. If I ask a kid to wash the 
dishes, you say, oh, child labor. You know, they could come up with some kind of crazy thing 
which is obviously completely out of context that could be the next step right behind that, so 
—….The issue of Haredi or not Haredi is action, and that's what sells. The secular people 
love to—the—one second—the media—the media loves to vilify the, you know, the negative, 
and that's what sells by them. And because it's exciting now, you know we have the bad guy. 
You have the good guys versus the bad guys, and they're the good guys, and we're—the 
Haredim are the bad guys. So if you—by doing that, that's where they're going to get their—
increase their readership or viewership or whatever, so they just—anything that—it fits their 
agenda. Whether it's true? Absolutely not. Whether some of the things happened? They did. 
What's the real—what's the real truth? Somewhere in the middle. (Interview with Yehuda 
Aronson, 2011) 
 
The protests sought to increase an awareness of the need for communal self-
governance and the desire by the ultra-Orthodox community to govern its internal affairs. 
The secular community saw this incident as sensationalized media fodder, and coverage in 
secular papers was extensive and extremely disproportionate to the facts of the story (Siegel-
Itzkovich, 2009). The secular fascination with the other side, with the closed world of the 
ultra-Orthodox community, can be interpreted through film, media, news coverage, tours and 
so on. Perhaps these two factors, an intense interest in the separate ultra-Orthodox 
community, as well as the sensational stories that capture the public imagination and manage 
to sell newspapers, feed off each other in much the same way the thesis proposes a 
homeostatic relationship between institutions and actors. In this case, the pressures, or 
perhaps, the failings of the system created a disproportionate news story signifying the great 
deal of public scrutiny over this particular issue. Again in this case, the ultra-Orthodox 
community demonstrated wide-ranging solidarity by forming a protest made up of many 
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factions and sects and became directly engaged in a form of conversation with secular society 
bypassing the traditional use of community leaders and politicians. While the particular case 
itself was quietly resolved and no longer part of a spectacular media frenzy, the underlying 
issue of a desire for self-governance and internal social hegemony continues to be of the 
utmost importance for the ultra-Orthodox community.  
 
 Example 4: The Emmanuel school situation 
 The fourth in a series of wide-scale protests under examination, which also serves as 
an illustration for widespread frustration from the ultra-Orthodox community with the status 
quo, is the incident surrounding a school in Emmanuel. Emmanuel is a small development 
town in the West Bank with a population of approximately 3,000 (Emmanuel website). The 
facts of the case leading up to large-scale protests are complex, but in essence, a school was 
excessively segregated along ethnic lines, and this ultimately lead to the Supreme Court 
getting involved and forcing the school to desegregate (Alexander & Pinson et al., 2011, p. 
171). Naturally, this caused global headlines, and eventually, the court demanded that until 
the end of the school year, the school had to be integrated. The parents refused to follow the 
dictates of the courts and were found in contempt of court. The Supreme Court ruled that the 
parents in question be jailed for approximately two weeks. The mothers of the children went 
into hiding, and many of the fathers went to jail amid huge protests lauding them for their 
commitment to traditional values and the Torah rather than face the decision of the secular 
Supreme Court (Glickman, 2010).  
 The argument made by the parents was that the school was not segregated along 
ethnic lines, rather religious lines. Although a majority of the students on one side were 
Ashkenazi, and the majority of the students on the other were Sephardi, the parents explained 
that this issue was a misunderstanding. This would have been less problematic as it is 
possible to have schools where all of the students adhere to certain levels of religious 
observance. The parents and the school administrators felt that it would be simpler to divide 
the school into two to serve the needs of each population. The courts found that this was not 
the case although debate remains over this issue. The court decision itself and the ultimate 
integration of the school are essentially nonissues because the next year parents who chose 
not to send their children to the newly reintegrated school, for whatever reason it was 
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desegregated in the first place, were able to send their children to private schools and bus 
them elsewhere (see Medzini, 2010). This fact reflects similar decisions on the segregation 
policies historically, for example, in the United States (see Anderson 2003; Morrison, 2004; 
Clotfelter, 2011) but really does not address the underlying fundamental issue that the ultra-
Orthodox community felt it was appropriate to use state funding in this context. Again, while 
the protests did reflect some of the more immediate events, such as the fathers surrendering 
and being led to prison for their short stay, in general, the protest represented a great deal of 
frustration with the lack of autonomy the ultra-Orthodox community has over their own 
affairs.  
 The situation involving education in Emmanuel highlights the need for a national 
integrated educational policy. This should particularly be the case when using government 
funding for education. The need for this is to ensure that educational standards are met while 
at the same time, taking into account the particular religious and cultural considerations and 
sensitivities of the population being served. Again, in this case, the sheer numbers of 
protesters brought the issue to national attention. This served to propel the issue of private 
funding and education to centre stage among secular Israelis. As a result, this has awakened 
the Israeli consciousness to discuss the various educational structures and institutions paid for 
by public funding. Perhaps this will lead to more discussion and a consensus on education 
and the viewpoint of the society at large. Large-scale protests in this context served to reopen 
the debate around religion and education. This was done through a tangible and immediate 
physical presence of the people directly affected to make their voices heard. This was done in 
a way that, as in the other cases, did not necessarily work its way through the political 
machine, but rather, social protest had an immediate and noticeable effect to bring the issue 
to national attention and a relatively quick resolution. 
There is an interesting perspective regarding the perception of the ultra-Orthodox 
community as a reflection of its perceived reality and that of secular society. Menashe Blum 
outlines an ongoing struggle in which the secular press is used to swing the balance of power 
in favour of a secular interpretation of ultra-Orthodox life. The feeling that the media employ 
lies and trickery to maintain the hegemony of the ultra-Orthodox community over its own 
affairs is mentioned as well. There are many reasons why the sentiment of persecution 
emerges. In this case, dealing with social work issues, such as having the last word on 
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internal communal affairs, pitting the community against the state, prioritizing religious 
priorities rather than those of society as a whole, and other challenges underline the great 
deal of importance that the ultra-Orthodox society places on its perceived position in Israeli 
society. The challenges to religion by the secular state and attempts to maintain the status quo 
are not simple processes, and in this instance, a battle over the place of religion in society 
was fought in the public sphere. Perhaps, as Blum maintains, this is simply an issue of the 
secular press trying to paint a picture of good and bad, simplifying these issues as much as 
possible, or, perhaps, there is a deeper level to this perception. 
That's a difficult question because on the one hand, up until—I don't know what time, you'll 
know when you write the book—but Sephardi Jews had to go to Ashkenazi yeshivas because 
there just weren't any Sephardi yeshivas. That destroyed their culture, which I think was a 
terrible, terrible thing. To integrate—if a Sephardi family wants their kid to go to an 
Ashkenazi yeshiva, to be told that their minhagim are not proper, that their minhagim are 
different, or their halachic decisions—Sephardi halachic decisions—are wrong, a Sephardi 
family, I guess, has the right to do that. But then the question is, what kind of influence will 
the Sephardi family with Sephardi children have on the Ashkenazi children? To have a law or 
rules that they can't go to one school or the other, I don't think that's proper, and I don't think 
it's proper that any government should say that they have to go. I think, kind of like in 
America, you know, separate, but equal. There are black schools and white schools, but they 
should be equal; they don't have to be integrated. I think there should be Sephardi schools; 
there should be Ashkenazi schools. If there are individuals in either one that want to cross 
over, I think they should have that right. As long as the school agrees to it, and the kids want 
it or the family wants it, but not that the government should force it upon either community. 
(Interview with Menashe Blum, 2011) 
 
In contrast, Devorah Nudelman offers an interesting perspective—that of hands-off 
involvement in issues of education or rather a degree of sensitivity towards understanding the 
special needs and challenges of the ultra-Orthodox public in this regard. But at the same 
time, she acknowledges that the government in a publically funded school should have a say 
in how taxpayer money is spent. This adds an interesting perspective into the state funding 
debate and how individuals or communities view the ultimate abrader in society. 
It was inappropriate because they are—there does exist—the parents have a right to send 
their children to a school that fits their ethos, if you want to call it, their stream of 
Yiddishkeit, if you want to call it—I don’t like calling it that. We have it here. In Jerusalem 
we have it; you have Sephardic high schools and talmudei Torah, and Yeshivot and you 
can—anyone can apply, you know. And if you’re accepted on the, whatever merit or, you 
know, acceptance procedures, I don’t see the—you know, why shouldn’t—why shouldn’t 
parents be allowed to choose? You know, just like, you know, I’m sure in America or 
somewhere, there’s this Christian doctrine or dogma and this one—and there’s different 
types of parochial schools for different types of religious streams, you know, and that 
wouldn’t be considered—be called segregation. (Interview with Devorah Nudelman, 2011) 
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E. Labor Issues 
 Employment of a particular sector of Israeli society is perceived as a concrete 
financial indicator of its relative integration into the job market and into the larger society. 
The ultra-Orthodox and the Israeli Arab population have among the lowest employment rates 
in Israeli society—primarily ultra-Orthodox men and Israeli Arab women. There are many 
reasons for this situation regarding ultra-Orthodox men, both in terms of the priorities placed 
on learning versus a societal compulsion to work and provide sustenance. In this case, the 
expected social norms have been altered over time into an entirely new pattern. This is not to 
say that if one should choose to go outside the ultra-Orthodox sphere and pursue 
employment, there would not be significant barriers, as well as a high price to pay socially 
with one's immediate community. For many, leaving the yeshiva world and joining the 
labour market exposes that individual to being ostracized from his community and being 
excluded from the social society of the yeshiva. In a situation where every aspect of life—
from schools to vocation to housing—takes place within the same cloistered community, the 
stakes are high to go against the norms and roles of the ultra-Orthodox community. 
Nevertheless, if an individual chooses to join the labour market, despite the various 
associated risks, he will encounter a situation in which, as in other modern democratic 
societies, there are difficult challenges to gaining entry into the labour force. The 
requirements for higher education, for example, are stringent in many jobs. This may 
represent a barrier to securing employment with a ministry or agency, even for a menial low-
paying entry job.  
 The working conditions within the secular labour market are not necessarily geared 
towards an all-inclusive policy taking into consideration the religious needs of workers in all 
aspects of observance and related stringencies. Unlike governmental institutions, the military, 
or other organs of the state where there is a conscious effort to create an environment that is 
as inclusive as possible, in the private sector this is less so. While major Jewish holidays are 
celebrated as national holidays without work taking place, the conditions in the particular job 
setting, the gendered roles in the workplace, and other factors may make it difficult for ultra-
Orthodox individuals to leave the confines of their community for outside employment. Even 
when this can be overcome and does not present a barrier, there are still difficulties in the 
labour market on behalf of the secular employer, who does not necessarily understand the 
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needs of the ultra-Orthodox employee and, as a result, is more willing to hire someone 
secular. All these factors and others contribute to a difficult situation where there are many 
barriers to entry into the labour market. Once an ultra-Orthodox man is in the labour market, 
there is a distinct glass ceiling due to the connections and education his secular counterparts 
would be able to take advantage of. 
 
 1. Employment and advancement  
The rate of participation in the labor force in Israel is low compared to other developed 
economies. The overall rate of participation in the civilian labor force for women in 2001 was 
about 48.4% and 60.7% for men … In two segments of the Israeli society, the Arab sector 
and ultra-Orthodox sector, the rate of participation in the labor force is particularly low, 
especially for women. While the Arab difficulties in the labor market are related to 
discrimination and limited opportunities, for the ultra-Orthodox the avoidance of the labor 
market is often the result of a choice to study Torah and live on government subsidies. (Ben-
Porat, 2008, p. 108) 
 
Many of the ultra-Orthodox see no choice but to make certain accommodations, 
particularly when it comes to fiscal integration into the Israeli job market. The real question 
behind this is on whose terms will this happen? Employment and entry into the job market is 
critical for the long-term sustainability of the ultra-Orthodox community as well as Israeli 
society. The current financial arrangement of the government subsidizing ongoing religious 
study for an entire segment of society is unsustainable and does not create alternatives in 
which individuals could have a greater degree of flexibility in choice of various 
opportunities.  
To counter the poverty and reduce government subsidies, some Haredim are suggesting that 
the ultra-Orthodox move slightly closer to the mainstream, including taking regular jobs. “To 
preserve our traditional culture, we need minimal prosperity,” says Dudi Zilbershlag, who 
publishes a Haredi weekly newspaper. “Once Haredim enter the work place, they'll be more 
connected with other Israelis.” (Halevi, 2003, p. 14) 
 
Mainstream integration would change the dynamic between the ultra-Orthodox community 
and employers and perhaps on a political note, make the bloc voting power of the religious 
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community, which many secular Israelis see as special interest, more palatable to the general 
voting public. Because the average member of Israeli society would see the ultra-Orthodox 
community making a greater and measurable financial contribution to the Israeli economy, 
therefore, this might legitimize various positions the ultra-Orthodox community holds, 
perhaps even above the specter of non-service in the military. This would also have the effect 
of leveraging the social capital of the ultra-Orthodox community. This would enable 
individuals to assume positions of influence in society and attain new leadership roles 
previously unattainable for the ultra-Orthodox community due to the various barriers placed 
around education and training.  
The welfare policy has clearly had an impact. According to a study released by Hebrew 
University, no developed nation between 1970 and 1993 had a smaller share of 25 to 54-year 
old males in the work force than did Israel. The study found nearly 15% of Israeli children 
living in homes where prime-aged males did not work. Meanwhile, yeshiva attendance for 
males has nearly doubled since 1980. (Makovsky, 1997) 
 
A new paradigm would have a ripple effect on the larger society and enable not only 
employment but also long-term advancement and leadership emerging from the ultra-
Orthodox community. This would happen on a grass-roots level with slow and steady 
progression and could take many years or perhaps a generation for the impact of this type of 
policy to emerge. 
While the Diaspora and Israel relate to the conception of “a society of learners” 
differently, integration through employment would be an alternative for those not suited to 
full-time higher Jewish learning. Those who are unable to excel in Jewish studies could find 
a multitude of opportunities through education and integration into the larger Israeli job 
market. The social stigma surrounding these issues could be addressed through the transition 
of some members of the ultra-Orthodox community into the workforce by an initial 
movement towards employment. This would have a normalizing effect on both the external 
perception and influence of the ultra-Orthodox community by secular Israelis as well as a 
changing of attitudes within the ultra-Orthodox community itself.  
If an alternative to Jewish studies became a palatable option for many in the ultra-
Orthodox community who currently do not learn full time and yet have no other options, 
many would welcome a potential avenue of change. In time, this would become accepted as a 
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viable alternative for those not suited to full-time learning. This could have an effect on an 
individual level where men are able to sustain themselves financially, as well as on a societal 
level where members of the ultra-Orthodox community who are integrated into the job 
market will bring some of the newfound wealth into the various insular ultra-Orthodox 
communities and stimulate the smaller local economies in these places. “[Haredi students] 
realize how dire their prospects are without some sort of professional training. The question 
is whether there are ways that can be created to help them, while allowing them to remain 
within their Haredi world” (Beck, 2010, p. 25). Economic benefits of a degree of integration 
would be widespread and change the prevailing attitudes towards employment. 
The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies is one of a number of organizations trying to find 
practical solutions for these problems. A recent study by the Institute found that between 60% 
and 70% of young Haredi men are interested in studying at institutions of higher secular 
learning –despite the fact that to do so would mean having to take on military service and 
losing the stipends given to full-time Torah learners. (As of now, however, the Haredi 
students lack the basic education that would allow them entrance to these institutions.) One of 
the authors of the Institute's report, Dan Kaufman, notes that it would take young Haredim at 
least four or five years to catch up in order to earn a degree, during which time many of them 
would need to support a family – an enormous task given the indigent nature of this particular 
population. (Beck, 2010, p. 25) 
 
Yitzchak Cohen makes a very optimistic case for the ability of ultra-Orthodox 
individuals to obtain leadership positions in religious society through merit by working on 
and participating in higher Jewish learning, ultimately resulting in the ability to gain access 
to leadership roles. And in the same way, or perhaps less so, this is mirrored in the perception 
of secular society and the abilities of an ultra-Orthodox individual to maintain leadership 
roles. However, as he points out, this is reliant on the prioritization of secular goals, not 
necessarily of those shared by other ultra-Orthodox coreligionists. Thus, societal acceptance 
of leadership roles by ultra-Orthodox individuals may be perhaps more difficult than it would 
be for their secular counterparts. 
Well, certainly in religious society, if they study hard and grow in their spirituality, they can 
obtain a leadership role in that position. In secular society, I think they can. I think they have 
to choose to live their life a certain way and perhaps pursue different things that might not 
necessarily be on their agenda when they're younger, but if they want to get there, I believe 
it's possible. (Interview with Yitzhak Cohen, 2011) 
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In contrast, Eliezer Weiss makes the case that ultra-Orthodox individuals are 
fundamentally not able to gain access to leadership roles in society simply because the ultra-
Orthodox population, though a significant minority, does not have power to elect individuals 
to leadership roles in secular society. This makes an interesting statement, both on the 
perception of electoral power within the ultra-Orthodox community, as well as noting the 
issue of education as being central to an individual’s ability to gain access to leadership roles. 
Because of how society, in general, looks at us. How? We certainly don't have the education, 
according to them, obviously. That's basically—it's the way that the general society looks at 
us, and they just don't think we're qualified. Okay, so as long as somebody has to get elected, 
it's not going to happen. (Interview with Eliezer Weiss, 2011) 
 
Deena Friedberg discusses discrimination and stigma that members of the ultra-
Orthodox community perceive towards them by secular society. She discusses some of the 
generalizations that have been made by secular society towards members of the ultra-
Orthodox community. 
We're discriminated against. There was a study that came out recently, and it lumped in three 
very strange groups—I think Haredim, Ethiopian Jews, and Arabs. And they said we're all 
discriminated against, you know, in positions of power, because—let's face it, this is a 
secular state, and it's been controlled by left-wing, secular people since the founding of it. So 
they don't—I mean, even Sephardi people have trouble getting into positions of power. So 
definitely, there's, you know—it's also, it's a stigma, you know. Or if you're Haredi, you know, 
you're backward, you're primitive, you have 20 kids, and you don't serve the country, and, 
you know, a lot of, you know, this kind of stereotype stuff. (Interview with Deena Friedberg, 
2011) 
 
Yonatan Smith sees the positive outlook towards the ability of ultra-Orthodox 
individuals seeking political and religious leadership. He also notes economic leadership is 
difficult, but, ultimately, is possible as ultra-Orthodox individuals have a larger share of the 
workplace and can influence society from this role. 
I would say in certain areas of leadership. If we're talking about leadership in the religious 
area, then obviously that's true. Leadership in the political arena is becoming more and more 
open to members of the Haredi viewpoint. I'd say as far as the economic or—economic scene, 
it's a bit more difficult because of the Weltanschauung [outlook] of Haredim in general as to 
integrating them within the workplace, so that obviously finding leadership roles would be 
more far and few between, but in general I think it's definitely improving. (Interview with 
Yonatan Smith, 2011) 
 
Ephraim Lerner discusses a revealing account of an individual who chooses to pursue 
a secular education and even with a secular education, is still denied access into the 
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workforce due to discrimination of the ultra-Orthodox community by secular employers. 
Obviously, this story is related secondhand, and yet it shows an interesting perception as to 
how the ultra-Orthodox community is viewed by secular society; even if the appropriate 
educational milestones were met, integration into society is still a difficult challenge. This 
makes interesting comments on the ability to integrate socially rather than simply integrating 
by obtaining the right credentials, pointing to an underlying social schism that needs to be 
addressed.  
I had a very close friend who was a dentist. He went to the school of orthodontics here. And 
he was interviewed. He got top scores on all the exams, all the interviews, and then the 
interviewer told him—he says, I have to reject you because you’re a Haredi, and on the 
interview form there's a—if you check off Haredi, you get minus X number of points, and that 
throws you out. But since you’re so smart, I will let you come in, but one thing you have to 
know, you must do a perfect job. You know, so there's, like, a glass ceiling, as they call it in 
the States, against Haredim. They don’t want them to get too high. (Interview with Ephraim 
Lerner, 2011) 
 
 a. Haredi labor relations - the example of Matrix 
“The Haredi sector is willing, under certain conditions, to take a little more responsibility for 
earning its living,” said the Israeli online Globes site recently. “That is a message that both 
the business sector and policy makers struggling over plans for growth and combating 
unemployment should take to heart” (Devi, 2005, p. 8). 
 
A very interesting example of the way in which the ultra-Orthodox community, 
primarily women, have integrated into the job market is the company Matrix. A global 
multinational company, Matrix provides offshore computer programming and other technical 
services at a much more cost-effective rate than similar services in North America. Matrix 
has an interesting business model where it operates within ultra-Orthodox communities, 
usually with the approbation of ultra-Orthodox leaders, and offers a full range of services to 
its employees, keeping in mind the particular challenges faced by women in the ultra-
Orthodox community. 
Matrix Global, a division of the Matrix subsidiary of Israeli IT firm Formula Systems, is 
based in Modiin Illit, a West Bank settlement dubbed the “future Haredi city.” Matrix Global 
started hiring ultra-Orthodox women in 2004 and now employs 750, many with degrees in 
computer science or engineering, as software developers and testers. Religious conventions 
such as not shaking a man's hand or sitting alone in a room with him, not driving and keeping 
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strict Kashrut (Jewish dietary laws), can make it difficult for a Haredi woman to fit in, and 
Matrix tries to accommodate. The company's Chief Operating Officer Libby Affen, a Haredi 
woman herself, lists flexible work hours, proximity to the home, bus shuttles, close mentoring 
and guidance of a rabbi who explains religious rules to the customers “on the outside.” 
(Lubell, 2011, p. 2)  
 
For example, women are fully trained in their particular roles, such as computer 
programming or management, and the training can be quite extensive for women without the 
basic education, such as math skills or computer skills, which would normally be required to 
obtain a technical job. This extensive training takes place in a format that is compatible with 
the ultra-Orthodox lifestyle.  
The working conditions in the offices of Matrix also have an ultra-Orthodox character 
in that they have women-only offices where women and men do not need to interact on a 
regular basis, company hours are set up to allow women to care for their children by coming 
in later in the day and leaving earlier, as well as excellent benefits for maternity leave and 
other work interruptions. “Around 40 babies are born each week in Modi'in Illit [where 
Matrix is located], which has a population of 20,000 says one worker” (Devi, 2005, p. 8). By 
building these features into the corporate structure of a company and making what would be 
considerable perks for an ultra-Orthodox woman working in the secular workplace 
commonplace, this employer becomes the natural job of choice for high-level work without 
commuting for woman who are working in the ultra-Orthodox community, usually 
supporting their husbands who are learning. Because of Matrix’s integrated nature into the 
social fabric of ultra-Orthodox society, there is very little reason for women to leave and find 
more advanced and higher paying work as would normally be the case with a secular 
computer programmer. Because leaving Matrix to find a better job would necessitate leaving 
the confines of the community to go into a secular city to work for a high tech company, 
Matrix has positioned itself as a captive employer with both financial and social overtones. In 
Matrix, most of the Israeli operations of the company are run by secular Israelis who see the 
company as both a social as well as financially profitable endeavour.  
Matrix has raised potential employment for ultra-Orthodox women to more advanced 
technical skills, challenging the often-held misconception that the only jobs available to 
ultra-Orthodox women are teaching primary school, working in ultra-Orthodox institutions, 
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and working at other similar home-based or local jobs. Rather, Matrix gives its employees 
the chance to work with advanced technologies and provides the training and format to be 
acceptable within the ultra-Orthodox community. “Through training and offering more short-
term courses [Matrix] allow[s] students to study advanced technologies, guaranteeing them a 
job” (Devi, 2005, p. 8). 
It is interesting to note that the providers of financial support within the family, in this 
case ultra-Orthodox women, have less direct impact on social change than would be expected 
in other contexts (Ferree, 1990, pp. 866–867) through their support of the family. In this 
particular instance, the breadwinner, the wife and mother of the family, is socially integrated 
in the community in a particular role. This role is both to provide support from "outside" 
through labour and to assume the traditional child care role. This allows men in the ultra-
Orthodox community to pursue yeshiva learning unburdened. This is a fairly typical 
arrangement in the ultra-Orthodox community. In this arrangement, earning power does not 
translate into social capital, and this makes a very interesting dynamic for the role of gender 
and social authority. The role of women in this framework, through acquiescence to a 
patriarchal arrangement despite their wage earning, inherently diminishes the potential 
challenge to the rigidly defined social order of the ultra-Orthodox community.  
As an employer, Matrix uses various elements of religious teachings, maxims, and 
other vestiges of religious life to make the company more profitable, streamline worker 
productivity, and more deeply entrench the company within the overall community.  
Matrix recently offered a dinner or outing as a reward, but the staff chose to have a rabbi 
come and address them on Judaism, a perk that certainly appears to help maintain loyalty. “I 
would turn down a job if that environment didn't suit me,” says Chavie Josovic, the 
administrative director. “I'm a typical Talpiot [Matrix] person. My job is to connect ultra-
Orthodox religious life to high tech.” (Devi, 2005, p. 8) 
 
This push towards legitimacy is a critical aspect for the company because it is inherently at 
the mercy of the community leadership to determine if this is indeed an acceptable work 
environment for ultra-Orthodox women and whether the work and skills being taught are 
compatible with the ultra-Orthodox lifestyle and values. This approach is controversial 
because in the same way that the military promotes a secular religiosity based on a common 
theme of Judaism, Matrix and companies like it seek to promote hegemony over their 
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employees by making the perception and operation of the local branches intrinsically tied 
with and using elements of ultra-Orthodoxy. For all the inherent social issues Matrix brings 
up, there is no question that furthering ultra-Orthodox exposure to technology can be an 
important vector for social change and may be a catalyst for reform within the ultra-Orthodox 
community with women moving from more traditional roles, even though various forms of 
technology, such as advanced cell phones, Internet, computers, and so on, are generally 
considered taboo. This relates to employment as well, with a move towards a more 
technologically oriented labour force. In terms of education and employment, this means that 
there is a greater degree of intellectual independence granted to women even if this is merely 
a function of the more technologically advanced work ultra-Orthodox women are engaging 
in. Perhaps in time these small steps will lead to an internal examination of women’s roles 
within the community and present options in terms of rectifying the imbalances that exist 
between men and women in the ultra-Orthodox community in Israel. Indeed, “many haredim 
would get a job if workplaces ‘appropriate to the ultra-Orthodox culture and rules of conduct’ 
could be created, says Benjamin Fefferman, director of the planning, research, and 
economics administration at the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor” (Ackerman & 
Odenheimer, 2010, p. 17). 
 
 2. Israeli economy and job market 
  Israel faces numerous economic challenges. Many factors contribute to difficulties in 
the employment market, such as Israel being a small country with a relatively skilled job 
market and an educated population. The level of education required to be employed at an 
average position is, therefore, a challenge to some individuals who do not have the requisite 
education (Shavit & Yuchtman-Yaar, 2001). Being integrated in the job market gives a 
degree of satisfaction and quality of life (Lowenstein & Katz, 2005). For the ultra-Orthodox 
community, multiple challenges, both within and outside the community, prevent full 
integration into the labor force. Since the ultra-Orthodox community seeks to preserve its 
identity, way of life, and culture, there is unwillingness to integrate into the larger job market 
outside the religious community. There are also barriers outside the ultra-Orthodox 
community, such as the requirement for national service, requirements for education, 
educational standards within the academic sphere, and so on. There are allowances for new 
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immigrants to Israel to adapt to the local market (Raijman & Semyonov, 1995), but similar 
options are lacking for the economic integration of individuals in the ultra-Orthodox 
community who wish to pursue a wider range of employment options. These issues make it 
increasingly difficult for an individual from the ultra-Orthodox community to enter a job 
market focused on specialization. The Israeli job market is skewed towards the highest 
paying jobs being in technically advanced fields. This requires advanced degrees, and this 
type of education is generally unobtainable by individuals in the ultra-Orthodox community 
who may lack the prerequisite educational backgrounds (Lewin-Epstein & Semyonov, 1994). 
The process of increasing rights over duties has been intensified since 1977 elections in 
which Haredi members have translated into considerable party power in Israel's coalition 
politics (beyond their actual electoral weight). The growing involvement in politics is also 
related to the need for resources given the economic conditions of the community...Haredi 
men (aged 25-54) who do not participate in the labor market because they attend yeshiva full-
time rose from 41% in 1980 to 60% by 1996. Scholars argue that these levels are 
unprecedented amongst Jews in other Orthodox streams, and far exceed yeshiva attendance 
abroad where young men seldom attend past the age of 25. In these conditions, most members 
attain a modest lifestyle, live in poor crowded housing, and are highly dependent on state 
support. (Stadler et al., 2008, p. 220) 
 
 Learning Jewish subjects without a foundation in secular subjects (the core 
curriculum) (Schwartz & Shaul, 2013)) is how the ultra-Orthodox community has over time 
developed a separate educational system in Israel (Gross, 2003; Shamai, 2000). This means 
that the community is protected in a way from outside secular influences, but at the same 
time, it becomes increasingly difficult to break into the job market in any position, which 
requires some type of basic education. The particular way in which the education sphere and 
the labor market interact has a great deal of influence on how the academic curriculum is 
structured and developed and the lack of participation by the ultra-Orthodox community in 
the educational establishment at large (El-Or, 1994). From the ultra-Orthodox community’s 
perspective, there is an ongoing and mindful approach to prevent integration and assimilation 
through education. At the same time, it becomes increasingly difficult for members of the 
community to catch up or overcome lacking educational standards when one seeks to obtain 
the equivalent of a university level education. Coupled with this is the fact that higher Jewish 
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learning in a yeshiva is not considered to have the same legitimacy as a university degree, 
even if it is in the same sort of subjects. An example of this would be getting an academic 
degree in Talmud as opposed to studying Talmud in a yeshiva. This situation prevents 
individuals from having options and creates conditions for an underground grey market 
economy in which no money is returning to the tax base. As the economic situation globally 
becomes more difficult, access to the job market is even more critical than before. To make 
this access possible, employers need to become more flexible in terms of the qualifications 
and criteria that they require for particular jobs, and the ultra-Orthodox community needs to 
be more amenable in the types of education that are accessible. For the educational 
framework as a whole, sweeping changes are needed in order to take into account the 
particular challenges of the various communities, such as the ultra-Orthodox.  
Yitzchak Cohen talks about how ultra-Orthodox society, as a result of a policy of 
ongoing non-integration, has managed expectations when it comes to education. This, 
therefore, leaves individuals with access to particular outcomes, for example, things that do 
not necessarily involve in-depth secular education, such as computer programming, versus 
vocations that would require many years of university studies, such as medicine. This 
arrangement is perhaps due to the rigidity of the status quo arrangement and impacts the 
parameters of what is available to individuals in society. 
Well, one thing that I think would be—I think, personally, would be a great help for them, is if 
they had some sort of an education in—you know, besides just in their high schools—in their 
yeshivoth. I don't know if it's ever going to happen, but if they were able to be taught the 
sciences and maths, on a level, that if they wanted to pursue a career as a doctor, let's say, or 
a career as a lawyer, that they would have the skills necessary to go to college or take college 
courses, even online, or university courses, so that they can graduate and take a really, you 
know—a job that's considered, you know, "white-collar." That would be something that I 
think would be great. But also, and I think it's happening, having courses, and again, I really 
think they're doing this right now, geared to the Haredi ultra-Orthodox population in fields 
like—like I said, computers, perhaps accounting, maybe other specifically geared jobs—
perhaps ultrasounds or doing some sort of dental work or being an assistant—maybe not 
necessarily as a doctor. You know, the women also could get training in certain fields that 
they could work in. And I think they're doing it right now, and I think that's something that's 
happening as we speak. (Interview with Yitzhak Cohen, 2011)  
 
Cohen also maintains that it is important for individuals to find the particular niche in 
the job market in Israel due to the overall size of the economy. This is also a factor as he 
notes that there is a bias towards integration with preference being given to native Israelis 
versus immigrants. This is an issue not only on a religious level, but also in terms of 
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integration, which certainly has overtones of the division of labour as it relates to education 
and so on. 
I mean, it's a small country, and there's not necessarily much opportunity, because you're not 
dealing with—you know, when you're in a much bigger country, with a lot more people, 
and—you know, you can work in a job where there might be small profits, for example, but 
because you are dealing with a larger population, you could still make it and do well. In 
Israel, you've got to find the right niche. I think it might be a drop harder. I really don't know 
because I haven't explored that area as much, but it's harder. It's definitely harder, 
especially, you know— because I, you know, I'm not Israeli, I have a little bit of a bias, 
because I feel it is harder for someone who is not born and grown up there to be able to make 
it the same as someone that's lived there all their life. (Interview with Yitzhak Cohen, 2011) 
 
 This solution of integration, as far as education and employment, is only the first step 
as there needs to be an overhaul of the way in which the entire population is educated and 
employed. In society, education is a key element, but there are other factors that may prevent 
an individual from attaining economic integration. In order to find new ways of economic 
integration, a new perspective is required that takes the unique circumstances of the ultra-
Orthodox community into account. For example, offering university level credits within or in 
cooperation with various yeshivas and universities would enable individuals to pursue higher 
Jewish learning, but at the same time gain academic credentials, which would allow 
individuals to work in a variety of jobs. This needs to be considered on the high school level 
as well, as this is a critical step in shaping future citizens, particularly in the yeshiva high 
school environment (Ayalon & Yogev, 1996). The same economic circumstances affect other 
groups in Israeli society that are not integrated, such as Arab women. A new direction needs 
to be considered in order to create the conditions where individuals in the ultra-Orthodox 
community can flourish. 
Yitzchak Cohen talks about opportunity and the secular education that many in the 
ultra-Orthodox community lack. The fundamental question that he asks is: What does 
religious education equate with in the secular job market? There must be jobs that have a 
connection between the secular and religious roles. Determining what things are, for 
example, the equivalent of liberal arts degrees could make major inroads in terms of giving 
the ultra-Orthodox community access to jobs in the secular world. Essentially, secular 
education gives individuals an advantage over an ultra-Orthodox education when viewed 
through the paradigm of the secular job market. Cohen goes onto say that there are 
alternative options to integrate, such as separate educational options or opportunities in 
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advanced technologies, including computer programming and so on, that do not necessarily 
necessitate attending integrated programs with secular individuals while still allowing for 
technological advancement in a qualitative, if not necessarily quantitative, way when 
combined with higher Jewish learning in yeshiva. Perhaps this is a compromise, which 
allows for maintaining both a traditional way of life and at the same time achieving a 
relatively prestigious occupation in the secular world. 
I don't think it's 100% there yet. From what I've read, they continue to try to provide 
opportunities to integrate religious people, but the biggest fear that I have and, you know, I 
might be off, but unfortunately, most of the yeshivoth Israel do not provide any sort of secular 
education. So when you're talking about someone who is 20 or 25 or 30 years old that doesn't 
really have the same background, with a, you know, a proper high school diploma as 
someone who went through, you know, the system—the secular system, you know, it's hard to 
know whether those people have the same skill sets as someone who's gone to high school, 
and then gone to college and university. You know, I've heard people say that studying 
Gemara and studying other things does hone the mind and does, you know, give you some 
skills to help you in the workforce. I don't necessarily know what type of careers that might 
give you, you know, the help in. But certainly having the right high school education in 
English, in sciences, in math, you know, even in the Hebrew language, would probably give 
people who are secular, or at least— even religious people that have an education, a little bit 
of an advantage over someone who is Haredi or ultra-Orthodox, who's now—who's studying 
in a yeshiva and a kollel all his life and is now trying to find a job. But there are still 
opportunities. I've heard them. They could work in computers, there are courses they could 
take that can train them. And if they're looking, I think they could find, but they might not 
have the same equal opportunities as other people who have more education. (Interview with 
Yitzhak Cohen, 2011) 
 
Yoav Daniel identifies this interest for members of the ultra-Orthodox community 
joining the labour market as well as real barriers to integration into the labour market. These 
barriers are coupled with other factors and social challenges resulting in a difficult and 
complex situation. 
I know that I think it's pretty problematic for Haredim who—a lot of Haredim—there are 
certain—most Charedim have no interest in entering the mainstream job market, and for 
various reasons cannot, even if they were interested. But there's also a certain segment that 
would like to and cannot, both because of a lack of accommodations and because of hiring 
discrimination. (Interview with Yoav Daniel, 2011) 
 
Deena Friedberg makes an extremely interesting observation that for some jobs or 
integration into the labour market more widely, speaking English without mastering Hebrew 
limits options. This is interesting because many Israelis who speak Hebrew seek to improve 
their English skills in order to be more of a commodity in the labour market. This 
perspective, which uses language as a cultural integrator versus various issues of religion, 
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points to an interesting underlying current of immigration and immigrants versus native-born 
Israelis and the importance of cultural and language integration. This topic is not necessarily 
dealt with in this thesis, but it would certainly make an interesting study of how language 
transcends religious divisions, perhaps not entirely, but is certainly an indicator for the way 
in which they are divided. 
Job market? Well, I think there's a big difference, like, being an English speaker because that 
definitely limits what people can do. If—you know, I've been looking for another job because 
I do work for an American company, but the hours are terrible and the pay is even worse, so 
I'm looking for something else. But without Hebrew, it does limit you a lot. So I don't think it 
has to do with religious as much, I think it has to do with language.  
(Interview with Deena Friedberg, 2011) 
 
Yehuda Aaronson describes economic mobility and the difficulty immigrants face in 
order to adapt in a new society. This is not only adaptation but also figuring out a new social 
order and way of life, which may not be readily apparent to an immigrant. This also has an 
interesting undertone looking at society’s differences versus ones strictly of religion. This 
perhaps shows a variation in the way in which religion and society share a common 
boundary. 
Most people—the common working person is making a meager salary, not enough to live on. 
Poverty is the highest in—you know, the smallest percentage owns the maximum amount of 
the money, and everybody else is dividing up the, you know, the little bit. It's not divided 
properly. It's very hard for the little guy to move up in any way. The jobs are—for small 
businesses it's very difficult. Even big businesses, there's, you know, the tax laws make it 
impossible, you know, to get ahead. In order to function, everybody knows you have to have 
the (laughs)—the, you have to have the—you know, one income with another income, because 
you can't have—with 50 percent tax no one can live, that's not possible. And they themselves 
know that. An anecdote was, there's an American lawyer who made aliyah, came over here, 
and like a good innocent American reported all of her—exactly all of her income and all of 
her—you know, kept everything straight by the book. And the mas hakhnasah came to her and 
they said, mazal tov. According to your own admission, you're the highest paid lawyer in the 
country (laughs). She's, like, this little nothing lawyer. Obviously, because everybody knows 
that that's the—you can't function like this. (Interview with Yehuda Aronson, 2011) 
 
 Members of the ultra-Orthodox community have a great deal to contribute to Israeli 
society through their unique perspectives in the job market. In addition, this diversity will 
enhance the economic output of society overall and lessen the burden on social welfare while 
increasing productivity. In many ways, this analysis calls for a perspective that is similar to 
traditional patterns of Jewish life in the Diaspora and is reflective of the current situation in 
the Diaspora where even among ultra-Orthodox Jews, attaining education is key to the 
integration of society and does not necessarily mean a cultural or social demise. In addition, 
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having educated members of the ultra-Orthodox community with respected positions in 
society will ultimately have a positive social effect by lessening tensions over government 
support for Jewish learning, as well as creating new loci of power within society by 
individuals from the ultra-Orthodox community. This will increase the capacity of the ultra-
Orthodox community to gain legitimacy, not only by using their rights for continuing the 
status quo but also by demonstrating the many contributions ultra-Orthodox individuals are 
able to make to Israeli society, as is the case elsewhere in the Diaspora.  
The current economic situation is untenable as it puts a great deal of pressure on 
social support. “Almost 60% of Israel's estimated 100,000 ultra-Orthodox men of working 
age don’t have jobs. They have prompted Bank of Israel Governor Stanley Fischer and 
Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz to assert that the haredim…may impede Israel's prosperity” 
(Ackerman & Odenheimer 2010, p. 16). Moreover, “the low rate of employment is putting 
pressure on the economy in a way that is 'not sustainable,'” Fischer told reporters in 
Jerusalem in July [2010] (Ackerman & Odenheimer 2010, p. 16). This is feared as an ever-
increasing problem since the birthrate for the ultra-Orthodox community greatly exceeds that 
of secular Israelis. Currently, because so many in the ultra-Orthodox community are not able 
to pursue other options in terms of economic integration, there are many barriers to changing 
the status quo and finding a solution to this issue. Many things must be done in order to 
overcome bias on both sides of the economic question. This includes working towards new 
standards for education, clearly separating economic and social emerging and assimilation, 
and having public discourse relating to the elements of what an integrated solution should 
and could offer to members of Israeli society.  
Policy challenges regarding the Haredim are different as public policy has chosen to support 
the Haredi lifestyle in different ways: men can avoid military service, receive stipends and 
(recently increased) child allowances. However, as Haredim will soon make up 10% or more 
of the population and their number continues to grow, this policy is becoming increasingly 
difficult to sustain. (OECD 2010, p. 175) 
 
 Integration in the economy and job market does not mean that individuals will 
necessarily have to choose between their religious beliefs or attaining an education. The 
system should allow individuals to attain an education, be productive members of society, 
and at the same time, maintain their religious convictions in a way that does not require them 
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to assimilate. For various reasons, this has not been the case in Israel because of agreements 
such as the status quo; however, the way forward is utilizing a similar social arrangement to 
that of the Diaspora. In many countries around the world, individuals have religious 
freedoms. Therefore, at the same time, they are able to attain positions of respect and higher 
education, helping society and in effect, helping individuals in the ultra-Orthodox community 
through public recognition of their religiosity and knowledgeable skills. A shift also does not 
mean that individuals would be required to choose between yeshiva learning and the ability 
to attain a higher education. The reality is that many individuals are skilled at higher Jewish 
learning and would choose to remain in the yeshiva. The situation really becomes an issue for 
those who are not interested in attaining a yeshiva education and would rather be working 
and integrated into the labour force. Being accepted in the labour force with or without 
academic credentials is an important element of this issue that needs to be considered. At the 
same time, providing basic education and basic options to allow individuals more choices is 
also crucial. The difficulty that many in the ultra-Orthodox community face comes from a 
multitude of factors that has built up over time.  
 In the Diaspora, there are individuals who choose one option over another, but, in 
essence, they have choices, which is not necessarily the case among the ultra-Orthodox 
community in Israel. By presenting individuals with these choices, secular society will be 
pacified in that there is greater economic integration and less ongoing social support as 
individuals are able to support themselves. At the same time, there will be new capacity-
building within the ultra-Orthodox community to reinvigorate both Jewish learning in the 
yeshiva and a new paradigm of social order.  
Menashe Blum makes the case that many opportunities are only available to 
individuals who have served in the military. Because many in the ultra-Orthodox community 
have not served in a national service program and also do not have a secular background, it is 
increasingly difficult for them to integrate into society. This also causes increased difficulty 
when they look for employment. 
The system is set up that many jobs are only available if you have been in the army. So, the 
religious community that hasn't served in the army, many, many of these things are closed to 
them. Educationally, you know, they don't have the skills. You hear periodically that a kid 
that's been trained in Gemara for a lot of years has a very good mind, and he can be quickly 
taught to do many things in high tech or whatever, so that may be true. But how many jobs 
are like that? I don't know. But in general, without a secular education, without doing the 
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army, the society itself, the way it is set up, it's very hard to find a job. (Interview with 
Menashe Blum, 2011) 
 
Yoav Daniel makes an interesting point that while ultra-Orthodox individuals are 
willing to be accommodating to a certain extent, he thinks that many secular employers are 
not willing to make accommodations. Even when employers are willing to make 
accommodations, in order to meet the employee halfway, the compromise is simply too great 
in the context of giving up religious privileges and rights. Access to jobs in society is, 
therefore, that much more difficult. Even though obsessively observant individuals are able 
to integrate into the workforce, in reality, they would be required to do things that would go 
against their religious beliefs and way of life, making these positions unattainable. 
Of course not. Unless they are going to—you know, there are certain jobs that nowadays 
there really are jobs that they expect you to work on Shabbos, or work on Yom Tov, or work 
on certain days of the year that you're not going to want to work, or work in an environment 
that people who are used to gender segregation, for good reasons, the accommodations are 
not available. And even if they are willing to make compromises for the sake of a job, the 
compromises that are expected of them are too much. (Interview with Yoav Daniel, 2011) 
 
Sarah Falk discusses a hiring bias towards the ultra-Orthodox community in general 
by the secular society and, in specific, addresses the issue of women seeking employment in 
the secular world. Even if one overcomes the hiring bias towards ultra-Orthodox individuals, 
there is still the issue of maternity leave where ultra-Orthodox women have far more children 
than their secular counterparts and then will be on maternity leave repeatedly. This, therefore, 
poses a major issue for integration within the ultra-Orthodox community, as well as among 
secular employers who employ ultra-Orthodox women and make accommodation for this 
particular way of life. If that is not the case and generalized rules that apply to all society are 
used, when ultra-Orthodox individuals try to obtain employment, this could be incredibly 
difficult due to the very different pattern of life. 
There are a lot of secular people who are anti-hiring religious people. Like, I worked in a 
preschool and one of the parents came and they said, I don't mean to be horrible, but you're 
hiring too many Haredi teachers—to the director. Like, here we are, we're not teaching 
religion. We're basically watching their kids and people are—don't want you there because 
you're religious. And then also people—there are people who will straight out say to you, 
well we don't want this job to be for a young mother; we don't want someone who's going to 
keep having kids and going on maternity leave. So there is definitely a lot of bias against 
Haredi women in the workforce. (Interview with Sarah Falk, 2011) 
 
Yocheved Saks talks about the need for more options and flexibility when it comes to 
employment training and opportunity in the ultra-Orthodox community. This does not merely 
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mean looking at new ways of integration and assimilation but rather finding new ways to 
communicate with the secular public to see how a compromise could be made that is 
acceptable to both the ultra-Orthodox community and the secular community. It also means 
identifying what overlap there is that would be mutually acceptable in order to find new 
solutions for advancement in employment and training. 
Al regel achat, you want me to tell you what can change? (Laughs). There can be a bit better 
smorgasboard of options, both for men and for women, and more flexibility with regard to a 
Haredi lifestyle. And there's certainly the dialogue—since I'm here, there have only been one 
or two open dialogues between the Haredim and—there's a place over here on Shlomo 
Hamelech, I forget what it's called. There's a—it was even dedicated to this whole purpose of 
creating a Haredi-Hiloni dialogue. That dialogue has to be a lot more nurtured than it is 
now. There is no dialogue, there's no dialogue at all. And I'll tell you something that I 
experienced in America— that the observant Jews are not angry or upset or biased against 
non-observant Jews. There's a palpable hatred of non-observant Jews against the observant 
Jews. And there is a suspicion among the observant Jews that they're hated because, on a 
certain level, they're afraid that maybe they should be observing too, and they don't. And 
maybe Dad likes observant Jews more than he likes non-observant Jews. And Dad's door is 
always open, but you got to walk through the door. (Interview with Yocheved Saks, 2011) 
 
Menashe Blum makes an interesting observation and takes the inevitable shift 
towards the ultra-Orthodox community integrating into the workforce for granted. This is an 
interesting perspective as it would more closely model the ultra-Orthodox community 
elsewhere in the Diaspora, which is normally integrated into society on an economic level. 
What this could mean for the ultra-Orthodox community in Israel remains to be seen and if it 
is going to be the only outcome for society to integrate even on their own terms. The social 
impact will be interesting as it comes outside of a long progression of internal social 
development in Israel towards building a society that does not participate in the workforce 
while being state-supported for religious reasons. 
Well, I guess, if the Haredi community realizes that they can't go on like this forever then they 
would need to find a way—like in America, where people learned in yeshiva all day and then 
went to university at night to learn some sort of a skill that they could make a parnassa—still 
be involved in Torah, but have a skill to support their families. Maybe the Haredi 
communities will have to come to a point where they realize that has to happen. The Haredi 
community can't just support itself for much longer. There are just too many people and not 
enough income. (Interview with Menashe Blum, 2011) 
 
Yehuda Aronson discusses possible changes in terms of education and employment 
that involve compromises in the normally rigid secular criteria required in the job market. 
This would seek to make accommodations for members of the ultra-Orthodox community to 
find new potential avenues to join the workforce while at the same time maintaining their 
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religious studies and not necessarily having to qualify [and thereby integrate] in the secular 
stream of education. This perhaps could fulfill the need of the ultra-Orthodox community to 
integrate but at the same time replace secular academia, as this approach would severely limit 
the available jobs that individuals in the ultra-Orthodox community are able to obtain. 
Balancing these two factors is critical to determining the future of education in the ultra-
Orthodox community. 
There—there are groups that are trying to help integrate the religious people into the secular 
workplace. Mini-courses, not having to do Bagrut and things like that—you know, in other 
words you get the necessary information that you need without all the—you know, the entire 
degree without the length of time, without having to go to university, which the environment 
is the problem, maybe not the actual learning part. So, you know, that's the things (inaudible) 
that are helping. (Interview with Yehuda Aronson, 2011) 
 
 
 3. Funding and stipends, including national insurance payments 
Funding and stipends have become a key issue of contention with the ultra-Orthodox 
community. National insurance payments and the safety net provided to members of the 
ultra-Orthodox community engaged in full-time learning have become a critical schism in 
Israeli society. This has led to ongoing protests by secular university students, protesting the 
stipends and other forms of social assistance given to ultra-Orthodox individuals who learn in 
yeshiva on a full-time basis.  
There remains a central contradiction in the haredi relationship to Israel: Their isolation 
from secular Israeli society is made possible by the resources they receive from it. The more 
they impinge on the society, the greater the danger of backlash that will force them to 
choose between their principles and their economic viability. (Dowty, 2001, p. 181) 
 
The difficulty for the secular Israeli community is that many ultra-Orthodox individuals do 
not serve in national service in any form, and despite the exemptions and deferments, they 
are rewarded for this by essentially receiving salaries to continue to learn. This stands in 
distinct contrast to secular individuals who are required to complete several years of military 
or other service and upon finishing are required to finance their own higher level studies at 
university. University students have protested this situation saying that it would only be fair 
for the state to provide funding for university students as well. Their contention is that 
students studying in secular institutions of higher learning should be no different from ultra-
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Orthodox students learning in higher-level yeshivas. This creates a great deal of tension 
along religious/secular lines and is central to the historical development of the ultra-Orthodox 
community in Israel. The choices, which society faces, are many. Is it best to support both 
higher secular education, as well as higher-level religious studies, or is it preferable to 
support neither? The Supreme Court recently ruled against this status quo, which gives 
funding to yeshiva students but not to secular students, and this issue remains unresolved. 
Most recently, as many as 10,000 students demonstrated in Jerusalem protesting an attempt 
to legislate the continued payment of 132 million shekels ($33,000,000) paid to yeshiva 
students with families -- each family receives 1,045 shekels ($260.00) a month. The 
demonstrators were saying that the preferential treatment of yeshiva students can't go on. 
Israel's Supreme Court struck down the grant as of January 1st, but Haredi parties would like 
to legislate it into law. (Ain, 2011) 
 
This imbalance does not take into account the religious dimension of the equation nor the 
ultra-Orthodox communal values that they seek to preserve by the form and structure of the 
ultra-Orthodox community.  
It is important to look at the underlying implications of funding by the state to the 
religious minority. Many of the facets of life in the ultra-Orthodox community in Israel have 
continued because of long-term social advantages, which have gone unchecked for decades. 
This has led to a great deal of frustration among secular Israelis, who feel that their 
contributions in terms of education and integration with the job market are not appreciated 
with government subsidies and funding in the same way that the ultra-Orthodox community 
benefits from these subsidies. 
The question is: If there is room for potential compromise within the existing 
frameworks, would it be possible for increased secular funding and stipends for higher-level 
secular education or to create a balance between Orthodox education and secular education, 
essentially not creating a distinction between the two? There could potentially be a middle 
ground found so that students in both university and yeshiva would be able to find new ways 
to integrate. This means that, excluding all the other issues, in recognizing various types of 
education, new potential avenues for advancement integration might be found. Both secular 
and religious students have unique skills and could potentially find niche areas of 
productivity within the Israeli economy. However, if things are going to stay the same, this 
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will require new ways of thinking about state and religion and how funds should be allocated. 
This is important because it is not only a highly contentious political issue, but also one that 
has long-term ramifications for Israel as a whole. Examining the underlying fundamental 
causes of the status quo and the reasons that things have developed the way they have opens 
the potential for a discussion about how best to serve the population as a whole, no matter 
what the particular perspective is on the place of state and religion. 
Funding and stipends in terms of education could also have a significant impact on 
one’s ability to compete in the job market. Many jobs require a university degree and 
recognition of similar yeshiva learning (as an indicator of general education status) would 
mean that individuals would have much greater access. This certainly applies to programs, 
which are similar in both yeshiva and university, such as the study of the Talmud. Many 
religious programs have similar components to secular degrees, in terms of variation of 
study, and recognition that there is equivalence in this learning may open new areas of 
discussion. As long as the standards remain drastically apart and there is no equivalency to 
transition from the world of Orthodoxy to that of the secular, recognition and funding 
become a one-way street without the opportunity for compromise. Ultimately, there is a place 
for a discussion involving the utility of religious studies, and this could perhaps be 
accomplished in concert with secular studies.  
 The courts have expressed an unwillingness to engage in this problem and force a 
solution on the Israeli public.  
The high court struck down this discriminatory practice [of subsidizing yeshiva study versus 
that of university]. As is its wont, the Court left it up to the Knesset to determine how to 
rectify the situation. Ending the eligibility of yeshiva students for the guarantees would mean 
about 11,000 yeshiva students would no longer receive an average of 1,040 Shekels ($270) 
per month, which for many of them would be a significant reduction in their incomes. 
Extending it to all students on the other hand would raise the possibility of tens of thousands 
of students taking advantage of the income supplements, threatening the state budget with an 
extra liability of hundreds of millions of shekels. (The Jerusalem Report, 2010, p. 5) 
 
The Supreme Court was ruling on a petition that had been brought by Jenny Baruchi, a single 
mother who complained that she had been denied welfare assistance as a university student 
while yeshiva students receive such payments.  
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A 1980 Knesset law forbade university students from enjoying income assurance, out of 
concern that students from middle and upper class backgrounds would use the payments as a 
convenient source of income while they were enrolled. Yeshiva students were explicitly 
exempted from this condition. (The Jerusalem Report, 2010, p. 5) 
 
Although the court sent this issue back to the Knesset in order to create laws that reflect the 
interests of the people, nevertheless, with the fragmented nature of Israeli politics, and the 
contentious nature of state and religious issues in Israel, this crucial step may not be resolved 
in the near future. The potential for a discussion regarding state and religion relies on the 
ability of the individuals concerned to discuss these issues and to find a middle ground. This 
would solve many of the educational issues in terms of recognition but on a deeper level 
would speak to the stipends and funding ultra-Orthodox students receive, which secular 
students do not, and find an equilibrium where funding is equitable. 
  
 4. Social assistance 
Social assistance as a component of the support the state gives to the ultra-Orthodox 
community is complex and a source of great tension. This support speaks to the root cause of 
the problems facing individuals who are stuck, understanding the role of society at large in 
the support and promotion of Jewish learning. This support can be seen as an extension of the 
fundamentals of the state and part of the inherent character of the state to support religious 
learning as a cornerstone of national identity. Even if this is not factual in practice, with 
many citizens actually being somewhat secular, the obligation of the state to fund higher 
Jewish learning is a complex question. At the same time, when looked at from a utilitarian 
perspective, there is obviously a great difference in opinion as to the real and tangible 
benefits of this funding to the state. Both state sponsorship and private funds are employed in 
the scheme, which has grown in size and complexity over the decades. The result has been 
the creation of a religious and social model in which reliance on external funding has shaped 
the internal structure of the community.  
A recently released report by the Israeli Treasury noted that the country loses $1.5 billion 
annually as a result of the sector's nonparticipation in the workforce -- 300% more than in 
2000. This does not include billions of tax dollars going towards yeshivot (schools teaching 
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classical Judaism), social security, and child benefits for the Haredi population. (Beck, 2010, 
p. 22) 
 
It is interesting to note that many of these principles are in line with the practice of ultra-
Orthodox Judaism and express themselves in new dynamic ways in which to provide 
resources under economic duress. Social assistance has become a facet of life in the ultra-
Orthodox community. This is partly due to the situation with national and military service. 
By not integrating on a social or economic basis, the ultra-Orthodox community as a whole is 
generally left with meager resources with which to support individuals and communal 
institutions. There are many reasons for this physical reality, among them the priority placed 
on religious learning, which has become a key motivating factor for the ultra-Orthodox 
community. Yet this intense specialization across the spectrum of the ultra-Orthodox 
community is not necessarily sustainable without a large amount of external funding. This 
funding can come from multiple sources, including donations from the Diaspora, but largely, 
funding for the ultra-Orthodox community comes from government budgets allocated 
specifically to maintain the ultra-Orthodox community. 
In maintaining separate communities Haredim are in a constant conflict with surrounding 
society because traditionally, Haredim do not participate in the Israeli labor market, do not 
serve in the army, and are dependent on the largess of the state for survival. At the same 
time, however, they have attained impressive success in terms of budgets allocated to them, 
widening their educational system, the number of institutions catering to their needs and 
their cultural and political influence.... Haredim were awarded these rights because of the 
historical necessity of Israel as a state to receive religious sanction for its ethno-national 
boundaries as a Jewish-Israeli collective. Yet this situation means that because of non-
participation in the central arenas of characterizing citizenship in nation-states (the labor 
market and military service) they “spoil” the delicate balance between civic duties and 
rights. (Stadler et al., 2008, p. 220) 
 
This is where the ongoing political maneuvering has great effects. In order for the state to 
provide sufficient resources to the ultra-Orthodox community from the national budget, a 
great degree of interconnectedness must exist with the state. Through negation by the ultra-
Orthodox community, funding is attained at the expense of issues viewed as peripheral to the 
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ultra-Orthodox community. The responsibility for funding is very different for the ultra-
Orthodox community than in the secular perspective. From the ultra-Orthodox perspective, 
ongoing Torah learning is no less than the preservation of Jewish life and tradition as 
expressed through Orthodox Judaism. In the ultra-Orthodox view, this is something that 
demands public funding and, in fact, informs the spiritual Jewish component of the state of 
Israel. From the secular perspective, by the government funding the ultra-Orthodox 
community to a great degree and with ultra-Orthodox men having among the lowest 
employment rates of any sector in Israel, there is a huge lost production value. In addition, 
secular Israelis claim that keeping the status quo as it is, particularly in terms of economic 
support, will carry into increasingly difficult patterns of social development, which will be 
increasingly difficult to back away from in the future.  
Haredi young men, who are prevented from joining the labor force or seeking secular 
education at least until the age of 30-35, for fear of being drafted, have come to depend on 
State subsidies and on their wives' earning for their livelihood. In 1993 these non-earning 
Haredim constituted 2.3% of all working age Israeli males and 67% of all men who had ever 
been in a yeshiva were not working for a living, officially at least. This has cost a rate of 
civilian non-participation in the labor force of prime-aged males (between 25 and 54) in Israel 
to be 12.2%, the highest in a developed world. (Shafir & Peled, 2002, p. 144) 
 
This is of particular concern to Israeli society at large as the ultra-Orthodox community has a 
greatly increased birthrate as well as a more rapid, compared to secular society, cycle of life 
events (such as marriage and raising a family). “Haredi families are characterized by young 
age at marriage and a high birth rate (the average number of children in a Haredi home is 7.7 
in contrast to 2.6 in the general Israel population)” (Stadler et al., 2008, p. 220). 
This means that future demographic changes will have a ripple effect in both the 
concentration of power as well as the budgetary allocations made towards the ultra-Orthodox 
community. This concern underlines the necessity to have an open discussion regarding the 
cost of the extreme specialization of the ultra-Orthodox community and the priorities of 
society as a whole and the need to be proactive in addressing the demographic shift that will 
occur as the ultra-Orthodox community outpaces secular society. 
[However], the Haredi poor are not totally reliant on government handouts. The Haredi 
community has created self-help programs in which an array of items, from cribs to clothes, 
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can be borrowed. Interest-free loans enable young Haredi couples to have a respectful 
wedding. Haredi organizations make periodic food deliveries, using computerized lists to 
show which families are the poorest. But the Haredim would be much poorer if not for the 
largess of the State. Subsidies support studies at rabbinical seminaries, extended daycare, and 
a network of youth groups. Secular schools often have 40 children in a class and close early 
in the afternoon but government aid helps the Haredi schools operate longer each day with 
smaller classes. (Makovsky, 1997) 
 
Support for the community comes both from without through state and other support and 
from within in the form of various social assistance organizations. In one particular version 
of this, mutual benefit organizations in the ultra-Orthodox community play a key role in 
providing safety and support. Yonatan Smith makes an interesting point that there is a great 
deal of inward funding and participation in mutual assistant societies, perhaps at a greater 
degree than these organizations exist in the Diaspora, even within ultra-Orthodox 
communities. 
Well, the gemach in the Haredi society is something which has no paradigm in the world 
over. I know that my daughter works for an organization which helps children that are 
disabled, and I cannot really go into the details, but we're talking about a very big 
organization. And we're dealing with many, many children with a wide range of severe 
disabilities, and they've come up with a service where they provide service for the children, a 
service for the parents. And all this is done on a gemach basis; there is no charge for the 
people that come that need this help. We're talking about an organization that raises millions, 
if not tens of millions, and they're currently building a tremendous new structure in 
[…identifying information removed…] and that's just one type of gemach we know they 
enabled. (Interview with Yonatan Smith, 2011) 
 
Smith makes an interesting case why there exists a greater degree of economic assistance 
within the ultra-Orthodox community in Israel. In short, the responsibilities that individuals 
have to each other within society very much mirror the responsibilities that one has to a 
religious action and precepts. In this way, observance of ultra-Orthodox Judaism is very 
much a package deal that encompasses literally every aspect of life in an all-or-nothing 
proposition. This idea can be seen elsewhere in the way in which change, compromise, or 
reinterpretation of particular values are taken by the ultra-Orthodox community, which sees 
change as the first step towards outright assimilation. 
I think the Haredi society understands the lesson of al shlosha devarim ha'olam omed: al 
ha'Torah, al ha'avodah, ve'al gemilut chasadim. That's the three basics, the three 
cornerstones of Judaism. Those are the cornerstones of Jewish values; not just studying the 
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Torah, not just being a tefillah—service to Hashem, various formats, but bein adam 
le'chavero—gemilut chasadim in all its beautiful forms—bein adam le'chavero, these are of 
utmost importance. And just as we see there are two Luchot ha'Brit, okay, the right and the 
left; the right being mainly bein adam la'Makom and the left being mainly bein adam 
le'chavero, okay? If I might just interject a d'var Torah, a short d'var Torah which I heard 
yesterday, a very beautiful—it says in the pasuk Moshe Rabbenu saw the Jews with the 
golden calf, with the egel ha'zahav, and it says in the pasuk, Va'yashleikh mi'yadav. He came 
down with his two luchot, okay, and you have a difference between the qere and the ketiv, 
between the way it's read and the way it's written. It's read va'yashleikh mi'yadav, it's written 
va'yashleikh mi'yado, in the singular. Why is that? The reason is, when Moshe Rabbenu saw 
the Jews with the egel ha'zahav, he said I cannot give them their first luach; it’s bein adam 
la'Makom. Anochi Hashem Elokeicha, Lo yihiyeh lecha—these people are transgressing on 
all this. Forget that one, but we have the second luach, where here it says don't steal, don't 
kill, don't commit adultery, all that. We just will give them that. Let's try to save the situation. 
And Hashem says to Moshe Rabbenu, no, there's no such thing; it's a package deal, it all 
goes together; bein adam la'Makom, bein adam la'havero, it's all one package. If you have to 
throw the first one away, the second one goes with it. (Interview with Yonatan Smith, 2011) 
 
There are multiple levels of mutual benefit societies. Smaller assistance organizations 
within the community help various members. At the same time, larger national mutual 
benefit societies link ultra-Orthodox communities and even secular individuals across the 
country. This development is perhaps an indication of the way in which ultra-Orthodox 
individuals have coped with economic hardship and has emerged out of the way in which the 
community has developed within the Israeli context. 
And I'll tell you an anecdote. I know a guy who moved back from Israel to do kiruv in 
America. He brought with him the Har Nof phone book, and he went to secular people, and 
he was trying to show the Jews what Israel is all about. He opened up the Har Nof phone 
book. He said, “Look at how many pages of gemachim there are.” And people went crazy 
over that because they felt a sense of community as opposed to just individuals, everyone just 
going to the job and had no sense of community. And that won the hearts of a lot of people 
who never saw what a Jew—a community is, a functioning community. So, there's very 
localized gemachim, there's more general type of gemachim, but I don't think—nobody can 
match it, what—the chesed that goes on in the religious society. (Interview with Yehuda 
Aronson, 2011) 
 
Fears of a growing demographic crisis could be offset by an open discussion 
regarding economic integration, and addressing the issue of an increasing birthrate 
disproportionate with the current division between religious and secular groups. It is 
important to address the fact that the status quo is a recent social development in Israel and is 
out of step with Jewish history traditionally, as well as the contemporary experience in the 
Diaspora. In fact, in the Diaspora, ultra-Orthodox Jews obtain employment at far higher rates 
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than in Israel for reasons of integration, the lack of a national service requirement, as well as 
a very different social development pattern during the last century.  
In the ultra-Orthodox community, a case can be made for re-evaluating the model of 
ultra-Orthodox study, both in Israel and in the Diaspora. Yocheved Saks uses a personal 
example to illustrate the point that as a societal function, studying as a profession needs to 
have some way to pay for it, which does not necessarily rely on social assistance. 
I'm an American. I'll tell you what I told my children. If you're poor in America, then the 
government has to support you because you're poor. You know, if you're Black and you grew 
up in Harlem, you never had any advantages, so you never had any education; you can't 
support your family, so the government has to support you. If you grow up in my household, 
and I provide you with an education and I provide you with the ability to get out there and 
make a living, and you go and you marry somebody and you go sit in kollel and you collect 
social security, Mommy will not come to your house and eat at your table. She will not do 
that. If you want to live a Torah life, then you better find a way to finance that.…For most of 
his [husband] professional life, most of his day was spent in kollel. We didn't live high on the 
hog, which is interesting—you know this expression in Canada? (laughs) Interesting Jewish 
expression, but we certainly were comfortable.  
You know, I didn't buy my children clothing at Nordstrom and Lord & Taylor, but 
they certainly dressed nicely. But there were no luxuries, and they knew darn well what the 
difference between a luxury and a necessity was. I hope to this day they do. If you want a life 
of Torah— what do they say? Pat b'melach tochel v'mayim b'msurah tishteh v'al ha'aretz 
tishan? Then that's what it means, and it doesn't mean being babysat by the Torah—by the 
government. Not in America and—I don't think—not anywhere. You want Torah? I once had 
this discussion with one of the big gedolim at the Agudah convention in America. And I told 
him, I said, when we first were married, we decided—we said it's very simple; if I want candy 
I go into the store and I plunk down my nickel and then I get my candy. And we sat and we 
discussed how we were going to get the nickel in order to get the candy. (Interview with 
Yocheved Saks, 2011) 
 
The concept of social assistance is an important factor in the debate over the place of 
religion within the greater context of Israeli society. For Yitzchak Cohen, the conclusion is 
that social assistance is important because this remains an important facet of society as 
religion is an integral component. 
I don't think so, because—the reason why I don't think so is because I think the ultra-
Orthodox, and their way of life, involves larger families and, you know, a learning lifestyle, 
and that contributes, I believe, to the way, you know, the country is as a whole, and that's—
and as a person who believes in G-d and believes that people studying Torah and clinging to 
G-d, in a certain sense, that they—in the way they do, is an important aspect of the entire 
whole and the entire flavor of the country. I think it's important for the government to assist 
them, as well as anyone else. And I believe that there is, now more than ever, a lot more 
ultra-Orthodox people—quote unquote—because I don't really like that term actually, so 
much—people in the workforce and involved. And I think that for those that aren't, it's 
important for, I believe, the government to support them. (Interview with Yitzhak Cohen, 
2011) 
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There are advocates for social assistance for individuals in the ultra-Orthodox 
community not participating in the workforce, but learning through Jewish higher education. 
There also needs to be a discussion between the two sides in order to increase 
communication and find a way for all elements to be more integrated into society, placing 
special emphasis on the value of religious contribution to a society. 
Yeah, it's justified, but, again, the discussion needs to be between the two sides. Government 
has a right to determine minimum standards in many things, okay, and I have a right to 
determine the type of community I want to live in. And if I want to take money from you, there 
has to be some sort of balance. When the Brisker people, the Brisker yeshiva, I don't know 
about now, but I know when Rav Soloveitchik, when the Brisker Rav was involved, they didn't 
take money from the state. They didn't believe in what the state did and, therefore, they didn't 
take money. That can't be today; today they have to take money. So where do you draw the 
line? I don't know, but there needs to be discussion, there needs to be—I don't know why 
there isn't. Maybe there is discussion behind—I don't know about, but it doesn't seem like 
there is any discussion. It doesn't seem like there's any communication, just yelling back and 
forth. There's no sitting with calm minds and trying to find solutions—maybe there are—I 
don't know. (Interview with Menashe Blum, 2011) 
 
It is important to note that women have a significant role in the issues surrounding 
social assistance as well. As discussed in the section dealing with work power relations, a 
woman’s place within the ultra-Orthodox community does not change, even though in many 
cases she is the breadwinner; the internal power dynamics do not change. In fact, women in 
the ultra-Orthodox community play an important economic role in order to bridge the gap 
between social assistance and income provided by the family through stipends, assistance, 
and other means.  
 A Taub Center study showed that 30 years ago, 21% of Haredi males did not work. Today, 
65% are not working. A comparative study shows that in the same Haredi communities in 
New York and London, 70% of the males are employed, compared to 35% employed in 
Israel. That means that they are not working here because they are able to get away with it. 
They aren't doing it in New York and London because the government does not subsidize 
them. (Ain, 2011) 
 
With growing families placing increased economic pressure on individuals and the 
community as a whole, and government subsidies either being not sufficient or nonexistent 
depending on the particular circumstance, ultra-Orthodox women are going outside the 
community in greater numbers than ever before in order to work in the secular job market. 
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This means that additional funds are brought into the ultra-Orthodox community, yet a great 
deal of improvement still needs to be made to increase the available economic opportunities 
for individuals who are trapped within the rigid constraints of national service and limited 
educational options. 
General Conclusion 
 
 The thesis deals with many complex issues involving state and religion. The ultra-
Orthodox are a unique case within the Israeli context. However, many similar cleavages that 
rely on consociationalism can be seen in various societies throughout the world (O'Donnel, 
Schmitter, & Whitehead, 2001, p. 131). Although the unique aspects of the Israeli context are 
discussed in depth in the thesis, the prognosis for the future of the Israeli state as a collective 
of its disparate parts is positive. There are many potential avenues for programs to promote 
positive social change as long as the various stakeholders continue to operate on a 
cooperative basis. 
 A new paradigm involving the relations among the various communities can emerge. 
The conclusion will discuss a number of these possibilities and provide a starting point for an 
optimistic, perhaps idealistic, way forward. In this new direction, in which the brinksmanship 
of consociationalism can be backed away from, a solution of inclusiveness rather than 
separation can be implemented. Moving from separate communities vying for advantage in a 
system based on consociationalism, to separate, yet integrated, communities is the key to 
progress and forging a new identity for Israeli society. This could take place through 
multiculturalism or another paradigm. The fears of the secular population looming in reaction 
to the demographic crisis from the ultra-Orthodox community can be averted and at the same 
time, create new-found respect for the religious and social concerns of religious groups, 
allowing them to maintain their identity without fear of assimilation. 
 One of the critical elements of addressing the issue of state and religion in Israel 
today is looking beyond external national issues (such as a political agreement with the 
Palestinians, external security issues with regional states, and so on) to divisions within the 
country. Even with external security pressures, things must change on the domestic front. 
Further, nothing can be solved externally if internal issues are not addressed and solved first. 
Israel is cognizant that it will face a pending demographic change in decades to come. This 
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will lead to an inevitable shift on social issues. With demographic growth in the ultra-
Orthodox community outpacing the growth rate of secular Israelis, these issues will become 
increasingly important fixtures on the national agenda. In addition, labour studies show that 
ultra-Orthodox men and Arab women are among the lowest employed in the Israeli labour 
market (Rivlin, 2010, p. 238). These two factors will contribute to the need for social change 
as religious and secular segments of the population are on a collision course. Re-examining 
social policies in a new and constructive way can lead to new solutions, and perhaps a new 
way of thinking can be arrived at regarding this important social cleavage. This does not 
mean that the status quo will be perpetuated. The creation of another defunct system, in 
which special interests rule over the majority, is clearly not the solution for a wide reaching 
societal transformation.  
This thesis shows how using key informants (who are both insiders and outsiders) to 
gain access to the ultra-Orthodox community is an important resource to finding solutions for 
the social and political issues. Using this approach with other distinct social groups that 
overlap with the ultra-Orthodox community could provide valuable insight into the 
mainstream and help devise strategies for recognizing social problems and providing a 
catalyst for positive growth and change. These new arrangements will have a ripple effect 
through all of society and be the catalyst for positive social change and integration. Through 
various integration programs, economic programs, educational programs, and so on, the net 
effect for all of Israeli society will be extremely positive. Yet it must be done in a manner 
that respects cultural and religious diversity and does not seek to homogenize all of society as 
has been the case in the past. Creating opportunity without barriers for integration is quite 
different from wholesale assimilation and will provide many of those struggling today with a 
positive outlook and potential for the future. 
 While it is the highly complex and perhaps untenable proposition, the separation of 
church (synagogue) and state on an official level such as in the United States or on an 
informal basis such as in the UK or the Netherlands would greatly benefit Israel and alleviate 
many of the technical issues that currently plague Israeli society. From a secular standpoint, 
this change would be welcomed and would enable a far greater percentage of citizens to 
practice a particular religion if they so choose. From a religious standpoint, this would allow 
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individuals to practice without necessarily controlling a government monopoly over the 
personal sphere of the entire society.  
 Separation of church and state would allow for official recognition of state religions 
as is the case in the previously mentioned states. Yet, it would do so without the extensive 
bureaucracy required to run a ministry of religion and the inherent complexities it entails. 
Perhaps oversimplified, the separation of church and state would provide for equal 
recognition of various streams of Judaism and of other streams of religions currently not 
recognized in Israel. This plurality would allow for greatly enhanced religious freedom and 
contribute towards a shared social, cultural, and religious identity, which currently stymies 
many Israelis as they do not feel included or are not included under ultra-Orthodox 
interpretations of Jewish law. The separation of church and state would also change the 
funding dynamic of public religious institutions to similar models used elsewhere in the 
world. In effect, this would mitigate much of the criticism secular society brings towards 
religious society regarding non-participation in the affairs of the state while at the same time 
utilizing state resources to maintain educational and religious institutions. Clearly, the 
separation of church and state is a fundamental and complex issue on its own and relates to 
many of the other points raised in the conclusion. 
 Another proposed element is to find alternative forms of voting. Numerous 
government committees have studied the parliamentary electoral system in order to 
redistribute votes better and, in effect, rebalance the proportionality of the Israeli electoral 
system. Because thresholds for creating parties are very low by international standards, and 
have been set at low levels in order to ensure inclusiveness of minority elements of society, 
during the past 64 years, the Israel government has constantly had a factional government 
without once having a clear majority composed of one party. The result is that coalition 
governments are often subject to swing votes by small elements of the population on specific 
issues such as funding for the ultra-Orthodox community. There are a number of issues with 
the way consociationalism is used to balance competing factors, among them voting issues 
that seek to create a particular outcome (Horowitz, 2003, pp. 147–149; Binman and Prasad, 
2006, p. 54; Reynolds, 2002, pp. 19–22).  
 Solutions to change voting would include the possibility of allowing higher 
thresholds for political parties to run for parliamentary election. The fear of this approach, 
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however, is that it would drastically limit the number of potential parties able to gain seats in 
national elections and, in essence, silence many minority voices from the various populations 
in Israeli society. The obvious solution would be to create a majority centrist party in the 
Knesset that would, in effect, serve as a unifying power. This would encompass religious 
groups and other societal organizations, ruling through a majority consensus within the party. 
However, centre parties have in the past sought to reach accommodations even within the 
party and particularly within the coalition. There have often been contentious arguments over 
particular issues with elements of various coalitions threatening to break down the 
government over various legislations.  
In effect, a system of accommodation creates a hostage government that has to 
negotiate carefully in order to remain in power. By creating a majority party, this would be 
alleviated. Yet, the political system in Israel is so fundamentally rooted in smaller special 
interest parties, this would be unlikely. The third possibility, which has the potential to remap 
the political landscape in Israel, is a shift from national elections without local representation 
to a combination of territorial and national elections. Various scenarios relating to the 
distribution of territorial and national parliamentary seats would, in effect, change the swing 
vote dynamic since various national parties have varied corresponding local power bases that 
do not always correlate with the national scene. This approach would also change the power 
dynamic within Israeli society and create a buffer to disproportional swing votes that could 
be used unfairly, as they have been in the past, to influence governments and funding. 
 A crucial issue is to limit subsidies as part of enacting methods that will foster social 
change. It is not possible simply to remove all social assistance at once or drastically limit it, 
as has been done in the past. Without gradual, integrative methods, including job training and 
so on, a particularly vulnerable segment of the population will be left completely destitute. 
This is not only the case for the ultra-Orthodox but also for other non-integrated segments of 
the population as well, such as Israeli Arab women. A gradual process of limiting subsidies 
and increasing assistance in various areas has the potential to create the conditions for 
individuals to become independent and self-sustaining. Pursuing a policy of gradual social 
change with foresight as to the impact must be a priority in order to ensure the integrity of the 
evolving process. This means that there needs to be a fundamental redefinition of the 
relationship between citizens and the state. The state can no longer be viewed simply as a 
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one-way funding source. It must be a collaborative entity in which citizens receive and give 
in equal proportion. This extends to productivity, employment, taxation, and many other 
areas and includes the fundamental raison d'être of the ultra-Orthodox community, 
continuing higher Torah studies.  
For exemplary yeshiva students, much as in the university system, funding should be 
made available to those who are qualified. Slowly limiting subsidies and increasing job 
training or other potential integrating routes are critical. Over time, increased social 
assistance has led to a welfare trap in which it is often more profitable for students, even if 
unproductive, to stay within the confines of the yeshiva. They remain on government 
subsidies rather than seeking employment in the job market. For many, the potential 
employment opportunities, without training, necessitate a severe pay cut. Perhaps in terms of 
subsidies and social change, real fundamental change in individuals’ viewpoints cannot be 
altered within a short span of a generation or two. Yet, real fundamental social change can be 
reached when a new social paradigm arises in the place of consociationalism and looks 
beyond creating firewalls to insulate the various communities from each other and rather 
seeks to re-imagine a new and dynamic Israeli society. 
 Perhaps another aspect of this ongoing debate as to how and in what context to 
reformulate social relations in society comes out of the reformulation of the connection 
between the state and the biblical land of Israel. One of the most extreme cleavages among 
the various elements of Israeli society, particularly between the ultra-Orthodox community 
and the rest of Israeli society, is the fundamental principle of the inherent intrinsic holiness of 
the state of Israel or the land of Israel and its various permutations. How modern Zionism fits 
in with the changing demographic reality is the key question. How religion is dominated by 
ultra-Orthodox Jews is crucial to understanding how a secular state formation that relies on 
the origins of Judaism to tell its story can be reconciled in a way in which the land of Israel 
and the state of Israel, as ideologies, can peacefully coexist without necessitating clashes and 
strife. Similar to many other states, a national religious ethos is present in Israel, perhaps 
more so with the overlay of Zionism. Yet this does not fundamentally alter the potential for 
reconciling the state with religion. Particularly in the context of separation of church and 
state, or perhaps in this situation, synagogue and state, one’s views regarding the religiosity 
of Zionism do not necessarily have to impinge on being a productive and valued citizen in 
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society. This distinction is minimal, yet absolutely crucial to understanding and imagining a 
future in which citizens are able to hold disparate religious beliefs while at the same time 
function as part of a larger unified society that respects individual beliefs. This can be seen 
on both the micro and macro levels as: 
Additional problems arise from judging the outcomes of individual confrontations. Is it a 
success if one side gets a law enacted, but the measure is seldom enforced or is implemented 
in a way in ways which are criticized by those who support its enactment? And how does one 
assess a situation where the same problem (for instance, controversy over public modesty, 
Sabbath observance, or the availability of non-kosher food) arises again and again, but each 
time with slight variations and the nature of the demands and subtle differences in the way 
the issue is resolved. But what if a particular controversy simply disappears from the public 
agenda without a resolution? In some circumstances the most persuasive conclusion is that 
neither side has one. Religious activists have scored some victories, but so have secular 
Israelis. It is difficult to weigh the closure of a road against the opening of a restaurant, 
discotheques, and cinemas and on the Sabbath. The score is a tie, more or less. (Sharkansky, 
1997, p. 162) 
 
 Crucial to discussions concerning the future potential of a new social paradigm in 
Israel is that the mainstream, the wider population, must engage in an ongoing solution. 
Through public debate and discussion and bringing social issues to the fore, the majority in 
society should have constructive input into how to forge a new vision of this future for all 
Israelis. Extremists at either end of the spectrum will not be assuaged and must be brought 
into a new social reality. Left to their own devices, extremists would gladly create a more 
hostile and less cooperative and comprehensive society in which the cleavages perpetuated 
by consociationalism would only continue to grow. These barriers to integration, even 
perhaps at first if only on an economic level, must be brought down, and a new 
understanding must be reached by the majority of society that individuals are entitled to 
freedoms and liberties without the intervention of the state. At the same time, these factors 
are crucial elements in the formation, construction, and perpetuation of the state. In the 
theoretical section of the thesis, there is a discussion relating to actors and institutions and the 
co-dependency Giddens discusses between them. This is a crucial distinction because there is 
no element of society that is outside these structures. Institutions are made up of component 
Shapiro 310 
 
parts of actors, and actors are influenced by institutions. The homeostatic relationship that 
actors and institutions establish is important to visualizing what a future society could look 
like if discussed, debated, and implemented by the mainstream. 
 A crucial element to any future solution is increasing responsibility that individuals, 
communities, and societies feel towards the state and creating collective interest in the affairs 
and well-being of not just individual segments of society but of society as a whole. While 
secular society, for example, is concerned with the economic productivity of Israel overall 
and the ultra-Orthodox community is concerned about the Torah output of yeshivas and the 
adherence of members of the community to strict communal standards, these absolutes can 
be compromised through tacit cooperation and seeing that fundamental beliefs do not have to 
be pushed aside in favour of assimilation into a larger society in order to have a stake in the 
future. 
 Recent interesting trends, perhaps presently minimal, yet with a future potential, 
involve more interest from secular or traditional segments of society interested in 
“reclaiming” Judaism. This can be perceived through projects such as the secular yeshiva that 
seeks to incorporate Torah learning and the fundamental study of Jewish subjects along the 
lines of ultra-Orthodox yeshivas, while students themselves do not adhere to an ultra-
Orthodox lifestyle. This is a positive step towards religious pluralism and inclusion. If this is 
eventually mirrored by the recognition of alternate streams of Judaism such as Reform and 
Conservative with the same governmental authority to perform marriages, burials, and other 
elements related to the personal sphere, a new non-coercive form of religion will inevitably 
emerge in Israel, in which individuals are not obligated to adhere to a particular form of 
Judaism simply because of bureaucratic rules but will be able to express their religion in 
ways that they determine are personally relevant. This will, of course, have an effect on the 
relations between state and religion and the way in which bureaucracy governs religious 
policies. The net effect of this type of change will ultimately be extremely positive and in 
Israel, the Jewish state, will allow a far greater segment of society to feel included in the 
Jewish religion. 
It is possible to make a distinction between intellectual and emotional understanding. 
So while it is possible to intellectually understand the challenges that the ultra-Orthodox 
community or the secular community face, it is much more difficult to understand this on an 
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emotional level as there are so many separating factors between the two. Menashe Blum also 
makes the interesting point that societal standards reinforce the straightest (perhaps 
narrowest) possible interpretation of religious stringency in the ultra-Orthodox community, 
and, perhaps, this does not necessarily need to be so in order to find areas in which leniency 
potentially bridges the gap between secular and ultra-Orthodox society. 
I think the first thing is to somehow to be able to see the other side, to be able to try and 
understand, which is—it's almost impossible. Intellectually, at most, I think, it is 
intellectually, each side can understand the other side intellectually. But to actually 
understand it on a more emotional level is going to be nearly impossible. It's one thing to 
read a little book on all the av melakhot on Shabbos and understand it, and it's another thing 
to actually understand what Shabbos is all about. You can't learn that from reading the book 
on all the av melakhot. You might be able to tell the Haredi person that your son, a secular 
boy, is going into Gaza and people are shooting at him, and you may be able to hear that, but 
you can't understand that because you never experienced it, and you don't have anybody 
within your community that has experienced it. So, it will be very hard emotionally to 
understand the other side. And without that understanding and that emotional understanding, 
I don't know how you're going to bridge the gap. Because, again, everything is black and 
white; there's no room for compromise. I don't know if it's true or not, but it seems in many 
ways that the Haredi community has picked a halachic point of view which doesn't give much 
leeway. Even though within Halachaa there is leeway, and if you're not going to be able to 
give a little bit, I don't know how it's going to work out; I don't know. (Interview with 
Menashe Blum, 2011) 
 
Deena Friedberg touches upon bridging and resolving social issues by finding 
commonalities between secular Israelis and those in the ultra-Orthodox community. 
Well, there should be more understanding of each other. There should be people sitting down 
together and trying to do that. Like bridging—I mean people are trying to do that. There are 
groups trying to come together. Not necessarily, oh, we're going to convert them to the truth, 
but just to sit down as people and say, look, you know, we have a lot of issues, some we can 
see eye-to-eye on, some that we don't, but we should try to talk together as people, you know, 
as a small minority group in a hostile sea—which is what we are—and try to see how we 
could come together, not separate each other. (Interview with Deena Friedberg, 2011) 
 
There is a perceived need by the ultra-Orthodox community for more education 
regarding the ultra-Orthodox community and religious principles. In general, this would 
serve to conceptualize and explain the ultra-Orthodox way of life and religious values in 
order to bring common understanding. Then, it might be possible to bridge the gap between 
secular and religious Israelis by discussing some commonalities in Judaism from a religious 
perspective and outline the need of discussing these values from a religious perspective.  
I think to improve Israeli society as a whole, the secular side needs more education about 
Torah u'mitzvot. And we're not talking about something rote where they have to study for 
bagrut; be it Torah shebe'al peh, Torah—Tanach, and just to study the texts, but to 
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understand. And let's say just to get an organization such as Arachim or such a type of 
organization: Hidabroot or Shofar or organizations that deal with kiruv, organizations that 
understand the youth and are able to relate to them, to communicate to the youth and to show 
them the beauty of leading a Torah life—show them the beauty and the understanding of what 
it means. Not just as a dry text or a poster that they've seen in school. (Interview with 
Yonatan Smith, 2011) 
 
There is an extreme perspective that the present situation is untenable. The 
commonality felt through the ultra-Orthodox perspective, in this view, is brought to an 
extreme with the establishment of a theocracy. This means that the ultra-Orthodox extreme 
could become the norm, and everyone across the spectrum would be forced to participate. 
This perspective breaks down the barriers within the ultra-Orthodox community and Israeli 
society at large as in a theocracy there would be little room for dialog among groups with 
differing religious views. It is interesting that this approach, one that advocates for the return 
of pre-Diaspora centralized Judaism is being promulgated as a solution to solve the fractious 
divisions within the ultra-Orthodox community and Israeli society today. 
What do you think should ideally happen to improve—I guess—I told you, my ideal would be 
that we have a Sanhedrin in charge making the rules. It gets rid of the problem of Ashkenazi 
versus Sephardi versus Temani, versus Edot HaMizrach. There's no—it's basically one big 
group of rabbis (inaudible), and I think it would definitely—it would get rid of a lot of the 
cultural whatevers, because everyone would just be Jewish, and everyone would be dati, and 
you no longer have Ashkenazi, Sephardi, you know. You no longer have these cultural 
inflates....On a religious level, if the country were run by a Sanhedrin instead of a Knesset, 
for example, everyone would be keeping Shabbat, everyone would be keeping kashrut. And if 
they weren't, they'd be thrown into jail. Therefore, in a religious level everyone would be on 
the same place. And those who didn’t know, they would learn. (Interview with Miriam 
Jacoby, 2011) 
 
Yitzchak Cohen highlights the way in which society will change and adapt in order to 
meet the current needs. In the context of Israel, the commonality, he notes, among the 
various citizens will carry, no matter what the circumstance is. It is interesting to note that in 
this interview, the emphasis is on the external versus the internal visions within Israeli 
society, and these are seen as the ultimate issue, rather than internal divisions. 
Look I mean, we've made until now. Certainly everyone seems to have an opinion. I'm sure 
that will continue and will morph into however we morph into, based on, you know, what the 
needs are at any given time. I mean, there are always going to be disagreements, but the end 
of the day, the Jewish people are one family, and I think even the secular Jews and the 
religious Jews do recognize that we have a huge threat from the Arabs around us, the Arab 
countries that want to destroy Israel, and the terrorists that want to destroy Israel, and at the 
end of the day, you know, when push comes to shove, they make it work, and we'll make it. 
(Interview with Yitzhak Cohen, 2011) 
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Menashe Blum’s following interview has an interesting tone, which ranges from the idea that 
a failure to coexist will simply degenerate in catastrophic terms into a mass exodus of ultra-
Orthodox individuals from Israel. This follows through with the idea that communication is 
key, and top leaders need to have the availability to speak to each other. The interview 
concludes with the concept of the return of the Messiah—ultimately the perfect solution for 
what may otherwise be an intractable argument between secular and ultra-Orthodox 
communities within Israel. 
Meaning, if we don't find a way to deal with each other? I remember I once saw, I think 
maybe it was the Chazan Ish, maybe, when the government wanted to draft girls into the 
army and the frum Jews were all—the gedolim were talking about it was pretty much time to 
say, time to leave Israel. Will it get to that point? I don't think it will get to that point. You 
know, the religious parties are very powerful, so I don't think it will ever get to that point. But 
will it continue like this? There are brilliant people on both sides, and they have to be able to 
somehow talk to one another and find a way out of the mess, I don't know. I'm not that 
brilliant, I'm not that powerful, but there has to be a way. I think it has to be a way before 
Mashiach comes, too. There has to be a way; I don't know what it is. (Interview with 
Menashe Blum, 2011) 
 
Yonatan Smith posits that the ultimate plan cannot be known, but it appears that 
everything is moving into messianic times. As a result, the eventual outcome will, hopefully, 
he maintains, be in the ultra-Orthodox community’s favor, and there seems to be, while the 
plan is not itself known, movement in the direction of the end of days. This has an interesting 
connotation on the public debate over the place of religion with secular and ultra-Orthodox 
society. 
Well, I think it's definitely a tough situation. It's definitely a tough situation and—I 
understand it's yemot haMashiach, and we don't know when, but we definitely see things 
changing in the world around us. And as we can see now, yad sarim ve'melachim beyad 
Hashem. We see governments being overthrown. We're seeing in entire Middle East region, 
okay: Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, things are—great changes, great upheavals are coming, and, 
hopefully, that's all for the good. And hopefully that's all for our good. I believe—our 
viewpoint is that everything that does take place in the world around us, there is a reason for 
us to be affected. It does affect us and, hopefully, for the good. (Interview with Yonatan 
Smith, 2011) 
 
Yitzchak Cohen discusses how bridges need to be built to find a common element 
between the extremes in the ultra-Orthodox community and the secular community, which 
can be found in causes such as the pursuit for social justice. 
I think there will need to be bridges built between the secular and the ultra-Orthodox 
community, so that they can live in better harmony....Just organizing, perhaps, groups where 
they can talk together about their differences, where they can explore the values that they do 
share, and perhaps work together to just make Israel a better place. You know, I think that if 
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you can find—and I think people are already doing this, a common denominator, or in 
Hebrew it's called the tzad ha'shaveh, between the secular Chiloni and the ultra-Orthodox 
Haredi, and have them spend time, perhaps on ideas that are—what do you call that? Social 
justice and things that even the secular Jew cares about, that is rooted in the Torah, that they 
can (inaudible). (Interview with Yitzhak Cohen, 2011) 
 
The Future of Service and the State 
 An extreme tactic for social engineering would be to tie the rights and privileges of 
citizenship (voting) or other measures of citizenship to national service, education, taxation, 
and some other method to ensure that voting and citizenship retain their intended meaning. 
The right to vote has been linked to national service in history, for example in the American 
Revolutionary Period: 
First-class American citizenship – at this time including the right to vote – often was connected 
with military service and national defense. Nine of the original states constitutions included the 
“duty of the citizen to render military service” and compelled Him to do so if necessary” (Fenner 
and DeYoung, 2001, p.54).  
 
Although this is seemingly a solution to form a homogeneous society, Israel is comprised of 
many cultures, viewpoints, and motivations, often at odds with the official state “party line,” 
and it is this very diversity that gives Israel its unique character. Therefore, forcing 
participation in exchange for rights would be impossible in the Israeli context, which has thus 
far included minority opinion as can be understood through the context of a fractured 
political process with coalition governments.  
 
 Reclamation of Jewish learning: the Secular Yeshiva 
 An interesting phenomenon in Israeli secular/religious relations has been the 
development of the secular yeshiva movement. Central to this movement is the inherent 
question about ownership of Jewish knowledge. Secular proponents of the higher Jewish 
education institutions, which have begun to create a great deal of secular public interest, 
claim that there is a distinct separation between religiosity and pure knowledge (Roy, 2010, 
p. 88). They challenge the ultra-Orthodox claim that there cannot be a separation between a 
religious lifestyle and religious knowledge and ultimately claim that the corpus of Jewish 
knowledge is as much their birthright as that of any other Israeli citizen. This intellectual 
challenge has encouraged many to take time out of their academic studies, in many cases 
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without academic credit, to study Jewish tradition and law in an egalitarian forum without 
religious overtones. It is interesting to note that this movement has not sparked a cultural 
renaissance, changing the way in which Judaism is administered in the state of Israel, such as 
is the goal of the Conservative and Reform movements. Secular Judaism, for administrative 
purposes, remains unrecognized. And while some secular yeshivas can potentially receive 
state funding, their approach has been more targeted towards the pursuit of religious 
knowledge rather than trying to change the lifestyle of the ultra-Orthodox or even the 
majority of secular Jews in Israel. 
In spite of the middle category, the religious-secular status quo seems in recent years to have 
been crumbling under new pressures. In the Israeli parliament a steady growth can be 
observed in the power of both Haredi (Jewish Orthodox) parties and an opposing 
ideologically militant secular camp. Political and public debates over the questions of 
conscription of religious Jews, gay rights, and the sale of non-kosher food, and commercial 
activity on Saturday all are part of a growing religious-secular struggle that seems to defy any 
attempt to find new compromises. The polarization is also reflected in the public's opinion of 
religious-secular relations. (Ben-Porat, 2008, p. 32) 
 
Change is slow but ongoing. New dramatic action must be taken in order to work within the 
boundaries of Halacha and acknowledge challenges to the social organization of Jews in 
Israel and the Diaspora. This includes a broad view of the changing social, economic, and 
societal factors. 
 
Potential Future Scenarios 
 Three potential scenarios in the conclusion, ranging from complete secularization, to 
continuing with the current status quo, and finally to a religious turn in Israeli society, are 
examined as potential avenues for thought into the future of the face of Israeli democracy and 
religion and state relations. 
 
 I: Complete secularization 
 The first of three potential scenarios involving the future of the state and religious 
relations is that of complete secularization where governance of the personal sphere through 
religious interpretations would no longer apply, whether in the strictest sense of the term with 
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a complete separation of religion and state or a more moderate approach that seeks to 
incorporate a state religion in name only. A process of complete secularization involving the 
absolute separation of church and state, the revamping of the relationship between religious 
authority, the state and the population, and an overhaul of personal sphere laws to allow for 
civil marriage and so on, will fundamentally change the way in which Judaism is perceived 
within the larger context of Israeli society. This approach presents a complex dilemma as 
Israel is a Jewish state, though the term Jewish is fundamentally undefined and requires a 
certain de facto recognition of what it means to be Jewish. Therefore, a completely 
secularized state would lead to fundamental difficulties identifying what it means to be 
Israeli or, for that matter, how secular Zionism relates to Judaism and vice versa. There are 
many gradations of the lack of separation of church and state, and there are many complex 
interdependencies in Israel regarding the bureaucratization of religion; these problems cannot 
be easily alleviated by completely moving religion from the public sphere. Should a complete 
separation of church and state occur, Israeli society will need to forge a new identity and 
collectively decide what it means to be Israeli and what form national unity would take in a 
country comprised of individuals from such disparate backgrounds. On the flip side, a 
complete separation of church and state would allow for a greater degree of religious 
freedom for groups currently not recognized by the government and would allow individuals 
far more flexibility in the way in which they wish to practice their religion. 
 
 II: Status quo 
 The second scenario is continuing the current situation of the status quo in which the 
various cleavages and flash points that occur between secular and religious society are 
merely bargained away over the long term in an attempt to maintain a balance among various 
segments of society without one ever taking advantage over another as explained through the 
theory of consociationalism. The problem with this approach is that while on the surface, 
minor battles are determined or passed on one way or another, the overall war in the big 
picture is slowly being won by secular Israelis as explained throughout the thesis. An 
ongoing shift towards secularization for the majority, while maintaining strategic victories 
for the religious minority, essentially creates a community that separates itself from the larger 
Israeli society and seeks to maintain a degree of internal hegemony over its affairs. If this 
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system were productive in a way that ultra-Orthodox individuals were productive and happy 
in society, able to gain parity with their secular counterparts, and had the ability to have a 
certain amount of internal and external political and social control, the situation would be 
quite different. However, this is not the case as many ultra-Orthodox individuals are trapped 
in the system that seeks to perpetuate a very particular social pattern that does not necessarily 
serve the best interest of every member of society.  
While it is important to recognize that integration, particularly economic growth, is 
not the equivalent of full assimilation and requires every individual to become secular or for 
that matter the reverse, it is important to maintain an element of diversity yet allow 
individuals the freedom to succeed in society. The present situation does not meet these 
demands and even more so has created increasing pressures on the ultra-Orthodox 
community to conform to secular standards. As a result, a longstanding war of one-
upmanship has been waged by both secular and ultra-Orthodox communities in Israel 
resulting in a deadlock that ultimately, for political reasons, keeps issues and discussion 
relating to social advancement in a virtual siege being held hostage by special interests. The 
need for change is clear. Preferably, this change can be enacted or enabled on a consensus 
basis in which the input of citizens re-creates and re-imagines new possibilities for the state 
of Israel incorporating both religious aspects though at the same time not constraining 
individuals across the spectrum in their private lives. 
 
 III: A religious theocracy 
 The third scenario is the opposite extreme, creating a state based in either literal or 
interpretive Rabbinic Judaism that essentially becomes a theocracy. This can be either along 
the lines of Iran, which incorporates secular forms of government alongside religious 
leadership or a pure theocracy as in other contexts that completely eliminate the non-
religious bureaucracy altogether. This, of course, is an unlikely scenario given the 
demographic makeup of the state of Israel. It is interesting to examine what the potential 
consequences could be for the majority of Israelis. Presently, secular citizens of Israel feel 
inconvenienced by the religious restrictions on personal sphere issues, most notably those of 
marriage, divorce, burial, and religious identity.  
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How much more so would this be the case if ultra-Orthodox interests governed the 
country? There has been discussion of the possibility of increased religious alliances, 
particularly as part of a movement of “returnees to the faith,” in which new-found religiosity 
would reshape the current political landscape. This also represents a remote possibility due to 
the political cleavages present in Israeli society and the factionalism that defines Israeli 
politics. However, the fundamental question of how would ultra-Orthodox interests govern 
the larger population is an interesting question because the majority of Israelis are not ultra-
Orthodox and therefore would constantly be in conflict with ultra-Orthodox values. The 
special privileges that ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel are afforded in the state of Israel, which 
were not present in the context of historical Jewry before the creation of the state, necessitate 
ultra-Orthodox Jews living as a minority.  
As a majority, the priorities of the state would be quite different and perhaps would 
out of necessity need to be re-evaluated. Therefore, many of the current politically 
contentious issues, such as military service, would have to be met realistically by a religious 
government; this type of bargaining and negotiation is present in ongoing negotiations with 
Israeli religious political parties. A sort of de facto recognition of the status quo and 
understanding of where the parameters lie in terms of issues that can be negotiated and issues 
that have to be tacitly accepted exists as there is no viable alternative. 
  
Future Questions 
 There are many unanswered questions in this field. While this thesis has outlined 
many of the factors and proposed a way forward for the ultra-Orthodox community and 
Israeli society, many avenues have been left unexplored. Future questions need to be asked 
about finding a permanent solution to these social divisions. Not addressing these issues will 
only lead to new and more complicated rifts forming, with the question of Jewish identity 
and what this means to the Jewish state forever being bounced back and forth. Civic 
participation and other types of integration need to be re-examined. In addition, new ways of 
imagining a society that both takes direction from and serves the interest of all, participants 
and non-participants alike, need to be thought of to avoid a demographic crisis and/or a 
fundamental shift in the meaning and mission of the state.  
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 Questions that could be asked include: Are there solutions involving changes in the 
electoral process, while maintaining the same type of balance and representation of the past? 
Can the ultra-Orthodox community become partners in the reformation of state and religion 
in Israel to form a new type of status quo? Can secular Zionism be reimagined to include a 
religious element? Are assimilation and integration the only way in which to bring ultra-
Orthodox society in line with the target goals of the OECD Israeli society? This includes 
more integration in the workforce for the religious community, a greater number of educated 
individuals, less primary social support and increased integration with society. Should 
additional efforts be made to customize the integration of various groups to allow them easier 
access to mainstream Israeli society? Could a form of nonreligious, egalitarian, 
multiculturalism work in the Israeli context? What would the state look like after separating 
religion from state, or alternatively, what would open funding for all religious groups, 
without bureaucracy, look like? What would an in-depth research project among the ultra-
Orthodox community resemble? Would taking religious and social party commentary into 
account substantially change the conclusions of this work? Would this then present a new 
possibility for the future? 
 
Summation 
 Social change is difficult to come by, particularly in the Israeli context where the state 
was not founded on the basis of a written constitution and very different ideologies drive 
various component factions of society. Yet, for the vast majority of Israeli citizens, there is 
an underlying commonality, despite all the political and social differences among them. 
Creation of the state following the Holocaust and incorporating Jewish populations from all 
over the world are not without problems, yet fundamentally, there is a way forward in which 
common ground can be found. Jewish tradition throughout the ages affords a particular view 
of how a state can be formulated with others and, perhaps, in the case of the state of Israel. 
Other views are comprised of the secular or traditional ideologies, which ultimately the ultra-
Orthodox community will have to meet halfway in order to reach an accommodation that 
serves the interest of the state and all its component communities. 
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Appendix 1: Interviews 
 
List of Interviews: 
 
Interview #1 - Gershon Plony 
The demographic and biographic information for this interviewee was not recorded, as per 
the interview subject’s request. The interview and material were discarded. 
 
Interview #2 - Yitzhak Cohen 
Yitzhak Cohen is in his 30s, male, and identifies as being Ashkenazi. He was born in Israel 
and considers his hometown in Israel to be Jerusalem. He characterizes the community he 
currently lives in as being extremely Haredi. 
 
Interview #3 - Menashe Blum 
Menashe is in his mid-60s, male, identifies with being Ashkenazi, and immigrated in the 
1980s to Israel from the United States. His hometown in Israel is in the centre of the country, 
and he describes the community which he lives in as American Haredi.  
 
Interview #4 - Yoav Daniel 
Yoav is in his 40s, male, and he identifies as being Ashkenazi. He immigrated in the 1990s to 
Israel from the United States. He currently lives in the centre of Israel and describes the 
community which he lives in as being Haredi. 
 
Interview #5 - Eliezer Weiss 
Eliezer is in his mid-50s, male, and identifies as being Ashkenazi. He immigrated to Israel 
over 30 years ago. He states that his hometown is Jerusalem and the community which he 
lives in, he classifies as Haredi. 
 
Interview #6 - Ruchama Spiegel 
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Ruchama is in her mid-40s, female, identifies as being Ashkenazi, and immigrated 
approximately 20 years ago from Canada. She currently lives in Jerusalem and describes the 
community which she lives in as being Haredi. 
 
Interview #7 - Devorah Nudelman 
Devorah is in her early 50s, female, and identifies as being Ashkenazi. She immigrated to 
Israel approximately 20 years ago. Her hometown is Jerusalem and she describes the 
community she lives in as being cohesively Haredi. 
 
Interview #8 - Deena Friedberg 
Deena is in her early 60s, female, and identifies as being Ashkenazi. She immigrated to Israel 
approximately 20 years ago from Canada, and identifies her hometown as Jerusalem. She 
describes the community which she lives in as “mitchared,” becoming religious, with 
changes happening in the neighborhood's religious character. 
 
Interview #9 - Yonatan Smith 
Yonatan Smith is in his mid-50s, male, and identifies himself as being normative Ashkenazi. 
He immigrated to Israel approximately 20 years ago and currently resides in Jerusalem. He 
describes the community that he lives in as being mostly Haredi and partly Dati Leumi. 
 
Interview #10 - Miriam Jacoby 
Miriam is in her mid-20s, female, and identifies as being Ashkenazi. She immigrated recently 
from the United States and currently resides in the centre of the country. She describes her 
community as being an open community of a mixed character. 
 
Interview #11 - Moshe Auerbach 
Moshe is in his early 30s, male, and identifies as being of Ashkenazi descent. He immigrated 
to Israel approximately 10 years ago and currently resides in Jerusalem. He characterizes the 
community that he currently lives in as being a Haredi mix with components of Litvish, 
Hassidic, and Sephardi residents in the community. 
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Interview #12 - Leah Halpern 
Leah is in her late 20s, female, and identifies as being Ashkenazi. She immigrated several 
years ago from the United States and currently resides in Jerusalem. She characterizes the 
community that she currently lives in as being mostly Haredi, approximately 95%, with the 
remaining 5% mixed.  
 
Interview #13 - Sarah Falk 
Sarah is in her early 20s, female, and identifies as being of Ashkenazi descent. She 
immigrated recently from the United States and currently resides in Jerusalem. She describes 
the community that she lives in as being 90% Haredi and 10% secular.  
 
Interview #14 - Rivka Lowey 
Rivka is in her early 60s, female, and identifies as being Ashkenazi. She immigrated to Israel 
approximately 10 years ago from the United States, currently resides in Jerusalem, and 
characterizes the neighborhood which she lives in as being Haredi. 
 
Interview #15 - Yehuda Aronson 
Yehuda is in his late 40s, male, and identifies as being of Ashkenazi descent. He immigrated 
approximately 20 years ago from the United States and currently resides in Jerusalem. He 
describes the community that he is living in as predominantly religious. 
 
Interview #16 - Ephraim Lerner 
Ephraim is in his early 60s, male, and identifies as being of Ashkenazi descent. He 
immigrated recently to Israel from the United States and currently resides in Jerusalem. He 
characterizes his neighborhood as being mixed, with some Haredi elements, some national 
religious elements, some secular elements, and some anti-religious elements. 
 
Interview #17 - Yocheved Saks 
Yocheved is in her early 60s, female, and identifies as being of Ashkenazi descent. She 
recently immigrated to Israel from the United States and currently resides in Jerusalem. She 
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describes the community in which she currently lives as mixed with 50% being Ashkenazi 
and 50% being Sephardi, as well as 50% being religious and 50% being secular. 
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Consent Form 
 
 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM FOR THESIS 
State and Religion 
 
Date:  
 
 I am a student at Laurentian University in the School in the MA Sociology / 
Political Science program studying the intersection between the ultra-Orthodox 
population and the state of Israel. The study is intended to show potential methods for 
integration and societal advancement for the ultra-Orthodox segment of Israeli society. 
You should be aware that there are potential risks in revealing sensitive information 
regarding military service and social attitudes. The interview will be digitally recorded 
and will take approximately up to one hour.  
 
Your participation in this study is strictly voluntary. You have the right to withdraw at 
any time without penalty. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about the study or about being a subject, I can be 
reached in Canada at 705-585-3199 and 08-914-4791 in Israel. In addition the Research 
Officer can be reached at (705) 675-1151, ext. 3213 for information. 
 
Your identity will not be revealed at any time. 
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Researcher: Sidney Shapiro, Sociology MA student. This study is being conducted at 
Laurentian University, Sudbury, Ontario, Canada under the supervision of Professor 
Aurélie Lacassagne (alacassagne@laurentian.ca) and Professor Tim Nieguth 
(tnieguth@laurentian.ca). 
What you will be asked to do in the Research: You will be asked a series of questions 
pertaining to religion, society, religious politics and demographic information. 
 
Voluntary Participation: Your participation in the study is completely voluntary and 
you may refuse to answer any question or choose to stop participating at any time. Your 
decision not to volunteer will not influence the nature of the ongoing relationship you 
may have with the researcher or nature of your relationship with Laurentian University 
either now, or in the future.  
Withdrawal from the Study: You can stop participating in the study at any time, for any 
reason, if you so decide. If you decide to stop participating, you can do so without 
penalty. Your decision to stop participating, or to refuse to answer particular questions, 
will not affect your relationship with the researcher or Laurentian University. Should you 
decide to withdraw from the study; all data generated as a consequence of your 
participation will be destroyed. 
Confidentiality: Unless you choose otherwise, interviews, notes and/or recording of the 
interview will not be associated with identifying information. You may refuse to answer 
any questions. All information you supply during the research will be held in confidence 
and, unless you specifically indicate your consent, your name will not appear in any 
report or publication of the research. Your data will be safely stored in a locked facility 
and only the researcher will have access to this information. Confidentiality will be 
provided to the fullest extent possible by Canadian law on privacy. In addition, your 
privacy and the confidentiality of your interview will be protected under Israeli law, to 
the full extent of your legal rights.  
Note: Data from the research and interviews will be digitally stored in an encrypted 
format on a server located in the United States. Be aware that the government of the 
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United States may demand to see the data under the Patriot Act. 
Questions about the Research: If you have any questions or concerns about the study, 
you can contact the principal researcher by email at sx_shapiro@laurentian.ca (email) or 
by phone at 705-585-3199 in Canada and 08-914-4791 in Israel. If you have questions or 
concerns pertaining to the ethics aspects of the study, you can contact the Jean Dragon 
Ph.D., ethics officer at LU at (705) 675-1151, ext. 3213 or write at 
jdragon@laurentian.ca 
 
I agree to participate in this study, and I have received a copy of this 
consent form. 
□ 
I would like to see the results prior to dissemination □ 
I would like a copy of the study □ 
  
 
 
 
Signature     Date       
Participant  
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 noitalsnarT werbeH - mroF tnesnoC
 
  טופס הסכמה מודעת לתיזה
  דת ומדינה
  
  :תאריך
  
חוקר את הצומת שבין , בתוכנית המאסטרס בסוציולוגיה ומדעי המדינהאני סטודנט באוניברסיטת לאורנטיאן 
מטרת המחקר היא להציג שיטות פוטנציאליות של השתלבות והתקדמות . האוכלוסיה החרדית ומדינת ישראל
הריני מביא לידיעתך שקיימים סיכונים אפשריים בחשיפת . חברתית של המגזר החרדי בחברה הישראלית
  .  הראיון יוקלט באופן דיגיטלי ויארך כשעה.שירות צבאי וגישות חברתיותמידע רגיש בנוגע ל
  
   .יש לך את הזכות להתחרט בכל עת ללא תוצאות. השתתפותך במחקר זה הינו התנדבותי לחלוטין
  
- 585-507ניתן להשיג אותי בקנדה בטלפון , אם יש לך שאלות או חששות בנוגע למחקר או להשתתפותך בו
 1511-576-507ניתן להשיג את ראש המחקר בטלפון , בנוסף. 1974-419-80טלפון או בארץ ב 9913
  . בכל עניין 3123שלוחה 
  
  .זהותך לא תיחשף כלל
  
, סאדברי, מחקר זה נערך באוניברסיטת לאורנטיאן.  בסוציולוגיה.A.Mסטודנט ,  סידני שפירא:עורך המחקר
ופרופסור טים ( engassacala@naitnerual.ac)' גתחת פיקוחה של פרופסור אורלי לקסנ, קנדה, אונטריו
  (.htugeint@naitnerual.ac)' ניגות
  
מידע פוליטיקה דתית ו, חברה,  תישאל סדרת שאלות המתייחסות לדת:מה שיידרש ממך במסגרת המחקר
  .דמוגרפי
  
 השתתפותך במחקר היא התנדבותית לחלוטין והינך יכול לסרב לענות על כל שאלה :השתתפות בהתנדבות
החלטתך לא להתנדב לא ישפיע על יחסיך עם עורך המחקר או על טיב . או להפסיק את השתתפותך בכל עת
  . יחסיך עם אוניברסיטת לאורנטיאן בהווה או בעתיד
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אם תחליט . אם תחליט לעשות כן,  מכל סיבה שהיא,נך יכול לצאת מהחקר בכל עת הי:יציאה מהמחקר
החלטתך להפסיק להשתתף או . תוכל לעשות זאת ללא השלכות כלשהן, להפסיק את השתתפותך במחקר
אם . לא תשפיע על יחסיך עם עורך המחקר או עם אוניברסיטת לאורנטיאן, לסרב לענות על שאלה מסוימת
  . יושמד, כל המידע שהתקבל כתוצאה מהשתתפותך, תאכן תחליט לסג
  
תוכל . או הקלטות של הראיון לא יקושרו עם פרטים מזהים/הערות ו, ראיונות,  אם לא תבקש אחרת:סודיות
ואם לא תציין את , כל המידע שתספק במסגרת המחקר ישמר בסודיות מוחלטת. לסרב לענות על כל שאלה
הנתונים שלך יישמרו במתקן נעול ורק . אף דוח או הוצאה של המחקרשמך לא יופיע ב, הסכמתך בפירוש
סודיות תסופק בדרגה הגבוהה ביותר האפשרית תחת חוק הפרטיות . לעורך המחקר תהיה גישה למידע זה
 .באופן מלא מבחינת זכויותיך החוקיות, פרטיותך וסודיות הראיון יובטחו תחת החוק הישראלי, בנוסף. הקנדי
 
עליך . ב“ים מהמחקר ומהראיונות יישמרו באופן דיגיטלי בפורמט מקודד בשרת הנמצא בארה נתונ:הערה
  .ב תדרוש לראות את הנתונים האלה תחת החוק הפטריוטי“לדעת שיתכן שממשלת ארה
  
ניתן להשיג את העורך הראשי של ,  אם יש לך שאלות או חששות בנוגע למחקר:שאלות בנוגע למחקר
-419- 80: בקנדה ובטלפון 9913- 585-507:  או בטלפוןxs_oripahs@naitnerual.ac: המחקר במייל
ין 'ר ג“ניתן ליצור קשר עם ד, אם יש לך שאלות או חששות בנוגע להיבטים האתיים של המחקר. בארץ 1974
: או במייל 3123שלוחה  1511-576- 507: קצינת האתיקה באוניברסיטת לאורנטיאן בטלפון, דרגון
   nogardj@naitneual.ac
  
    אני מסכים להשתתף במחקר וקיבלתי עותק מטופס הסכמה זה
    אני מעוניין לראות את התוצאות לפני ההפצה
    אבקש לקבל העתק של המחקר
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Interview Script 
Interview Questions for State and Religion: 
The Conflicts of ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel 
 
 
Demographic Information 
 
Name? 
Age? 
Sex? 
Do you identify as being of Ashkenazi or Sephardi descent? 
Were you born in Israel or did you immigratei? 
If immigrated to Israel, when and from whereii? 
Where is your hometown in Israel? 
How would you describe the community you are currently living iniii? 
 
Religious Beliefs 
What stream of Judaism do you identify withiv? 
How would you define your religious beliefsv? 
Do you associate yourself with a particular sect of Judaismvi? 
 
Social-Religious Beliefs 
What does being “American-Haredi (English speaking ultra-Orthodox)” mean? 
Do “American-Haredi” people reflect the reality of the Haredi world? 
Are there advantages or disadvantages associated with being able to speak other 
languages in the Haredi world? 
 
Education 
What type of primary education did you receivevii? 
What subjects were the focus of your education? 
Do you believe your education was sufficient? 
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What type of post-primary education did you receiveviii? 
 
Did you attend any other types of educational institutions (such as higher level religious 
institutions, university, college, vocational school etc.)? 
 
Do you feel you have additional educational opportunities available to youix? 
 
In terms of education, how do you see yourself compared to the Haredi public? 
 
Definitions and feelings of political and social terminology and their feelings 
 
How would you define the following terms: 
Toratam Omanutamx 
Self Governance 
Religious Society 
Rabbinic Authority 
Halachaxi  
Social Assistance 
 
 
 
Impressions of recent events involving the State and Religion: 
 
1. What is your impression of the events surrounding the Jerusalem city government’s 
decision in 2009/2010 to keep parking lots open on the Sabbathxii?  
 
1a. Relate and describe the events that took place. 
1b. Do you believe the controversy surrounding this issue was justified? 
1c. Do you think there will be lasting repercussions following this incident? 
 
2. What are your impressions of the State taking religious considerations into account 
when dealing with archeologyxiii? 
 
2a. Do you believe the controversy surrounding this issue is justified? 
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3. Describe the events surrounding the events in July 2009 pertaining to social workers 
accusing an ultra-Orthodox woman of child abusexiv. 
 
3a. Do you believe the controversy surrounding this issue was justified? 
 
4. What is your impression of the events surrounding the Supreme Court decision to 
desegregate a publicly funded school in Emmanuelxv?  
 
4a. Do you believe the court treated the parties involved equally and considered all 
viewpoints? 
4b. Do you think there will be lasting repercussions following this incident? 
4c. Do you believe the controversy surrounding this issue was justified? 
 
 
Questions on Social, State, Military, and Employment issues: 
Is it a challenge to maintain religious identity in Israeli society? 
What is the importance of marriage in religious society? 
How would you define the timeline of the life of a typical ultra-Orthodox Jew living in 
Israel? 
Are ultra-Orthodox members of society able to gain access to leadership roles? 
What do you think should ideally happen to improve Israeli society? 
 
What is your impression of the state of Israel? 
How are the state and Judaism linked? 
Given the current state of affairs, is the present situation viable long term? 
Does the State provide the same level of religious freedom as other governments? 
Do Ashkenazi and Sephardi members of society have equal access and potential? 
Is ongoing debate over social assistance to ultra-Orthodox society justified? 
 
Did you serve in the military, social or civilian service? 
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What is your opinion of the Tal Law? 
Does mandatory military service pose a barrier to ultra-Orthodox Jews? 
What is your opinion of military or national service programs geared towards the ultra-
Orthodox population? 
 
Generally, what is the current state of the job market in Israel? 
Do religious members of society have the same access to jobs as members of secular 
society? 
What can change in terms of employment training and opportunity? 
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 noitalsnarT werbeH - tpircS weivretnI
 
  שאלון
  הקונפליקטים של חרדים בישראל: דת ומדינה
  
  מידע דמוגרפי
  :שם
  :גיל
  :מין
  ?ה/ה או ספרדי/ה מגדיר את עצמך כאשכנזי/האם את
  ?האם נולדת בארץ
  ?מאיפה ומתי, אם עלית
  ?מהו מקום מגוריך בארץ
  ?י את קהילתך הנוכחית/דירכיצד תג
  
  
  אמונה יהודית
  ?ה מזדהה/עם איזה זרם ביהדות את
  ?י את אמונותיך היהודיות/כיצד תגדיר
  ?ת למגזר יהודי מסוים/ה משתייכ/האם את
  
  
  דתית-אמונה חברתית
  ?(חרדי דובר אנגלית )“אמריקאי-חרדי”מה המשמעות של להיות 
  ?אות של העולם החרדי משקפים את המצי“חרדים אמריקאיים”האם 
  ?האם ישנם יתרונות או חסרונות הקשורים ליכולת לדבר שפות נוספות בעולם החרדי
  
  
  חינוך
  ?איזה סוג של חינוך יסודי קיבלת
  ?באילו מקצועות התמקד החינוך שלך
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  ?ה שהחינוך שקיבלת מספיק/ה מאמינ/האם את
  ?יסודי קיבלת-איזה סוג של חינוך על
בית ספר , מכללה, אוניברסיטה, למשל מוסד דתי להשכלה גבוהה)ינוך מסוג אחר האם למדת במוסדות ח
 ?(מקצועי וכדומה
 
  ?ה שזמינים לך הזדמנויות חינוך נוספות/ה מרגיש/האם את
  
 ?ה רואה את עצמך ביחס לציבור החרדי/כיצד את, בנוגע לחינוך
  
  
  הגדרות ורגשות בנוגע לטרמינולוגיה פוליטית וחברתית
  :ת המונחים הבאיםי א/הגדר
  תורתם אומנותם
  רבנות
  שלטון עצמי
  הלכה
  חברה דתית
 סיוע חברתי
 
  :התרשמות מאירועים שהתרחשו לאחרונה הקשורים בדת ומדינה
  
לפתוח את  0102- 9002-מהי התרשמותך מן האירועים הקשורים להחלטת עיריית ירושלים מ .1
 ?החניונים בשבת
  התרחשוי את המאורעות ש/י ותאר/התייחס. א.1
  ?ה שהמחלוקת סביב עניין זה הייתה מוצדקת/ה מאמינ/האם את. ב.1
  ?ת שתהיינה השלכות ארוכות טווח למאורעות אלה/ה חושב/האם את. ג.1
  
  
מהי התרשמותך מן הדרך שבה המדינה לקחה בחשבון שיקולים דתיים בטיפול בחפירות  .2
 ?ארכיאולוגיות
  ?ין זה הייתה מוצדקתה שהמלוקת סביב עני/ה מאמינ/האם את. א.2
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בנוגע לעובדים סוציאליים שהאשימו אשה חרדית  9002י את האירועים סביב אירועי יולי /תאר .3
 ?בהתעללות בילדיה
  ?ה שחילוקי הדעות סביב נושא זה היו מוצדקים/ה מאמינ/האם את. א.3
  
  
העדתית מהי התרשמותך מן האירועים סביב החלטת בית המשפט העליון לבטל את ההפרדה  .4
 ?בבית ספר ציבורי בעמנואל
ה שבית המשפט התייחס לצדדים באופן שוויוני ולקח בחשבון את כל /ה מאמינ/האם את. א.4
  ?הדעות
  ?ת שהתהיינה השלכות ארוכות טווח למאורעות אלה/ה חושב/האם את. ב.4
  ?ה שהמחלוקת סביב עניין זה הייתה מוצדקת/ה מאמינ/האם את. ג.4
  
  
  
  
  :צבא ותעסוקה, מדינה,  לנושאי חברהשאלות בנוגע
  
  ?האם זה מאתגר לשמר את הזהות הדתית בחברה הישראלית
  ?מהי חשיבות מוסד הנישואין בחברה הדתית
  ?י את ציר הזמן הטיפוסי של חרדי הגר בישראל/כיצד תגדיר
  ?האם לחרדים יש גישה לתפקידי מנהיגות
  ?ת באופן אידאלימה לדעתך צריך לקרות כדי לשפר את החברה הישראלי
  
  
  
  ?מהי התרשמותך ממדינת ישראל
  ?כיצד קשורים המדינה והיהדות
  ?קיימא לאורך זמן-האם המצב הנוכחי הוא בר, עם מצב העניינים הקיים
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  ?האם המדינה מספקת אותה רמה של חופש דת כמו ממשלות אחרות
  ?האם לאשכנזים ולספרדים גישה שווה ופוטנציאל שווה
 ?ך בסיוע חברתי לחברה החרדית מוצדקהאם הדיון המתמש
  
  
  ?או שירות אזרחי, שירות לאומי, האם שירתת בצבא
  ?מה דעתך על חוק טל
  ?האם שירות חובה מהווה מחסום עבור חרדים
 ?מה דעתך על שירות צבאי או שירות לאומי המותאמות לציבור החרדי
  
  
  ?מהו המצב הנוכחי של שוק העבודה בישראל, באופן כללי
  ? לדתיים יש את אותה גישה למשרות שיש לחילוניםהאם
  ?מה ניתן לשנות בנוגע להכשרה מקצועית והזדמנויות תעסוקה
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Appendix 3: Notes 
 
Spellings, translations, and phonetic use of various words.  
 
 The thesis includes a wide range of foreign terms from Hebrew, Yiddish and other 
languages. The primary text seeks to maintain a consistency in the spelling and phonetic 
pronunciation of various words, generally using an Ashkenazi anglicized pronunciation for 
these foreign words. It is important to note that many non-English words used in the thesis, 
particularly those which come from secondary sources are preserved in their original form 
and therefore may very greatly in terms of spelling and emphasis on pronunciation within the 
terms. The glossary and explanation of terms section seeks to accommodate for these 
disparities and includes a number of entries which are linked to one another as to simplify the 
process of defining various terms and contents used throughout the thesis.  
 
The Tal Law 
 
As of February 21st 2012, when this document was being edited prior to submission, 
the Supreme Court has ruled against the perpetuation of the Tal Law and requires the 
government to establish an alternative framework by the summer (August) of 2012. This 
change marks a distinct break with the past decade and a half of tolerance for a policy, which 
in theory, I extended the status quo into the military/public service obligation arrangement, 
but in reality did very little to settle the ongoing conflicts between participation and 
nonparticipating members of Israeli society on the basis of religion. It is therefore uncertain 
than an alternative to the Tal Law will go any further to create new positioning points within 
the status quo arrangement governing state and religion relationships in Israeli Society. 
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Appendix 4: Glossary and Explanation of Terms 
 
Note: Many terms are transliterated from Hebrew, Yiddish, or Aramaic and thus the spelling 
in English may vary considerably. Alternative transliterations are given in parentheses. 
Throughout the main text, terms appear as transliterated in specific quoted material. 
 
achdus (also achdut): unity 
 
aflayah: discrimination 
 
Agudah: Ashkenazi Orthodox political movement founded in Katowice, Poland in 1912, 
officially known as World Agudath Israel, with branches in many countries. Its aims 
included the strengthening of Jewish institutions, particularly schools. As a Polish 
political party, it elected representatives to the Polish Sejm. After the establishment of 
the State of Israel, it reached an agreement with the secular state regarding some aspects 
of Jewish practice, and remains an important Orthodox political party with 
representation in the Knesset. 
 
al regel achat: (lit., on one foot), to give a succinct interpretation 
 
aliyah: (lit., going up), 1) traditional term for emigration to Israel; 2) in the synagogue 
service, it refers to the honor of being called to read a segment of the Torah portion; the 
segment itself is called an aliyah. 
 
al shlosha devarim ha’olam omed: al ha’Torah, al ha’avodah, ve’al gemilut chasadim (“On 
three things does the world stand: on Torah [learning], on work [i.e., prayer], and on 
kind deeds.”), saying from the Talmud, Pirkei Avot. 
 
Am chofshi: a free people 
 
Am kodshi: a holy people 
 
amutah (pl. amutot): a non-profit charitable organization recognized under Israeli law. 
 
Anochi Hashem Elokeicha, Lo yihiyeh lecha: the opening words of the first of the the Ten 
Commandments (Exodus 20:2 and Deuteronomy 5:6); “I am the LORD your God; you 
shall have no other gods before Me.” 
 
apikorsus: term originally derived from a misunderstood notion of the Greek Epicurean 
philosophical school. As used in Jewish circles, it refers to non-observance of, or 
disdain for Jewish law and practice. Apikores: (noun) term used in the Talmud for an 
apostate 
 
arachim: values 
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aseh lecha rav: (lit., to make for oneself a rabbi), to chose and appoint a rabbi or rabbinic 
authority to guide one 
 
Ashkelon: ancient coastal city in southern Israel 
 
Ashkenaz: (lit., Germany), the region of northwestern Europe from which a major division of 
the Jews, with specific customs originated. Ashkenazi (adjective or noun); Ashkenazim 
(noun, plural), Jews from this cultural subgroup. 
 
assur: forbidden according to Jewish law 
 
Av melakhot: any of 49 primary types of work forbidden on the Sabbath, including such 
things as sowing, reaping, sewing, writing, etc. The types of work were those associated 
with building the tabernacle (mishkan) in the wilderness, all of which were suspended 
on the Sabbath. All other prohibitions of types of work on the Sabbath are derived from 
these main categories. 
 
aveira, pl. aveirot (also aveiras): sins 
 
avira de’ara’machkima: (Aramaic), the atmosphere in Israel is so holy that it causes one to 
be wiser 
 
avodah: work; also used to refer to the formal Jewish prayer 
 
Avraham Avinu (lit., our father Abraham): the biblical patriarch Abraham, considered the 
first Jew, and the first to proclaim belief in a single God. 
 
baal teshuva (lit., master of returning): one who has taken on the Orthodox Jewish lifestyle 
and practice; sometimes called hozer b’tshuva (lit., returner to returning); See tshuva. 
 
bachur, pl. bachurim (lit., chosen, firstborn): can refer to an eldest son, or colloquially to any 
male yeshiva student 
 
Badatz: Hebrew acronym for Beit Din Tzedek (righteous court), an ultra-Orthodox body that 
handles matters according to a strict interpretation of Jewish law. It oversees, for 
example, divorce cases and offers kashrut certification. 
 
bagrut: the Israeli high school matriculation exam. 
 
Bais Yaakov (also Beit Yaakov; lit. House of Jacob): a system of schools and seminaries for 
Orthodox women founded in Kraków, Poland in 1917 by Sarah Shenirer. One of its 
main activities is teacher training for Orthodox schools. 
 
Baka: a neighborhood of Jerusalem 
 
Shapiro 344 
 
banu el mamenucha ve’el hanachala: (idiom) we found peace and quiet (or we have finally 
settled). 
 
Bar Ilan: Israeli public university founded in 1955 and located in Ramat Gan near Tel Aviv. 
As with all universities in Israel, it accepts students from all backgrounds. It has eight 
faculties: Exact Sciences, Life Sciences, Social Sciences, Humanities, Jewish Studies, 
Medicine, Engineering, and Law. It is named for Rabbi Meir Bar-Ilan (formerly Rabbi 
Meir Berlin), a religious Zionist leader. One of the aims of the university was to 
combine Jewish religious and secular studies. 
 
Barkat, Nir (1959–): businessman and politician, mayor of Jerusalem (2008). 
 
bar mitzvah (lit., son of the commandment): at the age of 13, Jewish boys take on adult 
religious responsibilities, and can be counted as part of a minyan (the quorum for public 
prayer). For girls, bat mitzvah takes place at age 12, since Jewish tradition held that girls 
mature somewhat earlier than boys. 
 
Baruch Hashem (lit., blessed be the Name): a exclamation roughly equivalent to “thank 
God!” but used in a very general sense, often in response to the query, “how are you?” 
 
Baruch she’amar (lit., blessed is the one who said...): a special blessing recited as part of the 
Torah reading in the synagogue service; it is recited for the one called to the Torah. 
 
basar v’chalav (lit., meat and milk): Jewish law prohibits the mixing of meat and milk 
products, hence the meaning of combining two things or ideas that should not be 
together. Also can refers to “illegitimate” mixing. 
 
Bayit veGan (lit., home and garden): a neighborhood in Jerusalem 
 
b’davka: purposefully  
 
bechirah chofshit: freedom of choice (free will) 
 
Be’er Sheva: a city in Southern Israel. 
 
be’etzem: actually 
 
bein adam la-chavero (lit., between a man and his fellow): describes interpersonal 
relationships 
 
bein adam la-Makom (lit., between a man and the Place): HaMakom is a poetic way of 
referring to God, so this means between a man and his Maker. 
 
Beis Din (also Beit Din, lit. house of judgment): rabbinical court 
 
Beit Hamikdash: the Temple in Jerusalem 
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Beitar: a Revisionist Zionist youth movement founded by Ze’ev Jabotinsky in Riga, Latvia in 
1923; also, a soccer team 
 
Beitar Illit: an ultra-Orthodox suburb of Jerusalem 
 
Belz: a town in Western Ukraine near the Polish border that was home to a major Hasidic 
dynasty. 
 
Ben Gurion, David (1886–1973): Zionist leader and first Prime Minister of Israel 
 
ben-Torah (lit., son of the Torah): an observant Jew 
 
Ben Yehuda, Eliezer (1858–1922): lexicographer and newspaper editor who worked 
tirelessly to revive Hebrew as a modern spoken language. 
 
Bereishit (lit., in, or with, the beginning): the first word of the Bible; also, the book of 
Genesis 
 
bikur cholim (lit., visiting the sick): the good deed of visiting the sick; it also is the name of a 
nineteenth-century Jerusalem hospital. 
 
Binyamin: the youngest son of the patriarch Jacob 
 
Bituach Leumi (lit., national insurance): Israeli office for welfare, disability, and pension 
payments. 
 
Bnei Brak: an ancient town in central Israel with a majority ultra-Orthodox population. 
 
bnei hayeshiva: (lit., sons of the Yeshiva) Yeshiva student 
 
bracha m’zonot: a short grace after eating a light meal that includes grains, but does not 
include bread 
 
Breslov: a Ukrainian town that was home to Rabbi Nachman, founder of the Breslov Hasidic 
dynasty. 
 
bris (also brit; lit., covenant): any type of covenant, but often used as a short form for brit 
milah, the ritual circumcision of Jewish boys at eight days of age. 
 
Brisker Rav: the traditional head of the Brisker yeshivas, associated with the Soloveitchik 
dynasty that originated in Brest-Litovsk, Belarus. 
 
Bucharest: Capital of Romania 
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burqa (Arabic): a garment worn by Muslim women which covers the entire body and the 
face. 
 
Carlebachi: a follower of Rabbi Shlomo Carlebach (1925–1994), a rabbi and musician whose 
followers established Mevo Modiim in central Israel. 
 
Chabad (acronym of chachma-binah-daat: wisdom-undertanding-knowledge), the movement 
founded by the Hasidic Rabbi Schneur Zalman of Liadi (1745–1812); today a major 
worldwide Jewish outreach organization. Chabadnik: a follower of this tradition. 
 
chavurah (also chaburah): a movement of informal groups organized for Jewish prayer, 
learning, and celebration. 
 
chachamim (also hakhamim; lit., wise ones), respected religious teachers, sages 
 
chag (also hag; religious holiday; “chag same’ach” happy holiday 
 
chametz products containing leavening, whose use is forbidden during Passover 
 
charedi (pl., charedim; also haredi, hareidi) ultra-Orthodox Jews strictly observant of Jewish 
law and religious practices. 
 
chas v’shalom, (lit., protecting and peace), an exclamation similar to God forbid! 
 
chavrusa (also chavruta, havruta), a study partner, especially in yeshiva 
 
chayal (m.; fem., chayelet), a soldier 
 
Chazal (acronym for chachamim zichronim l’vracha, “our sages of blessed memory”), the 
ancient sages who laid the foundation for normative Judaism in late Roman times. 
 
Chazon Ish: Rabbi Avroham Yeshaya Karelitz (1878–1953), the author of a book by that 
title. Born in Kosava (now Brest Voblast, Belarus), he emigrated to Palestine in 1933, 
and became a leading haredi scholar based in Bnei Brak. 
 
chesed: lovingkindness 
 
chillul Hashem (also hillul Hashem; lit., desecration of the Name): any act that would appear 
to damage God’s reputation, or bring disgrace upon religious practice, e.g., smoking on 
the Sabbath (see chillul Shabbat) 
 
chiloni (also hiloni, pl. chilonim): a person who does not observe Jewish practices, a secular 
Jew 
 
chinuch (also hinuch): education, especially religious education for children 
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chochma: wisdom 
 
Chafetz Chaim: Rabbi Yisrael Meir Kagan Poupko (1838–1933), called after his book of that 
title. He was a prolific author on Jewish law, notably the Mishneh Berurah, and gave his 
approval to the establishment of the Bais Yaakov school system for women. He was 
also a leading figure in the Agudath Israel movement for Orthodox Jews. See Bais 
Yaakov; Aguda. 
 
chol hamoed Pesach intermediate days of Passover on which some kinds of activity and 
work are permitted 
 
chumra: stringency 
 
chutz la’aretz (also hutz la’aretz): any place outside of Israel 
 
chutznik, pl. chutznikim: living abroad, someone who does not live in the place 
 
da’at Torah (lit., knowledge of Torah): the perspective, view or opinion of the Torah 
 
dafka or davka: on purpose 
 
dati (f. datiya): a religiously observant person 
 
Dati-Leumi: National Religious Party (Mafdal) in Israel, formed in 1956 and representing the 
religious Zionist movement. See Rav Kook. 
 
daven, davening: to pray, prayer 
 
David Hamelech: King David 
 
dayan, pl. dayanim: judges, especially in religious courts 
 
demokratiah: democracy 
 
derech, derech eretz (lit., way, way of the land): courtesy, politeness 
 
Edot Hamizrach: non-Ashkenazi Jewish subgroups, that is, Sephardim, Morrocans, 
Yemenites, etc. 
 
Egel hazahav: the biblical Golden Calf; see Exodus 32 
 
eidelkeit (Yiddish): purity of spirit, beyond “refinement ... fineness” (Dobroszycki and 
Gurock, 1993, p.197) 
 
Eilat: the southernmost city of Israel on the Gulf of Aqaba 
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eiruv (also eruv): a boundary made according to Jewish law, which allows persons within it 
to carry objects on the Sabbath 
 
Elyashiv, Rav: Rabbi Yosef Shalom Elyshaiv (ca. 1910-2012), an Ashkenazi rabbi, leader 
and rabbinical authority 
 
emunah: faith 
 
Eretz Israel (also Eretz Yisrael): the Land of Israel 
 
erev chag, erev Shabbat: the eve of a holy day or Sabbath; holy days begin at sunset. 
 
fressor (Yiddish): 
 
frum (Yiddish): religiously observant; frumkeit is religious observance 
 
gadol hador (lit., great one of the generation): any leading Torah luminary. 
 
galus (also galut): exile 
 
gashmius (also gashmiut): worldliness 
 
Gaza (also ’Aza): coastal territory formerly under Egyptian control, administered by Israel 
from 1967 to 2005, at which time Jewish settlements were evacuated and the area came 
under the Palestinian Authority, then Hamas. 
 
gedarim: fences, enclosures 
 
gedolim (lit., great ones): leading Torah scholars 
 
gemach (pl. gemachim): charitable funds used for non-interest loans and other forms of 
welfare 
 
Gemara: part of the Oral Torah 
 
gemilut chasadim: kind deeds 
 
Ger: one of the notable Hasidic dynasties 
 
goy, pl. goyim (lit. nation, nations): any non-Jewish nation or people; goyish, of or pertaining 
to non-Jewish nations and cultures 
 
Gruzini: someone originating from Gruzia (Georgia, formerly part of the Soviet Union). 
 
Gut Yom Tov (Yiddish): Happy Holy Day 
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Haaretz: the leading liberal (Left) newspaper in Israel 
 
Hadassah: American Jewish women’s Zionist organization founded in 1912 
 
hafganah, pl. hafganot: street demonstration 
 
Haifa: large industrial city located on the coast of northern Israel next to Acre 
 
HaKadosh Baruch Hu (lit., the Holy One, blessed be He): God 
 
halacha (pl. halachot; also Halacha, halakhot): laws of the Jewish legal system 
 
halacha grada: simply the Jewish law, the Jewish law alone 
 
Hamachon Hacharedi: the Haredi Institute 
 
ha-motzi (lit. he who brings forth”): refers to the blessing recited when one eats bread, 
blessing God, “who brings forth bread from the earth.” 
 
Har Nof: a haredi neighborhood in Jerusalem. 
 
Har Sinai: Mount Sinai, the site of the biblical revelation to the ancient Israelites 
 
haredization: the process of becoming more strictly observant of Jewish law and practice in 
neighborhoods whose population is increasingly haredi 
 
HaShabbat. Eifo tihiyi bashabbat? Eich bilit et hashabbat? The Sabbath. Where will you (f) 
be for the Sabbath? How did you (f) spend the Sabbath?  
 
Hashem (lit., the Name): a common way of referring to God, derived from the four-letter 
Name of God in the Torah, which is not pronounced; in Jewish prayers, this name is 
read as “Adonai”; in English Bibles, it is often printed as “LORD.” 
 
Hashkafa: view or perspective  
 
Hasidic, Hasidism, Hasid (lit., “pious”): today refers to the popular spiritual movement that 
arose in 18th-century Eastern Europe, whose founder, Israel Baal Shem Tov, 
emphasized fervent, ecstatic prayer, as opposed to the predominent emphasis on 
scholarship. The movement initially faced bitter opposition. See mitnagdim. 
 
Hasidic Rebbe: the often charismatic leader of any branch of Hasidim, or the descendant of 
the founder of a particular dynasty. The Rebbe is frequently credited with miraculous 
acts or unique spiritual and psychological insight. 
 
hasidische: of, or pertaining to the Hasidim 
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Haturim and Malchei Yisrael: an intersection (in a religious neighborhood) between two 
streets in Jerusalem  
 
hatzlacha: success 
 
Hebrew: 1) a Jew; 2) the language of the Tanakh (Hebrew Bible, Old Testament) and historic 
Jewish literature; re-established in the twentieth century as a modern spoken language 
that is the offical language of the State of Israel. 
 
Hebrish: English spoken with the addition of many Hebrew terms and phrases 
 
hechsher: certification that a food product is kosher and acceptable under Jewish law 
 
Herzl, Theodor (1860–1904): Viennese journalist who founded the World Zionist 
Organization 
 
Hesder yeshiva: a post-high school institution for Torah study in which the participants also 
serve in the IDF. 
 
Hidabroot: a dialogue 
 
hilkhot shavuot: regulations of Jewish law for the observance of the holy day of Shavuot 
(Pentecost) 
 
hilkhot sukka: regulations of Jewish law concerning the erection of a sukkah and the 
observance of the week-long holiday 
 
hiloni (pl. hilonim; also chilonim): secular Jews, that is, those who do not fully observe 
Jewish law and ritual practice 
 
Hirsch, Rabbi Shimshon Raphael (1808–1888): prominent figure of 19th-century German 
Orthodoxy and commentator. He is often considered the founder of Modern Orthodoxy. 
 
hishtadlut (also hishtadlus): intercession 
 
Histadrut (HaHistadrut haklalit shel HaOvdim be’Eretz Yisrael, General Federation of 
Laborers in the Land of Israel): organization of trades unions, founded in 1920 under the 
British Mandate. 
 
ikar: the main point, especially of an argument 
 
Intifada (Arabic, “casting off”): either of the two periods of terror attacks initiated by the 
Palestinians, 1987–1993 and 2000–2005. 
 
Ir Hakodesh (lit., Holy City): Jerusalem 
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Iriyat Yerushalayim: the Jerusalem city governing board and its attendant bureaucracy 
 
Issur: forbidden under Jewish law or a prohibition under Jewish law 
 
Issur v’heter: forbidden, but for which one may receive a loosening or leniency (heter) of the 
Halacha in order to perform an act.  
 
Iyar: the eighth month of the Hebrew lunar calendar, corresponding to April–May. 
 
Kaddish: an important prayer praising God which is recited with a minyan as part of the 
Jewish daily prayers. It is also recited for the dead, hence it is also sometimes called the 
mourners’ prayer. 
 
kadosh: holy 
 
Karo (or Caro), Rabbi Joseph (1488–1575): Spanish rabbi and codifier of Jewish Law, who 
eventually settled in Palestine and is buried in Safed. 
 
kashrut (also kashrus): pertaining to the requirements of Jewish law regarding foods. It 
includes rules concerning the humane slaughter of permitted animals; the prohibition of 
certain animals, birds, fish, and other creatures; and a strict prohibition on mixing meat 
and milk products or utensils used for them. See also hechsher, shochet, and mashgiach. 
 
Katamon: a neighborhood of Jerusalem 
 
kavod: respect 
 
kedushah: holiness; see also kadosh 
 
kibbutz (pl. kibbutzim): a type of communal, mainly agricultural, settlement developed in the 
late nineteenth century in which members work in communally-owned businesses and 
share profits equally. 
 
Kiddush: the blessing made over wine and/or bread at the beginning of and during the 
Sabbath and Holy Days; can refer to other types of blessings, for example, kiddush 
levana, a blessing on the New Moon. 
 
kiddush hachodesh: a ritual of blessing the beginning of each Hebrew lunar month. The time 
of the arrival the coming Hebrew month is announced during the Sabbath synagogue 
prayers. 
 
kiddush Hashem (lit., sanctification of the Name): often used to refer to martyrdom of Jews 
attacked by non-Jews. 
 
kippa (also kippah): the head covering worn by observant Jewish men; also called yarmulke 
(Yiddish). 
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kippah serugah: a type of crocheted head covering used by some Jewish men; it often 
identifies them as modern Orthodox or from a Zionist community 
 
kiruv: outreach; the effort by many synagogues and organizations to encourage Jews to 
become more knowledgeable and observant of Judaism. 
 
Kiryat Hayovel: a neighborhood of Jerusalem 
 
kivyachol: so to speak, as it were, hypothetically 
 
kizvat yeladim: a type of welfare payment for child support made through the National 
Insurance Institute. See Bituach Leumi. 
 
Klal Yisrael (lit., all Israel): the Jewish community as a whole 
 
Klausenberger: member of the Hasidic sect Sanz-Klausenberg that originated in Cluj-
Napoca, Romania. Rabbi Yekusiel Yehudah Halberstam (1927–1994) was head of the 
movement, which has centres in Boro Park, New York; Kiryat Sanz, Netanya Israel; 
Jerusalem, and other places. 
 
Knesset (lit. assembly): the Israeli parliament 
 
kochi v’otzem yadi: (from Deuteronomy 8:17) My strength and power. 
 
kol hakavod (lit., all honor [to you]): a phrase praising someone for an action. 
 
kollel: an organization for advanced Torah study; often for married men, often providing a 
small stipend 
 
Kook, Rav Abraham Isaac (1865–1935): First Chief Rabbi of Palestine appointed by the 
British. A noted scholar, poet, mystic and philosopher, he was an ardent supporter of the 
Jews’ return to settle in the Land of Israel 
 
kosher: suitable for Jews to eat. See also kashrut, hechsher, mashgiach 
 
Kotel (also Kotel Hamaaravi, Western Wall, Wailing Wall): the Herodian retaining wall of 
the Temple Mount; Jews gather to pray in the large plaza by this wall. 
 
Kupat Cholim: generally, any health maintenance organization, but mainly it refers to Kupat 
Cholim Klali, one the earliest of these organizations. 
 
Lau, Rabbi Yisrael Meir (1937– ): Polish-born rabbi and Holocaust survivor who was elected 
Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi in 1993. 
 
lechatchila: from the beginning 
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lein (Yiddish, to read): the formal reading of the Torah or other biblical texts, using the 
system of tropes and chant 
 
leshem shamayim (lit., in the name of heaven): for the sake of heaven 
 
Leumi (lit., national) 
 
Lihiyot am chofshi b’artzenu: “to be a free people in our land” 
 
limudei chol: secular studies, including mathematics, science, literature, etc.; non-Torah 
learning 
 
limudei kodesh (lit., holy studies): Jewish studies, including Torah, Tanakh, Jewish law, 
ethics, etc. 
 
Litvish (Yiddish, lit. “Lituanian”): refers historically to those who followed the Torah 
scholars based in the great yeshivot of Lithuania, especially in Vilna. It also refers to 
non-hasidic rabbis and schools of thought; many of the earliest opponents of the hasidic 
movement were from the Lithuanian yeshivot. 
 
luach: tablet; can refer to a bulletin board, a timetable, or the tablet of the Ten 
Commandments 
 
Lubavitch: another name for the Chabad hasidim. See Chabad. 
 
Luchot ha’Brit (lit., tablets of the Covenant; also shnei luchot habrit, two tablets of the 
Covenant): tablets of the Ten Commandments, especially as a decorative element in 
synagogues 
 
Maccabi: one of the major health maintenance organizations in Israel; the Hasmoneans who 
opposed the rule of Antiochus Epiphanes; sports teams (basketball) of that name 
 
machmir: strict 
 
Machon Gold: a women's seminary and yeshiva Jerusalem. 
 
Machon Lev: a Jerusalem yeshiva and high technology school 
 
macrocosm: the entire world or universe 
 
Malha: a neighborhood in Jerusalem; can also refer to a large mall in Jerusalem 
 
mamash: really 
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mamzer, pl. mamzerim, commonly, a bastard. In Jewish law it refers only to someone born of 
an incestuous or adulterous relationship. A known mamzer can never be counted as a 
Jew and can only marry a woman who is also a mamzera. 
 
mamzerut: the condition of being a mamzer 
 
mas hakhnasah: income tax 
 
mashgiach (pl. mashgichim): a kashrut inspector. Restaurants, hotels, educational 
institutions, the army, and food manufacturers employ mashgichim to certify that food 
and equipment meet the requirements of kashrut. 
 
Mashiach (also Moshiach): the Messiah 
 
Masorati (also, mesorati, lit. traditional): the Conservative movement in Israel 
 
mat’im: suitable, compatible 
 
mazal tov (lit. a good star):, 1) the exclamation on hearing about a joyful event, such as 
future marriage, birth of a baby, success of any sort. It can also be used as a noun to 
signify any happy event. 
 
Mea Shearim (also Meah She’arim; lit. one hundred gates): Jerusalem neighborhood founded 
outside the Old City in the nineteenth century; it is home to ultra-Orthodox Jews, 
including sects that do not recognize the State of Israel. 
 
mechalel Shabbos: deeds that break the sanctity of the Sabbath 
 
medina (also medinah): a state 
 
Medinat Yisrael: the State of Israel 
 
mehadrin: kosher according to the strictest standards, usually referring to food products 
 
meikil: (Hebrew and Yiddish) lenient 
 
merakezet: secretary, manager 
 
mercaz kehilati: community centre 
 
mesorah: tradition. See Masorati movement. 
 
meyased: founder 
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mezuzah, pl. mezuzot: small containers placed on the doorposts of Jewish homes that contain 
a parchment with bibical verses, including Sh’ma Yisrael, the Jewish statement of belief 
in one God. 
 
microcosm: a small system that is analogous to a larger system 
 
midbar: wilderness or desert 
 
Midrash: part of the Oral Torah, including stories and interpretations of the biblical text. 
 
miktzo’i: professional 
 
minhagim: customs. Various Jewish subgroups have particular customs which are recognized 
as valid for those communities, but not, strictly speaking, part of Jewish Law applicable 
to all communities. An example is the custom of Sephardi Jews to eat rice during the 
Passover holiday, which Ashkenazi Jews do not permit. 
 
Misrad Hapnim: Israeli Ministry of the Interior, which oversees citizenship, and provides 
identity cards, passports, and visas, among other services. 
 
mitnagdim (opponents): those who opposed the Hasidic movement.  
 
mitzva (also mitzvah, pl. mitzvot, mitzvoth, mitzvos): biblical commandments; sometimes 
used in the sense of a “good deed,” as in “it’s a mitzva to visit the sick.” 
 
Mizrahi: (also Mizrachi; lit. eastern or Oriental): 1) refers to Jews from mainly Arabic-
speaking areas, such as North Africa, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, etc. 2) a religious Zionist 
movement founded in 1902 aiming to recruit Orthodox Jews to the Zionist cause 
 
Modern Orthodox: a broad-spectrum movement that encourages Orthodox Jews to observe 
Jewish law and practices, while integrating into the modern world. This is in contrast to 
the ultra-Orthodox and Hasidic sects who tend to remain outside the mainstream. 
 
Modi’in Illit: an ultra-Orthodox city in central Israel, also known as “Kiryat Sefer.” 
 
morah de’asra: (Aramaic, lit. the master of the city) the main leader, which is used to refer to 
the main leader or rabbi 
 
Moshe Rabbenu (lit. Moses our Teacher): Moses, the traditional author of the Torah 
 
mossad (lit. institution ): any organization, but with a capital M refers to the external Israeli 
intelligence service. 
 
Nachal Charedi: an army combat unit that incorporates ultra-Orthodox men. 
 
Nahalat Shiv’a: a neighborhood of Jerusalem 
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Ner Yisroel: (lit. the light of Israel) can also refer to a large yeshiva movement 
 
neshamah: soul 
 
Netanyahu, Binyamin, (1949– ), Israeli politician, twice prime minister of Israel representing 
the Likud Party. 
 
Neturei Karta (lit. guardians of the wall): an ultra-Orthodox sect that does not recognize the 
State of Israel, has “diplomatic” relations with the Palestinian Authority, and whose 
members are sometimes seen in demonstrations worldwide against the State of Israel. 
 
noch a mol (Yiddish): again, another time 
 
Olam chesed yibaneh: deeds that in their merit, the world exists; a kind world will be built 
 
Olam HaZeh (lit. this world), the world, our times 
 
Old City: the historic centre of Jerusalem within the ancient walls 
 
olim: derived from aliya, refers to those who have immigrated to Israel. 
 
Oral Torah: Traditional body of literature of equal weight with the Tanakh. Includes the 
Mishnah, Gemara, and Midrash. 
 
Orthodox: Jews who follow Jewish law and practice, at varying degrees of strictness, but 
certainly including Sabbath observance, kashrut, and Halacha. 
 
otzar (lit. treasure, treasury) 
 
parashah: a portion of the Torah, which is divided into 54 segments with one or two being 
formally read during the synagogue service on Sabbaths, Holy Days, and on Mondays 
and Thursdays. 
 
parnassa (also parnassah): livelihood, earning a living 
 
pasken: to give a halakhic ruling; see posek, poskei hador 
 
pasuk: a verse of the Bible 
 
Pat b’melach tochel v’mayim b’msurah tishteh v’al ha’aretz tishan: (Ethics of the Fathers 
(Avot) 6:4) Eat bread with salt, drink water sparingly, and sleep on the land. A directive 
to live in moderation and not to excess. 
 
Pesach: Passover, the spring holiday commemorating the exodus from Egypt, during which 
no leavened products are eaten 
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Pindrus, Yitzchak: Haredi Jerusalem City Council member representing the Degel HaTorah 
party. 
 
 
Pirkei Avot (lit. chapters of the fathers): a tractate of the Mishneh containing succinct sayings 
on ethics and morals. 
 
Porat Yosef Torah: a Sephardic yeshiva in Jerusalem 
 
poskei hador: rabbis considered the greatest of a generation in deciding halakhic matters. 
 
posek: a rabbi qualified to decide halakhic questions 
 
protektzia: a Russian term indicating “protection” or special consideration, for example, in 
hiring, or in dealing with the bureaucracy 
 
psak: a halakhic decision, also psak Halacha 
 
Purim: the spring holiday that recalls the story of the bibical Esther who rescued the Jews of 
Persia from the machinations of Haman. Holiday observances include hearing the 
reading of the Book of Esther, wearing costumes, and drinking. 
 
rabbanim (also rabbonim, rebbeim): rabbis 
 
Rabbanut: the rabbinate of Israel 
 
Rabbanut HaTzva’i: the rabbinate for the IDF 
 
rabbinic authority 
 
Rabbinic Judaism: post-Exilic Judaism, particularly as it developed in late Roman times, 
becoming the normative Orthodox Judaism of today 
 
rachmanim: those who are merciful 
 
Ramat Beit Shemesh: town in central Israel 
 
Rambam: Acronym for Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon (d. 1204), the most prominent Spanish 
rabbi, philosopher, physician, and legal authority of the middle ages. 
 
rav: rabbi 
 
Rav HaRashi (also Rav Hareishi): the chief rabbi 
 
Rechov Malchei Yisrael: a thoroughfare in Jerusalem 
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Rema (also Remuh): Rabbi Moshe ben Israel Isserles (ca. 1520–1572), a noted halakhic 
authority, and founder of a major yeshiva. His synagogue and grave can be visited in 
Kraków. 
 
resha’im: evildoers 
 
Rosh Hashanah (lit. head of the year): the Jewish New Year, which occurs in the fall 
(September–October), and ushers in the ten-day period of repentence and self-
examination that ends on Yom Kippur. 
 
ruchnius, (also ruchniyus, ruchniyot), spirituality, especially joyful spirituality 
 
Sabbath (also Shabbat): the seventh day of the week, on which religious Jews do not work, 
handle money, or do many everyday tasks.  
 
sabbatical: refers to the seventh year, in which crops are not planted or harvested. Called 
shemittah in Hebrew. 
 
sabra: a type of cactus with a sweet edible fruit. Used to refer to Israelis who were 
supposedly tough on the outside, but sweet in the inside. 
 
Safra Square: the plaza in front of the Jerusalem Municipality building 
 
Sanhedria: an ultra-Orthodox neighborhood of Jerusalem; the tombs of members of the 
Sanhedrin are in this neighborhood. 
 
Sanhedrin: a governing body for Jewish life, especially as it was set up during Roman rule.  
 
Schneller: an army base and historic compound located in a religious neighborhood in 
Jerusalem 
 
secular Jews: see chilonim, hilonim 
 
Sefer Torah: the specially-prepared text of the Torah on parchment, read during the 
synagogue services on Sabbaths, Holy Days, Mondays and Thursdays. 
 
se’if: article, clause, or paragraph of a document 
 
Sephardi (of or pertaining to Spain [Sepharad]): one of the main cultural branches of 
Judaism; Jews of Spanish heritage, with particular customs and halakhic principles. 
Because of the expulsion of Jews from Spain either during Muslim times or under 
Christian rulers in 1492, Sephardi Jews are found throughout the world. 
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Sha’ar Shechem (Shechem Gate): one of the gates in the Old City walls of Jerusalem; also 
known as the Damascus Gate. The highway originally leading out of that gate ran 
through Shechem, and went on to Damascus. 
 
Shabak: acronym for Shirut Bitahom Klalit (general security service, GSS, or Shin Bet) the 
Israeli internal intelligence service 
 
Shabbat (also Shabbos, shabbes): the seventh day of the week. Religiously observant Jews do 
not work, shop, handle money, or cook, among other things, on that day. A day of rest, 
relaxation, and joy. 
 
Shach, Rabbi Eliezer (1898–2001):ultra-Orthodox scholar, head of the Ponevezh yeshiva and 
influential in Israeli politics; He formed the Ashkenazi political party Degel HaTorah in 
1988; he is opposed to Zionism. 
 
Shas: Shomrei Torah Sephardim (Sephardi Torah Guardians) a political party for Jews of 
North African and Mizrachi descent which unexpectedly made major gains in Knesset 
representation in 1999. 
 
sheitel (Yiddish): a wig, used by married Orthodox women of some sects to cover their 
natural hair 
 
shekel (also sheqel; lit. weight): the unit of currency used in both ancient and modern Israel 
 
Shira Chadasha (lit., a new song): may also refer to an egalitarian Orthodox synagogue in 
Jerusalem and a corresponding movement 
 
shiryonim: those serving in the armored corps. 
 
shiurim: lessons or lectures, particularly Torah learning 
 
Shiviti Hashem L’negdi Tamid: Psalm 16:8, “I have the Lord continually before me.” 
 
shlep, shlepping (Yiddish): carry, used in the sense of carrying a burden, even a 
psychological burden, for some distance.  
 
shalom bayis (lit. peace in the house; also shalom bayit): a home without strife or argument, 
the maintenance of which is considered a religious duty. Couples in divorce court are 
often required to attend the Shalom Bayit Committee before the court will consider their 
petition for divorce. 
 
Shlomo Hamelech (lit., Shlomo the King): King Solomon, the son of the biblical King David 
 
shmirat Shabbat (lit. guarding or keeping the Sabbath): observing the Sabbath day according 
to Orthodox norms 
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Shmuel Hanavi (lit. the prophet Samuel): 1) the biblical prophet Samuel; 2) a neighborhood 
in Jerusalem; 3) the traditional tomb of the prophet Samuel located on the outskirts of 
Jerusalem 
 
Shoah: another term for the Holocaust 
 
shochet (pl. shochtim): someone qualified to slaughter animals according the rules 
concerning kashrut. Shechitah is the practice of slaughtering according to Jewish law. 
 
shofar: the ram’s horn, used in biblical times to call men together for battle or public events; 
today used as a call to repentence and prayer during the month of Elul and the High 
Holy Day period (Rosh Hashana to Yom Kippur). 
 
shtadlan: intercessor 
 
shtadlanut: intercession, pleading, lobbying 
 
shtetl (Yiddish): a village, mostly associated with villages of Eastern Europe, some of which 
had a Jewish majority up to the period of World War II. 
 
shtreimel (Yiddish): the elegant flat fur hats worn mainly by Hasidic Jews on holy days and 
special occasions. 
 
shul (Yiddish): a synagogue 
 
Shulchan Aruch (lit., prepared table): the compendium of authoritative Jewish Law published 
by Rabbi Joseph Karo in 1565 CE. 
 
Shushan: the capital of Persia in which the Purim story takes place. 
 
simcha (pl. simchot, simchas): joy; it loosely refers to any joyous occasion of a Jewish 
nature, such as weddings, brit milah,  
 
Simchat Beit Hashoeivah: During the existence of the Temple in Jerusalem, there was a 
special drawing of water from the Shiloach spring which was poured over the altar 
during the festival of Sukkot, an occasion of great joy. A remembrance of this ceremony 
is celebrated by some Hasidic sects. 
 
sinat chinam: baseless hatred, traditionally one of the spiritual causes that led to the 
destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem 
 
Slonim Hasidim: a Hasidic dynasty originating in Slonim, Belarus in the early 19th century. 
There are two branches of the dynasty in Israel; virtually all of the Eastern European 
Slonimer hasidim were murdered in the Holocaust. 
 
Soloveitchik, Rabbi Joseph Dov (1903–1992): leading U.S. rabbinic scholar and philosopher. 
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sukka (also sukkah): the temporary dwelling erected for the 7-day feast of Sukkoth, 
reminding Jews of their wanderings in the wilderness after the Exodus from Egypt.  
 
Sukkot: the fall holiday lasting eight days, commemorating the wanderings of the Jews in the 
desert 
 
Tachanun: plea, supplication; part of the Jewish daily prayers 
 
Tachlis (Hebrew/Yiddish): straight to the point, the essence of the matter 
 
Tal Law: a law passed by the Israeli Knesset in 2002 (and which will expire in July 2012 
unless extended by the Knesset) which allowed ultra-Orthodox men to serve a shortened 
term in the IDF. The law remains controversial, although it has had some success in 
bringing about increased ultra-Orthodox enlistment. 
 
Talmid chacham (lit. wise student): any prominent yeshiva student 
 
Talmud: the “Oral Torah” that consists of Midrash, Mishna, and Gemara, which originated as 
oral discussions and was recorded under the authority of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in the 
fifth century, CE. Two versions exist, the Babylonian and Jerusalem (the latter was 
completed in the fourth century). 
 
talmudei Torah: Orthodox grade school system that emphasizes Torah learning alongside 
mandatory secular subjects. 
 
talmudic: of, or pertaining to the Talmud; can loosely refer to a type of logic that is 
convoluted and focussed on detail 
 
Tanach (also Tanakh): the Hebrew Scriptures or Bible. The acronym stands for Torah (the 
five books of Moses); Nevi’im (the prophets); and ketuvim (the writings, including 
Psalms, Proverbs, and other books). In Christian Bibles, the Tanakh is called the Old 
Testament, and the books are printed in an order differing from the Hebrew Scriptures. 
 
Tartarean: Literary term of or relating to Tartarus; infernal; from to Greek Mythology, the 
abysmal regions below Hades where the Titans were confined. (Merriam-Webster, 
Merriam-Webster, et al., p. 439 1984) 
 
Teddy Kollek, the legendary mayor of Jerusalem, who was responsible for much of its 
development and good relations between its residents 
 
tefillin: phylacteries; small black leather boxes with long straps that are tied onto the forehead 
and usually the left arm by Jewish men during prayer. The boxes contain specific verses 
from the Torah, and the practice derives from the biblical commandment (Exodus 11-
16). 
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Tehillim: the book of Psalms 
 
Teimani (also Temani), Yemenite Jew 
 
Tel Aviv, Israel’s largest city located on the Mediterranean coast next to Jaffa.  
 
tfassim: lit. forms 
 
theocracies: governments based on religious law. 
 
Torah: 1) the five books of Moses in the Bible (Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, 
Deuteronomy); 2) the way of life practiced by Jews, encompassing the laws and 
philosophy derived from the Torah 
 
Torah im Derech Eretz:  
 
Torah sheba’al peh (lit. oral Torah): see Talmud 
 
torasam umanusam (also Toratam Omanutam) (lit. Torah is their vocation); “It describes the 
ideal of the contemporary ultra-Orthodox: Learning is seen as a calling to be pursued 
singlemindedly by all (males, that is)”. (Efron, 2003, p.62) 
 
tov me’od: very good 
 
treif (Yiddish): food that is unsuitable for use by Jews. Can also refer to anything that is 
forbidden or contrary to Jewish practice, or meat from animals that are kosher, but have 
not been slaughtered according to Jewish Law. 
 
tshuva (lit. returning): 1) returning to religious practice, in the sense of repentance; 2) a 
response to a question. 
 
tsnius (also tzniut), modesty; often it refers to dressing in modest clothing, including married 
women covering their hair 
 
tumah: “unclean” in the biblical sense of a taboo, restricting one from associating with holy 
places, activities, meals, and sacred objects. Certain vessels or houses can also become 
tameh (unclean). In most cases, the condition is time-limited and is eliminated 
afterwards by ritual bathing in a mikveh. Being “unclean” is not related to sin.  
 
tzad ha’shaveh (lit. an equal side)  
 
tzadikim: the righteous; can also refer to Jewish sages of old 
 
Tzahal: abbreviation for Tzevah Haganah L’Israel, Israel Defense Forces, IDF 
 
tzanhanim (Hebrew): the paratroops of the IDF 
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tzanua: modesty. See tzniut. 
 
tzedaka (lit. righteousness): in common use, it refers to any charity, or the giving of 
charitable donations 
 
ultra-Orthodox: Jews who are exceptionally strict in their observance of Jewish law. Because 
of this they often self-segregate 
 
u’malah ha’aretz de’at Hashem k’mayim layam m’chasim (Isaiah 11:9): The land will be 
filled with knowledge of God just as the ocean is filled with water.  
 
u’mitzvot: and commandments (good deeds)  
 
Upsherin (Yiddish): the joyful ceremony of giving a three-year-old boy his first haircut. 
 
Via Dolorosa: a short route in the Old City of Jerusalem that traces the path of Jesus from his 
condemnation by Pilate to his crucifixion. The fourteen “stations” were developed in the 
Middle Ages by Christian pilgrims. 
 
Weltanschauung (German): worldview 
 
Yad Sarah: a charitable organization that makes medical equipment available on loan. 
 
Yafo (also Yaffo): the ancient port of Jaffa, now part of the Tel Aviv-Jaffa Municipality. 
 
Yahadut: Judaism 
 
yarmulke (Yiddish): a skullcap worn by Jewish men. See kippa. 
 
yatzah secharo behefsedo: (Hebrew idiom) he lost more than he gained. 
 
Yemenite: a Jew from Yemen; see Temani 
 
yemot HaMashiach: the days of the Messiah 
 
Yerushalayim (Hebrew): Jerusalem 
 
Yerushalmi-Charedi: ultra-Orthodox Jerusalemite  
 
yeshiva (pl. yeshivot): an institution of Jewish learning. Can include all levels from grade 
school through advanced postgraduate studies. yeshivish of or pertaining to the yeshiva 
lifestyle and ways of thinking. 
 
Yid (pl. Yidden; slang) a Jew 
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Yiddish: a language based on medieval German and Hebrew, used throughout the Ashkenazi 
Jewish world. Today it includes loan words from many languages of countries where 
Jewish communities thrived. Among some ultra-Orthodox Jews, Yiddish is the language 
of everyday discourse, Hebrew being reserved for prayer and Torah study. The vibrant 
Yiddish culture in prewar Eastern Europe included secular literature, plays, film, music, 
and journalism. 
 
Yiddishkeit (Yiddish): all of Jewish culture, including religious observance. 
 
yirat shamayim (also yirat shomayim) “fear(or awe) of heaven”; yirei shomayim those who 
fear or are in awe of heaven; those who try to attain holiness in their daily lives. 
 
Yitzchak (also Yitzhak): the son of Abraham and Sarah. 
 
Yizkor (lit. will remember): the anniversary of a death; the ritual prayers of remembrance; 
the synagogue service with a minyan to say kaddish for the departed. 
 
Yom Ha’atzmaut: Israel’s Independence Day, May 14–15, 1948 (5 Iyar in the Jewish 
calendar). 
 
Yom Rishon (lit. first day), Sunday 
 
yom rishon, yom sheni (lit. first day, second day): Sunday, Monday  
 
Yom Tov (lit. good day), a Holy Day 
 
Yosef, Rabbi Ovadia (1920–): noted Iraqi-born halakhic scholar and former Sephardi Chief 
Rabbi of Israel (elected in 1973), and spiritual head of the Shas political party. He has 
been called “Posek haDor” and “Gadol haDor.” 
 
zeide (Yiddish), grandfather 
 
Zionist: one who believes in the reestablishment of the Jewish people in historic Palestine. 
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